Presentation Grant Theodore

“Reconceptualizing the Cyprus Problem: Looking beyond deadlock into a cooperative future”: 

“Reconceptualizing the Cyprus Problem: Looking beyond deadlock into a cooperative future” Ted Grant

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 : 

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 Turkey invaded the island in 1974 Resulted in North-South divide between Turkish and Greek populations Development of two states in the 1980s: Republic of Cyprus (Greek) - South Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Turkish) - North

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007: 

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 Through the 1990s, each state viewed the other as a long-term threat to its national security In 1997 the EU opened accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus On April 16, 2003, the Republic signed the EU Treaty of Accession

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007: 

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 Between 2002 and April, 2004, Kofi Annan repeatedly tried and failed to negotiate a compromise settlement between the two states One last effort was made in April, 2004 The Annan plan was submitted to the Cypriot populations via referendum Favored by majority of Turkish Cypriots in the North, but rejected by Greek Cypriots in the South

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 (cont.): 

Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 (cont.) Result: Republic of Cyprus entered the EU without the consent of the TRNC Cyprus remains divided today

Yesilada and Sozen (2002) : 

Yesilada and Sozen (2002) Argue that T>P>R>S payoff ordering defines the preferences of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots Predicted outcome: Deadlock Obviously, will hold over repeated games

Yesilada and Sozen (2002) Outdated: 

Yesilada and Sozen (2002) Outdated Three developments make this game theoretical analysis no longer correct: The EU’s announcement that it would commence accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004 (late 2002) The EU’s announcement that resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession (2003) Accession of Greek Cyprus to EU (2004)

New Model: 

New Model I propose to model the current situation with a new 2 x 2 social dilemma game: Same set of strategies: C or D New ordering of payoffs: Republic of Cyprus - T>R>P=S TRNC - R>T>S>P

New Variables: 

New Variables V/2 is the value to both sides of cooperating split equally between them T is the intangible cost to the Greek side of Turkey’s accession to the EU t is the intangible benefit to the Turkish side of Turkey’s accession to the EU P is the political and emotional benefit gained by playing D against a cooperative enemy

New Model: 

New Model

New Model: 

New Model Note: I assume resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession. The outcome of this game is DC, which differs from the DD outcome predicted by Yesilada and Sozen (2002).

Hypothetical Case: 

Hypothetical Case What if CC were no longer a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU? My claim: This would create opportunity for cooperation in the near future, perhaps even before Turkey enters the EU.

Important (Debatable) Assumptions: 

Important (Debatable) Assumptions The EU actually wants Turkey to join its supranational federation Should the Cyprus condition be lifted, Turkey would eventually be granted EU membership Should Turkey be granted EU membership, Cypriots, Turks and Europeans would make the assumption that the Cyprus problem will be resolved either before or after accession

New Variables: 

New Variables L is the additional negotiating leverage held by Turkish Cypriots post-accession because of their parent country’s membership in the EU - is therefore also included as a cost to the Greek side  is defined as a bureaucratic cost to completing the accession process in the second period, once Turkey is part of the EU Note: In the CC outcome, Turkish Cypriots receive L b/c this is the maximum the Greeks are willing to concede before the accession to avoid a non-CC outcome

Hypothetical Model: 

Hypothetical Model

Prediction: 

Prediction I argue that a CC outcome is marginally preferred given this set of payoffs: Both sides would prefer to compromise before Turkey’s accession