Characteristics of War : Characteristics of War · Use or threat of lethal force Counterexample: "economic warfare" · Organized and premeditated War is not anarchy Counterexample: ethnic riots · Socially legitimate and generally highly constrained by social norms In theory, violence is primarily directed against other military forces War is not a breakdown of international law; it is part of the established system Counterexample: organized crime


Characteristics of War contd…: Characteristics of War contd… · Political Sovereign state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence Counterexample: feuds, duels · International Counterexample: civil war and revolution   This is the "Clausewitzian model" after Carl von Clausewitz, 1780-1831, who wrote On War. It does not necessarily describe the contemporary system...


Historical Evolution of War : Historical Evolution of War HEROIC 3000BCE - ? almost everywhere   CLASSICAL MODELS Nomadic cavalry 2000 BCE - 1300 Huns, Vikings, Mongols Imperial 2000 BC - 1700 Sumer, Rome, China Feudal 500 - 1350 Europe; Japan TRANSITION FROM CLASSICAL TO MODERN 1350 - 1450: Defeat of heavy cavalry by pike, longbow 1450 - 1550: Use of gunpowder to destroy castles; economic power becomes prerequisite for military power 1550 - 1650: "New Model" militaries; efficient centralized taxation systems


Historical Evolution of War continued…: Historical Evolution of War continued… MODERN PRE-INDUSTRIAL 1650 - 1850: "Age of Limited War" trade and colonial wars Napoleonic Wars INDUSTRIAL 1850 - 1950: "Age of Total War"; major changes in transportation, production, communication; democratization   NUCLEAR AND (?) 1950 - present Nuclear arms race (1950-1995) Global availability of industrial weapons Increase in the influence of militarized non-state actors


Heroic Model : Heroic Model Emphasizes individual rather than group Highly ritualized and seasonal Emphasizes acts of bravery rather than killing or holding territory Frequently combined with cattle theft Involves all young males; no specialization Examples in fiction: Iliad and Odyssey (Homer) any movie starring Errol Flynn, John Wayne, Sylvester Stallone, Chuck Norris, Jackie Chan, or Arnold Schwarzenegger most comic books/graphic novels and video games


CLASSICAL MODELS: Nomadic : CLASSICAL MODELS: Nomadic Retains many elements of the heroic model in the emphasis on individual; most males in society are involved in seasonal fighting. Political leadership is based on military ability; leadership usually based on merit rather than birth Military advantage is mobility due to horse or ships Economic base is raiding, which is difficult to sustain over long periods.


CLASSICAL MODELS: Imperial: CLASSICAL MODELS: Imperial Urban base: Associated with walled cities and centralized political authority Highly disciplined group activity; phalanx system can resist both cavalry and unorganized "barbarians" operating on the heroic model Military is a distinct class with specialized skills and technology Political leaders still in command but most fighting is done by paid professionals Objective is conquest of territory, which is controlled through efficient movement of troops Economic base is taxation and imperial landholdings Substantially more lethal than heroic combat


CLASSICAL MODELS: Feudal: CLASSICAL MODELS: Feudal Rural base in local agriculture; power is highly decentralized Emphasis on heavy cavalry and holding defensive strongpoint (forts and castles). Military specialization is limited to a very small part of society. Political leaders do most of the fighting [or conversely, fighters do most of the leading, such as it is.] A literate, semi-independent bureaucracy may develop, e.g. Catholic church and monasteries in Europe; Confucian bureaucracy in China] to handle most of the governing.


Imperial vs. Feudal Systems : Imperial vs. Feudal Systems These form a continuum: Imperial systems can be consolidated out of a feudal system the Chinese system cycled between imperial and feudal models several times When an imperial system weakens, local political/military leaders take control and it becomes a feudal system the urban leadership of an empire is always vulnerable to successful military leaders on the periphery this was the fate of the numerous attempts during medieval Europe to re-establish the Roman Empire


FEUDAL TO MODERN TRANSITION I (Military counterpart of the Westphalian Transition) : FEUDAL TO MODERN TRANSITION I (Military counterpart of the Westphalian Transition) “The first modern army that could not have been defeated by the army of Alexander the Great [330 BCE] was probably the army of Gustavus Adolphus [1620 AD]” Col T.N. Dupuy, US Army 1300 - 1450: Neutralization of heavy cavalry Heavy cavalry are neutralized by peasant weapons: English longbow, Swiss and Dutch pike; Italian crossbow Switch from feudal levies (demands for labor) to taxation (demands for cash). This leads to the development of independent mercenary corps and allows central governments more flexibility vis a vis the nobility.


FEUDAL TO MODERN TRANSITION II: FEUDAL TO MODERN TRANSITION II 1450 - 1550: Castle Busting Gunpowder is introduced in field artillery and by the end of the period is able to destroy fixed fortifications (e.g. fall of Constantinople in 1453; defeat of English fixed fortification system by the French under Charles VII). Taxation system is expanded; rise of capitalism means there is more to tax; development of city-states provides power independent of the landed nobility. Temporary development of merchant states (cities) employing mercenary forces. Italian and German city-states. Non-warriors gain political control through control of money


FEUDAL TO MODERN TRANSITION III: FEUDAL TO MODERN TRANSITION III 1550 - 1650: New Model Armies Gunpowder used in small arms, which requires money, expertise and logistics Greater emphasis on training and expertise throughout the military Average size of military unit reduces from 5000 men to 100 men, increasing tactical flexibility Professional military with firearms is able to defeat both heavy cavalry (i.e. nobility) and pike or crossbow formations (i.e. peasants and merchants) Military is used to enhance taxation systems and ultimately supports the centralized absolutist state


Early Modern Transition: 1600-1850: Early Modern Transition: 1600-1850 Technological: gunpowder; then industrialization "Rationalization": war shifts from the heroic model to a Clausewitzian political model Centralization: monopoly of violence (and taxation) by the centralized state Commercialization: rise of trade and colonial wars rather than wars for simple control of local territory Professionalization: aristocracy ceases to be effectively involved in warfare Scientific revolution: gradual set of technological changes that leading to Industrial Revolution, plus increase in literacy.


Napoleonic Wars: 1790-1815: Napoleonic Wars: 1790-1815 Nationalism and military conscription dramatically increases the size of armies. However, size is still constrained by Inability to produce quality weapons—technology in firearms used for hunting for about fifty years ahead of military technology Lack of long-distance communication Logistical support is inadequate to support large numbers of troops


INDUSTRIALIZATION OF WARFARE:1850-1914: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF WARFARE: 1850-1914 repeating rifle; later the machine gun steel cannon telegraph balloon reconnaissance movement of troops and supplies by rail armored steamship literate citizen armies chemical explosives replace black powder control of epidemic disease and some tropical diseases


INDUSTRIALIZATION OF WARFARE:1914 - 1945: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF WARFARE: 1914 - 1945 tank and armored personnel carrier movement of troops and supplies by road rather than rail strategic bomber; fighter aircraft, radar and modern anti-aircraft systems; parachute troops and effective amphibious warfare long-range strategic missiles (V1 and V2) aircraft carrier submarine radio communication antibiotics nuclear weapons modern economic planning allows mobilization of most of population


INDUSTRIALIZATION OF WARFARE: 1945 - present: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF WARFARE: 1945 - present helicopter (introduced in Korean War) satellite reconnaissance effective personal anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons "smart" offensive weapons


Obsolescence of War Arguments : Obsolescence of War Arguments Most wars now result in the restoration of the status quo ante Due to nationalism democratization, new territory is difficult to control politically International system has delegitimated aggressive war Economic well-being is only loosely linked to the control of population and territory; trading is less risky than fighting Nuclear weapons make war between the major powers too destructive Globalization of military technology makes intervention by major powers anywhere in the world increasingly risky Violent conflict increasingly involves sub-national and unconventional forces rather than regular, national forces


WAR IN THE 1980s: WAR IN THE 1980s Attacker Target Outcome                               Libya Chad status quo Israel PLO/Lebanon PLO removed; status quo Syria Lebanon Syria achieves control after civil war Argentina Great Britain status quo (Falkland/Malvinas) USSR Afghanistan status quo Iraq Iran status quo USA Libya status quo Ethiopia Eritrea Eritrean forces win in 1991 South Africa Angola status quo South Africa Namibia Namibia achieves independence with UN mediation Vietnam Cambodia Vietnam withdraws; UN mediation USA Grenada USA achieves control after coup Morocco Spanish Sahara Morocco annexes territory


"Operational Bombing Doctrine" : "Operational Bombing Doctrine" 1. Locate everything using satellite reconnaissance and remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs). 2. Suppress air defenses using specialized weapons, including F-22 3. Destroy high-value fixed military targets such as defense ministry infrastructure, airfield control towers, fuel and ammunition depots, and communications facilities using cruise missiles and long-range bombers (B-2, B-52) 4. Destroy mobile capital intensive equipment -- tanks and aircraft -- using fighter-bombers with laser-guided munitions targeted by special forces and RPVs. 5. Allow local forces to defeat opponent on the ground. Examples: Iraq (partially), Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan


Advantages of operational bombing : Advantages of operational bombing 1. It has worked so far. 2. Produces very, very few US casualties 3. Civilian casualties are limited compared to the strategic bombing campaigns of WWII, Vietnam 4. Only the US has this capability


Disadvantages of operational bombing : Disadvantages of operational bombing 1. It does not result in US control on the ground -- essentially it creates a military power vacuum that brings in the second-strongest force in the area, whoever that happens to be. If you don't like that second-strongest force (e.g. in Iraq 1991 and 2003, an independent Kurdistan in the north and a Shi'a state allied with Iran in the south), the approach is not effective. 2. Only works against a conventional military force that has fixed, capital-intensive assets. For example, this would not work against drug cartels or an urban terrorist cell (e.g. al-Qaeda). 3. Near-zero US casualties makes this very attractive to civilian leadership. This may make it more likely that the US will abandon an operation if there are sudden, conspicuous casualties, as happened in Lebanon and Somalia. 4. By re-writing the rules of the game, it makes most of the US military—notably the parts designed to kill Russians in Germany— irrelevant. E.g. situation of British navy in 1890. 5. System substantially damages civilian infrastructure—electricity, roads and bridges, communication—which makes a subsequent occupation more difficult, weakens the new government, and increases the costs of repairs.


Lessons learned from recent US military engagements: pre-Iraq : Lessons learned from recent US military engagements: pre-Iraq 1. Tanks are not necessarily a dominant weapon -- they are too slow to deploy, too easy to target, and can't operate many places we need them. This mostly applies to helicopters as well. 2. Existing equipment already gives the US air superiority -- there is no [military] need for the Joint Strike Fighter. 3. Long-range bombers are still very important. The B-52 is the equivalent of the British ship-of-the-line, which might last a century or more. 4. It is very unlikely that we will deploy large numbers of troops. Mobile, well-trained, specialized forces are more important. The size of the military could probably be reduced substantially with no loss of US effectiveness. 5. High technology weapons that are essentially robotic are very important.


Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq”: Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq” 1.“Do not try to do too much with your own hands.” 2. Act quickly, because every army of liberation has a half-life before it becomes an army of occupation. 3. Money is ammunition. 4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success. 5. Analyze “costs and benefits” before each operation. 6. Intelligence is the key to success. 7. Everyone must do nation-building. 8. Help build institutions, not just units. 9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier. 10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations. 11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders. 12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants. 13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders. 14. A leader’s most important task is to set the right tone. Source: MILITARY REVIEW 86,1:1-12 (January-February 2006 )


Lessons learned from Iraq [so far…] : Lessons learned from Iraq [so far…] 1. The US still does not face any peer competitors, consequently almost all warfare is asymmetric 2. Stability operations are equal in importance to combat operations 3. Stabilization of a potentially-hostile population takes a force to population ratio of somewhere between 1:20 and 1:50. This very substantially limits even the US, particularly once training and refitting is taken into consideration. 4. The diffusion of effective small-scale weapons that can significantly impact military operations appears to be increasing and is continuously being adapted 5. There has been a very substantial privatization of military roles in Iraq: we are nearing a situation where something approaching mercenaries are once again a factor in warfare.


Patterns of US military expenditures: Patterns of US military expenditures


Problems in US military recruitment: Problems in US military recruitment