THE CUBAN REVOLUTION : THE CUBAN REVOLUTION Political Science 4396
Dr. Arthur K. Smith
Fall Semester 2006
Cuba : Cuba
Central America and the Caribbean : Central America and the Caribbean
Prevailing Myths About the Cuban Revolution : Prevailing Myths About the Cuban Revolution ● The Ernesto “Che” Guevara version: “That a handful of bearded rebels with a rural peasant base singlehandedly took on and defeated a standing army, thereby overthrowing the dictator and bringing the revolutionaries to power.”
● That 1959 represented a “watershed” year for the Cuban Revolution, a break with the past rather than the culmination of more than six decades of virtually continuous struggle.
● That Fidel Castro “had his hands in all of the major and minor decisions of the 26th of July Movement during the insurrection and was responsible for all of its failures and successes.”
Questions to be considered: : Questions to be considered: ● What are the historical antecedents of the Cuban Revolution?
● Did M-26-7 prevail in 1958 primarily through
guerrilla warfare, or were other tactics equally
crucial to victory?
● What has been the role of the United States in shaping
Cuban political and economic history?
● What role will the U.S. play in the post-Fidel era?
● How best to understand the role of Fidel Castro as
Cuba’s revolutionary leader?
● How best to understand the recent “temporary” transfer
of power to Raul Castro?
● What role has been and will be played by the Cuban
exile community?
● What is likely to happen after Fidel’s death?
Cuba in the Early Spanish Colonial Era, 1492-1800 : Cuba in the Early Spanish Colonial Era, 1492-1800 ● Structure of Spanish Colonial Administration
● Spain’s conquest of the New World
● Contrast with England’s colonization of
North America
● Role of Cuba in Spain’s colonial economy
● Mercantilism
• Dominant economic system from about the 16th through the 18th centuries
• Rise of the nation-state in Europe
• Fueled rise of imperialism
● From about 1531 to 1660, Spain extracted from its LA colonies
some 181 tons of gold and 16,000 tons of silver (official figures)
● Effects on Spain’s politics and economy
● Inflation, undermined aristocracy, strengthened powers of
monarchy, retarded growth of independent commercial class
• Havana’s role in Spain’s mineral exploitation of Latin America
Cuba in the Early Spanish Colonial Era, 1492-1800 (2) : Cuba in the Early Spanish Colonial Era, 1492-1800 (2) ● Peninsulares vs. Criollos in Spanish colonial America
● Decline of mining, rise of plantation economy
● Importation of African slaves
● Spain’s restrictive policies for Cuba from 16th through 19th
centuries
● Occupation of Havana by the English in 1862
• The world context: England, France, Spain, and the United States
at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century
● Industrial revolution in England, expansion of world trade
● American and French Revolutions, the Enlightenment
● Slave uprising in Sainte Domingue, Hispaniola (Haiti)
● Legitimacy crisis in Spain and Portugal
• Napoleonic wars
● Three kinds of legitimacy
● Traditional
● Charismatic
● Rational-Legal
Cuba in the Early Spanish Colonial Era, 1492-1800 (3) : Cuba in the Early Spanish Colonial Era, 1492-1800 (3) ● Insularity of Cuba from LA wars of independence (Simon Bolivar
and Jose de San Martin)
• Effects of these events on Cuba
• Cuba became a refuge for displaced peninsulares and immigrants
from Spain
• Before proceeding with examination of Cuba in the 19th century,
review Introductory Chapter in Julia Sweig’s Book
● “Prevailing myths” to be examined and evaluated:
● The Ernesto “Che” Guevara version: “That a handful of bearded
rebels with a rural peasant base singlehandedly took on and
defeated a standing army, thereby overthrowing the dictator
and bringing the revolutionaries to power.”
● That 1959 represented a “watershed” year for the Cuban
Revolution, a break with the past rather than the culmination
of more than six decades of virtually continuous struggle.
● That Fidel Castro “had his hands in all of the major and minor
decisions of the 26th of July Movement during the insurrection
and was responsible for all of its failures and successes.”
Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1898 : Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1898 ● Cuba in the 19th Century: Rise of the Sugar Culture
● Great Power Politics:
● Pax Britannica
● U.S. “Manifest Destiny”
● The Monroe Doctrine
● Cuba’s attractiveness to the U.S. (refer to map)
● Offer to buy Cuba from Spain, the Ostend Manifesto
● Decline of Spain as an Imperial Power
● Emergence of the United States as a Great Power
● Influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan
● Social Darwinism
● The “First Rebellion” in Spain’s Cuba, 1868-1878
● Grito de Yara (1868)
● Cuba Libre
● Jose Marti
Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1898 (2) : Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1898 (2)
Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1903 (3) : Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1903 (3) ● 1878 Settlement by Spain led to shaky peace
● Promised reforms, amnesty, emancipation of slaves
(finally fulfilled in 1886)
● Growth of trade in sugar & tobacco with U.S.
● Trade agreement cancelled by Spain in 1894
● Hurt sugar growers in Cuba, caused resentment in
the U.S.
● Final war of independence, 1895-1898
● Roles of Jose Marti, Antonio Maceo, Calixto Garcia
● General Valeriano “Butcher” Weyler
● Reconcentrados, free fire zones
● Forces provoking American intervention
● Economic, strategic, humanitarian
● The “Yellow Press”
● Sinking of the USS Maine (February 15, 1898)
Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1908 (4) : Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1908 (4) ● Spanish-American War
● “Remember the Maine”
● War declared on April 11, 1898
● The Teller Amendment
● Theodore Roosevelt, the “Rough Riders”
● The Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898)
● Contrast between U.S. & Cuban historical perspectives
on the war
● American Military Rule, 1898-1902
● Conditions in Cuba were deplorable
● Benevolent reconstruction, Dr. Leonard Wood
● Debates in both Cuba & U.S. about future relationship:
● Annexation vs. Independence
● Elections of 1900 in the U.S.
● TR as war hero, Republican candidate for VP
● Assassination of McKinley, rise of TR
● Constitutional Assembly in Cuba (1900)
Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1903 (5) : Cuba in the Late Spanish Colonial Era, 1800-1903 (5) ● The Platt Amendment (Secretary of State Elihu Root)
● Limits on Cuban sovereignty, naval stations, U.S. right
to intervene “for the preservation of Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government
adequate for the protection of life, property, and
individual liberty.”
● Adopted by U.S. Congress as rider to army appropriations
act of 1901
● Added to new Cuban constitution in June 1901
● Election of 1st President of Cuba, Tomas Estrada Palma
● End of U.S. military rule (May 1902)
● Beginning of U.S. Protectorate (1902-1934)
● Estrada Palma’s first term, 1902-1906
● Good start, trade treaty of 1903 with U.S.
● 20% reduction in tariff duties for Cuban sugar
● U.S. settles on only Guantanamo Bay as naval base
● Traditional Cuban corruption moderated
Growth of the Sugar Culture and the U.S. Protectorate, 1902-1925 : Growth of the Sugar Culture and the U.S. Protectorate, 1902-1925 ● Framework for political analysis
● Power contenders
● Power capabilities
● Political currencies
● Three types of legitimacy
● Role of the military in Latin American countries
● Golpes de estado
● Rise of U.S. policy of “Gunboat Diplomacy”
● Diplomatic recognition of new governments
● De jure vs. de facto recognition
● Recognition used as a power tactic by U.S. governments
● Roosevelt Corollary to Monroe Doctrine
● Panama Canal
● 1st Test of Platt Amendment in 1906
● Estrada Palma’s “Moderates” vs. “Liberals” (Jose
Miguel Gomez, Alfredo Zayas)
● TR sent William Howard Taft, then appointed Charles Magoon as
governor to supplant the elected president
● New elections in 1909 brought Gomez to power
Growth of the Sugar Culture and the U.S. Protectorate, 1902-1925 (2) : Growth of the Sugar Culture and the U.S. Protectorate, 1902-1925 (2) ● Rise of venality after 1909, repeated U.S. interventions to maintain order
● Pattern of U.S. protectorate established
● President Mario Garcia Menocal (1913-1921) continued
corruption
● Fraudulent reelection in 1917 (U.S. troops put down
revolt by opposition)
● Cuba followed U.S. in declaring war on Germany in
1917
● U.S. bought Cuban sugar during WWI, but prices
collapsed after war ended
● The “Dance of the Millions”
● Economic collapse, all Cuban-owned banks failed
● Alfredo Zayas elected president in 1921 in midst of
continuing economic turmoil
● Gen. Enoch Crowder sent by U.S. in “painless intervention”
● Economic recovery until 1923, when Crowder left
● Quick return to corruption
● Election of Gerardo Machado in 1925
The Machado Years, 1925-1933 : The Machado Years, 1925-1933 ● Promising beginning for Machado Government
● Diversified economy, public works, easy loans from
New York banks
● Era of “Dollar Diplomacy” replaced “Gunboat Diplomacy”
● But Machado built his own corrupt political machine
● Reelected in 1928, but opposition grew
● University of Havana played major role in opposition
● ABC society of some 40,000 members
● Machado “porrista” thugs, reign of terror
● Public order deteriorated, but U.S. President
Hoover resisted calls for intervention
● The Great Depression set in and deepened throughout
most of the world
● New U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933)
● The “Good Neighbor” policy of FDR replaced “Dollar Diplomacy”
The Machado Years, 1925-1933 (2) : The Machado Years, 1925-1933 (2) ● Sumner Welles sent by FDR as ambassador to Cuba to
apply pressure on Machado
● ABC called a general strike in August 1933, Cuban
army leaders demanded changes
● Machado took flight to Bahamas
● Provisional government brokered by Welles, but
lasted only three weeks
● Overthrown by the “revolt of the sergeants”
● Tradition of military “golpes de estado” in LA
● Sergeant Fulgencio Batista deposed officer corps
and seized power, promoted himself to colonel
and army chief of staff
● Batista appointed Professor Ramon Grau San Martin
as Provisional President
● Grau lasted only 4 months (U.S. withheld recognition)
● de facto vs. de jure recognition
● But Grau decreed end of Platt Amendment as law in Cuba
The Revolt of the Sergeants and the Rise of Fulgencio Batista, 1933-1944 : The Revolt of the Sergeants and the Rise of Fulgencio Batista, 1933-1944 ● Platt Amendment then formally abrogated by U.S. (1934)
● Batista ruled Cuba from behind the scenes from 1934-1940
● Succession of seven puppet presidents
● Notably Carlos Mendieta, Miguel Mariano Gomez, and
Federico Laredo Bru
● Cuban economy shaky during 1930s
● Impact of worldwide depression
● General strike in 1935, but Batista’s army suppressed it
● Batista’s behind-the-scenes dictatorship characterized
as “mild, suave, and sweet”
● Social reforms under Laredo Bru
● Women’s suffrage, sugar cooperatives, trade
unionization (Confederation of Cuban Workers)
● U.S. presence lessened, but rising anti-
Americanism among intellectuals
● Rise of Fascism in Europe, the “New Deal” in
the U.S.; Spanish civil war
The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 : The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 ● Constituent Assembly elected in November 1939
● Constitution of 1940 was a very progressive document
● Cross between presidential and parliamentary systems
● Prime minister responsible to president & congress
● No immediate reelection of president (4 year term)
● Civil liberties, worker’s rights, unions, agrarian reform,
industrialization, Cubanization of the national economy
● Batista elected President in 1940, supported by his
Democratic Socialist coalition and the PSP
● Opposed by Grau San Martin (Autenticos)
● Batista a strong, democratic, popular president from 1940-44
● Cuba declared war on Axis Powers on Dec. 9, 1941
● Recognized USSR in 1943
● U.S. provided aid, plus U.S. purchased entire sugar crop
at favorable prices
● Zafra averaging about 5 million tons annually
The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 (2) : The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 (2) ● Batista was a masterful politician at this time
● Actually gave Cuba the best government it had ever had
● Public works projects, support of army, upper and middle classes,
organized labor, Communists
● Role of COMINTERN in 1930’s and 1940’s
● PSP was strongly tied to Moscow and the USSR
● Cuban intellectuals still disaffected, but isolated
● But Batista took care to enrich himself (commissions, kick-backs)
● In 1944, he allowed free elections and turned over power to Grau
San Martin and the Autenticos
● Batista went to live in Florida
● Grau’s government from 1944-48 was a big disappointment
● Set new records for graft and corruption
● Havana became a mecca for U.S. tourists, gambling, prostitution,
narcotics, mafia
The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 (3) : The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 (3) ● By 1947-48, Cuba seemed to be coming apart
● Students at University of Havana rioted, armed themselves
● Political assassinations were common
● Emergence of Fidel Castro
● Father Angel Castro, from Galicia (Gallego) b. Dec. 4, 1892,
emigrated to Cuba in 1912
● Worked for United Fruit Company, started own hacienda—10,000
acres in Oriente
● Married, but fell for housemaid Lina Ruz
● Six children with Lina Ruz;, Fidel b. Aug. 13, 1926
● Rustic upbringing, athletic, sometimes violent, brawling; Catholic
schools in Santiago and Havana
● To University of Havana in fall 1945 to study law
The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 (4) : The Constitution of 1940, WWII, and the Post-War Years, 1945-1952 (4) ● Elections of 1948 (Carlos Prio Socarras vs. Senator Eduardo Chibas & two
other candidates)
● Autenticos vs. Ortodoxos
● Prio won a plurality of the votes
● Corruption became even worse, especially Prio himself
● But Cuban economy growing (sugar, Korean War, tourism)
● Buildup to national elections of 1952
● Growing sentiment for Batista to return to power (elected to Senate)
● Chibas growing in popularity, but dramatic suicide on radio show
● Roberto Agramonte became Ortodoxo candidate, Batista likely
to lose the election
● Cuartelazo of March 1952, Camp Columbia
● Prio Socarras deposed
● Elections cancelled
Fulgencio Batista’s Second Coup, 1952 : Fulgencio Batista’s Second Coup, 1952 ● Batista’s return to power initially greeted with widespread relief
● U.S. recognized new government some two weeks later
● But old progressiveness quickly devolved into dictatorship
● Press muzzled, university closed, congress dissolved, military law
declared
● Link with Meyer Lansky and the U.S. mafia, which invested in
hotels, gambling, prostitution
● Role of frustrated intellectuals such as Fidel Castro
● Student factions, growing violence and government repression
● Broader context of dictatorships in Latin America
● The Bogatazo in Colombia (April 1948) and Fidel Castro
● Jorge Eliecer Gaitan assassinated, period of La Violencia, Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla (1953-57)
● Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (Dominican Republic, 1930-61)
● Cayo Confites expedition
Fulgencio Batista’s Second Coup, 1952 (2) : Fulgencio Batista’s Second Coup, 1952 (2) ● Marcos Perez Jimenez (Venezuela, 1948-58)
● Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina (1943-55)
● Manuel Odria in Peru (1948-56) and APRA
● Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay (1954-89)
● Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua (1933-56)
● Getulio Vargas in Brazil (elected 1950-54, but former military
dictator from 1930-45)
● But there were a few bright spots in L.A. for democratic reform
● Chile and Mexico changed governments regularly
through elections
● The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 (Victor Paz Estenssoro and
the MNR)
● Jose “Pepe” Figueres and the National Liberation Party (PLN)
in Costa Rica
● Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (1950-54)
● The “Caribbean Legion”
● Role of the Organization of American States (OAS)
● U.S. policy of “containment” of communism
The Moncada Raid, July 26, 1953 : The Moncada Raid, July 26, 1953 ● Fidel Castro’s political ambitions as an Ortodoxo
● Frustrated by Batista’s coup
● Turned to violent overthrow of government as only remaining
route to power
● Planning and Organization of the Moncada Raid
● Fidel’s budding “movement” of disaffected and marginalized Cubans
● “Fidelistas” grew to a movement of about 1,200 by June 1953
● Raising money, gathering armaments
● Ideology? Communist?
● Charismatic legitimation, mantle of Marti
● Stance of PSP as Fidelista movement grew
● Focus on Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba
● Planned as early as February 1952 with Abel Arcos
● Hope was that dramatic and heroic feat would spark nationwide uprising
● Romantic, “Morir por la Patria es Vivir”
● 165 men and two women, Batistiano uniforms
● But everything went wrong from the start, army troops rallied
The Moncada Raid, July 26, 1953 (2) : The Moncada Raid, July 26, 1953 (2) ● Fidel gave order to retreat, escaped with about 18 others to
Sierra Maestra
● Those captured were tortured and most were executed
● Moncada raid was a military failure but a political success
● Brutality of Batista regime was crystalized for nation to see
● Fidel catapulted into leadership role on grander scale
● As dust settled, Fidel and Raul gave themselves up
● Brought to trial in September 1953 (some 24 conspirators in all)
● Fidel defended himself, cross-examined accusers
● Lengthy summation included his justification for the Moncada attack and
his political agenda
● Manifesto called for restoration of the Constitution of 1940
● Ownership of land by tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters
● Right of workers to share of profits of business enterprises,
including sugar mills and plantations
The Moncada Raid, July 26, 1953 (3) : The Moncada Raid, July 26, 1953 (3)
● Confiscation of property that had been secured through
graft and fraud
● Castigated foreign ownership of land (esp. United Fruit
Company)
● Rejected absolute freedom of enterprise, guarantees for investment
capital, law of supply and demand
● Castro’s speech held out a bright and shining vision of the future
● “History will absolve me”
Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 : Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 ● Fidel sentenced to 15 years, Raul to 13,
20 others given 10 years
● Boniato Prison on the Isle of Pines
● While in prison, Fidel continued to work on his Manifesto
● More radical than Ortodoxos, but far short of Communist
● Fairly well treated as a political prisoner, allowed to communicate with
wife Mirta and lover Naty Revuelta and to maintain unity among his
imprisoned followers
● Meanwhile, Batista increasingly confident, held elections in 1954
● Batista himself the only legal candidate
● Even allowed release of Fidel and his Moncada raid comrades from
prison in May 1955 as part of deal with Ortodoxo Party
● Fidel dallied briefly in Havana, then left for voluntary exile in Mexico City
● Mexico in the 1950s under President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and the PRI
Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (2) : Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (2) ● Immediately focused on organizing M-26-7
● Forged linkages with important Cuban exiles, including Carlos
Prio Socarras
● But already jockeying for leadership of anti-Batista forces
● Already focused on landing in Oriente in tradition of Marti
● M-26-7 in Mexico City quickly grew to about 70 followers
● Rigorous paramilitary training, organization into cells
● Met Che Guevara in July 1955
● Fidel and Che complemented each other as revolutionaries
● Raul Castro, Alberto Bayo (veteran of Spanish civil war), and
Frank Pais completed core group of leaders
● Pais least well known, but perhaps most important after Fidel
● His ANR (Accion Nacional Revolucionaria) became the
in-Cuba wing of M-26-7
● Role was to mount diversionary uprising in Santiago during
planned landing in Oriente
Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (3) : Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (3) ● By fall 1955, Fidel was actively raising money for M-26-7
● Visits to Cuban exiles in New York, Tampa, New Jersey
● There was in April 1956 an abortive military coup against Batista
● Easily put down, but effect was to eliminate from Batista’s army
its most professionalized officers (mostly trained in U.S.)
● Followers of Prio Socarras assaulted army barracks in Matanzas
● Fidel watched from afar, pleased at these failures
● In July 1956 Fidel met with Jose Antonio Echeverria, leader of
anti-Batista group Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE)
● Formed in 1955, middle- and upper-middle-class youths
● Idealistic, pro-democracy, but supported violent overthrow
of Batista
● Fidel met with Prio Socarras in McAllen, Texas, and won
financial support
Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (4) : Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (4) ● Events in Fidel’s personal life
● Ex-wife Mirta Diaz-Balart remarried
● Fidel concerned about his son “Fidelito,” then six years old
● Naty Revuelta bore him a daughter in March 1956
● Affairs with various other women
● Death of Fidel’s father, Angel, in October 1956
● Purchase of the Granma, aged 38-foot yacht in Tuxpan, Mexico,
in early November
● M-26-7 group filtered in to Tuxpan, about 88 in all
● Granma set out for Cuba on November 25, dangerously overloaded
● Stormy passage to Oriente, rampant seasickness, voyage delayed
● Batista was aware of M-26-7 plans
● On November 30, Fidel learned of failure of Frank Pais’s
diversionary attack in Santiago
● Landing on December 2
Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (5) : Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (5) ● On December 5, after having moved inland some 22 miles, the M-26-7 landing party was ambushed by Cuban army
● Most were killed, about 12 survivors scattered, including
Fidel’s top leadership (Che was slightly wounded)
● Survivors reunited after about 11 grueling days in the rugged
Sierra Maestra
● Now the real guerrilla struggle began
● Early raid on army outpost at La Plata was successful
● Word quietly and slowly got out to Fidelistas, and the band of
guerrillas started to grow
● Strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare
● Unconventional, asymmetrical
● Numerous successful examples known at that time, among
them:
● China (Mao Tse-tung, mid-1940s)
Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (6) : Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (6) ● Yugoslavia (Josip Broz Tito in early 1940s)
● Viet Nam (General Vo Nguyen Giap, early 1950s)
● Mexico (Emiliano Zapata, mid 1910s))
● Nicaragua (Augusto Cesar Sandino, late 1920s))
● Cuba’s own war of independence against Spain (1895-98)
● Political vs. military victory
● Measures of success are different
● “Hit and run” tactics
● Avoidance of set-piece battles against conventional forces
● Common setting: Rural vs. urban
● Support of peasants (or campesinos) is crucial
● Roles of propaganda and terrorism
● Purpose: To de-legitimize regime and create conditions
for its fall
Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (7) : Castro’s Imprisonment, Exile in Mexico, and Return to Cuba, 1953-1956 (7) ● Question: Was Cuba a modern, transitional, or underdeveloped country in 1957-58?
● Metaphor of growth:
● Heuristic
● But possibly teleological or deterministic
● Example: Karl Marx’s economic determinism
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 ● What was Cuba like in early 1957?
● Dimensions of political (as contrasted with economic) modernization
● Secularization
● More than simply independence of the political from religious—
how people conceive their role in the process of change
● Integration
● Individuals owe primary allegiance to nation, rather than religion,
tribe, or region
● Social Mobilization
● Individuals and groups actively seek ways to resolve problems
● Participation
● People conceive of political action
● Institutionalization
● Activity channeled through political institutions and accepted
rules
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (2) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (2) ● Dimensions of economic modernization
● Industrialization, urbanization, education
● Concept of economic and political dependency (“Dependency Theory”)
● Means of production (land, labor, capital, technology)
● Primary vs. secondary products
● Doctrine of comparative advantage in international trade
● Efficiency lies in specialization
● But specialization in primary products means specialization in
land and labor rather than in capital and technology
● Rostow’s “Revolution of Rising Expectations”
● Cuba in the 1950’s not as backward or as underdeveloped as has been often portrayed, especially in comparison to the rest of Latin America
● By 1953 census, about 60 percent of labor force in
nonagricultural occupations
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (3) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (3) ● Third in LA in average daily consumption of food (after Argentina and Uruguay)
● Ranked near top in LA in number of radios and television sets
● Foreign ownership of sugar mills was in steady decline, from 66 in 1939
to only 36 in 1958
● By contrast, Cuban-owned sugar mills increased from 56 to 121 in the
same period
● Cuban-owned percentage of total sugar production had increased from
22% to 62%
● By 1958, Cuba’s per capita income was among the highest in LA
● Comparable worldwide to Italy, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania
● Cuban workers in cities enjoyed relatively good pay and benefits
● But agricultural workers were worse off, underemployed and seasonally
unemployed because of sugar culture
● Cuba was fairly highly urbanized, with nearly 60% living in cities
● Status of education was inadequate but improving
● Literacy rate of about 78% in 1953, ranking Cuba 4th in Latin America
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (4) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (4) ● In social structure, Cuba marked by steady growth of middle class
(professional, semi-professional, managerial, and proprietary
groups)
● In relation to total population, Cuba’s middle class among
strongest in L.A.
● On average, then, Cuba generally ranked quite high among L.A.
countries
● But average rankings concealed wide disparities and inequalities
● In summary, the picture of Cuba in late 1950s as a backward,
poverty-ridden land was not completely accurate, especially in
relation to L.A.
● But relative to U.S. and Western Europe, Cuba was clearly
underdeveloped
● In per capita income, Cuba ranked far below Mississippi, the
poorest state
● And below all Western European nations except Portugal
● Wealth and land ownership concentrated in the hands of the few
● And Cuba had its share of major problems
● Economy sluggish, growth in GNP was slow
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (5) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (5) ● Overreliance on sugar (75-80% of Cuba’s exports)
● U.S. citizens owned or controlled many public utilities, much of
the banking system, and about 36 percent of sugar industry
(albeit U.S. share was in steady decline)
● Cuba’s trade overwhelmingly was with U.S. (about 60%)
● But while the perception was much higher, U.S. financial
interests controlled only six percent of the gross Cuban GNP
● Cubans had a love-hate relationship with the U.S.
● Despised U.S. materialism, its pragmatism, and its historic
influence in Cuban affairs
● Many Cubans ashamed of what Havana had become by 1950s
● But Cubans also desirous of sharing in the profits that U.S.
investments and tourists brought
● And copying American ways and customs (e.g., slang words,
baseball, even racial prejudice)
● Cubans so prosperous that Cuban tourists spent more in
the U.S. than U.S. tourists spent in Cuba
● U.S. support of Batista dictatorship was not set in concrete
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (6) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (6) ● My point: The Cuban Revolution was born not so much out of grinding
poverty, racial inequalities, economic underdevelopment, or
U.S. imperialism
● As out of the fact that development of a more modern Cuba
was not proceeding fast enough to satisfy people’s rising
expectations, especially among middle class
● Cuba was a “transitional” nation that had “taken off” toward
modernization
● Dimensions of political modernization: Uneven progress
● Secularization
● Integration
● Social Mobilization
● Participation
● Institutionalization
● Tensions in society exacerbated by a tradition of aggressive
nationalism with a strong anti-Yanqui twist
● A particularly violent revolutionary tradition
● Influence of Cold War conflicts elsewhere in the world
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (7) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (7) ● Why is it important to understand this?
● The “Myth” of the Cuban Revolution promulgated by
Castro, Guevara, and others (e.g., C. Wright Mills,
Jean Paul Sartre, Leo Huberman, Regis Debray, Paul
Sweezy, to mention a few)
● Cuba was widely portrayed as an island inhabited by a largely
rural population living in misery and filth, illiteracy, and
exploitation
● Whose conditions of life were so abysmal that the country
simply exploded under the leadership of Fidel Castro
to create a new social order through revolution
● The facts belie much of the myth, and the truth is much
more complicated
● But while the period from 1953-1958 was prosperous,
Batista’s dictatorship was becoming progressively more
tyrannical and brutal
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (8) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (8) ● Never had Cubans been richer—at least, those who held office, who
were granted concessions, who owned land and good businesses
● And among the richest was ex-sergeant Fulgencio Batista
● Under Batista, Cuba had virtually everything—except liberty
● The opportunity to participate in politics was closed to all but the
few batistianos
● Meanwhile, back in the Sierra Maestra, the fidelistas were working at
guerrilla warfare
● Basic strategy (January 1957-February 1958) was to attack army
posts, withdraw immediately, then prepare ambush for the pursuing
army troops
● The M-26-7 rebel band grew slowly, with most new recruits coming
not from guajiros but rather from among young urban students and
intellectuals
● Mostly from Santiago and recruited by Frank Pais
● Pais had been arrested and jailed after the abortive uprising scheduled
to coincide with the Granma landing, then was acquitted (May 1957)
● Very few guajiros recruited to fight, but support of the guajiros was cultivated
with land reform and as source of food and supplies
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (9) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (9) ● Turning point came when Frank Pais sent Herbert Matthews to Castro
in the mountains in February 1957
● Veteran New York Times war correspondent
● Fortuitous, Matthews “the right man at exactly the right time”
● Matthews’ three stories in New York Times revealed that Fidel was not
only alive but was actively engaging Batista’s army
● Fidel adept at “guerrilla theatre” during Matthews’ visit
● Romantic portrayal by Matthews caused a sensation in U.S.,
but also in Cuba
● Batista scoffed at fidelista threat, and PSP publicly denounced Castro
● M-26-7 leaders agreed to complement Sierra activities with urban underground
● Frank Pais played the role of coordinator
● More than Fidel, Pais was the actual architect of organization and
national strategy for M-26-7
● Sierra and Llano tactics worked in concert
● Activities in the Sierra were dependent on Llano for virtually everything
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (10) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (10) ● M-26-7 resisted alliances with other leading anti-Batista groups
● M-26-7 portrayed as something new and independent
● Again, the goal of strategy during this period: Nationwide general strike,
supported by armed struggle in both the Sierra and the Llano
● Cells were organized in all six provinces, but Pais was headquartered
in Santiago
● Llano employed a strategy of sabotage through urban guerrilla warfare
to prepare the way for the planned general strike
● M-26-7’s relationship with the PSP (i.e., the Communists) was delicate
● Many M-26-7 members were anti-Communist, “democratic left”
● PSP had been closely linked to Batista since 1930s
● But if the objective was to be a general strike, PSP cooperation was
vitally needed
● PSP exercised much control over labor unions in CTC
● M-26-7’s relationships with the Autenticos (OA, still led by Prio Socarras) and the
Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) were even more difficult
● But on March 13, 1957, both of these rival groups staged an assault
on Batista’s palace in Havana
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (11) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (11) ● More than 40 killed, including Jose Antonio Echeverria, the leader of the DRE
● Thus a major potential rival to Fidel was removed
● M-26-7 profited from this in various ways, including weapons
● Government crackdown after the assault on Batista’s palace
Repression of dissidents damaged both OA and DRE
● At the same time, another organization, called the Joint Civic Institutions (CIC),
was rallying many professional groups in opposition to Batista and
to the elections he planned for 1958
● Appearance of the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra
● Published in Bohemia magazine on July 28, 1957
● Fidel was the primary author, but Frank Pais was influential in
striking a moderate rather then radical tone
● Building tactical coalition with Raul Chibas, Felipe Pazos,
Roberto Agramonte, Justo Carrillo (Ortodoxos-Historicos)
● Key element of the Manifesto at this time: M-26-7 granted power to the CIC to
name a provisional government
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (12) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (12) ● Rejected elections as a solution until Batista overthrown
● But the Manifesto set free elections and constitutional goverment
as central post-Batista goals
● Elections were to be held within one year after Batista’s defeat
● Called for formation of the Civic Revolutionary Front to bring about
Batista’s downfall
● Manifesto set forth a post-overthrow program of reforms that closely reflected
longstanding platform of Ortodoxo party
● Manifesto was effective in discrediting the elections planned for 1958 as a
competing strategy for ending Batista’s rule
● Roles of women such as Celia Sanchez, Vilma Espin, Haydee Santamaria
● Celia was Fidel’s lover and a key organizer/strategist
● Vilma (later to become Raul’s wife) was a staunch communist and key
plotter against Pais as Fidel’s rival for power within M-26-7
● Pais (only 23 years old) was betrayed from within M-26-7 and assassinated by
Batista’s police in Santiago (late July 1957)
● Spontaneous and widespread mourning, work stoppages in Oriente
● Government overreacted with repression
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (13) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (13) ● Pais’s death cleared way for Fidel to assert not only his undisputed leadership of
M-26-7
● But also the supremacy of the Sierra strategy over that of the Llano
● The August 5 general strike was organized by ND leaders
● Abortive, not supported by PSP
● September 5 naval mutiny in Cienfuegos, easily suppressed by Batista’s army
● Effect was elimination of most M-26-7 allies within military
● During fall 1957, M-26-7 sowed terror across Cuba by burning cane fields
● Meanwhile, the remains of the DRE opened up a guerrilla front of its own
in Escambray mountains in central Cuba, with some 800 members
● Poorly coordinated, eventually not very effective
● And Raul Castro opened up a second front in Oriente in March 1958
● Very effective militarily, carried out some 247 actions against Cuban army through
the end of December
● Raul also resorted to political kidnappings as terror tactic
● Including busload of 47 U.S. sailors returning to base at Guantanamo
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (14) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (14) ● U.S. support of Batista was now becoming ambivalent
● U.S. imposed an arms embargo in March 1958
● State Department concluded that Batista must go
● Attracted by the transitionist plan outlined in the Sierra Manifesto
● “Pact of Miami” and the “Cuban Liberation Junta”
● The PSP also decided to hedge its bets, sending younger members
to join M-26-7 in guerrilla warfare
● PSP leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez traveled to Sierra in May/June and
remained there with Fidel
● M-26-7 llano leaders called for a nationwide general strike on April 9, 1958
● Strike failed, even though it nominally had Fidel’s support
● In May 1958, Batista ordered a major offensive, sent 10,000 troops
to Oriente with air force bombers
● Army suffered some tactical defeats, some defections among its troops
● U.S. pressure forced Batista to stop use of bombing
● In effect, the U.S. government was abandoning Batista to his fate
The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (15) : The 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra and in the Llano, 1956-1958 (15) ● On August 7, Cuban army began a disorderly retreat, marking
beginning of final stage of the insurrection
● Guerrillas of M-26-7 now about 800 in number, and had been reorganized
into four “columns”
● First and second columns, commanded respectively by Fidel and Raul,
stayed where they had been in the Sierra
● Third, commanded by Che Guevara, went to the Escambray
mountains in Las Villas province
● Fourth, led by Camilo Cienfuegos, sent to Pinar del Rio, at the
western tip of Cuba (but never arrived, and actually fell in with Che)
● Oriente province was now virtually completely under rebel control
● And forces under Che and Camilo Cienfuegos threatened to
cut the island in two in Las Villas province
● As fall 1958 progressed, the Cuban army melted away from desertions
● By December 1958, both the U.S. government and Batista’s army leaders
realized that Batista had to go
● On December 31, city of Santa Clara (Las Villas) fell to Che and Camilo
● And Fidel’s column was laying siege to Santiago
● That same night, Batista fled the island
● Victory for Fidel and the M-26-7 was at last at hand
The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I : The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I ● Why did Castro win?
● Five basic reasons
1. Military action
2. The revolutionary potential of the island
3. Programmatic content of the Sierra Manifesto (promise of
liberal democracy)
4. Castro’s personal characteristics and his effective elimination
of potential rivals for power outside M-26-7
5. Lack of support for Batista across spectrum of power contenders
● Fidel began an unhurried victory march from Santiago to Havana
● Che and Camilo had already moved forces into Havana on January 1
● Occupied La Cabana Fortress and Camp Columbia
● Mobs roamed Havana, trashing hotels and casinos
● On January 8, Fidel rode in on a tank to a hero’s welcome
before a crowd of more than a million wildly cheering Cubans
The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (2) : The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (2) ● Without regard for earlier pledge to have the CIC (Joint Civic Institutions)
appoint a provisional government, Castro quickly assumed power to rule by
decree
● Often used mass meetings in the square in Havana, lengthy speeches,
and rhetorical pleas for mass approval
● Unfettered by any legal or constitutional limitations
● Even before Castro arrived in Havana on January 8, M-26-7 announced
a new government headed by Judge Manuel Urrutia LLeo as provisional president
● “Revolutionary Cabinet” (formed under Art. 40 of the 1940 Constitution)
● Fidel as CinC of the armed forces
● Roberto Agramonte (Ortodoxo) as foreign minister
● Osvaldo Dorticos (PSP) became minister in charge of drafting
revolutionary laws
● Others: Armando Hart (Education), Jose Miro Cardona (Prime
Minister), Luis Orlando Rodriguez (Interior), Angel Fernandez
Rodriguez (Justice), Manuel Ray (Communication), and Faustino
Perez (Recovery of Misappropriated Funds)
● Except for Agramonte & Dorticos, no one named from rival opposition groups
● U.S. formally recognized the new government on January 5
The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (3) : The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (3) ● Despite appearances of a provisional government in accord with the
Constitution of 1940, Fidel Castro very much in charge from the outset
● In effect, there were two governments in operation
● Fidel took over top three penthouse floors of the Havana Hilton
● Governed through public speeches, radio and television addresses,
and claims of popular mandates
● Grafted “Code of the Sierra Maestra” onto existing Cuban law to
legalize capital punishment
● Then on January 22, 1959, Fidel launched a series of public
show “trials” of Batistiano war criminals
● Crowds shouted “Paredon,” i.e., “to the execution wall”
● U.S. public opinion, favorable at first when Batista overthrown,
was revulsed by the ongoing spectacle of kangaroo trials
and executions
● Catharsis for Cuban people, also decimated military officer corps
● Retrials of 43 earlier acquitted airmen indicative of strategy
● M-26-7 leadership began to split over issues such as trials,
planning for the elections that had been promised within one year
● Struggle between Communists and democratic leftists
with Castro usually siding with the Communists
The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (4) : The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (4) ● Three basic and interrelated issues had to be faced
1. What was to be the political structure of the revolution?
● Could fundamental revolutionary changes be carried out through
the promised liberal democracy, or was a dictatorship necessary?
2. Could a viable revolutionary regime be formed solely from the
non-Communist elements of M-26-7?
● Or was it necessary to have the organizational skills and
alliance of the PSP?
3. Would the U.S. tolerate a regime bent on revolutionary change
in Cuba?
● Despite negative impacts on U.S. business interests and diplomacy?
● The new regime’s basic shift to the left was notable almost immediately
● Why did it happen this way?
● Was Castro always a Communist?
● Does the answer lie in Castro’s perverse personality?
● What is clear is that he had been deeply committed to fundamental
social and economic change in Cuba for many years
● Apparently Castro made two early decisions
1. His desired reforms could not be carried out gradually, but rather
had to be done rapidly
2. It was his personal destiny to bring these changes to Cuba
The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (5) : The Revolution Takes Power, January 1959-December 1960, Part I (5) ● From July through November 1959, Castro relied increasingly on members
of the PSP
● PSP offered several things that Castro needed
● Strong sense of organization and discipline, and a packaged ideology
● Belief in a hierarchical power structure
● Powerful international allies, especially the USSR
● Castro learned from the experience of the Arbenz government in
Guatemala
● U.S. business interests were going to be adversely affected by reforms
● U.S government therefore was likely to intervene
● A strong ally outside Cuba was needed to counterbalance the U.S.
● The pace of revolutionary changes in Cuba in 1959-60 was extraordinary
● How was it possible? Four factors seem especially relevant:
1. Fidel’s great aura and charisma
● Cubans disposed to follow him wherever he wanted to go
2. Economic structure of the island itself
● Cu