AIAA conference keynote address

The 10th Annual IMPROVING SPACE OPERATIONS WORKSHOP: 

Launch Operations from Heritage to EELV The 10th Annual IMPROVING SPACE OPERATIONS WORKSHOP Lt Col Greg Schiller Delta II Program Manager SMC/CL

Agenda: 

Agenda Characterization of Heritage Launch Systems Titan, Delta II, Atlas II/III Characterization of EELV Launch Systems Delta IV, Atlas V The Changing Environment EELV System Evolution to Date Mission Assurance Lessons Summary and Closing Thoughts

Titan Characteristics: 

Titan Characteristics Titan Space Launcher developed from existing USAF ICBM systems Titan Gemini, Titan II, III, 34D, and finally Titan IV systems emerged over the last 40 years Developed to support US National Security and DoD requirements Launched from both Cape Canaveral AFS & Vandenberg AFB Titan III considered operational with Integrate, Transfer, Launch (ITL) approach West Coast Titan III had a 20 day call-up rqmt and 90 day launch centers Titan IV became a highly complex system with multiple satellite interfaces and configurations (caused by Shuttle transition) Maintained by significant support staff with extensive experience –very demanding day of launch processing Multiple, extensive, and rigorous reviews: H/W, S/W, and launch site Substantial Government oversight required Initiated a substantial rehearsal process to keep team trained Required extensive on pad processing ~5 month turn time currently

Atlas II/III Characteristics: 

Atlas II/III Characteristics Atlas Systems developed in the 1950s as an ICBM and competed with Titan Was evolved, like Titan, into a space launch system Utilized to carry medium size payloads (DSCS, Commercial, and NRO missions) The Atlas III system served as a transition between Atlas II and Atlas V: Utilized the Russian RD-180 engine for higher performance and reliability Went to a structurally stable versus a pressure stabilized core vehicle Improved reliability and processing with use of a single engine Centaur configuration Atlas has simpler interfaces and processing requirements

Delta II Characteristics: 

Delta II Characteristics Described as the most “operational” of current launch systems Two Pads East Coast (AF owned), One west Coast (NASA owned) Single AF customer - GPS (2 new customers recently) Main supplier of NASA launch needs Stack on Pad (~5 weeks on pad) Final checkout accomplished at launch site (not quite ship and shoot) Gov’t oversight with formal deliverables Fairly rigorous AF review process Fewer rehearsals than Titan due to higher launch rate Very few hardware changes – less complex interfaces, standard configuration for USAF GPS missions, and standard launch-to-launch procedures NASA interplanetary missions more demanding, but still within Delta experience

EELV Characteristics: 

EELV Characteristics Lockheed Martin - Atlas V Common booster core – hardware proven by Atlas III missions Designed to support 1 to 5 solids depending on mission needs Heavy Launch design ready to build upon demand Ship and shoot from the factory Stack in the Vertical Integration Facility for final integration/processing Clean Pad approach – less than one day on the pad (East Coast) Boeing - Delta IV State of the art factory in Decatur modeled after commercial aircraft Common booster core with multiple solids’ configuration Heavy launch available - demo mission to prove concept Ship and shoot from factory concept Booster + upper stage stacked horizontally in HIF; encapsulated payload at pad Move to pad ~8+ days prior to launch depending on configuration Both Contractors Commercially owned/operated facilities providing commercial type of launch service

EELV Initial Environment: 

EELV Initial Environment EELV Paradigm = Commercial (No Independent Assessment) Numerous commercial launches to mitigate later government launch risk and prove out new configurations Very limited government involvement (insight with limited staff: technically, programmatically) Few formal Government reviews – scheduled at key milestones No formal deliverables – information gained via “pull” from central database structure (Genisys, Webvue) and attending contractor reviews Minimal rehearsal process – experience gained through normal processing flow Assured Access for Government missions gained through two launch vehicle providers 100 % Contractor run launch countdown and problem resolution

So What Changed?: 

So What Changed? 1998 Launch market dominated by commercial market Tremendous growth potential in commercial market Sufficient market to support two EELV families Share development costs between government and commercial Mature reliability through commercial launches Reliance on contractor’s mission assurance process Government remains the dominant customer Commercial market potential dissipated Business case inadequate to support 2 providers without Gov’t help Work with industry to retain industrial base – assure access to space Government prime customer on early missions BAR recommended additional government involvement Present Adding Independent Mission Assurance to gain confidence in early government missions Six launch failures in 1998 & 1999 Must mitigate increased risk with more robust mission assurance Warfighters dependence on space assets Space operating in an R&D environment

Evolution Timeline: 

Evolution Timeline 1998-1999 2000 2001 EELV Contract restructure Numerous Government and commercial launch failures Space Launch BAR Boeing BMAR LMA IAT Aerospace Independent Assessment Teams Commercial Market drawdown 2002 2003 2004 Shuttle Columbia Accident CAIB Report Lessons from CAIB BAR II, III, IV Other Independent Assessments EELV Buy I (28 missions awarded) EELV Buy II (3 missions awarded) EELV Program Today Future Buy in progress Changing contracting Strategy Justification for 2 Launch Providers Assured Access to Space Money IRRT/MAT for every Gov’t mission Current systems Titan/Atlas/DII increased focus on mission success objectives Implemented many relearned “best practices”

EELV “Evolution”: 

EELV “Evolution” Assured Access through two providers AND Government Mission Assurance process “Failure is not an option” for either provider Increased government “oversight” vice previous insight Substantial increase in gov’t manpower & funding resources to support additional mission assurance objectives Hardware pedigrees on high priority components Extensive IV&V of software and mission analysis Rigorous rehearsal process Addition of Gov’t Mission Director and increased teaming during launch operations Future: Contract structure more favorable to gov’t mission assurance objectives with adequate funding to ensure two viable providers

EELV Value Added Tasks : 

EELV Value Added Tasks CY01 CY02 CY03 CY04 CY 05 Launch Certification Planning Non-Recurring Certification Tasks Recurring Certification Tasks EV / NRO Define “launch certification” process –NRO & non-NRO missions Define “launch certification” criteria Allocate certification and management responsibilities Atlas V / Delta IV Manufacturing and quality processes review LV hardware design, manufacture & test LV software design & test LV design and mission analysis LV ground hardware, software and processing Build paper / pedigree / acceptance test reviews Mission specific LV software design & test Mission specific LV design and mission analysis Mission specific LV ground hardware, software and processing Atlas V / Delta IV

Mission Assurance Lessons : 

Mission Assurance Lessons Mission success is the #1 priority Wear it as a banner on your sleeve Leadership is paramount to the #1 priority Robust risk management maintains focus on critical concerns Systems engineering puts it all together Collaboration ensures all parties are on the same page Apathy, Entropy, and Atrophy are your enemies Maintaining critical launch system talent and expertise are your friends

Summary: 

Summary Leadership must embrace the idea that: Mission Success is the #1 one priority Mission Assurance is everyone’s job You can and must make a difference!

Info slides: 

Info slides

Leadership: 

Leadership Leaders must balance program influences (schedule, budget, political pressure, etc.), but keep priorities clear: Mission Success is #1 priority Must be willing to stand up and say "no" when tasked to operate without sufficient resources Must promote and encourage the airing of minority opinions, regardless of (un)popularity Must avoid insulating themselves (or giving perception of insulating themselves) Must avoid over-simplification of problems … learn to think worst case and develop issues from there Focus on employees’ needs Must be prepared to “STOP the train” when questions arise

Risk Management: 

Risk Management A disciplined, rigorous, useful risk management process is necessary at all levels Risk management must be embraced by management as a resource management tool Evaluate and document overall vehicle reliability and associated failure risk during all hardware/software modification reviews Tradeoff improvements against failure risk Increase emphasis on test and analysis Minimize “qualified by similarity” approach Consider a demonstration flight or a highly instrumented first flight of a “non-critical” payload when launching first of a kind vehicle configuration

Systems Engineering: 

Systems Engineering Systems engineering is a key component of mission assurance Systems Engineering is everyone’s job! (explicitly by design, implicitly by function) Ensure engineering accountability from design through postflight analysis Design engineering presence, oversight, and approval of first-time issuances and subsequent changes of Key supplier products, processes, and procedures Field site procedures, test, assembly, and postflight analysis Assure adequate/formal communication exists between engineering and manufacturing Communicate engineering intent for design Elimination of ambiguous language in work instructions Strong communication between engineering and technicians Ensure truly “closed loop” requirements traceability and verification

Collaboration: 

Collaboration Goal is to share program status, issues, test objectives, Create opportunities to compare notes Formulate consistent government direction/feedback to contractor base Resolve issues without undue duplication or burden on launch providers Share costs/opportunities across government organizations Share IV&V data Partnership teaming for product assurance and quality objectives

Causes Of Launch Failures: 

Causes Of Launch Failures “Design” failures are more common for new vehicles. “Process” failures are more common for mature vehicles. 1983 - Present Note: Domestic and foreign launch vehicles. Data from Space System Engineering Database maintained by The Aerospace Corporation.

Evolution of Delta Family: 

4 GEM 60s Modified Delta III second stage RL10B-2 Stretched Delta III second stage tank RL10B-2 RS-68 main engine Common booster core Rocketdyne RS-27 main engine Isogrid first stage LO2 tank 2 GEM 60s Modular, producible booster core Low-cost, high-margin, low-complexity engine Streamline launch pads and equipment Flight-proven Delta heritage upper stages, software, and fairings Strap-on graphite epoxy motors to allow greater payload range LEO 17.9 22.6 17.2 24.9 50.7 GTO 9.2 12.9 10.4 14.5 29.6 Evolution of Delta Family lbs

Evolution of Atlas Family: 

Implementing a Low Risk Evolution Process GTO 10.9-13.1 8.75-19.12 29.0 GSO 15.06 5.91-8.58 14.0 LEO(dual) 16.85-21.72 22.7-45.2 42.0 Evolution of Atlas Family lbs