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Webbers Falls, Oklahoma Robert Y. Love Allision With the I-40 Bridge May 26, 2002: 

Webbers Falls, Oklahoma Robert Y. Love Allision With the I-40 Bridge May 26, 2002

Slide3: 

Estimated track of the towboat Robert Y. Love and tow

Parties to the Investigation: 

Parties to the Investigation Federal Highway Administration U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Department of Justice State of Oklahoma Magnolia Marine Transport Company

Issues: 

Issues The captain’s incapacitation and countermeasures for such an event Bridge protection, including risk assessment Mitigation of loss of life, including motorist warning systems

On-Scene Investigative Staff: 

On-Scene Investigative Staff George Black Member Bob Barlett On-Scene Coordination Michele Beckjord Survival Factors Chris Voeglie Vehicle Factors Dennis Collins Human Performance Robert Accetta Highway and Evidence Documentation Mark Bagnard Evidence Documentation

On-Scene Investigative Staff (cont): 

On-Scene Investigative Staff (cont) James Scheffer Marine IIC and Operations Theodore White Marine Survival Factors Tom Roth-Roffy Marine Engineering Jamie Estock Marine Human Performance Keith Holloway Public Affairs Ken Suydam Investigator-in-Charge

Report Development Staff: 

Report Development Staff Dr. Mitch Garber Medical Officer Joe Gregor GPS James Skeen Meteorology Bill Woody Marine Human Performance Leon Katcharian Marine Report Writer Don Tyrrell Marine Report Writer/Manager

Report Development Staff (Cont): 

Report Development Staff (Cont) Mike Brown Recommendations Ed Pacchetti Recommendations Debbie Taylor Editor Michele McMurtry Project Manager

Human Performance Issues: 

Human Performance Issues Dennis Collins

Robert Y. Love Captain: 

Robert Y. Love Captain 60 year-old male 40 years on inland towing vessels 29 years licensed as operator With current company 11 years Captain of Love since February 2001 Held a current license Normal vision, hearing

Issues: 

Issues Several excluded Workload Training, experience, qualifications Alcohol / illicit / prescription drugs Two factors of interest Fatigue Medical condition

Captain’s Work Schedule: 

Captain’s Work Schedule Normally 30 days on, 15 days off Stood “Captain’s watches” 0600 – 1200 1800 – 2400 Normal industry schedule Schedule changed prior to the accident

Slide17: 

23 May 24 May 25 May 26 May 12 6 12 6 12 AM PM AM

Sleep Deficit: 

Sleep Deficit Captain had a sleep deficit Between Jennie Dehmer and Robert Y. Love 1038 miles 20.5 hours in a car Slept 3.5 hours Several disruptions to usual schedule

Other Information: 

Other Information Sleep deficit may not have caused incapacitation Slept at least 5 hours Loss of consciousness “all at once” His position after the allision Visual problems, disorientation Loss of consciousness atypical of fatigue

Medical Issues: 

Medical Issues Mitch Garber

Captain’s Statements: 

Captain’s Statements No recollection for last 1/3 mile (4 minutes) No recollection of allision Found himself wedged in crouched position between console and chair Initially could not visually focus or get oriented

Syncope (Faint): 

Syncope (Faint) Loss of consciousness due to interruption of blood flow to brain Typically, consciousness is restored rapidly after individual falls Space did not allow complete fall

Syncope (Faint): 

Syncope (Faint) Possible causes Certain heart conditions Dehydration Rising too quickly Certain types of migraines Not associated with fatigue

Preaccident Conditions: 

Preaccident Conditions No significant diagnoses Recent dizzy spells at home (attributed to overexertion from yard work) 4 days prior, dizzy spell with nausea while on another vessel No other symptoms

Postaccident Testing: 

Postaccident Testing Comprehensive evaluation at local regional medical center Results normal except blocked coronary artery with no effect on heart function Later electrophysiological study (EPS) generated serious abnormal rhythms Implanted defibrillator – no shocks, no symptoms

Postaccident Testing: 

Postaccident Testing Cardiac catheterization, EPS done, despite negative noninvasive evaluation With normal nuclear medicine stress test, invasive testing not essential Without loss of consciousness, invasive testing would not have been pursued Preaccident evaluation would not have been abnormal

Toxicology: 

Toxicology Diphenhydramine (Benadryl®) at low levels in captain’s blood and urine Consistent with reported ingestion of two tablets of Benadryl® the night before the accident Diphenhydramine is impairing and sedating, but substantial effects unlikely at low levels detected

Alerter Systems and Safe Transit Procedures: 

Alerter Systems and Safe Transit Procedures James Scheffer

Wheelhouse Alerter Systems: 

Wheelhouse Alerter Systems Two systems under evaluation by three inland towing companies Monitoring of rudder movement Monitoring of physical motion

Slide32: 

Rudder Controls

Slide34: 

Wheelhouse Motion Detection

Wheelhouse Alerter Systems: 

Wheelhouse Alerter Systems Promising safety improvement Three companies independently evaluating these systems

Safe Transit Procedures: 

Safe Transit Procedures Identify bridges subject to allisions Develop best practices for transiting bridges Route familiarization Sharing of near-miss information Removal and alteration of bridges Crew Endurance Management Systems

Crew Endurance Management Systems: 

Crew Endurance Management Systems Develop a system to manage risk factors Ensure sufficient hours of uninterrupted sleep Demonstration project Eight companies 40 towing vessels 150 CEMS coaches

Crew Endurance Management Systems: 

Crew Endurance Management Systems The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 The Secretary shall conduct and report to Congress on the results of a demonstration project involving the implementation of Crew Endurance Management Systems on towing vessels

Bridge Protection: 

Bridge Protection Michele McMurtry

Slide41: 

Source: ODOT N Source: ODOT

Slide42: 

N

Pier Protection: 

Pier Protection 1960s - Pier protection not required 1970 - Vessel traffic near bridge 1977 and 1980 - Damage on channel piers 1982 - Application to install protection cells No standards

Accidents Outside of Navigation Channel: 

Accidents Outside of Navigation Channel Pier protection inside navigation channel Bridge struck outside navigation channel

Slide45: 

Benjamin Harrison Bridge James River, Hopewell, Virginia (1977) Source: Virginia DOT

Slide46: 

Sunshine Skyway Bridge Tampa, Florida (1980) Source: St. Petersburg Times

Slide47: 

Judge William Seeber Bridge New Orleans, Louisiana (1993)

Slide48: 

Bayou Canot RR Bridge Mobile, Alabama (1993)

Slide49: 

Queen Isabella Causeway South Padre Island, Texas (2001)

Accidents Outside of Navigation Channel: 

Accidents Outside of Navigation Channel Previous accidents demonstrate Most bridges can be struck outside navigation channel Increases complexity of bridge protection

Protecting All Bridge Piers: 

Protecting All Bridge Piers Pier protection cells I-40 bridge would cost $6.8 million 2,844 highway bridges requiring permits Multiple piers vulnerable to vessel impact

AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications: 

AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications Bridge’s risk to collision and collapse Load and resistance factor design (LRFD) In 2007, LRFD will be the Federal-aid bridge standard Florida is using for new bridge design

AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications (cont): 

AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications (cont) Louisiana using to evaluate existing bridges Oklahoma evaluating 12 existing river crossings Not mandatory to evaluate vulnerability of existing bridges

Sufficiency Rating System: 

Sufficiency Rating System Method of measuring one bridge’s needs against another Relative risk of a bridge to extreme events Vessel or vehicle collisions Flooding, including scour and debris loading Seismic events Terrorist attacks Not part of the sufficiency rating formula

Sufficiency Rating System (cont): 

Sufficiency Rating System (cont) Tools are available Risks to extreme events can be included in a bridge’s sufficiency rating Balance needs while not ignoring conditions that can lead to catastrophic events

Motorist Warning Systems: 

Motorist Warning Systems Robert Accetta

Available Sight Distance: 

Available Sight Distance Passenger cars and truck tractor semi-trailers East and westbound directions Total stopping distances exceeded available sight distances

Slide58: 

Westbound

Slide59: 

Eastbound

Motorist Warning Systems Installed After Bridge Accidents: 

Motorist Warning Systems Installed After Bridge Accidents Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in Louisiana Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Florida Queen Isabella Causeway in Texas

Lake Pontchartrain Warning System: 

Lake Pontchartrain Warning System Marine radar system scans lake for vessels Hazard lighting system uses yellow flashing lights Police monitor marine frequencies and post messages on variable message signs Coast Guard is notified for enforcement action

Sunshine Skyway Bridge Warning System : 

Sunshine Skyway Bridge Warning System Digital message signs high winds Bridge span continuity warning system less than totally dependable

Slide63: 

Queen Isabella Causeway

Queen Isabella Causeway Motorist Warning System: 

Queen Isabella Causeway Motorist Warning System Fiber-optic cable “STOP WHEN FLASHING, DANGER” warning signs Gates at both ends of causeway Red flashing signals in both directions

Slide65: 

Fiber-Optic Cable Source: TXDOT

Slide66: 

Fiber Circuit Breaker and Fiber Optics Source: TXDOT

Slide67: 

Queen Isabella Causeway Source: TXDOT

Slide68: 

Red Warning Signals Source: TXDOT

Queen Isabella Causeway Motorist Warning System: 

Queen Isabella Causeway Motorist Warning System If the fiber-optic cable is severed – Signals before break flash red – Signals beyond break do not flash Automatically calls police and Coast Guard

Slide72: 

Motorist Warning Systems FHWA working to improve reliability of long-term instrumentation March 2004 Structural Health Monitoring initiative Neither AASHTO nor the FHWA provide guidance on the use of these systems