cbrn attack - an overview(final)

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CBRN Emergency Management :

CBRN Emergency Management Specialised Training Courses on

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Emergency Management :

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN ) Emergency Management Insp. Vinod Chaudhary BIDR , BSF Academy

What is CBRN?:

What is CBRN? CBRN is an acronym referring to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear The term is commonly used worldwide, referring to incidents and weapons in which any of these 4 hazards have presented themselves Low- probability but High- impact Threats

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Major CBRN Incidents in the world

The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima & Nagasaki :

The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima & Nagasaki Hiroshima Nagasaki Pre-raid population 2,55,000 1,95,000 Dead 66,000 39,000 Injured 69,000 25,000 Total Casualties 1,35,000 64,000 Estimates of Casualties

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Hiroshima AFTER Attack NAGASAKI After Attack

Halabja massacre (Bloody Friday):

Halabja massacre (Bloody Friday) The Halabja poison gas attack , was an act of genocide massacre against the Kurdish people by the Iraqi government forces at the Kurdish town of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan during the closing days of the Iran–Iraq War The attack killed between 3,200 and 5,000 people, and injured around 7,000 to 10,000 more, most of them civilians; thousands more died of complications, diseases, and congenital malformations in the years after the attack

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Sarin Attack @ Matsumoto Sarin gas released on June 27/ 28, 1994 using 4 special vehicles. The gas was mixed using a computer controlled system & dispersed by fans The cloud of sarin floated toward private homes, an apartment complex and a dormitory. The dormitory housed three judges hearing a lawsuit in a case against Aum . Within minutes seven people ( including two of the judges ) were dead. ~ 600 hospitalized, nearly half of whom needed to treatment overnight. EMS personnel exposed caring for victims The Cult and the End of the World (Crown, 1996); D.W. Brackett, Holy Terrors: Armageddon in Tokyo (Weatherhill, 1996,Helen Hardacre, 1996, “Aum Shinrikyo and the Japanese Media,” Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper no. 19.

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Tokyo: March 20, 1995 >5000-6000 exposed 12 deaths: 9 at scene, 1 on arrival at hospital, 2 delayed (hypoxic brain) 17 patients admitted to ICU 640 persons presented in Hospitals; 493 admitted (41 hospitals), most discharged within 48 hours 3227 presented to EDs (worried well) One of the deadliest terrorist attacks in history - a coordinated series of gassings

2001 Anthrax Attacks:

2001 Anthrax Attacks Occurred over the course of several weeks beginning on Tuesday, September 18, 2001 Letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media offices and two Democratic U.S. Senators, killing five people and infecting 17 others. Bruce Edwards Ivins is an extremely sensitive suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks July 27, 2008

Assassination Umbrella 7 September 1978:

Assassination Umbrella 7 September 1978 Designed to infect a target with a toxic pellet of Ricin Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, a BBC World Service journalist and a strong critic of the communist regime, was killed in London when he was injected with ricin while he waited at a bus stop By evening Markov had developed a high fever and he died three days later.

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Aum Shinrikyo cult deploy botulin toxin aerosol 3 times 1990-1995 1993 Aum Shinrikyo cult experiment with anthrax spores 1993 Aum Shinrikyo cult visit Zaire to obtain Ebola virus

Indian outbreaks natural or suspected? :

Indian outbreaks natural or suspected? 1994 Epidemic 693 suspected bubonic or pneumonic Plague 52 deaths; 4 lakh fled

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Mr. Alexander Valterovich Litvinenko a former KGB officer turned Kremlin critic , received political asylum in the United Kingdom, was working for MI6 and MI5 Wrote two books, Blowing up Russia: Terror from within and Lubyanka Criminal Group 1 November 2006 - suddenly fell ill; hospitalized 23 Nov 2006 - died of radiation sickness He was killed by a "little, tiny nuclear bomb, so small that you couldn't see it.'‘ - Walter Litvinenko Radiotargeted stealth assassination ‘ FIRST ’ confirmed victim of lethal Po-210 induced

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After entering the bloodstream, Po -210 goes predominantly to the liver and kidneys along with the bone marrow initially admitted to hospital with severe diarrhoea and vomiting. His hair later fell out and his skin turned yellow, indicating liver problems before his death Polonium-210 can be rendered tasteless in a solution as a citrate, nitrate or other salt, making it easy to slip into a drink undetected. It also emits short-range alpha radiation, which cannot be picked up by airport scanners, making it very easy to smuggle into a country. One gram of polonium is sufficient to kill a human being. Seven members of the bar tested positive Italian contact Mr. Mario Scaramella Marina Lugovoi and Kovtun

ORPHAN SOURCES:

Lack adequate regulatory control, sufficient accountability, and proper disposal ORPHAN SOURCES

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THE RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT IN GOIANIA Area of contamination: 4 000 000 m 2 249 contaminated ( 137 Cs ) persons , 129 with internal contamination , 4 deaths Misuse of a strongly radioactive medical teletherapy source not under radiation protection surveillance . Caesium chloride salt

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Lack adequate regulatory control, sufficient accountability, and proper disposal In April 2010, the radiological accident was reported in Mayapuri , Delhi. A gamma irradiator GC220(Gamma Cell produced in 1968 by AEC in Canada with activity of ~3680Ci) no longer in use since 1985 in a chemistry laboratory at Delhi University was auctioned on a scrap market of Mayapuri on 26 Feb 2010. There were total sixteen number of Co-60 pencils in the Gamma Cell. Each pencil had seven slugs of the radioactive source. The total activity of the radioactive source at the time of accident was:  14 Ci Radiation level at 1 cm from unshielded single pencil 75 Gy /h Consequences: 1 fatality, 7 injuries Mayapuri Radiological Accident

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Lessons Learnt Awareness at community level is necessary to develop a state of alertness Necessary training of various first responders is necessary Necessary precautions and Dos and Don’ts should be available Indicators for identification of such emergencies by health and non-health responders

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Accident at the Chernobyl (Ukraine) nuclear power station in the Soviet Union, the worst in the history of nuclear power generation 26-04-1986 CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT

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CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT Iodine-131 (Half-life = 8 days) Cesium-137 (Half-life=30 years) Strontium-90 (Half-life=29 years) 1,35,000 people evacuated from an area (r= 30 km) Total number of the resettled persons >1,50,000

Slide25:

The accident happened during testing of turbine generator during a normal scheduled shutdown of the Unit 4 reactor Safety systems were deliberately switched off The reactor had to be powered down to 25 % of it’s capacity, this procedure did not occur and the reactor power fell to less than 1% HOW THIS HAPPENED??

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HOW THIS HAPPENED? 135 000 people had to be evacuated from an area within a radius of 30 km. The radioactive contamination exceeded by one hundred times that of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki According to data from the Chornobyl Union of Ukraine, over 600,000 people have died in the 20 years since the Accident Some 2,293 villages with a population of approximately 2.6 million were contaminated and, overall, more than 250,000 people were resettled

Slide27:

Triple Disasters in Japan – Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear A series of ongoing equipment failures and releases of radioactive materials The plant comprises six separate boiling water reactors maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) In a 20-km radius around Fukushima Daiichi an estimated 110,000 people have been evacuated. In a 10-km radius around Fukushima Daini about 30,000 people have been evacuated

Syria Crisis:

Syria Crisis Syria is suspected of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare (CW) capabilities in the Middle East. The country's initial CW capability was provided by Egypt prior to the October 1973 war against Israel. Since then, Syria appears to have acquired an indigenous capability to develop and produce chemical weapons agents, including mustard gas and  sarin, and possibly also VX nerve agent. Chemical weapons agents have allegedly been produced at facilities located near the Cerin, Hama, Homs, Latakia, Palmyra and Al-Safir.

Slide29:

The destructive power of a nuclear weapon comes from the blast (pressure shock wave), thermal radiation (heat), and nuclear radiation (prompt and delayed). China France India Israel North Korea Pakistan Russia United Kingdom  United States

CBRN Terrorism: Official view:

CBRN Terrorism: Official view The likelihood of acquiring CBRN agents is improbable…; we have adequate safeguards in place.. The terrorists just can’t gain access to CBRN agents…. An accident just can’t occur in a nuclear reactor…..or otherwise.

Slide31:

CBRN Terrorism….. a Horror/Hype/Myth/.. or a stern Reality? Terrorists potentially have a wide range of available weapons (ranging from very simple to exceedingly complex) Conventional explosives / weapons Chemical Weapon Agents (warfare and industrial), e.g., Sarin attack in Japan and Chlorine Tanker explosions in Iraq war Biological Weapons including pathogens and toxins, e.g., Anthrax and Ricin toxin Nuclear and Radiological agents, e.g., Dirty bomb, Improvised Nuclear devices

Threat perceptions:

Threat perceptions CBRN is an imperative threat There is a persistent threat from a variety of CBRN agents that can be used to kill or incapacitate the military / paramilitary forces and the undefended civilian targets

Threat Scenarios:

Threat Scenarios Overt attack (Foreign State Actors, Mumbai Style, State- sponsered ..) Non-State Actors getting possession of NBC warhead and delivery systems (Global terror, illicit arms trade, proxy wars, deteriorating state solvency, rogue scientists) CBRN Terrorism (Dirty Bomb, .., ..) Accidents during production, handling and Storages Threats take on a variety of forms and functions

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CBRN PROSPECTS LIKELY SCENARIOS Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Toxic Release/Liberation of chemicals; Emission of gases; Oil spill Use of Chemical Warfare Agents Chemical Poisoning Bio-warfare or Liberation of organism leading to Infectious diseases Nuclear holocaust Satellite disaster Accidents involving chemicals at MAH Units External threats/sabotage (security) Bio-security Atomic Energy Plant emergencies Nuclear Security Reckless handling of TIC/TIM during production, storage and transportation (Including Pipelines) Reckless handling of toxic biological agent Reckless handling of TRMs Incidents involving toxic Chemical waste Biological / biochemical waste Nuclear waste CHEMICAL TERRORISM Bioterrorism RADIOL. TERRORISM Agro-terrorism EPIDEMICS/PANDEMICS

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Mass transportation State/residential buildings Airports & Harbors Malls & Shopping streets Hospitals Assets TICs Chemical warfare agents Chemical accidents Infrastructure Communication Water & Sewage Hotels & Resorts Cultural facilities EMP* * E lectro M agnetic P ulse CBRN THREATS – Likely Targets Mass Congregations Biological warfare agents Epidemics Pandemics New emerging diseases Dirty bomb Nuclear weapon Nuclear accident

Vulnerability assessment:

Vulnerability assessment Phenomenon of terrorism is ubiquitous in India We are surrounded by many unstable nations and have an active presence of many non-state entities from the subcontinent Chinese threats; LTTE; Pakistan & Myanmar emerging as a rogue country Nonproliferation challenges posed by Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea , and Syria Virtually all CBRN weapon states have deep strike capability

CBRN Threats and Vulnerabilities:

CBRN Threats and Vulnerabilities Indian armed forces and other responders faces potential CBRN Threats Movement, communication and even a simplest soldier task becomes vastly complicated and difficult in an CBRN environment Vulnerabilities Unwarned military or paramilitary forces Unprotected military or paramilitary forces National Assets Physical infrastructure Civilian population

Slide38:

Impact on Resources Psychological vulnerability and Neuropsychological Sequel Fear of unknown Fleeing of affected community Exponential spread of disease victims Crowding of hospitals by people believing themselves to be ill Hoardings Decreased efficiency of system Collapse of civil disorder and essential services …feeling of Powerlessness DEPLETION OF RESOURCES Worst case scenario is much more threatening

CBRN Disaster Management:

CBRN Disaster Management Management of mass casualty incidences due to covert attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents or man-made accidents involving them, needs Overall Preparedness and Risk Reduction at all levels, including Contingency Planning and Capacity Development for an Efficient Response

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provided we are PREPARED, EQUIPPED & TRAINED for the same Days after Days without slightest relaxation Mitigation of CBRN Emergency is Easy

National Vision for Management of CBRN Emergencies:

National Vision for Management of CBRN Emergencies To prevent CBRN events CBRN

Prevention :

Prevention • Reduce Vulnerabilities • Understand behavior of hazards • Reduce the possibility for exposure • Increase / Improve Readiness (Capacity, Capability, Efficiency, Effectiveness) • Mitigate the impact of hazards By managing risk, we may prevent disasters HOW?

Preventive measures:

Preventive measures Contingency plans and CBRN preparedness First response strategies Special Forces training measures and equipment Cooperation and management between the military, NDRF, Fire Services and local police forces

National Vision for Management of CBRN Emergencies:

National Vision for Management of CBRN Emergencies History repeats itself as we don't learn from it. Many big mishaps have apparently small causes behind, which are likely to be wrong overlooked. Something may go in spite of best system.

National Vision for Management of CBRN Emergencies:

National Vision for Management of CBRN Emergencies In the event of occurrence of CBRN Emergencies, various stakeholder shall under take certain pre-planned and established Structural and Non-structural measures so as to minimize risks to health, life and environment

Consequence Management:

Consequence Management PROTECTION DETECTION RESUSCITATION DECONTAMINATION DECORPORATION MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

Slide47:

CBRN DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS: DRDO’s CONTRIBUTIONS Formulation of SOPs for CBRN eventualities Formulation of National Guidelines and Action Plans R&D on Technologies, Equipments & Systems Awareness Generation and Training

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Pre-attack phase Post -attack phase Trans-attack phase Response (Management of crisis & consequences, …) Mitigation ,……. Awareness & Preparedness (Warning of imminence of attack, Mgmt. of Resources…)

Slide49:

PRE-REQUISITE OF AN IDEAL RESPONSE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE UNEXPECTED; SAFETY OF THE RESPONDERS.

Response:

Response Management of Emergencies due to covert attacks involving CBRN agents or man-made accidents involving them, needs creation of awareness , overall preparedness and risk reduction at all levels, including contingency planning and capacity development for a prompt and efficient RESPONSE

Slide51:

Local, Community, District, State & National Response Response to a CBRN incident occurs in layers Local response should be available within minutes (at the scene via ambulance, fire and police; in emergency room and hospital) Community response should be available within an hour or so. District, State or National response along with resources if the incident unfolds beyond the coping capacity of local/ community response

Response strategies:

Response strategies Contingency plans and CBRN preparedness for the event Preventive security measures at the event venues Special Forces training measures and equipment Cooperation and management between the military, NDRF, Fire & Emergency Services , Medical services and local administration

Multiagency Response (Civil administration, NDRF, Military etc.):

Multiagency Response (Civil administration, NDRF, Military etc.) To ensure everybody sings off the same hymn sheet, using the same language A major lesson learnt

Five steps to Emergency Response:

Five steps to Emergency Response  Secure the Area To keep Non-Emergency Response Personnel out of danger.  Approach with Care No Blind Rushing, Approach upwind.  Identify Products Placards / Labeling for the hazard.  Assess the Situation Fire / Spill / Leak / Weather conditions / Terrain like / At risk, people, property, environment / evacuation necessary / what to be done right away.  Respond In an appropriate manner. Establish Command Post/Lines of Communication/Control of the site / Safety of the People in the Area /Own Safety

Slide55:

The contaminated area is called the Hot Zone . The area separating the hot and cold zones where decontamination occurs is the Warm Zone The clean treatment area is referred to as the Cold Zone.

CBRN Casualty Management at Incident Site – Critical Factors:

CBRN Casualty Management at Incident Site – Critical Factors Trauma related problems Exposure to toxicants Environmental Contamination Risk to Care Providers – Cross Contamination Decisions over Life support trauma care vs. need of immediate decontamination Triage – complexities due to multiple injuries, multiple agent’s involvement, time, distance and shielded victims etc. Prime Objective- Save Life & don’t become a casualty

At the Incident Site :

At the Incident Site Save yourself before saving others Anticipate secondary events Secure self & protect responders Take decision from the Head (not Heart) Protect public, casualties and incident scene

Medical Preparedness:

Medical P reparedness Medical preparedness accounts for Development of incident site assessment and management capabilities Health care management facilities Laboratory to clinics efforts to convert research products into therapeutic modalities Infrastructure, manpower and specialized equipment - development and continued research efforts Hospital DM Planning Management

Slide59:

General Protocol for Medical Management Resuscitation Decontamination at Incident Site Triage Evacuation Hospital level Decontamination Specific Treatment

Stay Aware Stay Alive :

Stay Aware Stay Alive CBRN Emergency Scenarios Common Indicators of CBRN Emergencies Dos and Don’ts for incident Site Management

Slide61:

‘We’ have to be lucky all the time. ‘They’ have to be successful only once!! When planning, THINK more than a terrorist! When implementing, think as if U R a disaster victim ! CBRN Defence - a challenging formidable task

‘Take it for guaranteed,… :

‘Take it for guaranteed,… ….an emergency system that’s DUSTED OFF AND USED ONLY DURING A RARE EVENT isn’t GOING TO WORK’

Slide63:

W  RKING T  GETHER W  RKS

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Hiroshima On August 6, 1945, at 9:15 AM Tokyo time, a B-29 plane, the ‘Enola Gay’ dropped a uranium atomic bomb, code named ‘Little Boy’ over the center of Hiroshima It exploded about 2,000 ft. above the city and had a blast the equivalent to 13 kilotons of TNT. Six planes of the 509th Composite Group, participated in this mission; one to carry the bomb Enola Gay , one to take scientific measurements of the blast The Great Artiste , the third to take photographs Necessary Evil the others flew approximately an hour ahead to act as weather scouts Aircraft that took part in the Hiroshima bombing.

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43 seconds – the city did not exist 1 min.: 66,000 killed / 69,000 injured Within the first two to four months of the bombings, the acute effects killed 90,000–166,000 people in Hiroshima Due to radiation, more than 150,000 additional people have died Leukemia in children born post WWII. Hiroshima Little Boy

Fat Man:

Fat Man ‘Fat Man’ was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 39,000 killed instantly Koba Hillside protected some Japanese from not getting killed in Nagasaki Within the first two to four months of the bombings, the acute effects killed 60,000–80,000 in Nagasaki By the end of the year, 200,000 had died of injuries and/or radiation

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