On Scepticism

Slide 1: 

A Look at Skepticism A LOOK AT SKEPTICISM

Slide 2: 

Diversity of opinions and contradictions among philosophers. Errors and illusions Relativity of knowledge. Vicious circles. Impossible to reach the definitive truth SKEPTICISM

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THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION It Is impossible that the same thing both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. ARISTOTLE. Metaphysics, IV,3, 1005b 11

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1. One cannot make an error about it. 2. It does not presuppose other principles. 3. It is known naturally. See ST THOMAAS AQUINAS. In IV Metaphysicorum, lect. 6, n. 599 Surest of all judgments

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THE OBJECTIVITY OF SENSE KNOWLEDGE The external senses immediately know their object as something trans-subjective.

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Capacity to distinguish the real from the apparent See GILSON. El realismo metodico, op. cit., p.199

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The senses can only make mistakes per accidens about common sensibles; only by organic malfunction in regard to proper sensibles. See ST THOMAS AQUINAS. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1

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AN EXAMINATION OF RELATIVISM See ARISTOTLE. Metaphysics, IV, 6, 1011a 22-28

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The criticism of Husserl Individual relativism is genuine nonsense because the meaning of its affirmation denies what the meaning of every affirmation implies, i.e., that what is affirmed is, itself is true. See HUSSERL. Investigaciones logicas, vol. 1, pp. 144-146. Specific relativism is also absurd because “truth is one and the same whether for man or other non-human beings, angels or gods, those who learn through judgment.” HUSSERL. Op. cit., pp. 146-148.

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The criticism of Frege On the materialistic sensism underlying relativism “(W)e must remind ourselves that a proposition does not cease to be true when I cease to think of it, just as the sun is not annihilated when I close my eyes.” G. FREGE, Fundamentos de la Aritmetica, pp. 17-18.

Slide 11: 

See ARISTOTLE. Metaphysics, IV, 6, 1011a 22-28 Relativism and sensism

Slide 12: 

There are many things that exist really without anybody perceiving them or having opinions about them See THOMAS AQUINAS. In IV Metaphysicorum, lect. 15, n. 716