4S EASST

Should the public trust claims that National Identity Schemes (and facial biometric passports) can help make us terrorist attack proof?: 

Should the public trust claims that National Identity Schemes (and facial biometric passports) can help make us terrorist attack proof? Andrew Clement and Krista Boa with Joseph Ferenbok Information Policy Research Program Faculty of Information Studies University of Toronto 4S-EASST conference Paris August 28, 2004

Overview: 

Overview NIDS promotion A post-9/11 revival Facial biometric passports On their way ‘Proving’ personal ID Not easy, not enough! Effective against terrorist threat? No! Why the push, with no proof? Opportunism+ Civil liberties tradeoffs? Premature at best Needed now? An informed public debate!

Post 9/11, a flurry of activity…: 

Post 9/11, a flurry of activity… NIDS “gifts” Larry Ellison, Oracle Scott McNealy, Sun Am. Assoc. of Motor Vehicle Administrators De facto national ID card proposal US military biometric ID card underway Public hearings US Congress, California State Assembly, Canada, UK

…and public opinion shifts: 

…and public opinion shifts 80% of Canadians would submit themselves “to providing fingerprints for a national identity card that would be carried on your person at all times to show police or security officials on request” (Globe & Mail, Oct. 6, 2001). 86% in the UK backed the introduction of some form of ID card A (temporary?) window of political opportunity?

Not so fast!: 

Not so fast! “Serious and sustained analysis and discussion of the complex issues presented by national identity systems are needed. Understanding the goals of such a system is a primary consideration.” IDs – Not That Easy U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications (2002)

Biometric travel documents: 

Biometric travel documents ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) “... If a state is putting biometrics on its travel documents, the incorporation of a facial image is mandatory …”( May 19, 2003) US-VISIT (based on USA PATRIOT act) Digital scans of both index fingers and facial image are required of non-Americans (January 5, 2004) Smart Borders (Canada-US) + 30 point action plan Common standards for (multiple) biometric identifiers (Dec 2001) Canadian Biometric Passport (proposed for 2005) Facial image stored on an embedded chip Enhanced ‘security’ is the principal rationale. But will this work?

Can a biometric passport meet its (implied) promises?: 

Can a biometric passport meet its (implied) promises? Securely and reliably identify everyone? Intercept ‘9/11’ attackers?

Identification Processes: 

Identification Processes Registration Biometric sample taken, stored and compared ID token issued, based on existing records Data-matching and profiling Ongoing, behind the scenes Data gathering + database linkages Authentication (at control points) Identity match between body and ID token Database checks (personal data, watch list) Request denied or approved

1. Securely and reliably identify everyone?: 

1. Securely and reliably identify everyone? Immature technology e.g. Automated facial recognition’s inadequate performance (see FRVT using FERET database) Inherent biometric limits False positives versus false negatives Varying or missing bio features Masquerade, deceptions… Unreliable, inscrutable, vulnerable systems e.g. Ted Kennedy Insecure, unreliable base documentation The weakest link?

What about Ahmed Ressam?: 

What about Ahmed Ressam? 

What about Maher Arar?: 

What about Maher Arar? 

Slide12: 

                   American Airlines #11 American Airlines #77 United Airlines #93 United Airlines #175 Who among the 9/11 attackers would be stopped?

2. Intercept ‘9/11’ attackers?: 

2. Intercept ‘9/11’ attackers? Everyone with a ‘clean’ record passes Most 9/11 attackers had NO record of suspicion Terrorist training manual: “fit in” as “normal” Can repeatedly test screening system, then only need to pass once! “The positive identification of individuals does not equate to trustworthiness or lack of criminal intent.” (emphasis in original) (Ben Shneiderman, USACM testimony at the Congressional Hearings on National Identification Card Systems, Nov 2001)

It is NOT mainly about identification!A NIDS/biometric passport would NOT be effective. + risks false sense of security  + incurs great costs: 

It is NOT mainly about identification! A NIDS/biometric passport would NOT be effective. + risks false sense of security + incurs great costs

The Canadian ‘public proof’ so far:: 

The Canadian ‘public proof’ so far: National ID card proposal: Proposed (Fall 2002) Parliamentary committee Recommended against (Fall 2003) Cabinet cancels (March 2004) Biometric passport: ‘Strategy’ proposal (April 2004) Vague assertions only No press release, or public documentation Bids requested (obtained via FOI)

The ‘absence of evidence’ (of a proof): 

The ‘absence of evidence’ (of a proof)

Do we need to give up our civil liberties?: 

Do we need to give up our civil liberties? Myriad threats to civil liberties from such schemes In the absence of a convincing case that the ‘security’ measures would be effective, the burden of proof should be on scheme promoters, not civil liberty advocates Discussing pre-maturely possible civil liberty tradeoffs, concedes a fundamental point, and may unnecessarily weakens liberties.

In the absence (impossibility) of a ‘public proof’, why the push to NIDS/biometric passports?: 

In the absence (impossibility) of a ‘public proof’, why the push to NIDS/biometric passports? A combination of: Frightened, willing, uniformed public Superficial comfort of high tech identity proof Shared ‘security’ worldview on mass ‘identity management (IT experts, public safety,, administrative apparatus) Imperial manipulative reach Political expediency Compliant news media Dis-connected academic research Fledgling civil soceity advocacy movement

We do need a public debate!: 

We do need a public debate! “Proponents of such a (NIDS) system should be required to present a very compelling case.” (National Academy of Science, 2002) Very high stakes, but No clear explication of any proposed scheme No political interest Limited opportunity for public input

Slide20: 

What should a public proof NIDS/biometric passports look like? Full public disclosure Honest discussion of threats and risks Identify clear purposes and justification Distinction between “security”, administrative and “entitlement” purposes Background studies accessible to public, including alternatives and privacy impact assessments Burden of proof resting with the promoter Removal of civil liberties tradeoff threat Adequate time frames (years, not weeks) Transparent, accountable, facilitated process See recent UK ID card consultation and environmental impact regulations

What do we* do now?: 

What do we* do now? * We = Professionals/Associations + citizens Convene and participate in public forums CPSR, ACM, NAS, IEEE, IFIP, 4S-EASST? Resist emphasis on overly costly, unreliable, narrowly technological approaches What are the purposes? Would it be effective? Who is being served? Disadvantaged? What are the alternatives? Demand social and political accountability from NIDS/biometric promoters Promote more socially sophisticated approaches to anti-terrorism Address causes, social dynamics of terrorism

Further information:: 

Further information: Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) http://www.cpsr.org Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) Privacy International +++ Information Policy Research Program (IPRP) http://www.fis.utoronto.ca/research/iprp

Reference: 

Reference Clement, A., Guerra, R, Johnson, J., & Stalder, F. “National Identification Schemes (NIDS): A Remedy Against Terrorist Attack?” Proceedings of the Sixth Conference on Human Choice and Computers HCC6, IFIP World Computer Congress, Kluwer, Dordrecht, Netherlands, pp 195-205

Slide24: 

Level of Public Dialogue Risk: Lack of control of process Exposure to high profile public debate in media Time Required Option 3 - Written Submissions Plus Public Meetings/Hearings Option 2 - Written Submissions Plus Sectoral/Stakeholder Focus Groups Option 1 - Written Submissions Only 4 Weeks 6 Weeks 8 Weeks Release of Consultation Paper Taken from: Communications Strategy, Ontario Smart Card Project, March 16, 2001 Not this (Ontario Smart Card Project )

Slide25: 

Nor this: Canadian government response to cross border travel restrictions based on USA PATRIOT Act (Section 414) (October 2002) (b) Development of the System.--In the development of the integrated entry and exit data system … (under section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1365a), ) the Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall particularly focus on– (1) the utilization of biometric technology; and (2) the development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of entry. Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration Hearings on : C-18 An Act respecting Canadian Citizenship, Provincial/Territorial Nominee Program, Immigration Settlement Programs in Canada and a National Identity Card Little notice, low public profile, no clear focus, very little public information, short duration