logging in or signing up leuven2 Rainero Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 179 Category: Education License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: February 28, 2008 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Evolutionary Game Dynamics Slide2: The greatest conceptual revolution in biology...the replacement of typological thinking by population thinking. Ernst Mayr Nash equilibria: Nash equilibria Nash equilibria: Nash equilibria Nash equilibria: Nash equilibria Symmetric Games: Symmetric Games Chicken Game: Chicken Game John Maynard Smith: John Maynard SmithPopulation setting: Population setting Population setting: Population setting Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria: Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria: Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria Folk theorem of evolutionary game theory: Folk theorem of evolutionary game theory Nash equilibria are rest points strict Nash equilibria are attractors stable rest points are Nash equilibria limits of interior orbits are Nash equilibriaExistence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Existence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Existence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Existence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Replicator equation for n=2: Replicator equation for n=2 Replicator equations for n=2:: Replicator equations for n=2: Dominance Bistability stable coexistenceExample dominance: Example dominance Example bistability: Example bistability Example coexistence: Example coexistence The ‚Hawk-Dove‘ Game: The ‚Hawk-Dove‘ Game Replicator equations for n=3:: Replicator equations for n=3: Possibility for rock-scissors-paper heteroclinic cyclesRock-Scissors-Paper in nature: Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature Uta stansburiana (lizards) males: 3 morphs (inheritable) monogamous, guards female polygamous, guards harem (less efficiently) loose males, sneaky matingsRock-Scissors-Paper in nature: Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature Escherichia coli (bacteria) can produce colicin (toxic) and immunity protein can produce only immunity can produce neither norRock-Scissors-Paper: Rock-Scissors-Paper Rock-Scissors-Paper: Rock-Scissors-Paper Phase portraits of Replicator equations:: Phase portraits of Replicator equations: Slide34: Replicator dynamics assumes clonal replication (like begets like) other derivation from models of learning and imitationImitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Imitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Piecewise replicator-like Imitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Imitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Elimination of dominated strategies: Elimination of dominated strategies Elimination of dominated strategies: Elimination of dominated strategies Elimination of dominated strategies: Elimination of dominated strategies Best Reply Dynamics: Best Reply Dynamics Best Reply Dynamics: Best Reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Adjustment Dynamics: Adjustment Dynamics Adjustment Dynamics: Adjustment Dynamics Equilibrium Selection: Equilibrium Selection Equilibrium Selection: Equilibrium Selection Equilibrium Selection: Equilibrium Selection Equilibrium Selection via travelling waves : Equilibrium Selection via travelling waves You do not have the permission to view this presentation. In order to view it, please contact the author of the presentation.
leuven2 Rainero Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 179 Category: Education License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: February 28, 2008 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Evolutionary Game Dynamics Slide2: The greatest conceptual revolution in biology...the replacement of typological thinking by population thinking. Ernst Mayr Nash equilibria: Nash equilibria Nash equilibria: Nash equilibria Nash equilibria: Nash equilibria Symmetric Games: Symmetric Games Chicken Game: Chicken Game John Maynard Smith: John Maynard SmithPopulation setting: Population setting Population setting: Population setting Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator equation: Replicator equation Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria: Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria: Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria Folk theorem of evolutionary game theory: Folk theorem of evolutionary game theory Nash equilibria are rest points strict Nash equilibria are attractors stable rest points are Nash equilibria limits of interior orbits are Nash equilibriaExistence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Existence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Existence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Existence of Nash equilibria:: Existence of Nash equilibria: Replicator equation for n=2: Replicator equation for n=2 Replicator equations for n=2:: Replicator equations for n=2: Dominance Bistability stable coexistenceExample dominance: Example dominance Example bistability: Example bistability Example coexistence: Example coexistence The ‚Hawk-Dove‘ Game: The ‚Hawk-Dove‘ Game Replicator equations for n=3:: Replicator equations for n=3: Possibility for rock-scissors-paper heteroclinic cyclesRock-Scissors-Paper in nature: Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature Uta stansburiana (lizards) males: 3 morphs (inheritable) monogamous, guards female polygamous, guards harem (less efficiently) loose males, sneaky matingsRock-Scissors-Paper in nature: Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature Escherichia coli (bacteria) can produce colicin (toxic) and immunity protein can produce only immunity can produce neither norRock-Scissors-Paper: Rock-Scissors-Paper Rock-Scissors-Paper: Rock-Scissors-Paper Phase portraits of Replicator equations:: Phase portraits of Replicator equations: Slide34: Replicator dynamics assumes clonal replication (like begets like) other derivation from models of learning and imitationImitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Imitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Piecewise replicator-like Imitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Imitation Dynamics: Imitation Dynamics Elimination of dominated strategies: Elimination of dominated strategies Elimination of dominated strategies: Elimination of dominated strategies Elimination of dominated strategies: Elimination of dominated strategies Best Reply Dynamics: Best Reply Dynamics Best Reply Dynamics: Best Reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Best reply Dynamics: Best reply Dynamics Adjustment Dynamics: Adjustment Dynamics Adjustment Dynamics: Adjustment Dynamics Equilibrium Selection: Equilibrium Selection Equilibrium Selection: Equilibrium Selection Equilibrium Selection: Equilibrium Selection Equilibrium Selection via travelling waves : Equilibrium Selection via travelling waves