The Future Personnel System Flexibility is theme Evolution is always Plug and Play: The Future Personnel System Flexibility is theme Evolution is always Plug and Play Major Donald E. Vandergriff
Assistant Professor of Military Science
Georgetown University 9th Edition June 3, 2005
Purpose: Purpose The Army is good at understanding Why, the start point, does good at developing What, the end point, but has trouble getting there, the How-to, the hard part, the details of tying Why to What.
I will set the conditions for success, by:
Understanding war
Understanding that incremental changes won’t do anymore
Understanding how to develop and nurture adaptability
Providing a recommendation, how-to, to tie the two after redefining Why and briefly examining What the Army is doing now and in the near future.
Administrative Notes: Prepared for delivery, as supplement to “Minority Report,” January 2005 as well as to senior leaders, at all levels, with new ideas, editions from 1 through 9 were briefed to several groups from January to June 2005.
This briefing is a detailed summary of the forthcoming book, Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to deal with the Changing Face of War
This study reflects the observations and opinions of the author.
This study in no way reflect the official policy or opinion of the United States Army Cadet Command, the United States Army, Department of Defense, of the United States Government.
6th and 7th editions were delivered to TRADOC Commanding General, General Byrnes 3 & 17 March 2005
EXSUM delivered to Symposium “The Future of the U.S. Army,” Washington, D.C., 11 April 2005
EXSUM delivered to U.S. Army Strategy Conference, Army War College, 16 April 2005
8th edition was delivered to Cadet Command Commanding General Major General Thrasher 26 April 2005
9th edition was presented to the Army G1 for LTG Hagenbeck on 27 May and 3 June 2005 for presentation to Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker
Will serve as a baseline for further development of a future personnel system
DRAFT – the final version may be different. Administrative Notes Please do not cite this draft version without permission of the author.
Background: Why I Took This On: Background: Why I Took This On For seven years now, I have been asking myself these questions:
Can we do it better?
Frustrated by saying, briefing and publishing, but do we do it?
Can we still afford to change parts of the Army in isolation?
Are we preparing our future leaders to deal beyond the conventional, yet out of date view of war?:
The evolution of war to Fourth Generation Warfare?
Globalization?
The “revolution in technology”?
The Army as it evolves to an Expeditionary Army?
New ways to create Leaders must evolve parallel to the culture-to succeed-to nurture them as they develop and grow “Centralized command and control systems produce methodical (i.e., predictable) Warfighting doctrines premised on the assumption that subordinates should not be free (i.e., can not be trusted) to make their own decisions while staying within the broad guidance of a commander's intent.”
Colonel John Boyd, USAF
"Organic Design for Command and Control“
Points of Discussion: Points of Discussion Purpose
Part I Why-The Generations of War
Current and future operating environment
What does it entail for leaders?
Part II What-Army is doing good things, but
Factors identified in earlier Army and external studies still exist, despite current great efforts
Part III How-to
What the CSA can do now to begin the evolution
Parallel Evolution and the culture-evolving together
Recommendations to move from an Industrial based system to a system that allows for trust tactics & a move to an Expeditionary Army
Conclusion
Purpose: Purpose To provide a Strategic how-to, including a new personnel strategy and
force structure to move Army cultural transformation
from a Second Generation Force to a Third Generation Force
in order to set the conditions to create, groom and nurture adaptive leaders
to cope with the emerging conditions of 4th Generation Warfare
Purpose-Summary: Purpose-Summary The Army is good at:
Realizing “Why”
Defining “What”
But does not know “How”
To Make a Strategic Plan to
Evolve the Culture in Order to
Shape the Strategic Setting, so
Other Institutional Elements can Evolve
Parallel to one another,
Anticipating 2nd and 3rd Order Effects Goal: An
Expeditionary
Army Goal: A Culture that
supports a New
Generation Leading an
Expeditionary Army Goal: To
Integrate
Institutional
Elements’ Efforts to Achieve Parallel Objectives
Purpose: Summary What is Adaptability?: Purpose: Summary What is Adaptability? What is Adaptability?
Adaptability refers to the process of adjusting practices, processes, and systems to projected or actual changes of environment, e.g., the climate or the enemy.
Adaptability includes the creation of innovative combined arms organizations, doctrine, systems, and training concepts as demanded by the environment, allies, and the enemy.
Adaptive solutions to complex problems in chaotic, unpredictable situations are based more on intuition than on analysis, deliberate planning, and doctrine. “Sun Tzu’s theory of adaptability to existing situations is an important aspect of his self thought. Just as water adapts itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war one must be flexible; he must adapt his tactics to the enemy situation.”
John Poole, The Last Hundred Yards
Part I “Why”-The Generations of War: Part I “Why”-The Generations of War ©Dr. Chet Richards
Jaddams.com “What” type of Army & Leaders? Dr. Chet Richards
“Why”-The Generations of War: “Why”-The Generations of War Evolution into the 4th Generation of War is,
Non state groups have identified U.S. strengths and weaknesses
Hierarchal & Centralized units have slower decision-cycles
Breadth of time and space has no boundaries
Focused at retaining moral reason to continue
What does it mean for Army “Transformation”
“Strategic Lieutenant” (and “corporal”) becoming reality
Pushing more demands/requirements to “lowest levels”
Merging the traditional levels of war-decisions can impact strategy “What” does this tell the Army?
Why? The Future is now: Why? The Future is now Time/
Career
Experience Exposure to
And Familiarization
Of Complex
Problems 2GW
Time line
(peace) Cadet Lieutenant Captain Major LTC 2GW Time line (War) Individual Tasks Sqd & PLT Tasks Co/TM Tasks Tactical Planning Nation Building Tasks Dealing w/other Cultures Joint Operations Line equals at what point does the officer have
to deal with the particular task under the given
type of culture Grand Tactics Operational Art COL 3 & 4GW Time line (All) With the use of varying
education and training
techniques described in
this briefing, we will
better prepare our officers
earlier to deal with
complex tasks Moving Up Experience, Earlier Given our current accessions system, we act like conditions have not changed.
“Why”-The Generations of War Influencing the “What”: “Why”-The Generations of War Influencing the “What” What kind of war for the Army? Large scale operation/small scale contingency
How the enemy fights/operating environment Not the same culture? Flexibility? Which level has the “freedom of action”? People-Centric Warfare
Investing in people Politically tolerable to have junior “free-thinkers”? Centers of Gravity for Winning Wars Changed Culture
How-to? How is the Army
Reacting-with What?
Why? But? “What” is incomplete?: Why? But? “What” is incomplete? What happens when we define, “what” understand “Why”, but not “How”? The Culture
Present-Strategic Reform Officer Education
and Training=New ROTC Future
Army Current and future
operating environments
Emerging technology
Opponents
Technology
Global conditions Some lower level
Leaders, Soldiers
Units do adapt-
this is climate, not
culture change
These veterans will help
But full potential not tapped
Due to unchanged culture
Senior leaders, professional journals,
and “experts”:
“Change the culture” Continue to allow
internal factors to
impact effectiveness
distract from true
focus ? Personal
Efforts from
Below not
Enough must
Have support
From top
Go in with
Less than
required
Part II What?-Army Doing Good Things: Part II What?-Army Doing Good Things Most dramatic since reforms of Elihu Root (1899-1904)!
Focused on more than one type of threat
“17 focus areas” = parallel, systematic evolution - first time in army history
Understands need to change career path progression to create ‘pentathlete’ or adaptive leader Highly exemplary – but you must simultaneously evolve the CULTURE to support the pentathlete! BUT?
What?-Army Doing Good Things: Strategic leaders understand and desire need to evolve
Stabilization program will assist in changing culture
Most holistic program in 12 attempts
Views more than attaining unit cohesion
Focused across the spectrum of the Army
First time 2nd and 3rd Order effects analyzed
Aligned with modularity to
Establish cyclic unit program
Brigade Combat Teams (copied off Breaking the Phalanx) promise more flexibility
OPMS 3 attempting to
Restructured to correct some old problems, but
Accommodates new force structure
Major challenges due to
"requirements line" of officer manning by grade/length of service over future years, and the "on hand" line foreseen under present trends
This gap is the result of years of severe officer losses beginning at the 5-8 years-of-service point, and it is hurting and will hurt the Army What?-Army Doing Good Things But, then “What” is the problem?
What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?: What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? Major influences barriers to Transformation
Mobilization doctrine (Path to Victory)
Despite
Modularity: too weak, still too much overhead
Stabilization
Hierarchy remains reminiscent of Napoleonic and Cold War (9 levels-pushing down-IO (e-mail) accelerates this)
Culture of Management Science
Evolution of the training and evaluation process of Frederick Taylor
Focus on “fundamentals,” “there is time to learn the rest,” “academics-first,” “crawl-walk-run”-out of box seen as “fun” or “too-advanced” not training
Leadership evaluations focused on “checking-the-block” Influence of Management Science leads too?
What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?: What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? Factors identified as negative factors in past studies remain at base of culture:
Such as,
The “up or out” promotion system
Scientific management theme in manning approaches
“Production” of officers
“Making-mission”
Leaders and Soldiers have been conditioned to accept non-traditional Army norms by centralized, functional specialization and selection systems that will continue too
Emphasize competition
Individual replacements
Generalist, career model What does this do to adaptive leaders?
Slide18: Research has shown that individual performance appraisal and selection systems are,
Inaccurate
Unscientific
Prone to sub-group subversion?
More than half of any rating variance is due to “idiosyncratic rater effects” such as,
How much the rater likes the ratee
Whether they have similar personalities
Their views on performance
Sterotypes on gender, race and ethnicity
Self-interest
Sub-group factional interests
Variations in work context What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? What does this lead too?
What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?: Most importantly, centralized transfer promotion queues will continue to lead too,
Frequent, expensive moves will still occur
Reduce social capital
Erode trust
Add to careerist credentials
An “annual promotion tournament” will continue too,
Shift people between units, as if robbing “Peter to pay Paul,” primarily to reward the winners
Team improvement suffers
Legitimacy and commitment suffer because almost everyone not promoted to senior officer and non-commissioned officer rank is dissatisfied with the current system
Those who are promoted and in control will dismiss the dissatisfaction as “sour grapes” What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? In Sum, the Problem?
What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? The result: “The Army “machine” equates 2LTs with ZERO years of experience to Captains with 10 years of years.” (PERSORSA) What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? The result The Army’s response to:
current shortages
future field grade short falls
force structure changes,
i.e., increase of Units of Action But in reality:
Experience goes down
Quality decreases
Competence suffers
Retention pays
EXAMPLE—Non-BQ CPTs as APMS to schools To meet the cycle of decline
Increase “mission” Strategic, operational & tactical impacts Mark Lewis “Army Transformation meets the junior officer exodus””
What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? In sum: What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? In sum Army is adapting, but by climate, not culture
After the need goes away, so do the positive climates?
Cultural engines identified by Army Training and Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP) of 2001 remain
“up or out” promotion (1916)
Production line accessions=quantity trumps quality (1900)
Bloated officer corps, driven by short-term measures (1947)
Culture must evolve slightly ahead of other institutional changes in order to be in place,
To nurture traits of desired behavior
Sustain changes brought about to ensure success
The hardest part to develop is the details in a Strategic how-to to move from here to there What is the Solution?
What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? Conclusion: What?-Army Doing Good Things – But? Conclusion Army is adapting, but by climate, not culture
After the need goes away, so do the positive climates?
Cultural engines identified by Army Training and Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP) of 2001 remain
“up or out” promotion (1916)
Production line accessions=quantity trumps quality (1900)
Bloated officer corps, driven by short-term measures (1947)
Culture must evolve slightly ahead of other institutional changes in order to be in place,
To nurture traits of desired behavior
Sustain changes brought about to ensure success
The hardest part to develop is the details in a Strategic how-to to move from here to there
Part III How to-What Do We have?: Part III How to-What Do We have? VALUES OPERATIONAL
PRINCIPLES DOD – ARMY CULTURE UNITED STATES VALUES CULTURE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP
TRANSLATION OPERATIONAL
PRINCIPLES GOVERNMENT - PUBLIC SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS - PRIVATE CHANGED ARMY CULTURE ∆
How to-What Do We have? A modern, military bureaucracy: How to-What Do We have? A modern, military bureaucracy A modern bureaucracy that is,
Tends to repeat the same solutions
React late under pressure
Remain tied to narrow goals of cost reduction and incremental productivity
Translates into a culture that will continue too
Inhibit innovation
Have difficulty accommodating other philosophies, such as the professional military ethos
Institutional issues surrounding professional expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy fall outside the decision making routine of military (Army) bureaucracy Translation Needed Hard to Do!
How to-Translation?: How to-Translation? Army Strategic Leaders must,
Define operational principles & values apart from general society’s: humanistic, not materialistic!
Be coincident– “Live along Side” general societies!
Be service, not “stuff” oriented!
Adapt “postmodernism professionalism”
Set the example!
Get at change!
How-to: Suggestions to Get Started: How-to: Suggestions to Get Started Form an Ad-hoc, but sanctioned TF to take a Holist, System’s (Not ‘Pieces’) Institutional view and define what we must DO & HOW to Implement = CSA TF
Publicly Award & Assign RESPONSIBLE “Adaptive,” “Innovative” Leaders – Set the Value Example from the Top (Did they impact the Organization Positively?)! = CSA TF/G1
Shape the Executive & Legislative Branches’, Private Sector’s, and Public’s support for Army Cultural Evolution = CSA TF/PAO
Shape the Internal Environment – Get the Strategic and Senior Leader Cadres behind the Movement – They must support to make progress possible = CSA
Do all of these at the Same Time! = CSA TF/G3
How-to: Suggestions to Get Started: How-to: Suggestions to Get Started Adopt “Trust tactics” — five principal facets to achieve decision cycle dominance over potential 4GW enemies through the successful and independent decision-making of subordinate commanders
The first of these is scope for initiative.
The second is prudent risk-taking.
The third facet concerns the commander's intent to “trust tactics.”
Fourth, superior-subordinate relations must be characterized by
mutual trust.
Fifth, directive control presupposes subordinate initiative and feedback. Now, it is time to implement changes to officer accessions
How-to: Suggestions to Get Started: How-to: Suggestions to Get Started Create the environment required to create and support adaptive leaders:
Publicly praise and award signs of adaptability & innovators
Work with Army Times and AUSA to highlight their actions
Put on army.mil with message talking about such people
Form a task force composed of such people despite the fact that their careers may not appear to be “fast-tracked” as reflected officially in their files
The group advises and recommends the Army CSA on the necessary cultural changes to support the 21st Century Army
Continues to search for more examples of adaptability and innovation
Take these people and make them instructors in ROTC or at
West Point
How to-Get Δ Change?: How to-Get Δ Change? Society's V&OP Translated into Army Policy, Doctrine, Operating Policies & Procedures = ARMY CULTURE ∆ =
“How we want to do Business!” Strategic Leaders’
Stated Values &
Operational Principles
(V&OP) How we actually
Do Business –
Operational Reality Monitor Δ of Intent
Vs Outcome Reinforce Statement of
Values, Principles & Actions Outside Influences:
Generations of War & Enemy Internal Influences:
Society Support/Political
Understanding of Change
Resources Availability
How to-Who belongs and can build? How we want to do business: Moving to the details: How to-Who belongs and can build? How we want to do business: Moving to the details Four categories of professional and psychological maturity:
Stage 1: Not yet members of the profession
Stage 2: Limited members of the profession
Stage 3: They are true professionals
Stage 4: Lead the Army profession
The personnel strategy and force structure reforms proposed here aims to stream personnel into four main roles according to their level of professional maturity.
How to–Change The Way We Do Business: How to–Change The Way We Do Business Where are
WE?
Such As? Zero Defects
‘More’ Stuff
Technology Focus
Individual Focus Error Tolerance –
Surprise isn’t Bad
Equal Tec & People
More ‘WE’ less ‘ME’
More Service – Less
Stuff Where
Must WE GO?
Such As?
Build Bridges –
How
to Transition
between where we are
to
where we
MUST GO Define Present – Redefine – Build a Future “Picture” - Develop a Viable Plan to get There!
Preserve the Past, Build on the Present, Create the Future Expeditionary Army Cold War – Legacy THE STRATEGIC CHANGE MODEL: What we must DO!
How to: The Bridge – Parallel Evolution: How to: The Bridge – Parallel Evolution Present Culture
Evolve Officer Education
and Training = New ROTC Goal:
Expeditionary
Army
Future Culture Adaptive Leaders to Lead
this Army The Bridge -
How to Get
There? Doctrine Personnel Force Structure Leadership Other Cultural Systemic Factors OPEN, HONEST, APPRAISAL Move Beyond Rhetoric!
17 Focus Groups Evolving Together - Must Anticipate 2nd and 3rd Order Effects!
How-to: More Details What must occur simultaneously: How-to: More Details What must occur simultaneously
Information
Capital (IC)
Organizational
Culture
People
CD + ED Potential Value Strategy (Map) Strategic Leaders The ‘Hidden’ Dimension of Soldiers (CD + ED) Determines
How Potential Value Materializes, the Realism of the Strategy, and the Nature of Internal Strategic Processes The Three Components of Learning &Growth are NOT ‘Born Equal’ CD = Cognitive Development
ED = Social-Emotional Development Minority Report Annex A
of report
How-to: More Details What must occur simultaneously : How-to: More Details What must occur simultaneously New Unit of Action
(within new
Stabilization) Potential Value Changed Culture Strategic Leaders How Potential Value Materializes, the Realism of the Strategy, and the Nature of Internal Strategic Processes Repeat, the 17 Focused area Transformation needs to continue,
with these adjustments but culture changes are guided by Operational Staff
(makes changes to
OPMS 3) Specialists
(makes changes to
OPMS 3) Institutional Staff New Accessions &
Education System
How-to: More Details What must occur simultaneously: How-to: More Details What must occur simultaneously Today’s Culture
Stress process
Forecasting
Risk aversion
Bureaucratic
Top-down
Rank equals success
Change is criticism
= adherence to process
ensures success Future Army Culture
Stress innovation
Experimentation
Prudent risk-taking
Agility
Feedback loops
Contribution valued
Change is evolutionary
=as long as objectives are achieved
How-to: More Details The Personnel System: How-to: More Details The Personnel System New promotion system
Fill vacancies with or without a promotion
Holds competitions open only to Soldiers serving in that unit
Transfers and promotions not in sequence
Not from central selection list
Does not involve transfers from one BCT to another
Personnel specialists do selecting
Freedom to select, weigh and interpret complex and detailed data according to professional standards, the vacancy and circumstances of unit
Local competitions may be less costly than current, counterproductive, centralized, selection and promotion systems
How-to: More Details The Personnel System: How-to: More Details The Personnel System Specialists for personnel, social science and personnel management have sole authority for selection
Observers from Army have veto but cannot force selection
Chain of command has no vote, veto or otherwise
Based on information collected throughout career within a stable market of reputation and 360-degree view
Source of information on candidates can come from:
Chain of command
Peers
Subordinates
Stakeholders in other units
Information is not limited to surveys or performance reports
How-to: New Combined Arms Unit: How-to: New Combined Arms Unit All arms, all supporting brigade sized unit
Known by single name
No permanent unit, branches, corps occupations or affiliations that would sub-divide the BCT
Reduces resistance of competing affiliations and weapons systems to innovation and evolution
Provides sub-units for matrix organizations and networking for an array of mission
Regional recruited and based
Flexibility to assume role based on mission and campaign plan-fight one mission as infantry, rotate back and act as military police (after training and equipment switch)
How-to: New BCT The people: How-to: New BCT The people Officers and Soldiers spend entire life with BCT (Stages 1-2: see slide 27)
Key is to promote learning organization, innovation and adaptability as a unit
Stability brings this about by building trust
Can continually experiment
Accessions of officers and enlisted are by need basis, allowing for strenuous professional entrance standards
Moving to more mature Soldiers-leader and led
More attuned to 4GW
How-to: New BCT Capabilities: How-to: New BCT Capabilities Unit can evolve over time, can be switched to different types of mission over time
Instead of specific branches, assign changing mission to cohesive, long-standing unit led by vastly better educated and experienced leaders
Develops broad outlined doctrine that evolves based on lessons learned and experience of long serving members of UA
Similar to German Jager Infantry culture which was foundation for Sturm units used in World War I, and then evolved to Panzer units in WWII
Manages Stage 1 & 2 of Soldiers
How-to: Operational Staff: How-to: Operational Staff Not a “General Staff”
Selection and entrance into after experienced gained in stages 1 & 2
Selection built upon based on reputation over time
Experts and understanding of evolution of war
Advise levels above BCT, such as Corps Group, to free BCT of operational and strategic concerns
Are not bureaucratic staff officers
How-to: Operational Staff: How-to: Operational Staff Mid-point of career is first opportunity, equals 10-15 years of service
Actual initial selection into Operational Staff, competition opened directly to members operational staff to fill vacant positions
Filled with major to Major General
One distinguishing badge and uniform
How-to: Specialists: How-to: Specialists Evolved from Social and Human sciences professions
Military law, chaplain, IG, human resources, social work, social science, counseling and family services, medical and dental care, etc….
Stage 3 & 4
Monitor and assist BCTs so they can focus on tasks to perform effectively in 4GW
Separate badge for entire corps as well
How-to: Specialists: How-to: Specialists Are not CS or CSS, these are included in BCT as one Soldier
Only Stage 2 to 3 Soldiers allowed to enter to take advantage of experience (mid-service)
Focused to the human and social sciences that shape the cultural assumptions and behavior of the Soldier
How-to: More Details Leader Education and Accessions: How-to: More Details Leader Education and Accessions Complexity scale Resources scale Complex Unit Tasks Education:
“How to think” In sum:
Favor strengths
Educate early
task-train as necessary
to enhance decision making
as cognitive skills established plug in task training Cognitive
Skills education Task
Training Baseline Favors Centralized Training with resources, ranges, personnel, time Favors Campus-based Education, mental resources Individual Tasks Administrative Tasks Weapon Tasks Training Learning Theory Tactical Decision Games Force-on-Force,
Free-play exercises Language (s) Tasks Training:
“What to think” Cognitive development Strategy
How-to: More Details Education and Accessions: How-to: More Details Education and Accessions “Learning organization” exposes cadets-classical education- they find answers
Experiencing the emotional trauma of failing within a safe, face saving environment that is needed to promote ED
Once cadets finds the answers themselves these lessons are emotionally marked in time
CD and ED need to be developed in synchrony
in order to maximize knowledge development, KD
CD lays open to the individual a landscape of choices
ED determines whether he or she makes the RIGHT CHOICES under prevailing circumstances
Tools to assist good teachers
Tactical decision games (TDGs) key
Intensive confidential individual assessment, feedback, and development planning
360-degree double loop feedback
Establishing the blend of instructional technologies to use, particularly in the institutional setting, is critical to promoting synchronous growth in CD, ED, and, consequently, KD
Force on force, free play exercises against a thinking enemy
How-to: More Details Education and Accessions: How-to: More Details Education and Accessions Functional
Training
(ABN/Ranger,
Scout Leader) BOLC I BOLC II BOLC III Establishes the
foundation in
cognitive skills
“how to think”
sets the foundation “Culturalize”
Brings together
those who passed
through the “gate
of commissioning,”
creating bonds Specialized
training, and
administrative
tasks Academic Rigor begins here! First tough cut
comes here, needs to come earlier than later Rite of Passage Begins with tough screening These may be offered
earlier First unit Cognitive
Skills education Task Training Baseline Learning from the platoon sergeant/NCOs,
COs, many tasks can be learned here
How-to: More Details Education and Accessions: How-to: More Details Education and Accessions “Mental Preparation” is a long term investment, “we want to plant Oak trees, not Pine trees,” CSA April 11, 2003
BOLC is good start, with Phase II bonding/building trust early; BOLC III should favor task training
But…Phase I needs to develop cognitive development (CD) early, social emotional development (ED), Perceptual & Learning process (P&L), and Knowledge development (KD) is the sum of the first two.
Plan must favor strengths, understand-avoid weaknesses (summary)
How-to: More Details Education and Accessions: How-to: More Details Education and Accessions Commissioning
Based on
forecasted UA needs
not cohort numbers by law
BA Decisive
Leadership
Army loan forgiven Contracts at end
Of first year, begins
Army loan
MS II Foreign language Attends Army schools
Or cultural experience Stage 2
Prior service/
Green-to-Gold MS III MS IV LDAC Evaluation History, Cultural, and Leader requirements MS I
How-to: More Details Other Considerations-Pay: How-to: More Details Other Considerations-Pay Supports new force structure and personnel strategy, evolve together
Pay remains stratified by rank, but overlap to provide annual increases that reward accumulated military experience and commitment, regardless of degree of specialization
Personnel specialists in the Specialists corps manage a local system to support each BCT, Corps Group and Operational Staff
How-to: More Details Other Considerations-Career paths: How-to: More Details Other Considerations-Career paths All into BCT
At mid-point of career (after Stage 2), they can remain in BCT, acquiring additional abilities (with technology)
Or they can migrate to Specialist or compete to enter Operational staff
How-to: More Details Other Considerations: How-to: More Details Other Considerations Personnel management by competencies, lead to the ability to have a matrix organization
Effectiveness of BCT determines missions
Specialist corps acculturate and manage supply and demand of personnel
Problems must be solved, and not wait out a bad commander or passed on later
BCT forced to develop human resources at hand The Results!
How? Strategic Model – As I define What: How? Strategic Model – As I define What The Cold War Army (2nd GW)
ROTC trains officers for the Major Power War, where:
They operate within boundaries established by fixed chains of command, fixed doctrine, fixed force structure, & known threat
They train for certainty within these boundaries to fixed tasks, conditions, standards
Their decision making process assumes linearity with clear cause and effect relationships Future, Expeditionary Army (3rd GW—to Deal with 4GW)
Instead, ROTC needs to educate and train the new officer to deal with Small Wars, to:
Operate with flexible chains of command, beyond doctrine, with variable force structure, & unknown threat
Train for uncertainty with no boundaries to uncertain tasks, in uncertain conditions, with uncertain standards
Solve asymmetric warfare problems that are non-linear and whose solutions lie outside the defined boundaries John Tillson “Training for Adaptability”
Conclusion What this does for the Army: Conclusion What this does for the Army In terms of the Generations of war, the Army is very good at Second Generation Warfare, but needs to move to a culture that can fight 3rd Generation Warfare in order to understand and cope with Fourth Generation Warfare.
This study is not meant to imply criticism of our leaders and Soldiers, but of some of the way we do things now (culture).
Expeditionary (3GW-Maneuver), is a complete culture; it cannot be effectively adopted piecemeal, and without the dislocations that necessarily accompany true paradigm shifts. Current Army doctrine is not "broken," but even "whole," it may still be improved (better supported by our military culture).
Evolving doctrine will be effective, but words and goals are not as fully supported by our current "Methodical" culture as it could be.
A 3GW culture could provide advantages in training, administration, logistics, and operations that would enable current doctrine to achieve its full potential on the battlefield.
Countries have two very different military forces: one for peacetime, and one for war. These forces differ in size, structure, and most important of all, culture.
For all of the Army’s talk of "train the way you fight" and "Battle-Focus," the Army invariably trains using "peacetime" techniques and standards.
In the past mobilization and the early phases of war, we usually waste time and blood struggling to reorient ourselves to the inevitably different demands of war. This expensive process is, at its root, a cultural transformation. Wars often end before this transformation is completed.
Conclusion The Army of tomorrow!: Conclusion The Army of tomorrow! The Culture
Strategic
Contribution & seeking responsibility Goal:
Networked
Army? that works
seamlessly with
other services
government
agencies in order
To perform array of
missions Feed back loop: Bottom up encouraged by vertical
Culture, i.e., companycommander.com Hierarchal force structure flattened
To four areas: tactical, operational,
Strategic and technical-Command (control
taken out). 10 layers C&C
Modularity
UA/UE Army
Transformation
(2005-?) Neo-Taylorism career model replaced by Demming Action begins to replace rhetoric Tank, precision
Strike, jet/helo Success=professionalism Decisiveness at right time Service oriented leaders Leaders have ability to
multi-task, understand merging levels of war in a flat, matrix, networking force structure; Education & Training extensive Early rigor= common language Rank structure flattened to
four areas: tactical, operational,
strategic and technical, “perform or
out” replaces “up or out” Future combat system fielded/non-lethal, hand-held computers, time now information,
Quality over
quantity Once- untouchable laws, policies & beliefs are finally addressed Doctrine is in terms of principles to enhance evolution based on feedback loop
objective type orders Has ability
To understand
& deal with it FM 1-0
FM 3-0
FM 7-0 “Adaptive Leader”
Slide56: Back ups
How? How to facilitate these traits: How? How to facilitate these traits Future Army Culture
Stress innovation
Experimentation
Prudent risk-taking
Agility
Feedback loops
Contribution valued
Change is evolutionary
= as long as objectives are achieved
How to do it
Stabilization and unit manning will achieve “what right looks like”
Army schools need to also become centers of experimentation evolving tactics and techniques
Contributions need to be highlighted and rewarded
Evaluation reports need to focus on short-term as well as long term contributions to the larger organization up to the Army
How? How to facilitate these traits: How? How to facilitate these traits In order to get here
Stabilization and unit manning will allow time to get to achieve what right looks like
Army schools need to also become centers of experimentation evolving tactics and techniques
Contributions need to be highlighted and rewarded
Evaluation reports need to focus on short-term in present duties as well as long term contributions to the larger organization up to the Army
Encourage networking and matching the right teams
How to
Doctrine manuals are short, concise and on principles
Let personnel homestead, and rotate to TDA back to unit assignments
After command or primary staff positions, duty as an instructor at Army school, ROTC, or West Point is sought after, larger units even oversee these places in their regions allowing for rotation to and from and hosting
Change cultural definition of success, address rank structure
How? How to facilitate these traits: How? How to facilitate these traits To get here
Doctrine manuals are short, concise and on principles
Let personnel homestead, and rotate to TDA back to unit assignments
After command or primary staff positions, duty as an instructor at Army school, ROTC, or West Point is sought after. Larger units even oversee these places in their regions allowing for rotation to and from and hosting
Now we can address
how to develop our leaders How To
Award innovators like those who started and run Companycommand.com as a way to network and run a feedback loop
With units on cycle, they will rotate to and from places giving Soldiers array of experiences
Admit that each traditional level of war is complex and takes longer and more knowledge to master
Reduce bureaucratic staffs and flatten the organization see notes below
How? How to facilitate these traits: How? How to facilitate these traits To Get There
Award innovators like those who started and run Company command.com as a way to network and run a feedback loop
With units on cycle, they will rotate to and from places giving Soldiers array of experiences
Admit that each traditional level of war is complex and takes longer and more knowledge to master
Reduce bureaucratic staffs and flatten the organization see notes below How To
Convince Congress to pass a Goldwater-Nichols for personnel reform
Move from up or out to perform or out, but much more must be done to make that work
Access far fewer officers
Make it tougher to commission
Raise the pay of lower ranking leaders so they can afford middle class living, focus on profession
New educational and training requires a different instructional technology than that used in conventional E&T establishments