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After World War II – A New Idea of Europe: 

After World War II – A New Idea of Europe European Security after the End of the WWII: Mainly decided between USA and Soviet Union; France, Britain and most European countries utterly exhausted after the War effort Harry S. Truman became US President on April 12, 1945; No Alternative to Global Collective Security; Allies should Establish and Preserve a New Peaceful International Order; International Disputes should not be settled by Force “Nothing is more essential to the future peace of the world than continued cooperation of the nations which had to muster the force necessary to defeat the conspiracy of the axis powers to dominate the world. While these great states have a special responsibility to enforce the peace, their responsibility is based upon the obligations resting upon all states, large and small, not to use force in international relations except in the defense of law.”

After World War II – A New Idea of Europe: 

After World War II – A New Idea of Europe Soviet Foreign Policy after end of WWII: Realpolitik approach i.e. carving of spheres of influence; bilateral approaches rather than broader consensus US Foreign Policy as a “reflection of the nation´s moral values”; based on “fundamental principles of righteousness and justice”; Cultural Gap between US and Soviet Union as main contributer to the emergence of the Cold War – H.Kissinger Churchill and the quest for European Unity, “from which no nation should be permanently outcast”; Churchill as the first and leading advocate of reconcilliation with Germany; also a means to counter the Soviet threat. “I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.”

France and the German Question: 

France and the German Question Truisms about France´s position on Germany: The major obsession of French policy was defence against Germany; France was not especially worried about a possible Russian threat; France was not interested to see a Western bloc balancing Soviet power in Europe France tended to deal with the problem of Germany in terms of traditional reflexes rather than in a pragmatic way – Herbert Tint France more worried about the possibility of German rearmament than the threat posed by Soviet Union Therefore, France was reluctant to align with the US and Britain in the immediate post WWII period Yet, having said that…

France and the German Question: 

France and the German Question Within French domestic political circles, the British-American sponsored policy of integrating Western Germany into the Western world was commonly accepted French political leadership increasingly in favour of the “Western Strategy”, that is to say, the policy of organising Western Germany as state integrated into the Western system economically, politically, culturally, and, ultimately, militarily; this strategy was perceived as solving both of the great problems of France, that of Germany and the Soviet Union Public Vs Private statements of the French political leadership In Public: No anti-Soviet policy; Wary of the Western Strategy; Importance of showing that France kept an independent, sovereign based foreign policy; The political strength of the French Communist Party did not allow for a clear pro-Western policy In Private: French leaders made it quite clear that they wanted to cooperate with their British and American colleagues on the German question but were held back by domestic political concerns

France and the German Question: 

France and the German Question Therefore, there was a real gap between official French (foreign) policy and what key policymakers really wanted to do To a certain extent, the official French rhetoric about Germany was a “convenient myth”, inasmuch as it provided the necessary political cover for a course of action (defence) against the Soviet threat At the same time, there was a basic Western consensus that Western Germany should be organised by the allied powers and integrated into a Western bloc rather than trying to manage a unified Germany together with Soviet Union The politics of Status Quo: Because Western countries were Status Quo powers, a Western Germany dependent on Western governments for protection would be a Germany locked into status quo as well i.e. not threatening

France and the German Question: 

France and the German Question The US and France´s Interests: “French preoccupation with Germany as a major threat at this time seems to us outmoded and unrealistic. Germany might possibly become a threat in the distant future, but in the meantime the real threat to France seems to us to be another power which will undoubtedly seek to utilize a substantial segment of the German economy if unable to get control of Germany. In our opinion, French security for many years to come will depend on the integration of Western Europe, including the western German economy. Unless Western Germany during the coming years is effectively associated with the Western European nations, first through economic arrangements, and ultimately perhaps in some political way, there is a real danger that the whole of Germany will be drawn into the eastern orbit, with obvious dire consequences for all of us.” – US Secretary of State George Marshall, February 1948

France and the German Question: 

France and the German Question Early stages of European Defence thinking: Western powers agreed that Western Europe had to be defended as far to the east as possible – Principle of Forward Defence If West Germany were to benefit from a system of security linked to that principle, then it was only fair that “she provided her own contribution” – the taboo on (West) German rearmament broken France agreed with German rearmament – “but only under the condition that the creation of these [German military] units be not or tend not to become a risk which might be mortal to the democracies. In other words, that these units be not large units, but be integrated into European Divisions.” – Jules Moch, Cabinet Minister in the French Government, October 1950

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda: 

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic security community: NATO represents as institutionalisation of a security community to respond to a specific threat i.e. Soviet Union – Thomas Risse-Kappen Having said that, a Western security community, with the US, Britain and France at its core, already existed before the end of WWII, meaning that the Soviet threat only reinforced specific institutional means of the community in question US and European Security: “The greatest danger to the security of the United States is the possible economic collapse in Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of Communist elements” – CIA policy brief, 1947 – Ideological threat having the upper hand over military power

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda: 

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda Western Europe considered vital to American security interests for historical reasons (WWI and WWII), and, most importantly, ideological ones (Western Europe seen as a cornerstone of the liberal, political and economic world order envisaged by the US) Not Soviet power per se, but rather the Soviet domestic order and its expansion in Eastern Europe that worked as a trigger for building a trasatlantic security community “The Cold War was launched in fiercely ideological terms as an invasion or deligitimation of the Other´s social order, a demonology combined of course with mythology of the everlasting virtues of one´s own domain. This is not surprising, considering the universalism of the respective ideologies” – Anders Stephanson

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda: 

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda Without NATO, what were the alternative options for the US: To confront the Soviet Union in a strictly bipolar way To negotiate bilateral security arrangements with some Western European countries i.e cherrypicking On the other hand Western European states were clearly interested in commiting the US to the defence of Europe and its interests i.e. to transform the growing sense of Soviet threat into a firm US commitment to European Security The creation of NATO as a three-level game: US domestic politics and perceived national interests that were also at stake in Europe; transgovernmental consensus building; intergovernmental bargaining process across the Atlantic community to be

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda: 

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda NATO and the advantages of creating a multilateral institution: It enhanced the legitmacy of American leadership by giving the Western Europeans a say in the decision-making process; an alliance based on democratic principles, norms and decision-making rules; the indivisibility of the mutual security assistance procedure A liberal interpretation of NATO´s origins: The Cold War came to be as a result of the clash of fundamentally different worldviews about the domestic and international order for the post WWII era Western democracies perceived a threat to their fundamental values resulting from the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe; having said that, a Western liberal collective identity already existed prior to the Soviet threat; as a consequence, NATO became a way of institutionalising the transatlantic security community so as to find ways to deal with such threat while, on the other hand, reinforcing that same collective identity

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda: 

NATO as Security Provider: A Cold War Agenda Those same common values and the collective identity allowed for the creation of a multilateral organisation based on democratic principles and decision rules The normative power of those same principles and ideas also allowed for a balanced division of labour between the US and Western European states in the ways in which both helped to define and shape European Security during the Cold War, including nuclear arms control In conclusion, NATO (that of the Cold War period) should be conceptualised as going beyond formal interstate relations; rather, it came to life as a result of complex transnational and transgovernmental coalition building processes, that in many ways were to be replicated during the different processes of European integration

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