mobile computing

Slide 1: 

Mobile Identity Management

Outline : 

Outline Ideas Motivation Architecture Implementation notes Discussion

Motivation 1 : 

Motivation 1 The mobile phone has become a highly personal device: Phonebook E-mail Music, videos Landmarks Payment-related information Personal files

Motivation 2 : 

Motivation 2 Electronic identity documents: Identity cards Biometric passports SIM-based identification Security/privacyimprovements overthe old documents?

Motivation 3 : 

Motivation 3 “ -scenario” Reveal yourself to prove your age. Why?

Motivation 4 : 

Motivation 4 Privacy-enhancing technologies: State of public research is reasonably mature Real life?

Slide 7: 

Use Cases Operators Offering Secure Mobile Identity Services for 3rd parties Subscriber services, authentication & authorization Internal use, employee authentication Banks, financial transaction processors Authentication to web bank Signing on-line payments, card transactions, cash withdrawals (ATM), documents, agreements (stock exchange, loans, mortgage, insurance...) Internal use, employee authentication

Idea 1 : 

Idea 1 Mobile phone as an identity token: Officially recognised PKI-SIM cards available in Finland, Estonia, … Mobile network operators have the central role in current implementations.

Idea 2 : 

Idea 2 A proof of a certain attribute... ...shown by a mobile phone?

Idea 3 : 

Idea 3 The mobile phone as a contactless multi-application smart card Such cards have been available since 2001, but are still hard to find in the real life Post-issuance downloading of applets usually disabled (mostly due to security reasons) A second try with mobile phones? Can it be made open?

Credentials on mobile phones : 

Credentials on mobile phones Three options for a storage place: Unprotected memory Suitable for non-critical applications only Security environments See e.g. Nokia OnBoard Credentials Fully open Certification issues SIM card Can be easily moved to another phone Property of the MNO — any solutions?

PKI-SIM: Current implementation : 

PKI-SIM: Current implementation Figure by Pekka Rauhala, HST group

Access to SIM : 

Access to SIM The SIM card is owned by the operator Access to SAT applets Mobile user authentication (GAA) Installation of new applets over-the-air Other service providers can use it A contract with the operator is needed The operator charges for services Only online use

Access to SIM : 

Access to SIM JSR-177 Security and Trust Services, SATSA: Access to SIM-based applets from Java ME Exchange of APDU messages Supported by Nokia Series 40 since 3rd Edition FP 2 Nokia Series 60 since 3rd Edition Certain Sony Ericsson, BenQ, Motorola models

Near Field Communication : 

Near Field Communication A short-range communication technology. Three modes of operation: Reader/writer mode for tags and smart cards Tag emulation mode Peer-to-peer mode (up to 424 kbit/s) Nokia 3220 Nokia 5140i Nokia 6131 NFC BenQ T80 (with NFC shells only)‏

Near Field Communication : 

Near Field Communication Potentially, bright future: ABI Research: 20% of phones will have NFC by year 2012. Recently, ETSI has defined an interface between SIM and NFC. Proximity payments already offered by Visa and MasterCard.

Near Field Communication : 

Near Field Communication Potentially, some problems: Tampering with tags used in NFC services (Collin Mulliner, EUSecWest 2008) Attacks are similar to those based on manipulating with PIN entry devices (PEDs) in chip payments (Drimer, Murdoch) Protection against maliciously modified tags/terminals? Authenticate arriving requests, require user's informed consent.

Slide 18: 

What are Mobile Signatures? PKI-based identity on a SIM card Secret keys in tamper proof storage Keys protected by PIN codes Certificates and revocation lists in a irectory For authentication and digital signatures For mobile and web services Enter signing PIN! OK Cancel

Urgent need! : 

Urgent need! Industry has a demand to know the user and get his approval for actions. We must be sure that the user is who he claims to be. We must get user’s approval in a way that user can not claim afterwards that it did not happen. Needs to support mass-market.

Key Stakeholders : 

Key Stakeholders Bank Internet Bank & ePayment Services Customer base Mobile Operator Network Infrastucture Subscribers Government More and more public services moving to Web. Strong authentication a must! Consumer User of the value added services

Valimo : 

Valimo Need & Key Drivers Banks

VISA & Mastercard fraud figures : 

VISA & Mastercard fraud figures 40 million credit cards hacked in 2005 Breach at 3rd party payment processor affects 22 million VISA cards and 14 million MasterCards 70% of the losses caused by use of counterfeit cards e-Commerce is the next target Source: Jani Kallio, Security Manager, Luottokunta Eurocard Oy, Finland

Online fraud figures in UK : 

Online fraud figures in UK 2004 frauds £5 million 2005 £30 million 2006 EMV launched, POS card frauds going rapidly down, Online services on target Latest news (BBC1 Nov. 7th): Online frauds already doubled comparing to 2005 What it will be at the end of 2006? Source: FSA & BBC, UK

Net users want banks to do something : 

Source: Forrester UK Internet User Monitor, Q2 2005Base: British Net users “What could your bank do to boost your confidence in online banking security?” Net users want banks to do something

Online Banking Security Concerns : 

Online Banking Security Concerns

Key Drivers, Banks : 

Key Drivers, Banks The mobile phone is a trusted device that provides anywhere, anytime access to confidential, personal and business content and guarantees integrity and non-repudiation of electronic transactions

Key Drivers, Banks : 

Key Drivers, Banks Authentication through different channel than the service Makes phishing and Man-in-the-Middle impossible

Open Mobile Identity : 

Open Mobile Identity Architecture at a glance: Phone Terminal Credentials Privacy proxy Java Card applet J2ME applet SATSA NFC Security and trust services = = Near Field Communication Computer Display UI

Open Mobile Identity : 

Open Mobile Identity The SIM card applet contains: A pseudonym pool: biometric identifiers, customer numbers, strings. Identity profiles. A profile contains A private key, generated on-card A certificate issued to a pseudonym, with corresponding certificate chain Attribute certificates with masked values of attributes; attribute masks Secret keys Profile-loading private key and a corresponding public key certificate

Identity proxy : 

Identity proxy Provides a trusted user interface Informs the user about requests Asks for user's consent Communicates with the SIM card applet Communicates with the verifier/payment terminal A signed Java ME applet Signature is checked by the phone before any message exchange with SIM is allowed.

Loading an identity profile : 

Loading an identity profile Identity issuer Identity proxy SIM card Generate a timestamp T T Generate a keypair {KU, KR} KU signed and timestamped; profile-loading certificate; [pseudonym] Construct CertificationRequestInfo block CRI CRIKR Construct Certificate Signing Request CSR; profile-loading certificate, [pseudonym] Construct identity profile data Identity profile data Identity profile data Store identity profile

Identity proofs and digital signatures : 

Identity proofs and digital signatures Identity verifier Identity proxy SIM card Verify request signature; Acquire user's consent Identity profile type; list of attributes; message G to be signed (optional); timestamp TIV Identity profile type Root certificate Generate a timestamp TIP Request data; TIV , TIP Ask and verify PIN, if needed Proof data; G, TIV , TIPKR Proof data; G, TIV , TIPKR

Other uses : 

Other uses Challenge-response protocol Encrypt a nonce with a secret key Mobile phone as an electronic key, proximity scenario One-time passwords Encrypt the current time with a secret key Mobile phone as a secure authentication token

Biometric authentication : 

Biometric authentication Privacy-aware Biometric patterns not released to verifiers TPM/trusted user interface is needed 479a1 is a prooffingerprint

Implementation issues : 

Implementation issues NFC terminals are needed Not many yet, but the situation may change Many electronic ticketing trials Contactless payments with cellphones already work in some places For certificate validation, CRL is probably the best option Identity proxy must go online from time to time

Slide 36: 

eBanking, Authentication 2. Bank system sends authentication request to Operator’s authentication service, based on user credentials (account number) 3. User enters his authentication PIN 4. Access to the bank service is allowed (if PIN is correct and certificate is valid) An introductory page is shown to the user. The user enters their PIN and the Signature is sent The user is given feedback on the result of the signing

Slide 37: 

What about regulations? Supportive legislation in most European countries Scandinavia is the leader of the pack Finland is a showcase in pro’s and con’s Initiatives in many countries Banking & finance are top sponsors

Implementation issues : 

Implementation issues SIM as a storage place for profiles: Most SIMs have passed Common Criteria certification High density SIMs provide tens to hundreds of megabytes of Flash memory for profiles Not much RAM is required. 1024-bit RSA signatures in ~200 ms. Software distribution can be done over-the-air (Sirett et al., CARDIS 2006)

Discussion : 

Discussion Benefits A terminal that the user can trust Easy time syncronisation Secure and certified storage for identity info Fast proximity transactions No need for extra hardware tokens Biometrics supported Privacy-aware Open for use by anyone: a public tool Drawbacks Electronic tickets with stored value not supported Not many NFC terminals Possible opposition by mobile network operators Requires installation of a J2ME applet Pseudonymous, not anonymous