Terrorism Part 2

Who Were/Are the Terrorists and What is their Current Status?: 

1 Who Were/Are the Terrorists and What is their Current Status? Adapted from Understanding Terror Networks by Marc Sageman Khadafi Abubakar Janjala-Philippine Ramadan Shallah Palestinian Ali Saed Bin Ali Al Houri-Saudi Anas Al-Sabai Libyan Jaber A. Elbaneh Yemeni Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah-Egyptian Ali Atwa-Lebanese Abdul Rahman Yasin American Fazul Abdullah Mohammed-Kenya

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2 AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI USAMA BIN LADEN http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/fugitives.htm

TerrorismIntelligence Community Definition: 

3 TerrorismIntelligence Community Definition Premeditated Violence, or Threat of Violence Politically Motivated Against Non-Combatants A Criminal Act Symbolic In Nature Intended to Impact Audience Beyond the Immediate Victims Perpetrated by sub national groups or clandestine state agents The Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism Jerrold Post, GW University

Targets of Terrorism: 

4 Targets of Terrorism Violence Terror Compliance Influence Psychological Warfare Waged Through the Media The Media are not just Observers and Reporters, but are participants in the terrorist’s drama. They are active targets of manipulation. The Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism Jerrold Post, GW University

TerrorISMS: 

5 TerrorISMS The Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism Jerrold Post, GW University Global Salafi Jihadists Terrorist’s Organizations with Broad Social Support Terrorism Arising from Diaspora Émigré Populations Anti-Regime Terrorists Each should be understood in its unique historical, cultural, and political context.

Evidence Based Terrorism Research: 

6 Evidence Based Terrorism Research Application of scientific method to terrorism research Started with 9/11 Perpetrators as index sample 400 biographies of terrorists: Open Source information Trial transcripts US, France, Germany, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Canada Press accounts: English, French, German, Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, Dutch Academic publications Internet (corroborated)

Global Salafi Jihad: 

7 Global Salafi Jihad Violent Islamist born-again social movement Fight for justice & fairness: Build a better world; utopia modeled on the community of the Prophet & his companions (Salaf) Four phases: Peaceful capture of a state (Afghanistan?) Against the near enemy (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, etc.) Global expansion of defensive jihad - Global offense against the far enemy (Western Nations) Expel the West from the Middle East Establish an Islamist state

Evolution of al Qaeda: 

8 Evolution of al Qaeda - Control of “Golden Chain:” exclusive funding for terrorism - Control of training camps & establishment of shelter - Staff for planning & coordination - Afghanistan, as failed state, has little ability to control al Qaeda - 1988-9: Militants come to fight the anti-Soviet jihad & could not go home stayed behind and formed al Qaeda - 1991-2: Most militants expelled from Pakistan went to Sudan - Switch of strategy from “near enemy” to “far enemy” 1996: 150 militants expelled from Sudan returned to Afghanistan Three processes of self-selection of the most militants: 1996-2001: Golden age of al Qaeda: Al Qaeda controlled social movement & focused it on “far enemy”

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9 GLOBAL SALAFI NETWORK Central Staff (38) Militants who formed bonds after the Soviets left Afghanistan Core Arabs Arabian Peninsula Jordan Egypt (127) Maghreb Arabs Tunisia Algeria Morroco (162) Southeast Asians Indonesia Malaysia (55)

Family of Origin (SES): 

10 Family of Origin (SES)

Age Distribution: 

11 Age Distribution

Age: 

12 Age Average: 25.69 years Southeast Asians: 29.35 years Central Staff: 27.90 years Core Arabs: 23.75 years

Type of Education: 

13 Type of Education .

Levels of Education: 

14 Levels of Education

Devotion as Youth: 

15 Devotion as Youth

Occupation: 

16 Occupation

Family Status: 

17 Family Status 73% married Most had children All of Central Staff and Southeast Asian members were married Most unmarried were students or too young Consistent with Salafi Islam

Criminal Background: 

18 Criminal Background Vast Majority: no crime Some major crime Robbery (Roubaix gang, Kelkal gang, JI) Petty crime: Maghreb logistic cells Credit card fraud, false documents, insurance fraud Drug traffic (more common now) Those least likely to do harm individually are most able to do so collectively.

Mental Health: 

19 Mental Health Very little evidence of mental illness Very little evidence of personality disorder No narcissism (willingness to sacrifice for the comrade & cause) No pathological hatred Very little trauma in family studies: usually overprotected youths Overall, “good kids,” except second generation Maghreb Arabs, who lived life of petty crime

Diaspora: 

20 Diaspora Global Salafi Jihad is a Diaspora phenomenon 84% of Global Salafi Mujahedin have joined the jihad, while living in a Diaspora (87% in Western Europe) Since the early 1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities and Islamic organizations. Its motto is telling: "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope."

Joining the Jihad: 

21 Joining the Jihad Friendship (pre-existing): 68% “Bunch of guys” collectively deciding to join Joining childhood friends Kinship: 20% Fathers, brothers, first cousins Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement friendship bonds Discipleship: 10% Students of Sungkar & Baasyir from Jamaah Islamiyah Abu Bakar Bashir an Indonesian Muslim cleric and leader of the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (MMI). Intelligence agencies claim he is the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and has links with Al Qaeda

Trajectory of Core Arabs: 

22 Trajectory of Core Arabs Separated from traditional bonds & culture Homesick, lonely, marginalized & excluded from society Seek friends Drifted to mosques for companionship, not religion Moved in together (halal food), formed cliques Upwardly & geographically mobile (“best & brightest”) Mostly from religious, caring & middle class families Global citizens, conversant in 3 or 4 languages, skilled in computer technology HATE THE HYPOCRACY OF THE ROYAL FAMILIES

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23 The Foment of Islamic Fundamentalism The Core Arabs

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24 The family home of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the former president of the United Arab Emirates and ruler of Abu-Dhabi

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Saudi Arabian Wealth: 

34 Saudi Arabian Wealth Dozens of palaces are under construction. Even the average businessman is likely to have a huge home with silk draperies, secluded fountains and crystal chandeliers. When ailing King Fahd vacationed in Spain last year, he took 50 black Mercedes, 350 attendants and a 234-foot yacht, and had $2,000 worth of flowers and 50 cakes delivered each day.

Saudi Arabian Poverty: 

35 Saudi Arabian Poverty Since the Persian Gulf War the outskirts of Jidda and Riyadh (The Capital) have seen the growth of slums. Joblessness, low wages and incomes and difficulty in collecting enough money to marry and start families are all issues that can evoke anger. Officially, unemployment is about 8%. Private economists put the figure closer to 13%, and some Saudi political scientists have said it may be about 25%, if one considers the large number of young adults still living at home with their parents. Few women in the work force. Poverty and the Closed Society Breed Fundamentalism

Trajectory of Maghreb Arabs: 

36 Trajectory of Maghreb Arabs Two main paths Second generation in the West Young economic immigrants to the West Upwardly mobile, & completely secular background Excluded from society in Europe Dropped out of school Petty crime (false documents & drug dealing) Drug addiction Groups of friends, who grew up together & collectively drifted to religion to escape their situation

Slide 37: 

37 We have nothing to lose for we have nothing In your place I would not sleep well The bourgeoisie should tremble, the gangstas are in town Not to party, but to burn the place down…. Where are our roots? Who are our models? You’ve burned the wings of a whole generation Shattered dreams, soiled the seed of hope. Oh! when I think about it It’s time to think; it’s time that France Deigns to take account of its crimes But in any event, the cup is full History teaches that our chances are nil So stop before it gets out of hand Or creates even more hatred Let’s unite and incinerate the system But why, why are we waiting to set the fire? Suprême NTM (French Rap Group)

The Closed Society: 

38 The Closed Society Ethnic/Race/Class Exploitation The aim of a closed society is to ensure the supremacy of one class (or race or group) over another To bridge the gap, an elaborate set of explanations and ideas are needed which is, by definition, at variance with the facts SEGREGATION, APARTHIED, ETC.

European Social Conditions: 

39 European Social Conditions Alienated young Muslims, who became radicalized in Europe Lack of alternative expression of social protest Utopian vision for Justice & Fairness (Communist, Salafist…) Demise of old Left in Europe (same people attracted to both) Failure of European integration policy for Muslim populations - Rapid immigration growth post WWII - Vulnerable to economic crises Rigid social structure in Europe - Lack of bottom up integration - Failure of top down policy (France, Germany & Britain) Europe v. countries built on immigration - No “European Dream” but an alienation & radicalization of the younger generation

What Mobilizes Them?: 

40 What Mobilizes Them? Spontaneously self-organized “bunches of guys” of trusted friends, from the bottom up No top down Al Qaeda recruitment program No campaign, or budget dedicated to recruitment Social bonds came before ideological commitment No evidence of “brainwashing”: they simply acquired the beliefs of their friends

Motivation : 

41 Motivation Complete transformation of values Self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause Dynamics of dense social networks promotes in-group love Insidious process Low risk participation with an increasingly closer set of friends Importance of specific script for the global Salafi jihad: 12 Islamist institutions generated 50% of sample Salafi ideology: new values (Islam & ummah) - Greater jihad: “born again”, imitate Salaf through personal example - Faith & commitment grounded in intense small group dynamics - Gradual development of a collective identity

Out-group hate: 

42 Out-group hate Grounded in everyday experience of discrimination & exclusion from highest levels of society Endemic in Middle East & Western Europe Grounded in group dynamics: “Bunch of guys” escalation of mutual complaints about the unfairness & injustice in society Endorse conspiracy theories Endorse takfir doctrine  naming unbelievers and sanctions commission of crimes against them

Group Dynamics: 

43 Group Dynamics Explanation in normal group dynamics, rather than individual mental pathology Once in the movement, difficult to abandon it without betraying close friends & family This natural & intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists High risk terrorist operation The Formula In-group love + out-group hate (under specific violent script, often religious)  mass murder + suicide

Continued Evolution: 

44 Continued Evolution Success of Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism campaign Elimination of sanctuary, funding, communication & key leaders Neutralization of al Qaeda proper Physical break up of formal global Salafi jihad networks Expansion of home-grown initiative due to lack of leadership & restraints Local autonomy, self-financing & self-training Informal communications, difficult to monitor Fuzzy boundaries: no formal initiation or fixed numbers New local, more aggressive & reckless leadership

Present Status: 

45 Present Status Four types of networks existing in parallel: The old al Qaeda organization: Effectively neutralized (sanctuary denial, monitored) Quickly regaining a foot hold in Afghanistan and Pakistan The organized affiliated groups, now more autonomous: Iraqi organization; JI/Philippines; Indonesia; GSPC/Algeria Unaffiliated informal groups: Madrid group; “Salafia Jihadia” (Morocco); Hofstad group; Benchellali group (Algerian/Ricen); London groups; Khan al-Khalili and Taba resorts (Egypt); Istanbul group Singletons: Osman Petmezci – Turk in Germany Kamel Bourgass – London Poison Plot

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46 Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism campaign pressures Global Salafi Jihad to evolve into the last two types of networks. Unaffiliated informal groups Singletons Forces migration of the Jihad to the Internet Virtually connected via Internet World Wide Web: mass medium (passive, informative) Internet: interactive transformation of the jihad

Mass Medium for the Jihad: 

47 Mass Medium for the Jihad WWW impacts the substance of the Salafi message Diffusion of Salafi message, bypassing traditional imams Selective sound bite version of Islam Rejection of traditions fosters unique interpretation of the Quran No more need for “preachers of hate” Jihadi message alive on WWW WWW is home to war of narratives, fought on the battlefield of interpretations

Impact of WWW: 

48 Impact of WWW Virtual anonymous market place for providers (ideologues) & consumers (home-grown volunteers) of ideas: goals, strategy & tactics No need for leaders or training camps Rapid evolution toward a “Leaderless Jihad” Co-existence of multiple competing websites Peaceful co-existence of rivals on competing sites: decrease of internal dissent Consumers pick & choose preferred sites & messages (inspiration & activation) Inversion of power pyramid: followers are in control Natural selection of most persuasive sites

Toward a Global “Leaderless” Jihad: 

49 Toward a Global “Leaderless” Jihad Decentralized, loosely connected network Mobilized and motivated autonomously No more 9/11, but lots of 3/11/04 (Spain) 7/7/05 (London) and Great Britain 07, especially in Europe Threat to the West from Western Europe Military role (no hard targets) Sanctuary denial in potential failed or friendly states Coordination of local CT activities Virtual “Invisible Hand” Organizing Terrorist Operations Vision Of Salafi Utopia Unites The Leaderless Jihad Ideological Battleground – A War Of Ideas

Terrorism: 

50 Terrorism Adapts, Mutates and Challenges Pre-conceptions Problems in Profiling Sophisticated Failures Amateurish Murderers Iraq Insurgents have Adapted Western Strategies…car bombing, mechanisms, etc. Vast Majority are Now Freelancers and Self-Starters Last Line of Defense? Sniffers-Video-Barracades….Like a Moat Around a Castle Investigators In Europe and Other Nations Infiltration of Terrorist Groups

Iraq: 

51 Iraq Ethnic groups: Arabs 75-80%, Kurds 15%-20%, Assyrian, Iraqi Turkmen or other 5% Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi'a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3%

Afghanistan: 

52 Afghanistan