Air Transport in the 21st Century: Air Transport in the 21st Century Strong evidence to show that our global system is dependent upon air travel
Civil aviation began in 1920s with earlier precursor in Germany pre-WW I
High costs restricted widespread use of air travel
But since 1960s declining costs have made recreational air travel commonplace
Air freight increasingly important
What are the defining characteristics of contemporary air transport?
Technology Driven Industry: Technology Driven Industry Through a cascade of innovations, technology has dramatically altered the size, range, speed and safety of aircraft
Boeing 777 – advanced technology and extended range, smaller crew
Airbus 380- 555 passengers, range of 9,200 miles and 30% larger payload than the Boeing 747-400 and operating costs 15-30 % lower
The Dominance of Boeing and Airbus: The Dominance of Boeing and Airbus These two firms account for virtually all sales of aircraft with >100 seats
Aircraft manufacturing is a huge global production network
B777 uses 3 million parts
Japanese (fuselage), Italian (wing flaps), Canada (landing gears) and others are involved
Highly competitive business with huge lobbying efforts required
Does Airbus have an unfair advantage?
Technology Dynamics: Technology Dynamics Concorde became the travel mode for the ultra-rich
Mach 2 at 58,500 feet
But extremely expensive and noisy
Plus plagued by safety doubts
Retired in October, 2003
Boeing 7E7 www.newairplane.com: Boeing 7E7 www.newairplane.com New environmentally sensitive aircraft 2007
15-20% less fuel than conventional wide bodies
200-250 passengers
7,500-8,000 nautical miles (Seattle-Moscow, Sydney- Dallas, Paris- Honolulu, Shanghai- Johannesburg)
Mach .85 (85% of Speed of Sound)
Rise of the Airline Industry: Rise of the Airline Industry Prior to 2001, five decades of uninterrupted growth: strong passenger and cargo growth
Air fares have declined to make air travel more accessible to larger numbers of people
Postwar safe and secure setting- pax Americana
Broad geographic scale of economic activity
Liberalization and greater freedom to set fares and open up new routes
Deregulation of the U.S. Airline Industry: Deregulation of the U.S. Airline Industry Prior to 1978 airlines were subject to regulation by Civil Aeronautics Board
Regulated level and structure of fares, entry of new carriers in general and in specific links
In 40 years of regulation no new entry occurred in scheduled services
Why regulation?
Reasons for Regulation: Reasons for Regulation Felt necessary to insure future economic growth
Depression era produced a suspicion of free markets and potential havoc
Feeling that excessive competition would produce instability in the infant industry
Protect profitability of individual carriers and constrain growth of larger carriers
Winds of Change: Deregulation: Winds of Change: Deregulation By late 1970s restrictive policies of CAB came under attack
Proponents of less government influence argued that lack of competitive threat dampened incentives for efficient airline operations
Restrictions on price competition forced airlines to pursue non-price strategies such as: schedule frequency, non-stop services, in-flight amenities
Result was that airlines charged excessive fares and offered inefficient levels of service.
Paid too little attention to controlling labor and other costs- no competitive pressures to deliver
Airline Deregulation Act 1978: Airline Deregulation Act 1978 Gradual decontrol took place and CAB was phased out by 1985
Initial consequences: downward pressure on fares and ‘price wars’
Load factors (level of occupancy) increased
Route rationalization –see next slide
New aggressive entry- 25 new carriers between 1978 and 1982
Continued increase in employment
Route Rationalization: Route Rationalization Basically how can and have carriers changed their routing to enhance competitive position?
Increase average length of haul- add longer routes and delete shorter ones
Minimize cost of serving market and fare by flying larger aircraft at high load factors-use of wide bodies
Route diversification: reduce seasonality, improve traffic mix: tourism, elderly, business, education
Improve fleet utility
Hub and Spoke Networks: Hub and Spoke Networks
Changes in Route Structure: Changes in Route Structure Prior to deregulation services were taking place on a point-to-point basis.
Two airline companies (red and blue) are servicing a network of major cities.
Some direct connections exist, but mainly at the expense of the frequency of services and high costs (if not subsidized).
Also, many cities are serviced by the two airlines and connections are inconvenient.
Changes in Route Structure: Changes in Route Structure With deregulation, hub-and-spoke networks emerge
Consequence is each airline assumes dominance over a hub (red airline over the orange hub and blue airline over the light blue hub) and services are modified so the two hubs are connected to several spokes.
Both airlines tend to compete for flights between their hubs and may do so for specific spokes, if demand warrants it.
However, as network matures, it becomes increasingly difficult to compete at hubs as well as at spokes, mainly because of economies of agglomeration.
Changes in Route Structure: Changes in Route Structure As an airline assumes dominance of a hub, it reaches oligopolistic (if not monopolistic) control and may increase airfares for specific segments.
The advantage of such a system for airlines is the achievement of a regional market dominance and higher plane loads, while passengers benefit from better connectivity
But there are delays for connections and need to change planes more frequently
Advantages of Hub and Spoke: Advantages of Hub and Spoke By combining passengers with different origins and destinations, average passengers per flight will increase
Traffic feed permits more frequent service or service with larger aircraft
Either service strategy allows carrier to realize density economies
For example double # of flights w/o increasing ground crew
Larger aircraft more economical in fuel use and labor costs
Density economies allow larger carriers to offset input costs advantages of new entrants
Changing Winds Again : 1990s: Changing Winds Again : 1990s Airlines order new, efficient and expensive aircraft anticipating increased air travel
Higher jet fuel prices
Depressed economy reduces demand
Gulf War frightens tourist traffic
Inefficiencies of hub and spoke raised
Both United and American turn over short unprofitable routes to low cost or commuter airlines
Demise of Eastern and Pan Am- Continental and TWA bankruptcy
Low fare entrants: Southwest
September 11 further impacts carriers
Crisis in the Airlines: Crisis in the Airlines Global airline industry suffered worst year ever in 2001- losing US$11.6 billion
Sabena and Swissair collapsed
United Airlines and US Air announced bankruptcy-both are still under Chapter 11 currently
Huge number of aircraft were idled
What is the cause(s) of this state?
Causes of Airline Crisis: Causes of Airline Crisis Airline industry has never really been profitable- why?
Ordering of aircraft years in advance tends to foster boom-bust cycle
Pervasive involvement of state has diverted industry’s emphasis on profit making
Romance of air travel draws overinvestment
Economists argue that this is an “empty core” industry meaning a tendency towards unprofitability
Structure of Airline Costs: Structure of Airline Costs Fixed/Overhead- carrier’s capital especially aircraft 17 %
Operating-Direct-dependent on type of aircraft: flight crew, fuel, maintenance, depreciation, landing fees, leasing 60 %
Operating-Indirect- passenger related: passenger services, ticketing, station and ground costs, administrative 23%
Labor Costs: Labor Costs Labor costs represent significant proportion of total operating costs
1998 North America: USAir 40%; Delta 39%; United 38%
1998 Europe: Air France 34%; BA 28%; KLM 28%
1998 Asia: Korean 17%; Thai 17%; SIA 17%; JAL 15%
Strategies for Reducing Labor Costs: Strategies for Reducing Labor Costs Private European carriers set crisis measures to reduce costs
State owned carriers reduced costs as part of restructuring to qualify for EC aid
Renegotiate terms and conditions of employment and cut staff numbers
Set up low cost subsidiaries with lower wage scales-outsourcing loss making routes to low cost carriers
Stock options for employees- UA offered shares to unions and 3 of 12 seats on Board in exchange for pay cuts
The Plight of US Airways: The Plight of US Airways In early days of deregulation, USAir one of most profitable—monopoly in Northeast
Wave of consolidation- USAir purchased Pacific Southwest and Piedmont --# 6 rank
Both had lower cost structures but USAir rejected this
1990s scaled back and plugged plug on western routes but did not scale down crew bases, reservations centers, and training facilities
Lead in east with hubs at Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and Charlotte—captive travelers
CEO Wolf returns airline to profitability: Airbus fleet, European destinations, closed facilities
US Airways Plight cont’d: US Airways Plight cont’d Convinced pilots’ union to let airline buy regional jets
Made labor concessions in exchange and to stave off strikes
Endured by charging high fares to business customers but undermined by Internet
In 2000 acquired by United for $4.3 bil and assumption of $7.3 bil debt
Sept 11 hurt by slowdown and entered bankruptcy--$900 mil loan guaranteed from Federal government allows it to emerge
Southwest forced competition at Philadelphia hub-back to bankruptcy
The Regional Jet Phenomenon: The Regional Jet Phenomenon Additional impact of deregulation was growth of feeder airlines
Growth of RJs- 50 and 70 seat aircraft
Range and speed of larger jets
Cost less to purchase $23 mil vs $52 mil A320
Burn less fuel
Crews paid less
Allows airlines to cope with fluctuating demand
No Frills Airlines: No Frills Airlines Financial viability of airlines is uncertain
One response is to create low-cost, no-frills operations
Lower fares, select destinations, no food, e-tickets, first come seat assignments, strict baggage allowance
One type of aircraft: B737 or A320
Such carriers now account for 20% of seats nationwide
No Frills Prototype: No Frills Prototype Southwest Airlines begun over 30 years ago by Herb Kelleher
4th largest airline in U.S., 64 mil passengers annually to over 60 cities
355 aircraft less than 9 years old
Based upon sound management principles
Operates in largely short haul, low margin markets and eschews hub and spoke to better use aircraft and personnel in quick turnaround
Southwest Airlines: Southwest Airlines
jetBlue Airways: jetBlue Airways
Air Tran Airlines: Air Tran Airlines
Where the Future Touches Down:Airports in a Globalizing World: Where the Future Touches Down: Airports in a Globalizing World Huge increases in air traffic have concentrated in a handful of airports
Hubs paramount feature of the industry
Major hubs whether for passenger or cargo articulate relations between regional economies and broader global economy
Thus governments at all levels have invested heavily in new airports and upgrades
Major Passenger and Cargo Airports2002 Passengers (mil) and (metric tons): Major Passenger and Cargo Airports 2002 Passengers (mil) and (metric tons) (1) Atlanta 76.9 (2) Chicago (66.5) (3) London Heathrow (63.3) (4) Tokyo (61.1) (5) LAX (56.2) (6) DFW (52.8) (7) FKT (48)
(1) Memphis (3390) (2) Hong Kong (2516) (3) Anchorage (2027) (4) Tokyo Narita (2000) (5) LAX (1758) (6) Seoul (1705) (7) Singapore (1660) (8) FKT (1631) (9) Miami (1624) (10) NY-JFK (1574) (11) Louisville (1523)
Atlanta Hartsfield IAhttp://www.aci-na.org/docs/US_Econ_Impact.pdf : Atlanta Hartsfield IA http://www.aci-na.org/docs/US_Econ_Impact.pdf 75 million passengers annually
45K direct jobs,3.5K air freight, 2.1 ground transport
Total payroll $1.9 bil
Indirect impact of $3.8 bil on local-regional economy
$17.3 bil total annual regional impact
Ultra-Global Hubs: Singapore’s ChangiAirport: Ultra-Global Hubs: Singapore’s Changi Airport Opened in July 1981
2002 Passengers 29 mil
2002 Cargo 1,660,000 metric tons
In 2006 Terminal 3 additions will add 20 mil passenger capacity bringing total to 64 mil
Free Skytrain service between the terminals
Mini edge city shopping
Malaysia’s Super Multi Media Corridor: Malaysia’s Super Multi Media Corridor
Kuala Lumpur InternationalAirport www.klia.com.my: Kuala Lumpur International Airport www.klia.com.my Opened in 1998
Express rail link 27 minutes from downtown KL
Part of the Super Multi Media Corridor technology drive
Destination itself
Competing with Changi
Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam: Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam
9th largest in world
40,736,009 passengers in 2001 and a 3 % AGR
1,288,624 metric tons in 2001 and a 4.4 % AGR
Gateway to a nation with strong travel industry
http://www.schiphol.nl
Bluegrass Non-Stop Destinations: Bluegrass Non-Stop Destinations Y2000- 4 non-stops Y2005-12 non-stops
New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Washington, DC
Atlanta, Charlotte, Orlando, Dallas, Houston, Memphis, St Louis
Chicago ORD and Midway, Cincinnati, Detroit, Cleveland
To be added in Y05-07-Denver and Minneapolis
4-5 percent increases in traffic per annum
Slide43: Direct Flight Connections 2004
Controversies and Externalities: Controversies and Externalities Noise and conflicting land uses are the major problems
Noise pollution severely limited the utility of the Concorde because it could not attain supersonic speed over land
Airports occupy relatively little land area—O’Hare occupies only 9 sq mi- but proximity to cities is critical
New runways and runway extensions are controversial topics
O’Hare Airport Expansionhttp://www.flychicago.com/ohare/about/about.shtm: O’Hare Airport Expansion http://www.flychicago.com/ohare/about/about.shtm FAA approves $15 billion expansion to nation’s most delay prone airport
8 Year plan calls for 6 parallel and two diagonal runways
440 acres expansion requires city purchase and raze 550 homes, relocate 200 businesses and a cemetery dating to 1800s
Claim to save $12 billion over two decades by reducing passenger and aircraft delays