Presentation Transcript
Hacking Windows CE :Hacking Windows CE san@nsfocus.com
san@xfocus.org
Structure Overview :Structure Overview Windows CE Overview
Windows CE Memory Management
Windows CE Processes and Threads
Windows CE API Address Search Technology
The Shellcode for Windows CE
System Call
Windows CE Buffer Overflow Demonstration
About Decoding Shellcode
Conclusion
Reference
Windows CE Overview(1) :Windows CE Overview(1) Windows CE is a very popular embedded operating system for PDAs and mobiles
Windows developers can easily develop applications for Windows CE
Windows CE 5.0 is the latest version
This presentation is based on Windows CE.net(4.2)
Windows Mobile Software for Pocket PC and Smartphone are also based on the core of Windows CE
By default Windows CE is in little-endian mode Part 1/8
Windows CE Overview(2) :Windows CE Overview(2) ARM Architecture
RISC
ARMv1 - ARMv6
Memory Management(1) :Memory Management(1) Windows CE uses ROM (read only memory), RAM (random access memory)
The ROM in a Windows CE system is like a small read-only hard disk
The RAM in a Windows CE system is divided into two areas: program memory and object store
Windows CE is a 32-bit operating system, so it supports 4GB virtual address space
Upper 2GB is kernel space, used by the system for its own data Part 2/8
Memory Management(2) :Memory Management(2)
Memory Management(3) :Memory Management(3) Lower 2GB is user space
0x42000000-0x7FFFFFFF memory is used for large memory allocations, such as memory-mapped files
0x0-0x41FFFFFF memory is divided into 33 slots, each of which is 32MB
Memory Management(4) :Memory Management(4) Slot 0 layout
Processes and Threads(1) :Processes and Threads(1) Windows CE limits 32 processes being run at any one time
Every process at least has a primary thread associated with it upon starting (even if it never explicitly created one)
A process can created any number of additional threads (only limited by available memory)
Each thread belongs to a particular process (and shares the same memory space)
SetProcPermissions API will give the current thread access to any process
Each thread has an ID, a private stack and a set of registers Part 3/8
Processes and Threads(2) :Processes and Threads(2) When a process is loaded
Assigned to next available slot
DLLs loaded into the slot
Followed by the stack and default process heap
After this, then executed
When a process’ thread is scheduled
Copied from its slot into slot 0
This is mapped back to the original slot allocated to the process if the process becomes inactive
Processes and Threads(3) :Processes and Threads(3) Processes allocate stack for each thread, the default size is 64KB, depending on the link parameter when the program is compiled
Top 2KB used to guard against stack overflow
Remained available for use
Variables declared inside functions are allocated in the stack
Thread’s stack memory is reclaimed when it terminates
API Address Search(1) :API Address Search(1) Locate the loaded address of the coredll.dll
struct KDataStruct kdata; // 0xFFFFC800: PUserKData
0x324 KINX_MODULES ptr to module list
LPWSTR lpszModName; /* 0x08 Module name */
PMODULE pMod; /* 0x04 Next module in chain */
unsigned long e32_vbase; /* 0x7c Virtual base address of module */
struct info e32_unit[LITE_EXTRA]; /* 0x8c Array of extra info units */
0x8c EXP Export table position
PocketPC ROMs were builded with Enable Full Kernel Mode option
We got the loaded address of the coredll.dll and its export table position. Part 4/8
API Address Search(2) :API Address Search(2) Find API address via IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY structure like Win32.
typedef struct _IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY
{
......
DWORD AddressOfFunctions; // +0x1c RVA from base of image
DWORD AddressOfNames; // +0x20 RVA from base of image
DWORD AddressOfNameOrdinals; // +0x24 RVA from base of image
// +0x28
} IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY, *PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY;
API Address Search(3) :API Address Search(3) Export Directory Names Ordinals Functions 0x1c address “KernelIoControl”
Shellcode(1) :Shellcode(1) test.asm - the final shellcode
get_export_section
find_func
function implement of the shellcode
It will soft reset the PDA and open its bluetooth for some IPAQs(For example, HP1940) Part 5/8
Shellcode(2) :Shellcode(2) Something to attention while writing shellcode
LDR pseudo-instruction
"ldr r4, =0xffffc800" => "ldr r4, [pc, #0x108]"
"ldr r5, =0x324" => "mov r5, #0xC9, 30"
r0-r3 used as 1st-4th parameters of API, the other stored in the stack
Shellcode(3) :Shellcode(3) EVC has several bugs that makes debug difficult
EVC will change the stack contents when the stack reclaimed in the end of function
The instruction of breakpoint maybe change to 0xE6000010 in EVC sometimes
EVC allows code modify .text segment without error while using breakpoint. (sometimes it's useful)
System Call :System Call Windows CE APIs implement by system call
There is a formula to calculate the system call address
0xf0010000-(256*apiset+apinr)*4
The shellcode is more simple and it can used by user mode Part 6/8
Buffer Overflow Demo(1) :Buffer Overflow Demo(1) hello.cpp - the vulnerable program
Reading data from the "binfile" of the root directory to stack variable "buf" by fread()
Then the stack variable "buf" will be overflowed
ARM assembly language uses bl instruction to call function
"str lr, [sp, #-4]! " - the first instruction of the hello() function
"ldmia sp!, {pc} " - the last instruction of the hello() function
Overwriting lr register that is stored in the stack will obtain control when the function returned Part 7/8
Buffer Overflow Demo(2) :Buffer Overflow Demo(2) The variable's memory address allocated by program is corresponding to the loaded Slot, both stack and heap
The process maybe loaded into the difference Slot at each start time, so the base address always alters
Slot 0 is mapped from the current process' Slot, so its stack address is stable
Buffer Overflow Demo(3) :Buffer Overflow Demo(3)
Buffer Overflow Demo(4) :Buffer Overflow Demo(4) A failed exploit The PDA is frozen when the hello program is executed
Why? The stack of Windows CE is small
Buffer overflow destroyed the 2KB guard on the top of stack boundary
Buffer Overflow Demo(5) :Buffer Overflow Demo(5) A successful exploit - exp.c
The PDA restarts when the hello program is executed
The program flows to our shellcode
About Decoding Shellcode(1) :About Decoding Shellcode(1) Why need to decode shellcode?
The other programs maybe filter the special characters before string buffer overflow in some situations
It is difficult and inconvenient to write a shellcode without special characters by API address search method in Windows CE Part 8/8
About Decoding Shellcode(2) :About Decoding Shellcode(2) The newer ARM processor has Harvard Architecture
ARM9 core has 5 pipelines and ARM10 core has 6 pipelines
It separates instruction cache and data cache
Self-modifying code is not easy to implement
About Decoding Shellcode(3) :About Decoding Shellcode(3) A successful example
only use store(without load) to modify self-code
you'll get what you want after padding enough nop instructions
ARM10 core processor need more pad instructions
Seth Fogie's shellcode use this method
About Decoding Shellcode(4) :About Decoding Shellcode(4) A puzzled example
load a encoded byte and store it after decoded
pad instructions have no effect
SWI does nothing except 'movs pc,lr' under Windows CE
On PocketPC, applications run in kernel mode. So we can use mcr instruction to control coprocessor to manage cache system, but it hasn't been successful yet
Conclusion :Conclusion The codes talked above are the real-life buffer overflow example in Windows CE
Because of instruction cache, the decoding shellcode is not good enough
Internet and handset devices are growing quickly, so threats to the PDAs and mobiles become more and more serious
The patch of Windows CE is more difficult and dangerous
Reference :Reference [1] ARM Architecture Reference Manualhttp://www.arm.com
[2] Windows CE 4.2 Source Codehttp://msdn.microsoft.com/embedded/windowsce/default.aspx
[3] Details Emerge on the First Windows Mobile Virushttp://www.informit.com/articles/article.asp?p=337071
[4] Pocket PC Abuse - Seth Fogie
http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-04/bh-us-04-fogie/bh-us-04-fogie-up.pdf
[5] misc notes on the xda and windows cehttp://www.xs4all.nl/~itsme/projects/xda/
[6] Introduction to Windows CEhttp://www.cs-ipv6.lancs.ac.uk/acsp/WinCE/Slides/
[7] Nasiry 's wayhttp://www.cnblogs.com/nasiry/
[8] Programming Windows CE Second Edition - Doug Boling
[9] Win32 Assembly Componentshttp://LSD-PLaNET
Thank You! :Thank You! san@nsfocus.com
san@xfocus.org