SpichandGrosse

Homeland Security and US International Competitiveness: 

Homeland Security and US International Competitiveness by Robert Spich, UCLA and Robert Grosse, Thunderbird presented at Temple University April 2, 2005

What’s Interesting Here?: 

What’s Interesting Here? Academic research is usually driven by questions, conundrums, puzzles, contradictions, and other sorts of problems that researchers find interesting. It is not clear that HomSec per se is an interesting problem. We CIBERs have noted the low-level interest of many of our colleagues to undertake studies of this topic. One of our CIBER challenges is to define (reframe) the interesting parts of this issue and pose challenging questions that are both researchable and yield valuable insights. Today’s conference will help us do that.

Our Angle on HomSec: 

Our Angle on HomSec Concern for how government and business policies and practices responding to the 9/11 shock event can be counterproductive, contradictory, and damaging to the competitiveness of the U.S. business system. Messy problems, sense-making and improved management—the scope, scale, complexity, dynamism, informational ambiguity make the understanding of the HomSec response very challenging.There is a need to better understand its implications, critique its weaknesses, and improve its overall effectiveness. Use of theory to help develop frameworks for better conceptualization of the HomSec issues (organization systems theory, decision theory, economic theory). A series of concepts will be presented.

Terrorism Defined: 

Terrorism Defined Terrorism is a fear-inducing strategy that is a planned choice of an agent to disrupt, damage, and/or destroy the abilities and activities of a target group’s operations for the purpose of gaining some advantage, changing the state of relationships or an unfavorable condition or situation, or creating a new “game” where the rules are changed. Besides the ability to impose unwanted costs, terrorist acts are power-seeking acts that use fear, uncertainty, and ambiguity to gain advantage. A goal is to create an ability to control the options, activities, designs, and outcomes of the target group. ???s

Business Security: 

Business Security Business security can be defined as a defensive strategy and state of organizational readiness to assure and protect (but not guarantee) the functional integrity of the organization’s operational systems against purposeful, willful, and intentional attempts by agents (inside or outside) to disrupt, damage, dismantle, or destroy them. The goal and purpose of a security strategy and policy is to protect the firm against the ability of an “enemy” to put the capabilities of the firm’s responsiveness to security threats into doubt, to create uncertainty about its ability and willingness to maintain its strategic advantage, use its core competencies fully, or maintain its overall competitiveness.

HomSec: Key Elements of the Response: 

HomSec: Key Elements of the Response Policy response driven by an external systems shock event Ethos of anti-terrorism as central driver of policy Focus on vulnerability of domestic (homeland) life Defense-oriented, large-scale mobilization response Defense Taylorism—there is one best way to deal with terrorism: simple ideas, dualism (B/W) thinking Sacred mission: nationalism/idealism/noble cause mindsets Emergent top-down policy decision process—evolving policy guided by one key idea and limited sensitivity to costs or practical implications

System Shock Events: 

System Shock Events A systems shock event is defined here as a unique, one-time occurrence of a major event (man-made or natural and extraordinary in nature—size, reach, impact) where even though the parameters of the event can be modeled, the anticipation of the event is low because the probabilities of its occurrence are decidedly low as judged within the norms for such events at that time. Shock events have cycles of development.

Hierarchy of Interdependent Nested Systems: 

Hierarchy of Interdependent Nested Systems Top-down hierarchy—government-initiated Nested subsystems of a political economy (defense, education, food, health, transport, etc.) Interdependence effects—tight/loose linkages, flows, and interfaces, efficiencies of exchanges, errors, and failure Management issues: control, coordination, communication, culture, conflict 4 levels of competitiveness concerns—nation, industry, firm, and individual

Cooperative Ethos: 

Cooperative Ethos Traditional business-government adversarial relationship Globalization and changed roles of government (U.S.) in pro-active role seeking economic advantage, economic interests as defense interests, competitiveness challenge to the nation Guided markets theory—The Visible Hand (Chandler) Need a cooperative ethos between business and government in HomSec issues in order to leverage their mutual advantages

Environments, System Boundaries, and Flow: 

Environments, System Boundaries, and Flow Organization-environment conceptualization Closed and open systems contrasted The issue of vulnerability The contradiction in priorities: defensive reactions to shocks lead to closed systems, but since autarchy and interdependence of systems are fundamentals of globalization, openness is required The challenge: how to manage a balanced state of “open closedness” in times of threat and stress

Homeostasis, Equilibrium Management, and the Search for Solutions : 

Homeostasis, Equilibrium Management, and the Search for Solutions Equilibrium occurs where accommodations and adjustments have been made among the various subsystems to make a larger system work satisfactorily; stable, low uncertainty, comfort Homeostasis—sensing, monitoring, and feedback Shock event—ability of system to absorb shock and return to equilibrium is function of shock event Return to equilibrium not = return to original state Need to search for new and unique solutions to problems when the shock is > than homeostatic capability of the system K. Lewin’s Theory of Change—unfreeze, change, refreeze

Mindsets and Metaphors: 

Mindsets and Metaphors A critical factor for the HomeSec policy success is how intelligent, flexible, responsive, and robust its policy decisions and mindsets are Mindset is the present state of mind of a decision-maker where the configuration and content of values, beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions create unique ways of thinking about and reacting to the world that once set do not change readily Metaphors are inexact but useful comparisons between two states whereby the characteristics and features of one state that is well known can serve as an approximate measure for the other Metaphors and mindsets are interactive Problem of ideology and preferred metaphors (e.g., Neo Cons)

Framing and the Equifinality : 

Framing and the Equifinality Framing is a conscious attempt to influence the perceptions and choices of others by how you present an idea to them (e.g., aversion to losses versus size of gains; glass half full; problem or opportunity) Framing is affected by metaphors (e.g., terrorists as rats and an extermination metaphor) Frames can be changed (reframing)—this allows for flexibility in how we respond to issues Ideology (fixed mindsets) is a barrier to reframing Systems that insulate themselves from diversity in the environment tend to atrophy because they have no internal means of dealing with diversity. These systems lose complexity and distinctive nature (Law of Requisite Variety). Equifinality of open systems allows for many different ways of arriving at the same end (anti-Taylorism)

Summary and Segue: 

Summary and Segue We presented our concerns about HomSec policy action and its impacts on competitiveness We argue for a sense-making task of researchers to develop frameworks and conceptualizations to assist in understanding, critiquing, and improving the HomSec policy response We offer the idea that good theory can offer many insights for a HomSec framework. (Nothing is as practical as good theory!...K. Lewin) We now offer some practical insights into the management of the HomSec problem from the firm’s point of view.

Figure 1—Risks Facing the Global Firm : 

Figure 1—Risks Facing the Global Firm

Figure 2 - 4 Methods to Manage Risk: 

Figure 2 - 4 Methods to Manage Risk

Figure 3—A Risk Management Profile: 

Figure 3—A Risk Management Profile

Figure 4—Micro and Macro Costs to Firms from Homeland Security: 

Figure 4—Micro and Macro Costs to Firms from Homeland Security

Figure 5—Micro and Macro Risks to Firms from Homeland Security: 

Figure 5—Micro and Macro Risks to Firms from Homeland Security

Figure 6—Value-Added Chain Example: General Mills: 

Figure 6—Value-Added Chain Example: General Mills