Jasani

New Approaches to Achieving Space Security : 

New Approaches to Achieving Space Security Bhupendra Jasani Department of War Studies King's College London

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Space security is very much linked with earth bound security During the past four years or so, national and international security perception has changed Notion of threats from states is extended to threats from non-state organisations Introduction

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Recently two reports have emerged that deal with security: A 2004 UN report issued by the Secretary General identified the following threats:- Poverty Infectious disease Environmental degradation Conflict between and within states Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Terrorism, and Trans-national organised crime A state is secured when it is free from these threats Notion of security

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A second report, issued by the European Union (EU) in December 2003, called the Solana Report, identified the following threats:- terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime While the UN has taken a broader view of security by including poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation, there is, by and large an agreement on the threat perceptions between the international community and the EU Notion of security

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How does this affect security in outer space? Significant information could be gained by both military and commercial observation satellites: about WMD related activities of a state; and on on-going conflicts within a state as well as between states Such information is then often transmitted by communications satellites These and other application of spacecraft, such as navigation satellites, could make them very sensitive and therefore prone to attack. Notion of security

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Uses of outer space

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Some major space states

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Trends affecting space security Thus two trends evolved: (a) use of satellites to enhance potentials of terrestrial weapons; and (b) development of weapons to destroy satellites in orbits and missiles and warheads in transit through space Considerable impetus was the result of the Cold War but at the end of which the military use of space continued By 1960, the US Army’s proposal to convert its Nike Zeus ABM system to ASAT role established a link between ABM and ASAT weapons

Growing capabilities in commercial space: 

Growing capabilities in commercial space With the growing dependence on satellites for operation of terrestrial weapons, increasing capabilities of commercial spacecraft and perceived threats from long and short range missiles, interest in the development of weapons to counter these increased QuickBird commercial satellite

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Space weapons Investigations of earth- and space-based weapons aimed at satellites (ASAT systems) and missiles (BMD systems) have been in progress since signing the Outer Space Treaty in October 1967 Space weapons can be broadly grouped into three: nuclear, non-nuclear and non-dedicated space weapons Non-dedicated space weapons are those that do not destroy either a satellite or a missile but they destroy their command, control and space surveillance equipment which are vital to the efficient operations of spacecraft and missiles

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Various types of space weapons    

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Special note on laser weapons A 1-megawatt Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRCL), was fired into space from the US Army's White Sands, N.M., missile range against a satellite but failed However, a low power 30-watt laser used for alignment of the system and tracking of the spacecraft, was sufficient to blind the satellite temporarily A device like this was seen to have an advantage as it did not create any space debris like that in the case of a kinetic kill vehicle It also showed that a commercially available laser with a 1.5m mirror could be an effective ASAT weapon

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Some observations Any future NMD may affect nuclear policies of States with nuclear weapons e.g. China may feel its nuclear weapons impotent against US NMD thus probably increasing its nuclear arsenal and conduct more nuclear tests This will result in India conducting more nuclear tests to improve its minimum deterrence against China No doubt Pakistan will react to this A whole new cycle of nuclear arms race starts Not only this but when an in coming weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is intercepted and destroyed above the earth’s atmosphere, its lethal nuclear, chemical or biological ingredient will affect the earth below, thus we have not escaped the effect of the WMDs Moreover, even before a workable NMD is developed, we will have very effective ASAT weapons Finally, these systems will require testing aggravating an already serious debris problem

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Space debris Only a month and half ago on 29 March 2006, a piece of space debris crashed into a Russian broadcasting satellite damaging it As of August 2005, 9,379 objects in earth orbit have been catalogued by NORAD Of these, 2,954 are payloads and about a third are active satellites Some of the collisions and close encounters are summarised in the table

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Some examples of close encounters/collisions in orbit

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Way forward It is often argued that proliferation of space weapons and related technologies is undesirable In the past, solutions for such questions have been found in arms control agreements For example, the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) While, by and large, the NPT has been successful, the number of original five nuclear weapon states has now increased to at least eight This occurred as retaining and even to some extent improving such weapons by the five nuclear weapon states has not dissuaded others from acquiring nuclear weapons By the same logic, if space weapons are developed and deployed, it would be very difficult to convince other space faring nations not to embark on their own space weapon programmes It is important that negotiations at the CD commence as soon as possible

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Way forward – A possible high-altitude ASAT treaty A space weapon is that can damage, destroy, permanently disrupt the functioning of, or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other states An important provision It would prohibit development, testing in space or against space objects, or deployment of any ASAT for attacking satellites with orbital periods of 12 hours or greater or minimum altitudes of 5000 km or greater

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Way forward – Improve transparency Improve transparency in outer space: As a first step strengthen the compliance with the U.N. Convention on Registration of Outer Space Objects (1975) under which states require to provide basic information about their satellites launched into outer space The obligations under the Registration Convention are mandatory By and large, provision IV.1 .(e) has not been fulfilled, since nearly three-quarters of the satellites launched serve military purposes and hardly any of them have been described to the UN Secretary-General as having a military use Until the registration convention is strengthened, it may be possible to improve the space-traffic control

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Way forward – Improve space traffic control Improve space traffic control: The current openly available catalogues are not very accurate for effective traffic control The actual locations of space objects are only determined occasionally to check the predictions A working group convened by the four leading non-governmental organizations dealing with space issues, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the U.N. Office on Outer Space Affairs, the Confederation of European Aerospace Societies and International Academy of Astronautics, have suggested more extensive efforts to improve space traffic control procedures As a first step, an International Data Centre (IDC) could be established, for example, in Vienna, where data provided by participating countries on space objects in orbits would be collated and compiled; the data could be, for example, the telemetry emitted by satellites, their shapes, sizes, and orbits, the launching country, and the designation of satellites The second step would be that the IDC could establish some equipment necessary to track objects in space to verify the Registration Convention and also data that might be available from various states on orbital debris The latter would be to check measures that may be used on orbital mitigation

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Way forward – Orbital debris mitigation Orbital debris mitigation: The Inter-Agency Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) consisting of space agencies from China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the European Space Agency, has drawn up a set of guidelines However, these are not legally binding In any case, so far, Russia and India have blocked the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) from adopting the guidelines It might be suggested here that the COPUOS adopts a possible “Convention on Limiting and Eliminating Debris in Orbits (CLEDO)” The verification of such a convention could be carried out by the above proposed International Data Centre