International Security Trends Complexity – For Better and Worse Stephan De Spiegeleire HCSS Senior Scientist December 6-9, 2011 The Hague, Netherlands : International Security Trends Complexity – For Better and Worse Stephan De Spiegeleire HCSS Senior Scientist December 6-9, 2011 The Hague, Netherlands
Front matter up front: Front matter up front Security Context – ‘deep uncertainty’ Everything changes ever more quickly (‘global acceleration’) Everything is becoming more ‘complex’ (‘global weirding ’) Change in the topology of the international system Epochal change (towards post-industrial Security Forces) Financial tsunami: hard look at value for money Key things to fix: Framing of the issue (substantively and institutionally – OUR stovepipes are some of our biggest enemies) Way we look at the future (security foresight) Way we plan ‘capabilities’ for our ‘security forces’ Way we manage them (strategic defense and security management) Way we do operational planning
Ray Kurzweil, inventor: Ray Kurzweil , inventor
Dennis Bushnell – NASA Chief Scientist: Dennis Bushnell – NASA Chief Scientist
Complex systems: Complex systems
Complicated vs. complex: Complicated vs. complex Characteristics of Complex Problems : No definitive problem boundary The problem is relatively unique or unprecedented Unstable a no/or unpredictable problem parameters Multiple experiments are not possible There is no bounded set of alternative solutions Involve multiple stakeholders with different and/or conflicting viewpoints and interests No single optimal and/or objectively testable solution No clear stopping point Characteristics of Technical Problems : lsolateable , boundable problems Problems are of a universally similar type Stable and/or predictable problem parameters Multiple low-risk experiments are possible There is a limited set of alternative solutions Involve few or homogeneous stakeholders There is a single optimal and testable solution The single optimal solution can be clearly recognized
Complexity: ‘Seeing the system’: Complexity: ‘Seeing the system’
Vergen ook een andere soort implementatie: Vergen ook een andere soort implementatie
Strategy – complicated: Strategy – complicated
Strategy under complexity: Strategy under complexity
Epochal change: Epochal change
The international (scale-free) network: The international (scale-free) network
The menu… : The menu… Orientation Driving actors/factors Geopolitical trends Demography Economics Scarcity Natural Disasters Technology and Innovation Navigation International trends in security planning The Dutch approach to integral security planning Taming the Black Swan
The Current International Context: The Current International Context
Drijvende krachten en actoren: Drijvende krachten en actoren Drijvende krachten Actoren Mondialisering Grootmachten Economie Fragiele staten Demografie Risicolanden Schaarste aan natuurlijk hulpbronnen Niet-statelijke actoren Klimaatverandering Individuën Wetenschap and technologie Internationale en regionale organisaties Verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens Nederlandse samenleving Polarisatie en radicalisering Caribische delen van het Koninkrijk Ontwikkeling van conflicten
The Current International Context: The Current International Context Geopolitiek
“Mondiale zekerheden en waarschijnlijkheden”: “ Mondiale zekerheden en waarschijnlijkheden ”
Global Trends in Governance: Global Trends in Governance
Global Trends in Armed Conflict (1946-2010): Global Trends in Armed Conflict (1946-2010)
Failed states index: Failed states index
State fragility and warfare - mid 2011: State fragility and warfare - mid 2011
Deaths from High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 9/11/1991–9/10/2011: Deaths from High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 9/11/1991–9/10/2011
Global Net Decrease in Fragility Scores, 1995-2010: Global Net Decrease in Fragility Scores, 1995-2010
Changes in Mean Fragility Score by Region, 1995-2010 : Changes in Mean Fragility Score by Region, 1995-2010
Increase in Number INGOs/IGOs: Increase in Number INGOs/IGOs
The battle for clout between states and companies: The battle for clout between states and companies
Future contours of conflict – Overview: 27 Future contours of conflict – Overview Cyber and info
Future contours of conflict – across languages: Future contours of conflict – across l anguages
Internationale verspreiding kernwapens: Internationale verspreiding kernwapens
PowerPoint Presentation: Ballistic Missile states Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons Nuclear Weapons Source: Center for Non proliferations studies, Arms Control Association
The Arab League Problem: The Arab League Problem
The telecoms revolution – across type of governance: The telecoms revolution – across type of governance
Radicalisering: Radicalisering
The Current International Context: The Current International Context Demografie
Demografie: Demografie
The Current International Context: The Current International Context Economies
The world economic recovery is sluggish…: The world economic recovery is sluggish… GDP Growth ( percent ) Source: WEO database .
…and world trade is not looking healthy.: …and world trade is not looking healthy. Growth of Trade ( percent ) Source: WEO database . *Trade volume is calculated from the trade value deflated by CPB estimated price series
… (but don’t forget the big picture!): … (but don’t forget the big picture!)
Advanced economy prospects have worsened sharply.: Advanced economy prospects have worsened sharply. Consensus GDP Growth Forecasts for 2012 ( percent ) Source: ConsensusForecasts . WEO F orecast s
A third wave of fear has hit the markets…: A t hird wave of fear has hit the markets… Market Volatility Index ( VIX S&P 500 ) Source: Yahoo Finance. Lehman Greece Eurozone
Impact of economic crises on (inter)national security (1 of 2): Impact of economic crises on (inter)national security (1 of 2)
Economic Crises and Security: Economic Crises and Security
The Current International Context: The Current International Context Scarcity
Peak-oil hypothesis, but…: Peak-oil hypothesis, but…
… world reserves keep rising: … world reserves keep rising
Even fossil fuels are not running out: 47 Even fossil fuels are not running out
Price mechanism at work Oil cost curve: Price mechanism at work Oil cost curve
Scarcity – water: Scarcity – water
Critical Raw Materials EU: Critical Raw Materials EU
Scarcity – interaction effects: Scarcity – interaction effects
The Current International Context: The Current International Context Natural disasters
Natural catastrophes on the rise (1/3): Natural catastrophes on the rise (1/3)
Natural catastrophes on the rise (2/3): Natural catastrophes on the rise (2/3)
Natural catastrophes on the rise (3/3): Natural catastrophes on the rise (3/3 )
Natural catastrophes 2011: Natural catastrophes 2011
Europe not immune (but very good 2011): Europe not immune (but very good 2011)
Gevolgen klimaatverandering: Gevolgen klimaatverandering
The Current International Context: The Current International Context Technology and innovation
(Yet another?) Game-changer: (Yet another?) Game-changer
THE global story: THE global story
The Current International Context: The Current International Context Balance in foresight !!!
Where we are winning: Where we are winning
Where We Are Losing – or Don’t Know: Where We Are Losing – or Don’t Know Losing Unclear
National Security Planning: National Security Planning
National Security Planning: National Security Planning Some key international trends
More and better Anticipation: More and better Anticipation
Towards an integrated security approach: Towards an integrated s ecurity approach Internal security Whole-of- Government Stovepiped Whole-of- Government Ext ernal security Integrated security approach
Towards a balanced capability portfolio…: Towards a balanced capability portfolio…
From the trees…: From the trees… …to the forest
National Security Planning: National Security Planning The new Dutch Approach
General Context: General Context All our governments confronted with d eep uncertainty Our governments have grown tremendously over the past 50 years Security-relevant knowledge AND capabilities highly (functionally) stovepiped Reality of security challenges today crosses through these stovepipes More money coming into ‘security’ post 9/11 No basis for prioritization ( e.g. fighter aircraft vs. terrorism vs. pandemics) No international fora (like for defence planning) we ‘lost’ the ‘big picture’
Harnassing civilian and military assets – Experience in The Netherlands: Harnassing civilian and military assets – Experience in The Netherlands Started at the end of the security chain with disaster management Few disasters – fireworks in Enschede (2000, 23 fatalities) ; New Years fire in Volendam (2001, 14 dead) critical report in 2001 by Accounting Chamber after two disasters (cooperation police, fire departments and medical disaster relief – stovepiped!) New measures towards de-stovepiping Started with 2+1 ministries Defence – Interior (– Justice) - MACA Agreements on Civil-Military Cooperation (2005) – 3rd main task of Armed Forces – from safety net to structural security partner Intensification of Civil-Military Agreements (2006) – e.g. from 3000 to 4600 servicemen guaranteed to be available Since 2005 (also focus on terrorism after murder van Gogh (2004) and Hofstad network (2005)) throughout the entire security chain and whole-of-government – key vehicle: national security strategy
Project National Security – Dutch Context: Project National Security – Dutch Context Early 2004: ‘Impulse for an interdepartemental policy exploration of National Security’, CCSS, June 2004 Project National Security A number of studies commissioned ( Clingendael , COT, AEF/ Berenschot , RAND Europe) – key findings: There is no structural framework for prioritizing in national security Many departements lack risk awareness Fragmentation and stovepiping of national security policy insufficient proactive policy development Steering group of DGs: follow-on effort; interdepartmental project team (under Ministry of Interior as lead department); keywords : all-hazards, whole-of-government AND proactive
Context: Het ‘PNV gedachtengoed’: Context: Het ‘PNV gedachtengoed ’
Approaches for prioritizing: Approaches for prioritizing
Planning for National Security – The Dutch Model (2007): Planning for National Security – The Dutch Model (2007) 1. Government-wide analysis A. Strategic foresight B. Horizon-scanning B. Thematic in-depth foresight Report strategic foresight Process Product Decision- making Report Threat-picture Report themes and scenarios Cabinet decides on themes for thematic in-depth analyses C. National risk-assessment National Risk Picture 3. Follow-up Legislation Risk prioritization Measures Policy Planning assumptions programme tasks and capabilities 2. Strategic planning Required capabilies Current capabiliities Capabilities gap Capability- requirement Werk - Cabinet selects priorities on basis of national risk picture Cabinet decides on capabilities to be strengthened through normal budget system Foresight Risk assessment Capabilities planning
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment Methodology: Government-Wide National Risk Assessment Methodology
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing likelihood: Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing likelihood Hazards Class Quantitative (%) Qualitative description of danger A < 0,05 Highly improbable B 0.05 – 0.5 Improbable C 0.5 – 5 Possible D 5 – 50 Probable E 50 – 100 Highly probable Dangers Class Qualitative description of danger A No concrete indication, and event is thought to be inconceivable B No concrete indication, but event is conceivable C No concrete indication, but event is conceivable D Event is thought to be quite probable E Concrete indication event will occur
Impact assessment: Impact assessment Territorial Human Economic Ecological Pol-Soc stability
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing Impact: Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing Impact
Impact scores: Impact scores
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment: Government -Wide National Risk Assessment 13 threat scenarios Flu Pandemic / Mild Flu Pandemic / Serious Heatwave /drought Flooding EDO Flooding DR14 Country-wide blackout Intentional electricity disruption Oil geopolitical Animal activism Poltical salafism Left extremism Right extremism Muslim extremism 33 threat scenarios , clustered in 6 ‘ themes ’ : Climate change (+ flooding and flu )); Security of energy supply ; Polarisation and radicalization ; Disruption of ICT- infrastructure ; Interweaving of under - and upperworld ; Serious accidents (+ chemical and nuclear accident). 2008 2009 2010 6 new ones /3 themes Cyberconflict Disruption Internet exchange Food scarcity Mineral scarcity Rail accident Maritime accident
Also used private sector/security regions: Also used private sector/security regions
2008 Risk Diagram: 2008 Risk Diagram
2009 Risk Diagram: 2009 Risk Diagram
NRA with confidence intervals: NRA with confidence intervals
2010 Risk Diagram: 2010 Risk Diagram
Planning for National Security (CBP): National security planning method Foresight (Scenarios,…) Values Interests ForAffairs Interior Defence Who? ... With what ? Capabilities What? Tasks Analysis Prevention Response Evaluation What? Task fields Risks Planning for National Security (CBP)
Capabilities are at the heart…: Capabilities are at the heart… ‘The ability to…’ M P s M P j DOT M L P F 3D WoG WoS Forward resilience Means : materiel, information systems, etc People : civilians, military, first responders, leadership, etc Methods : procedures, plans, doctrine, training, organization (public private partnerships)
Capabilities Based Planning: Capabilities Based Planning The outcome of CBP should be an balanced effects-based investment portfolio that develops and sustains the capability priorities identified through the planning exercise. These capability development directions can then be used to prepare an integrated Capability Development Plan. A systemic approach will ensure an audit trail and suggest a performance management framework.
Capability Based Planning: Capability Based Planning Strengths: CBP caters to a more diffuse and dynamic strategic environment Breaks through stovepipes – forest instead of trees links procurement decisions to strategic goals and provides an audit trail encourages innovation through moving away from determining equipment solutions prematurely and enhances the quality of information available to decision-makers and capability developers .
Next step: a Network Centric Approach : Next step: a Network Centric Approach Network centric approach as a capabilities multiplier. It requires: Improved C2 networks and transmission (interoperability) Improved information sharing (C2 database and an Common Operational Picture) Improved shared Situational Awareness Improved decision making Improved Action As a final step, change the organizational structure
Final step: improved effects: Final step: improved effects Result of NCA: improved effects Effect Based Operations (EBO): a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect (on the enemy) through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of (military and nonmilitary) capabilities at all levels (of conflict). USJFCOM
Most important innovations: Most important innovations Government-wide, internal/external security, all-hazards Tackling stovepipes head-on Systematic method from foresight to risk-assessment to strategic planning Anchored in budget process Capabilities-based planning ‘Modern’ concept of ‘strategy’ (more ‘process’ than ‘design’) ‘Living’ capstone document with basis principles Working plan as part of the strategy Key remaining weaknesses Differential success in key components Limited buy-in from some departments Unchartered spaces, unknown unknowns - difficult
A personal assessment: A personal assessment
Waarmee voeden we de NRB?: Waarmee voeden we de NRB?
Op zoek naar andere ‘dimensies’ (Achilleshiel-analyse): Op zoek naar andere ‘ dimensies ’ ( Achilleshiel-analyse )
Dimensies van de incidentenscenario’s: Dimensies van de incidentenscenario’s
Coderen van alle scenario’s: Coderen van alle scenario’s
Belangrijkste achilleshielen (voorbeelden): Belangrijkste achilleshielen ( voorbeelden ) Meer extern (en ook ‘hard’)? Meer ‘out-of-the box’? Meer ‘ opwaarts ’?
Missing pieces: Missing pieces The ‘external’ security piece (link with defence planning) The ‘costing’ piece Risk v. uncertainty ‘Ecosystem’ – some of it quite ‘technocratic’ International ( CoBP )
“Meer op militaire leest geschoeid…” : “Meer op militaire leest geschoeid …”
“Meer op militaire leest geschoeid…” : “Meer op militaire leest geschoeid …”
“Meer op militaire leest geschoeid…” : “Meer op militaire leest geschoeid …”
“Meer op militaire leest geschoeid…” : “Meer op militaire leest geschoeid …”
“Meer op militaire leest geschoeid…” : “Meer op militaire leest geschoeid …”
Backup: Backup
Intern én extern: Intern én extern
Sense and Respond Strategies: 113 Sense and Respond Strategies
Different foresight for different branches of strategic planning: Different foresight for different branches of strategic planning After Paul Davis
Meta-fore – Etymology and Meaning: Meta-fore – Etymology and Meaning Meta-analysis of existing foresight exercises (Attempt to) carry the field of foresight beyond its current status Being ‘honest’ (i.e. humble) about the future Μετα - φορά ( metaphora) μετά ( meta ), “above, beyond’” μεταφέρω ( metapherō) “‘I transfer, apply’” φέρω ( pherō), “‘I bear, carry’” Meta-phore Ancient Greek ME, probably translation of Latin ‘providentia’ Fore -sight fore sight Meta-fore Fore sight ≠ Fore cast!!!
Strategic Agility: Strategic Agility Organisations driven by strategic planning Entrepreneurial organisations Operations-driven organizations Strategically agile organisations Simple/ Linear Wicked/ Complex Nature of change Speed of change Fast Slow
First Principles: First Principles Emerge your strategy Be strategically extremely sensitivity (anticipation) Put capabilities (“ability to...”) even more central Think real capability options (irreversible choices=huge bets) Late loose coupling instead of early tight coupling Open innovation Ecosystems (“don’t be a star, be a galaxy”) Future Me’s Collective commitment Closing the Loop Deep Uncertainty Strategic Agility Stephan De Spiegeleire & Frank Bekkers , Strategic Agility and Defence Capability Options: Who Says Generals Can’t Dance? , in Final Report Future Policy Survey, 2010.
Stroomschema PNV: Stroomschema PNV 1. Government-wide analysis A. Strategic foresight B. Horizon-scanning B. Thematic in-depth foresight Report strategic foresight Process Product Decision- making Report Threat-picture Report themes and scenarios Cabinet decides on themes for thematic in-depth analyses C. National risk-assessment National Risk Picture 3. Follow-up Legislation Risk prioritization Measures Policy Planning assumptions programme tasks and capabilities 2. Strategic planning Required capabilies Current capabiliities Capabilities gap Capability- requirement Werk - Cabinet selects priorities on basis of national risk picture Cabinet decides on capabilities to be strengthened through normal budget system Strategische Verkenningen Nationale Risico-Beoordeling Capacitaire planning
From planning to design: From planning to design Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the city of Nablus in April 2002
From planning to design: From planning to design
From planning to design: From planning to design
Security foresight pathologies: Security foresight pathologies Presentism Lack of imagination Herd mentality Overconfidence in datasets Underestimating ‘framing’ effects Reductionism - underappreciating systems effects Dubious timing Systematic bias in favor of gloom and doom Hybris ‘Masking’ uncertainty Stovepiped Virtually no validation effort (and what little there is, very discomforting) Striking lack of meta-foresight Suspiciously facile acceptance of ‘ process as important as outcome ’ Striking irrelevance of foresight Few good examples (NOT defence planning NOR petrochemical sector) Should be an organic part of strategic planning, frequently isn’t
Traditional way of dealing with the future: Traditional way of dealing with the future Knowns Unknowns ‘Lesser and included’ Knowns Unknowns A few point scenarios ‘Wise Prediction’/ Big gambler (Point-)Scenario-planning/ Scenario-gambling
Confronting uncertainty head-on: Confronting uncertainty head-on
Foresight 3.0: Foresight 3.0 Foresight 1.0 Prima Donna Foresight 2.0 Connecting people / Networks of (remarkable) people Foresight 3.0 Metafore Connecting ideas
Defence against the ‘Black Swan’: Defence against the ‘Black Swan’
Dennis Bushnell – NASA Chief Scientist: Dennis Bushnell – NASA Chief Scientist
Ray Kurzweil, inventor: Ray Kurzweil, inventor
Martin Rees: Martin Rees “I think the odds are no better than fifty-fifty that our present civilization will survive to the end of this century without a serious setback” “Populations could be wiped out by lethal ‘engineered’ viruses; human character may be changed by new techniques far more targeted and effective than the nostrums and drugs familiar today; we may even one day be threatened by rogue nanomachines that replicate catastrophically, or by superintelligent computers.” Martin John Rees , Baron Rees of Ludlow, English cosmologist and astrophysicist. Astronomer Royal (since 1995); Master of Trinity College, Cambridge (since 2004); President of the Royal Society (since 2005). Author of more than 500 research papers. Has made important contributions to the origin of cosmic microwave background radiation, as well as to galaxy clustering and formation. He was one of the first to propose that enormous black holes power quasars.
Shai Agassi, Better Place: Shai Agassi, Better Place Massive security implications for: energy security, Middle East Russia, etc.
Hic sunt dracones – Hic sunt cygni atrati?: Hic sunt dracones – Hic sunt cygni atrati ?
Turkeys before Thanksgiving: Turkeys before Thanksgiving
Turkeys after Thanksgiving: Turkeys after Thanksgiving
The cynefin framework: The cynefin framework