Golden Rules When HSE went Wrong ny versjon

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Presentation Transcript

Golden Rules of Safety When our HSE went wrong..: 

Golden Rules of Safety When our HSE went wrong..

Golden Rules of Safety: 

Golden Rules of Safety BP’s safety policy states no harm to people and no accidents. Everyone who works for or on behalf of BP is responsible for their safety and the safety of those around them. The following safety rules will be strictly enforced to ensure the safety of our people and our communities. BP‘s senior leadership are accountable for communicating, training, implementing, and auditing these rules to assure compliance and performance. Although embedded in each rule, it is important to emphasize that: Work will not be conducted without a pre-job risk assessment and a safety discussion appropriate for the level of risk All persons will be trained and competent in the work they conduct Personal protection equipment will be worn as per risk assessment and minimum site requirements Emergency response plans, developed from a review of potential emergency scenarios, will be in place before commencement of work Everyone has an obligation to stop work that is unsafe.

What is BP´s Golden rules of safety?: 

What is BP´s Golden rules of safety? Addresses the highest risk activities in BP worldwide. Based on lessons learned from fatalities and incidents in BP operations. Provide employees and contractors with a comprehensive understanding of these risk areas. Hopefully result in increased awareness and understanding of hazards.

Golden Rules of Safety: 

Golden Rules of Safety PROGRAM LIFTING OPERATIONS CONFINED SPACE ENTRY DRIVING SAFETY PERMIT TO WORK WORKING AT HEIGHTS ENERGY ISOLATION MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

LIFTING OPERATIONS: 

LIFTING OPERATIONS Lifts utilizing cranes, hoists or other mechanical lifting devices will not commence unless: An assessment of the lift has been completed and the lift method has been determined by a competent person(s) Equipment has been determined by a competent person(s) Operators of powered lifting devices are trained and certified for that equipment Rigging of the load is carried out by competent person(s) Lifting devices and equipment has been certified for use within the last 12 months (minimum) Load does not exceed dynamic and/or static capacities of the lifting equipment Any safety devices installed on lifting equipment are operational All lifting devices and equipment have been visually examined before each lift by a competent person(s)

LIFTING OPERATIONS: 

LIFTING OPERATIONS When our HSE went wrong… During loading from boat, a 43 feet container of 4 ton was to be landed on the pipedeck. The banksman helping to move the container in position, got caught and killed. This was a routin task which went very wrong. The investigation found that: Stacking ”dissimilar” baskets Imbalanced load Need to use wooden supports Previous attempt to land failed The deceaced placed himself in harm`s way Banksman was supervising the lift Approx position deceased was found. The incident happened on “Transocean Leader” 2 march 2002

Slide7: 

CONFINED SPACE ENTRY Entry into any confined space cannot proceed unless: all other options have been ruled out permit is issued with authorization by a responsible person(s) permit is communicated to all affected personnel and posted, as required all persons involved are competent to do the work all sources of energy affecting the space have been isolated testing of atmospheres is conducted, verified and repeated as often as defined by the risk assessment stand-by person is stationed unauthorized entry is prevented

The Golden Rule for Confined Space Entry: 

The Golden Rule for Confined Space Entry When our HSE went wrong… A catalyst replacement operation in a reactor was taking place under nitrogen to exclude the air Workers inside the reactor were protected but another man was sent to help move a ladder He entered the protected zone (hot zone) but did not put on the required PPE He did not enter the reactor but leant in to assist, was overcome and fell into the vessel The accident investigation found that: The measures that had been put in place to control the hazards were not enforced, and were not followed The risks of entry into confined spaces, and in particular of working with inert atmospheres were not sufficiently understood and respected because they had not been properly communicated to the workforce Reasonable alternatives to inert entry were not evaluated The diagram shows the position of the contract worker after the accident which took place in a refinery in Texas in August 2001

Slide9: 

VEHICLE SAFETY Vehicles will not be operated unless: vehicle is inspected and confirmed to be in safe working order drivers are trained and certified to operate the class of vehicle passenger number does not exceed manufacturer’s design specification for the vehicle seat belts are installed and worn by all occupants hand-held cell phones and radios are not in use by driver

The Golden Rule for Driving Safety: 

The Golden Rule for Driving Safety When our HSE went wrong… A delivery truck failed to negotiate a curve on a good quality mountain road and fell 20 feet before landing upside-down The driver was killed and his passenger seriously injured The accident investigation found that: The specialist mountain vehicle had not been inspected recently – it had defective transmission and brakes The driver had no specific training on the vehicle, and had had very little time to rest following his 17.5 hour shift the previous day The transport service provider had been engaged without a review of policies and procedures or an analysis of capabilities and performance The photograph shows the lubes delivery vehicle in which contract driver died and passenger was seriously injured in Colombia in January 2001.

PERMIT TO WORK: 

PERMIT TO WORK Before conducting work that involves confined space entry, work on energy systems, ground disturbance in locations where buried hazards may exist, or hot work in potentially explosive environments, a permit must be obtained that: defines scope of work identifies hazards and assesses risk establishes control measures to eliminate or mitigate hazards links the work to other associated work permits or simultaneous operations is authorized by the responsible person(s) communicates above information to all involved in the work ensures adequate control over the return to normal operations

The Golden Rule for Permit to Work: 

When our HSE went wrong… During completion of a new office building, an electrician was working on a lighting circuit that was not isolated and he was killed when he contacted a live circuit The accident investigation found that: No site safety orientation had been given to the contract electrician Although a permit was in force requiring electrical isolation, neither the victim or his co-worker had been involved in the Job Safety Analysis or the preparation of the permit Those who completed the permit did not verify that the procedures that they had put in place were being followed The workforce felt pressured by the contract project manager to complete the job as the culture was “delivery takes priority...” The Golden Rule for Permit to Work Photograph of the scene where a 36 year old electrician was electrocuted while fitting out an Upstream office building in Trinidad in 2000

Slide13: 

WORKING AT HEIGHTS Working at heights of 2 meters (6 feet) or higher above the ground cannot proceed unless: a fixed platform is used with guard or hand rails, verified by a competent person(s) or fall arrest equipment is used that is approved and is: a proper anchor mounted (capable of supporting at least a 1000 kg (2000 lbs) static load per person), preferably overhead full body harness using double latch self locking snap hooks at each connection synthetic fiber lanyards shock absorber fall arrest equipment will limit free fall to 2 meters (6 feet) or less a visual inspection of the fall arrest equipment and system is completed and any equipment that is damaged or has been activated is taken out of service. person(s) are competent to perform the work

Working at heights: 

Working at heights When our HSE went wrong… A shackle weighing 2.3 kg. fell from a scaffold and landed in a walkway 9 m below. The walkway was not barried off. The investigation foud that: The shackle was placed on the scaffold`s access way not having kicklist mounted, and having an opening space at approx. 1 m2 righ above the walkway. The working area on the scaffold had kicklist mounted. Even that we have high focus on securing of equipment in height, we still do mistakes leading to seriouse incidents if only one barrier is in place. All scaffolding must have kicklists. Barrie off area below must always be considered. When the incident happened none of the tree nearest scaffold pieces or the metal plate was installed.

Slide15: 

ENERGY ISOLATION Energy Isolation Any isolation of energy systems; mechanical, electrical, process, hydraulic and others, cannot proceed unless: the method of isolation and discharge of stored energy are agreed and executed by a competent person(s) any stored energy is discharged a system of locks and tags is utilised at isolation points a test is conducted to ensure the isolation is effective isolation effectiveness is periodically monitored

The Golden Rule for Energy Isolation: 

The Golden Rule for Energy Isolation When our HSE went wrong… Two process operators and a maintenance fitter were killed when the cover plate they were removing from a polymer catch tank blew off and struck them. The accident investigation found that: The cover blew off when half the bolts had been removed The polymer build up in the tank had degraded resulting in a build-up of pressure sufficient to cause the remaining bolts to fail Operational problems meant that more polymer was in the tank, and it was at a higher temperature than usual The mechanism that caused the pressure build-up was known within the organisation but had not been communicated to operations staff Design, product stewardship and operational aspects all contributed to this accident The photo shows the cover plate from the catch tank that blew off killing three employees at the BP Amoco Polymers plant in Augusta GA in March 2001

Slide17: 

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE Management of Change (MOC) Work arising from temporary and permanent changes to organization, personnel, systems, process, procedures, equipment, products, materials or substances, and laws and regulations cannot proceed unless a Management of Change process is completed, where applicable, to include: a risk assessment conducted by all impacted by the change development of a work plan that clearly specifies the timescale for the change and any control measures to be implemented regarding: equipment, facilities and process operations, maintenance, inspection procedures training, personnel and communication documentation authorization of the work plan by the responsible person(s) through completion

The Golden Rule for Management of Change: 

The Golden Rule for Management of Change When HSE went wrong… A reinforced hose was used to by-pass a problematical pump strainer on a hot hydrocarbon duty The decision was taken during the night, following much previous disruption to production After a few hours in service the hose failed and one worker died in the ensuing fire The accident investigation found that: Poor initial design had already led to one modification of the strainer and its pipework The production team felt under some pressure not to incur another shutdown that night The supervisor had suggested taking technical advice on the use of the hose, its materials of construction etc., but was overruled This accident occurred at a third party refinery in July 2000, but the circumstances could easily be reproduced at any BP operation