New Approaches to Achieving Space Security : New Approaches to Achieving Space Security Bhupendra Jasani
Department of War Studies
King's College London
Slide2 : Space security is very much linked with earth bound security
During the past four years or so, national and international security perception has changed
Notion of threats from states is extended to threats from non-state organisations Introduction
Slide3 : Recently two reports have emerged that deal with security:
A 2004 UN report issued by the Secretary General identified the following threats:-
Poverty
Infectious disease
Environmental degradation
Conflict between and within states
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Terrorism, and
Trans-national organised crime
A state is secured when it is free from these threats Notion of security
Slide4 : A second report, issued by the European Union (EU) in December 2003, called the Solana Report, identified the following threats:-
terrorism,
proliferation of WMD,
regional conflicts,
state failure and
organised crime
While the UN has taken a broader view of security by including poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation, there is, by and large an agreement on the threat perceptions between the international community and the EU Notion of security
Slide5 : How does this affect security in outer space?
Significant information could be gained by both military and commercial observation satellites:
about WMD related activities of a state; and
on on-going conflicts within a state as well as between states
Such information is then often transmitted by communications satellites
These and other application of spacecraft, such as navigation satellites, could make them very sensitive and therefore prone to attack. Notion of security
Slide6 : Uses of outer space
Slide7 : Some major space states
Slide8 : Trends affecting space security Thus two trends evolved:
(a) use of satellites to enhance potentials of terrestrial weapons; and
(b) development of weapons to destroy satellites in orbits and missiles and warheads in transit through space
Considerable impetus was the result of the Cold War but at the end of which the military use of space continued
By 1960, the US Army’s proposal to convert its Nike Zeus ABM system to ASAT role established a link between ABM and ASAT weapons
Growing capabilities in commercial space : Growing capabilities in commercial space With the growing dependence on satellites for operation of terrestrial weapons, increasing capabilities of commercial spacecraft and perceived threats from long and short range missiles, interest in the development of weapons to counter these increased QuickBird commercial satellite
Slide10 : Space weapons Investigations of earth- and space-based weapons aimed at satellites (ASAT systems) and missiles (BMD systems) have been in progress since signing the Outer Space Treaty in October 1967
Space weapons can be broadly grouped into three: nuclear, non-nuclear and non-dedicated space weapons
Non-dedicated space weapons are those that do not destroy either a satellite or a missile but they destroy their command, control and space surveillance equipment which are vital to the efficient operations of spacecraft and missiles
Slide11 : Various types of space weapons
Slide12 : Special note on laser weapons A 1-megawatt Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRCL), was fired into space from the US Army's White Sands, N.M., missile range against a satellite but failed
However, a low power 30-watt laser used for alignment of the system and tracking of the spacecraft, was sufficient to blind the satellite temporarily
A device like this was seen to have an advantage as it did not create any space debris like that in the case of a kinetic kill vehicle
It also showed that a commercially available laser with a 1.5m mirror could be an effective ASAT weapon
Slide13 : Some observations Any future NMD may affect nuclear policies of States with nuclear weapons
e.g. China may feel its nuclear weapons impotent against US NMD thus probably increasing its nuclear arsenal and conduct more nuclear tests
This will result in India conducting more nuclear tests to improve its minimum deterrence against China
No doubt Pakistan will react to this
A whole new cycle of nuclear arms race starts
Not only this but when an in coming weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is intercepted and destroyed above the earth’s atmosphere, its lethal nuclear, chemical or biological ingredient will affect the earth below, thus we have not escaped the effect of the WMDs
Moreover, even before a workable NMD is developed, we will have very effective ASAT weapons
Finally, these systems will require testing aggravating an already serious debris problem
Slide14 : Space debris Only a month and half ago on 29 March 2006, a piece of space debris crashed into a Russian broadcasting satellite damaging it
As of August 2005, 9,379 objects in earth orbit have been catalogued by NORAD
Of these, 2,954 are payloads and about a third are active satellites
Some of the collisions and close encounters are summarised in the table
Slide15 : Some examples of close encounters/collisions in orbit
Slide16 : Way forward It is often argued that proliferation of space weapons and related technologies is undesirable
In the past, solutions for such questions have been found in arms control agreements
For example, the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT)
While, by and large, the NPT has been successful, the number of original five nuclear weapon states has now increased to at least eight
This occurred as retaining and even to some extent improving such weapons by the five nuclear weapon states has not dissuaded others from acquiring nuclear weapons
By the same logic, if space weapons are developed and deployed, it would be very difficult to convince other space faring nations not to embark on their own space weapon programmes
It is important that negotiations at the CD commence as soon as possible
Slide17 : Way forward – A possible high-altitude ASAT treaty A space weapon is that can damage, destroy, permanently disrupt the functioning of, or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other states An important provision
It would prohibit development, testing in space or against space objects, or deployment of any ASAT for attacking satellites with orbital periods of 12 hours or greater or minimum altitudes of 5000 km or greater
Slide18 : Way forward – Improve transparency Improve transparency in outer space:
As a first step strengthen the compliance with the U.N. Convention on Registration of Outer Space Objects (1975) under which states require to provide basic information about their satellites launched into outer space
The obligations under the Registration Convention are mandatory
By and large, provision IV.1 .(e) has not been fulfilled, since nearly three-quarters of the satellites launched serve military purposes and hardly any of them have been described to the UN Secretary-General as having a military use
Until the registration convention is strengthened, it may be possible to improve the space-traffic control
Slide19 : Way forward – Improve space traffic control Improve space traffic control:
The current openly available catalogues are not very accurate for effective traffic control
The actual locations of space objects are only determined occasionally to check the predictions
A working group convened by the four leading non-governmental organizations dealing with space issues, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the U.N. Office on Outer Space Affairs, the Confederation of European Aerospace Societies and International Academy of Astronautics, have suggested more extensive efforts to improve space traffic control procedures
As a first step, an International Data Centre (IDC) could be established, for example, in Vienna, where data provided by participating countries on space objects in orbits would be collated and compiled; the data could be, for example, the telemetry emitted by satellites, their shapes, sizes, and orbits, the launching country, and the designation of satellites
The second step would be that the IDC could establish some equipment necessary to track objects in space to verify the Registration Convention and also data that might be available from various states on orbital debris
The latter would be to check measures that may be used on orbital mitigation
Slide20 : Way forward – Orbital debris mitigation Orbital debris mitigation:
The Inter-Agency Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) consisting of space agencies from China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the European Space Agency, has drawn up a set of guidelines
However, these are not legally binding
In any case, so far, Russia and India have blocked the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) from adopting the guidelines
It might be suggested here that the COPUOS adopts a possible “Convention on Limiting and Eliminating Debris in Orbits (CLEDO)”
The verification of such a convention could be carried out by the above proposed International Data Centre