logging in or signing up Presentation Armin Riess Rafael Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 209 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: December 23, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Slide1: Fiscal Consolidation and Public Investment: Friends, Foes, or Neutral Partners? A Look at Bulgaria and Romania Armin Riess European Investment Bank International Seminar for Experts “The coming enlargement of the the EU” Cicero Foundation October 12-13, 2006 Outline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionPublic debt in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006: Public debt in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006 Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006 Maastricht 60% criterionFiscal balance in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006: Fiscal balance in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006 Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006 Maastricht 3% criterionDebt dynamics: Debt dynamics Change in debt/GDP ratio = fiscal deficit/GDP ratio – nominal GDP growth • debt/GDP ratioDebt dynamics: Debt dynamics Change in debt/GDP ratio = fiscal deficit/GDP ratio – nominal GDP growth • debt/GDP ratio Key message: debt accumulation the slower, the smaller the deficit higher economic growthReal GDP growth (in %), 2000-05: Real GDP growth (in %), 2000-05 Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria) Bulgaria: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP): Bulgaria: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP) Source: National Statistical Institute (NSI) of Bulgaria; *Projected Public debt (right scale) Fiscal balance (left scale) Romania: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP): Romania: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP) Source: IMF; *based on policy measures (1.8% of GDP) relative to initial budget Pubic debt (right scale) Fiscal balance (left scale)Outline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionMacroeconomic constraints: Macroeconomic constraints Concerns about Inflation internal imbalances External current account external imbalancesMacroeconomic constraints: Macroeconomic constraints Concerns about Inflation internal imbalances External current account external imbalancesExternal current account (in % of GDP): External current account (in % of GDP) Current account balance = Savings – Investment Current account balance = Trade balance + …External current account (in % of GDP): External current account (in % of GDP) Saving Current account balance Investment Current account balance = Savings – Investment Current account balance = Trade balance + … Current account balance = External current account (in % of GDP): External current account (in % of GDP) Saving Current account balance Investment Current account balance = Savings – Investment Current account balance = Current account balance = Trade balance + … (Savings – Investment) of private sector + fiscal balance Outline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionBulgaria: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05: Bulgaria: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05 Source: Bulgarian National Bank Change in fiscal balance Change in fiscal balance 3.8 % Decline in interest payments on public debt 2.1 % Increase in revenue 3.1 % Increase in current expenditure (excl. interest payments) – 1.6 % Decline in public investment 0.2 %Romania: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05: Romania: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05 Source: IMF Change in fiscal balance Change in fiscal balance 3.3 % Decline in interest payments on public debt 3.7 % Decline in revenue 2.2 % Decline in current expenditure (excl. interest payments) 1.5 % Decline in public investment 0.3 %Public investment (% of GDP): Public investment (% of GDP) Source: AMECO (European Commission) Eurozone countries 2005 Conclusion: Conclusion Fiscal policy in BU & RO: macroeconomic stability rather than debt sustainability Public investment in BU & RO low compared to NMS-8, but increase possible without deteriorating fiscal balance Fiscal consolidation has not come at expense of public investment “neutral partners”Slide29: Fiscal consolidation and public investment: friends, foes, or neutral partners? A look at Bulgaria and Romania Armin Riess (a.riess@eib.org) European Investment Bank International Seminar for Experts “The coming enlargement of the the EU” Cicero Foundation October 12-13, 2006 You do not have the permission to view this presentation. In order to view it, please contact the author of the presentation.
Presentation Armin Riess Rafael Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 209 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: December 23, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Slide1: Fiscal Consolidation and Public Investment: Friends, Foes, or Neutral Partners? A Look at Bulgaria and Romania Armin Riess European Investment Bank International Seminar for Experts “The coming enlargement of the the EU” Cicero Foundation October 12-13, 2006 Outline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionPublic debt in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006: Public debt in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006 Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006 Maastricht 60% criterionFiscal balance in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006: Fiscal balance in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006 Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006 Maastricht 3% criterionDebt dynamics: Debt dynamics Change in debt/GDP ratio = fiscal deficit/GDP ratio – nominal GDP growth • debt/GDP ratioDebt dynamics: Debt dynamics Change in debt/GDP ratio = fiscal deficit/GDP ratio – nominal GDP growth • debt/GDP ratio Key message: debt accumulation the slower, the smaller the deficit higher economic growthReal GDP growth (in %), 2000-05: Real GDP growth (in %), 2000-05 Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria): Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria) Bulgaria: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP): Bulgaria: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP) Source: National Statistical Institute (NSI) of Bulgaria; *Projected Public debt (right scale) Fiscal balance (left scale) Romania: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP): Romania: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP) Source: IMF; *based on policy measures (1.8% of GDP) relative to initial budget Pubic debt (right scale) Fiscal balance (left scale)Outline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionMacroeconomic constraints: Macroeconomic constraints Concerns about Inflation internal imbalances External current account external imbalancesMacroeconomic constraints: Macroeconomic constraints Concerns about Inflation internal imbalances External current account external imbalancesExternal current account (in % of GDP): External current account (in % of GDP) Current account balance = Savings – Investment Current account balance = Trade balance + …External current account (in % of GDP): External current account (in % of GDP) Saving Current account balance Investment Current account balance = Savings – Investment Current account balance = Trade balance + … Current account balance = External current account (in % of GDP): External current account (in % of GDP) Saving Current account balance Investment Current account balance = Savings – Investment Current account balance = Current account balance = Trade balance + … (Savings – Investment) of private sector + fiscal balance Outline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionOutline: Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) Public debt sustainability (the long run) Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment Bulgaria Romania 4. ConclusionBulgaria: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05: Bulgaria: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05 Source: Bulgarian National Bank Change in fiscal balance Change in fiscal balance 3.8 % Decline in interest payments on public debt 2.1 % Increase in revenue 3.1 % Increase in current expenditure (excl. interest payments) – 1.6 % Decline in public investment 0.2 %Romania: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05: Romania: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05 Source: IMF Change in fiscal balance Change in fiscal balance 3.3 % Decline in interest payments on public debt 3.7 % Decline in revenue 2.2 % Decline in current expenditure (excl. interest payments) 1.5 % Decline in public investment 0.3 %Public investment (% of GDP): Public investment (% of GDP) Source: AMECO (European Commission) Eurozone countries 2005 Conclusion: Conclusion Fiscal policy in BU & RO: macroeconomic stability rather than debt sustainability Public investment in BU & RO low compared to NMS-8, but increase possible without deteriorating fiscal balance Fiscal consolidation has not come at expense of public investment “neutral partners”Slide29: Fiscal consolidation and public investment: friends, foes, or neutral partners? A look at Bulgaria and Romania Armin Riess (a.riess@eib.org) European Investment Bank International Seminar for Experts “The coming enlargement of the the EU” Cicero Foundation October 12-13, 2006