Glenpool board meeting

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Glenpool South Tank Farm Glenpool , Oklahoma April 7, 2003: 

Glenpool South Tank Farm Glenpool , Oklahoma April 7, 2003 Storage Tank Explosion and Fire ConocoPhillips

Investigation Team and Support Staff: 

Rick Flint Investigator-in-Charge Dr. Joseph Kolly, Explosion and Fire Nancy McAtee & Dr. Merritt Birky Leslee Shumway SCADA and Control Systems Frank Zakar Materials Laboratory Robert Moore & Editors Meg Athey Estimated man hours for the investigation: 4,500 Investigation Team and Support Staff

Parties to the Investigation: 

Parties to the Investigation ConocoPhillips Explorer Pipeline Office of Pipeline Safety Glenpool Fire Department

Slide5: 

12 7 8 9 Tank 11

Slide6: 

131st Street Highway 75 Tank 11 9 12 8 7

Slide7: 

Explorer and ConocoPhillips Tank Farms 7 11 12 8 9 28” Explorer mainline from Texas Explorer 24” line to ConocoPhillips 30” line to tank 11 Explorer Pipeline Glenpool Tank Farm ConocoPhillips Glenpool South Tank Farm 12” crude oil pipeline power lines

Slide8: 

Tank 11 Dike wall Location of 138,000 volt power lines

Slide9: 

Fire picture here

Slide10: 

power poles Power lines dike wall

Slide11: 

Tank 11 Tank 7 Pipeline overpressure protection equipment

Slide13: 

Tank 7 Tank 11

Slide14: 

Tank 8: damage from internal fire

Slide15: 

12 7 8 9 Tank 11

Safety Issues: 

Safety Issues Tank operations, including switch loading The adequacy of emergency planning and emergency response by ConocoPhillips and American Electric Power The adequacy of Federal regulations and industry standards for emergency planning

Safety Issue #1 : 

Tank operations, including switch loading, at the ConocoPhillips tank farm Safety Issue #1

Slide19: 

Switch Loading Hazards of switch loading Empty tank that previously contained gasoline was being filled with diesel

Slide20: 

Flow Tank 11 with the floating roof landed gasoline

Tank Operations: 

Tank Operations Diesel is a static charge accumulator Increased risk of a static discharge inside tank 11 Fill velocity and turbulence increase static charge

Tank Operations - Flammability: 

Tank Operations - Flammability Tank operations with gasoline on April 4 to 7 created a flammable mixture inside the tank

Slide23: 

no flow Gasoline in storage gasoline roof: floating tank shell

Slide24: 

closed Flow Gasoline removed (roof floating) gasoline roof: floating

Slide25: 

Flow Gasoline removed (roof landed) roof: landed gasoline open gasoline

Slide26: 

Flow Gasoline added (roof landed) roof: landed gasoline

Slide27: 

roof: floating closed after roof floats Flow Gasoline added (roof floating) gasoline

Slide28: 

Flow Gasoline removed (roof landed) roof: landed gasoline

Slide29: 

No flow Tank empty roof: landed closed

Slide30: 

roof: landed Flow Diesel added (switch load) diesel

Conclusion: 

Conclusion All the conditions necessary for fuel vapor ignition were present in the storage tank at the time of the accident, and the explosion most likely occurred when a static discharge ignited a flammable fuel-air mixture in the space between the surface of the diesel and the floating roof. The extensive damage to the tank is consistent with the flammable fuel-air mixture above the floating roof contributing to the force of the explosion.

Safety Issue # 2: 

Safety Issue # 2 Emergency Response and Emergency Planning

Slide34: 

Failure of energized power lines and additional fire Unsuccessful management of the electrical hazard Emergency Response Emergency response by American Electric Power

Slide35: 

No coordinated emergency planning between facility operators Emergency Planning

Conclusions: 

Conclusions The American Electric Power responder did not coordinate his actions with the incident command staff, and American Electric Power did not take effective emergency action.

Conclusions (Continued): 

Conclusions (Continued) Because ConocoPhillips Company and American Electric Power did not preplan their response to emergencies near the Glenpool South Tank Farm, the emergency response was unsuccessful in managing the electrical hazard caused by the tank explosion and fire.

Safety Issue #3: 

Safety Issue #3 Federal Regulations and Industry Standards for Emergency Planning

Federal Pipeline Regulations: 

Federal Pipeline Regulations Require operators to prepare an emergency plan Emergency plan must include procedures for notifying appropriate fire, police and other public officials No requirements to coordinate with electric utilities

Industry Standards: 

Industry Standards American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) pipeline codes do not require pipeline operators to coordinate with electric utilities Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) electrical safety code has no requirements for emergency response planning

Conclusion: 

Conclusion Comprehensive, practical industry guidance for the preparation of emergency plans would help operators of electric systems respond effectively to emergencies involving their utilities.