Slide 1:FMCT Fissile Materiel Cut-Off Treaty Treaty on the Cessation of Production of Fissile Material for Use in Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices


Scheme of Presentation :Introduction ( Annie) Definitions ( What is fissile Materiel)( Ghaffar) Scope of the treaty ( Fauzia) Articles Summery ( Text Analyzed)( Bilal) Chronology of important events (Annie) Current Status of the treaty ( Stances of Nation States: South Asia, Far East, Europe n America, Middle East)( Annie) Linkages to other issues( Annie) Limitations & Debates on the treaty( Maimuna) Recommendations ( Tahir) Acknowledgements Scheme of Presentation


Introduction :Introduction In the post cold war era there was a dire need of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons to compelling nuclear arms races and to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. Negotiation of such a treaty was endorsed without a dissenting vote in 1993 by the United Nations General Assembly. (UN General Assembly Resolution 48/75L) The Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in 2000 agreed that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” should commence immediately in the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD final doc article VI) in Geneva, "with a view to their conclusion within five years.” Nevertheless, the CD has, for various reasons, not yet formally launched negotiations on such a treaty. The purpose of this treaty is to ban the Fissile Material production and eventual elimination of fissile material stockpiles.


Introduction(2) :In the discussion of the proposed treaty at the CD, two issues have been especially contentious: verification pre-existing stocks. The debate over whether the treaty should involve a ban on the use of some pre-existing stocks for weapons has even led to the use of two different names for the proposed treaty: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty FMCT Fissile Material Treaty. FM(C)T Introduction(2)


Definitions :The NPT does not provide any specific definition of fissile material. Paragraph one of Article 3 refers to safeguards on all “source or fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility.” (which is not covered by safeguards can and may be used for nuclear weapons and should be covered by the FMT). The US draft treaty contains the following definition of fissile material in Article II: Plutonium, except Plutonium whose isotopic composition includes 80% or greater Plutonium-238. Uranium containing a 20% or greater enrichment in the isotopes Uranium- 233 or Uranium-235, separately or in combination; or Any material that contains the material defined in (a) or (b) above. Definitions


Definitions ( Cont…) :“Produce Fissile Material” means:  To separate any fissile material from fission products in irradiated nuclear material; To enrich Plutonium-239 in Plutonium by any isotopic separation process; or To enrich Uranium 233 or Uranium-235 to enrichment of 20% or greater in those isotopes separately or in combination, by any isotopic separation process. Definitions ( Cont…)


Chronology :In pursuit of the UNGA resolution 48/75L, the CD started discussions for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a Fissile Material Treaty in 1994. CD decided to nominate Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada as a Special Coordinator to consult member states on the scope and the negotiating mandate of the proposed ad hoc committee. Ambassador Shannon submitted his report in March 1995, which was accepted by the CD. This is generally referred to as the Shannon Report/ The Report of the Special Coordinator, and is contained in document CD/1299. Chronology


Shannons Report :“The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad hoc Committee on a “ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” “Concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention.” “Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the committee only of the future production of fissile material.” “Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also past production.” “Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile material (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.” Shannons Report


Recent Developments :1998: CD FM( C) T Adhoc committee by Canada reconvene 1999. 2000: Amorim Proposal 2002: 5 Ambassidor”s Proposal ( A5) 2008: Draft Presidential Decision 2009: CD May 2009 Recent Developments


Text of the Treaty :Preamble Article I: Basic Undertakings Article II: Definitions Article III: Verification Article IV: Declarations Article V: The Organization Article VI: Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance Article VII: National Implementation Measures Article VIII: Settlement of Disputes Article IX: Protocols Article X: Amendments Article XI: Funding Article XII: Duration, Review and Withdrawal Article XIII: Entry into Force Article XIV: Reservations Article XV: Depositary Article XVI: Authentic Texts Text of the Treaty


Scope of the treaty :Should the Fissile Material Treaty be an arms control and disarmament measure or merely a measure for non-proliferation? The minimum element of the scope will be the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As all non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT are already prohibited from producing nuclear material for weapons, and the five NPT nuclear weapon states have already informally stopped production of nuclear materials for weapons, Scope of the treaty


Slide 13:Some countries, e.g. Japan, are of the view that once the treaty banning future production has entered into force, state parties possessing fissile material production facilities for use in nuclear weapons would have the obligation to convert those facilities to non-nuclear weapon use or to decommission them or to close them down altogether. Any reversion of such facilities to production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would have to be banned.


Scope (cont…) :The non-nuclear weapon states, on the other hand, would like the FMCT to also be a disarmament treaty and therefore have taken the position that any Fissile Material Treaty must provide for a transparent rendering of existing stockpiles of fissile material and contain mechanisms for bringing them under international safeguards. Any diversion of existing or future stocks of fissile material for non-nuclear weapons use to use in nuclear weapons would be equivalent to production and would have to be banned as well. Transfer of stocks to any third state for nuclear weapons use would also be banned. Scope (cont…)


Scope ( Cont…) :State parties must also assume the obligation not to assist any state in its efforts to produce or acquire fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The verification regime should be designed in accordance with the scope. Scope ( Cont…)


Slide 16:Stances of States upon the treaty South Asia Far East Europe & America Middle East


South Asian Stance :India and Pakistan agreed to participate in FMCT negotiation positively, in the aftermath of Nuclear tests because of US pressure. Pakistan has adopted ‘delaying tactics’ because it want to enhance it stock piles of fissile material to reduce the disparity with India. Furthermore Pakistan want FMCT as a disarmament measure. However, India indicated following benchmarks for the treaty: Treaty must be non-discriminatory. It must have equal obligations and responsibilities for all member states. It must be internationally and effectively verifiable. South Asian Stance


Pakistan’s Perspective :CD 27 August 2009 Ambassador Zamir Akram emphasied Permanent Representative of Pakistan to UN •Despite substantive difficulties with the text, Pakistan had joined the consensus on decision CD/1864 in order to enable the Conference to make across-the-board progress on all the four core issues and in return it was Pakistan's expectation that those issues would be addressed in the implementation of the decision. •Pakistan was confronted with "disappointing and alarming" maneuvers even on procedural issues on the part of some delegations. •Pakistan had a right to ask for flexibility from others since it had accepted several of the amendments proposed to it. Pakistan’s Perspective


Cont… :Pakistan was also alarmed by arguments that rotation of chairs of all bodies could not be accepted as a principle. There could be no understanding on the time frame for rotation. Similarly, the rules of procedure, which required negotiating the programme of work at the beginning of every year, had been sought to be bypassed, with suggestions that the present programme should be rolled over for next year and perhaps beyond. Pakistan strongly opposes if issues such as fissile materials will be negotiated outside of the conference. Cont…


Far Eastern Perspective :Far Eastern Perspective


Europe & America :Europe & America


Middle East :Middle East


A Gentleman's Words :A Gentleman's Words


Limitations of the treaty & Debates on the issue :Negotiations On Scope There are two possibilities: 1:The issue of scope could be resolved before substantive negotiations on other aspects of the treaty. Alternatively, the scope could be agreed upon as the negotiations proceed, as happened during negotiations on the CTBT where verification was negotiated before agreement on the scope of the treaty. 2:The latter approach created a problem since in determining the scope after verification procedures had been agreed upon, and so the loophole of sub-critical testing could not be plugged. As such many believe that it would be appropriate to resolve the issue of the scope of the treaty before the rest of the treaty is negotiated. The verification regime should be designed in accordance with the scope. Limitations of the treaty & Debates on the issue


Debates ( Cont…) :Dispute over Agreement & Purpose A number of non-nuclear-weapon states, however, argue that a fissile material treaty (they tend not to use the word "cutoff") should be not just a nonproliferation measure but a disarmament measure as well, limiting existing stockpiles of fissile material in addition to future production.  Pakistan has taken this position as well, given its fears over India's possibly larger stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Some critics of civilian plutonium reprocessing have gone further, and argued that a fissile cutoff should ban all separation of plutonium, not just separation of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Debates ( Cont…)


Debates ( Cont…) :No major governments participating in the talks appear to be taking this view, however.  At the same time, some analysts, seeing the deadlock over scope and purpose, have proposed redefining the cutoff as focusing not just on production, but on a broad spectrum of measures to improve security for nuclear material in the face of potential terrorism, including improved physical protection. Debates ( Cont…)


Recommendations & Policy Options for Pakistan :Pakistan’s position is that the management and the proportional reduction of existing stocks must also be a part of the Treaty to eliminate asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states. It has proposed that the treaty should be named Fissile Material Treaty and not just a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Recommendations & Policy Options for Pakistan


Recommendations ( Cont…) :On the issue of existing stockpiles, it is clear that Pakistan has the smallest stockpile of fissile material among all the nuclear weapons states including India. Pakistan has to decide whether it would like to keep its own stockpiles a secret or would be ready to bring them into the open. In other words, it has to decide whether its insistence on bringing the existing stockpiles within the ambit of the Treaty is a tactical ploy which can be given up at an appropriate time with or without a quid pro quo, or whether it is prepared, with the support of some non-nuclear weapon states, to make this a make or break issue for the Treaty. Recommendations ( Cont…)


Recommendations ( Cont…) :While the principle that the Treaty should be a disarmament measure and not merely a non-proliferation measure is unexceptional, Pakistan should consider taking the pragmatic course and drop its demand for inclusion of existing stocks in the treaty at an appropriate stage. If Pakistan is prepared to take the pragmatic line it would be better for it not to pursue the strong and categorical position it articulated during the thematic debate on the FMCT. By doing so Pakistan has made its possible retreat from this position somewhat difficult and embarrassing. Recommendations ( Cont…)


BEST OPTION FOR PAKISTAN :So Pakistan should focus on the FMCT and withdraw his position from FMT. BEST OPTION FOR PAKISTAN


Acknowlegements :Acknowlegements