Presentation Transcript
Evolutionary Game Dynamics : Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Slide2 : The greatest conceptual revolution in biology...the replacement of typological thinking by population thinking.
Ernst Mayr
Nash equilibria : Nash equilibria
Nash equilibria : Nash equilibria
Nash equilibria : Nash equilibria
Symmetric Games : Symmetric Games
Chicken Game : Chicken Game
John Maynard Smith : John Maynard Smith
Population setting : Population setting
Population setting : Population setting
Replicator equation : Replicator equation
Replicator equation : Replicator equation
Replicator equation : Replicator equation
Replicator equation : Replicator equation
Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria : Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria
Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria : Replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria
Folk theorem of evolutionary game theory : Folk theorem of evolutionary game theory Nash equilibria are rest points
strict Nash equilibria are attractors
stable rest points are Nash equilibria
limits of interior orbits are Nash equilibria
Existence of Nash equilibria: : Existence of Nash equilibria:
Existence of Nash equilibria: : Existence of Nash equilibria:
Existence of Nash equilibria: : Existence of Nash equilibria:
Existence of Nash equilibria: : Existence of Nash equilibria:
Replicator equation for n=2 : Replicator equation for n=2
Replicator equations for n=2: : Replicator equations for n=2: Dominance
Bistability
stable coexistence
Example dominance : Example dominance
Example bistability : Example bistability
Example coexistence : Example coexistence
The ‚Hawk-Dove‘ Game : The ‚Hawk-Dove‘ Game
Replicator equations for n=3: : Replicator equations for n=3: Possibility for
rock-scissors-paper
heteroclinic cycles
Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature : Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature Uta stansburiana (lizards)
males: 3 morphs (inheritable)
monogamous, guards female
polygamous, guards harem (less efficiently)
loose males, sneaky matings
Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature : Rock-Scissors-Paper in nature Escherichia coli (bacteria)
can produce colicin (toxic) and immunity protein
can produce only immunity
can produce neither nor
Rock-Scissors-Paper : Rock-Scissors-Paper
Rock-Scissors-Paper : Rock-Scissors-Paper
Phase portraits of Replicator equations: : Phase portraits of Replicator equations:
Slide34 : Replicator dynamics assumes clonal replication (like begets like)
other derivation from models of learning and imitation
Imitation Dynamics : Imitation Dynamics
Imitation Dynamics : Imitation Dynamics Piecewise replicator-like
Imitation Dynamics : Imitation Dynamics
Imitation Dynamics : Imitation Dynamics
Elimination of dominated strategies : Elimination of dominated strategies
Elimination of dominated strategies : Elimination of dominated strategies
Elimination of dominated strategies : Elimination of dominated strategies
Best Reply Dynamics : Best Reply Dynamics
Best Reply Dynamics : Best Reply Dynamics
Best reply Dynamics : Best reply Dynamics
Best reply Dynamics : Best reply Dynamics
Best reply Dynamics : Best reply Dynamics
Best reply Dynamics : Best reply Dynamics
Adjustment Dynamics : Adjustment Dynamics
Adjustment Dynamics : Adjustment Dynamics
Equilibrium Selection : Equilibrium Selection
Equilibrium Selection : Equilibrium Selection
Equilibrium Selection : Equilibrium Selection
Equilibrium Selection via travelling waves : Equilibrium Selection via travelling waves
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