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Using GIS to Examine Risk-taking and System Hazard Among Rare Events: 

Using GIS to Examine Risk-taking and System Hazard Among Rare Events Gisela Bichler-Robertson, Ph.D. Director, Crime Prevention Analysis Laboratory- CSUSB Assistant Professor, California State University, San Bernardino ESRI International User Conference. Paper 521.

Current Accident Paradigm:: 

Current Accident Paradigm: 80% of the casualties investigated are said to be the result of human error Criticism: Tautological investigative process (Taska, 1990) Loss of operational context (Wagenaar, 1992, MTRB, 1976)

Alternative Explanations: 

Alternative Explanations Corporate Risk-taking Corporations make decisions that maximize profit and minimize costs. These decisions directly affect operating conditions. i.e. unrealistic sailing schedules, staffing deficiencies, inadequate equipment maintenance System Hazard Accidents occur within a transportation system that interacts with weather conditions, hydrological features and traffic volumes to create hazards that impact differentially. i.e. economics, enforcement procedures and practices, insurance, other corporations, Port Authorities

Events are caused by all factors.: 

Events are caused by all factors. Casualty Shipboard Operational Error System Hazard Corporate Risk-Taking

Methodological Issues: 

Methodological Issues Sample Generation and Data Analysis rare events lack of comprehensive database Variable Construction availability of corporate data changing national ability to collect information vessels travel through multiple regions

Resolving Methodological Limitations: 

Resolving Methodological Limitations Narrow Geographic Focus Right hand spatial censoring Limited generalizability and utility Too few events Retain a Large Geographic Focus by Triangulating data sources and analytic strategies Publicly available data cross-referenced against multiple sources Traditional and Innovative Analytic Strategies

Corporate Risk-taking: 

Corporate Risk-taking Acts of omission or commission resulting from deliberate decision-making by those occupying structural positions within the business organization—executives or managers—that renders the vessel unseaworthy, meaning it is unfit for its intended use FOC registration FOD registration 20+ years old Safety violations Overloading Manifest Issues

System Hazard: 

System Hazard Enforcement capacity – GDP 1993 US$ by quartiles Exposure to hazard – voyage length in nmi by quartiles High traffic area – w/ 1.5 nmi of major port or in shipping lane Collisions w/ vessel Inclement weather A general overarching threat posed by external or systemic elements—classification societies, Coast Guard, traffic volume, actions of other owners, etc.—associated with the maritime passenger transportation industry, within a particular area.

Data Collection Process: 

Data Collection Process Selection criteria All casualties 1950-1998 Passenger vessels legally carrying fare paying passengers. Certified to carry at least 10 people. Refugee and chartered fishing excluded. Data Sources News services, Maritime Court Proceedings, Accident Investigations, Registries, Chronicles

Casualty Database: 

Casualty Database 532 usable events (653 total) 24,205 deaths (33,265 total) 53.8 % event occurred last 10 years 54.2 % ferries Time of day 6:01 – 14:00 21.1 % 14:01 – 22:00 28.9 % 22:01 – 6:00 50 %

Nature of Passenger Ship Casualties, 1950-1998 (516 events).: 

Nature of Passenger Ship Casualties, 1950-1998 (516 events).

Regional Distribution of Passenger Ship Casualties, 1950-1998 (527 events).: 

Regional Distribution of Passenger Ship Casualties, 1950-1998 (527 events).

Table 3: 

Table 3

Table 4: 

Table 4

Table 5: 

Table 5

Table 6: 

Table 6

Findings from Traditional Statistical Analyses: 

Findings from Traditional Statistical Analyses Model is significant but: Corporate Risk-taking is only sig. among SE Asian casualties System hazard is not important in any of the regions Substantial number of casualties involve vessels with safety violations (70% SE Asia and approx. 40% Caribbean and S European).

Casualties occur in:: 

Casualties occur in: High traffic areas (regional effect) Inclement Weather (40 % in SE Asia) Rescue capacity makes a difference between high volume areas.

Spatial Analysis with GIS: 

Spatial Analysis with GIS Kernel Density equal interval and standard deviations to determine categories at varying scales in miles and nautical miles 50, 20, 10-mile radius 10 and 5-nautical mile radius To determine where corporate risk-taking and system hazard concentrate.

Findings from GIS Analyses: 

Findings from GIS Analyses Uneven distribution Concentrated around major ports Concentrated along shipping routes Overlapping regions of concentration

Discussion: 

Discussion Even within regions where corporate risk-taking and system hazard were not significant, areas of high concentration exist. The concentration of these factors increased with proximity to major ports. Important interaction effect that intensifies as the distance to port decreases.

International Efforts: 

International Efforts Paris MOU founded in 1982 18 member states inspect 85-95 % of vessels 52% of passenger vessels have existing safety problems 5 % decrease (45.5 to 40.4), insigificant GAO Report (1993) US Coast Guard inspections of 139 vessels involved in US based cruise industry found safety deficiencies in vessels 10% increase (36.8 to 46.2), insignificant

Implications: 

Implications Methodological Possible to use GIS to study corporate criminal behavior and other rare events. Traditional statistics/GIS do not stand alone. Combining analytic strategies are important to improve mining of the data. Findings International efforts to increase enforcement need to be examined (appear to be unsuccessful) Poor ship management is not a “them” phenomenon. Publicly available data can be used to effectively examine shipping on a global scale.

Future Research: 

Future Research Examine the effects of lighthouses and enforcement efforts, and traffic levels and tidal patterns. Examine the impact of multinational efforts to improve enforcement of shipping conventions. Paris MOU and US Coast Guard Inspection program. Careful analysis of FOC and FOD

Copies available:: 

Copies available: Powerpoint presentation Website cjrc.csusb.edu/cpal.htm Paper copies On site. Bichler-Robertson (2001). “Using GIS to Examine Maritime Corporate Crime: A study of Philippine Passenger Ship Accidents.” Crime Mapping News. 3(1):8-11. (www.policefoundation.org) Full Report Bichler-Robertson (2000). Maritime Commercial Passenger Ship Casualties, 1950 – 1998: An analysis of negligent corporate risk-taking and system hazard. Bell and Howell: Ann Arbor, Michigan.