Transforming Space Surveillance To Meet Today’s Space Superiority Needs15th AAS/AIAA Space Flight Mechanics ConferenceCopper Mountain, ColoradoJanuary 26, 2005: Transforming Space Surveillance To Meet Today’s Space Superiority Needs 15th AAS/AIAA Space Flight Mechanics Conference Copper Mountain, Colorado January 26, 2005 Dave Desrocher President & CEO Situational Awareness Solutions, Inc. Ph: 719-884-1195 Email: Dave@SAS-Corp.net


Overview: Transformation: The Bar is Set Space Surveillance Role in Space Superiority Conditions Leading to Today’s State of Space Surveillance Problems Required Changes Overview


Transformation: The Bar is Set: March, 1998 Transformation: The Bar is Set “…the U.S. must be able to identify and track much smaller objects in space than it can track today…An improved space surveillance network is needed to reduce the chance of collision between satellites, the Space Shuttle or the International Space Station and the thousands of pieces of space debris orbiting the earth. It will also have to track objects deeper in space, such as asteroids or spacecraft. And to reduce the possibility of surprise by hostile actors, it will have to monitor space activity.” 11 January, 2001


Space Surveillance Role inSpace Superiority: Space Surveillance Role in Space Superiority Counterspace Operations The “Ways and Means” to Space Superiority Components: DCS, OCS, SSA Space Situation Awareness Comprised of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Environmental Monitoring, C2 Space Surveillance Contributes to SSA Increased Importance to DCS and OCS


Conditions Leading to Today’s State of Space Surveillance: Conditions Leading to Today’s State of Space Surveillance Born of Cold War Necessity to Enable Missile Warning Tied to ITW/AA Environment Stove-Piped, Classified C2 Systems Upgrades Very Difficult & Expensive Predominantly Ground Based Radars Established Trusted Access Personnel Set Stage for Development Environment National Space Asset Involvement Introduced “Trump Card” Co-opted Development Approach, Controlled Players


Problems: Problems Too Few “Outsiders” Allowed to Contribute Uniformed Personnel at Disadvantage At Mercy of Closed Group of Advisors & Developers Frequent Rotation Aids Status Quo Cannot Readily Assess Merits of One Approach or Method from Another Do Not Learn the “Art of the Possible” Limited by Organizational Authority, Time, Money, Contract Hurdles Deficiencies Only Come to Light in Crisis Explained Away and/or Forgotten…Until Next Crisis


Required Changes: Required Changes Expand Sharing of Information and Data Create Means for Rapid Integration of New or Improved Capabilities More Broadly Engage and Unleash Human Potential


Slide8: “What all these stories have in common is a system that requires a demonstrated "need to know" before sharing. This approach assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. Such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Those Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate. The culture of agencies feeling they own the information they gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers' investment by making that information available.” “Recommendation: Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge.” “But the security concerns need to be weighed against the costs. Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentation of information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information. No one has to pay the long-term costs of over-classifying information, though these costs—even in literal financial terms— are substantial. There are no punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a "need-to-know" culture of information protection rather than pro­moting a "need-to-share" culture of integration.15” Page 417


Required Changes Means for Rapid Integration : Required Changes Means for Rapid Integration “Modernize” C2 and Ops Integration Pathway Emulate Successes of Air Domain Remove Space Surveillance from ITW/AA Development Environment Move to “TACSAT-Like” Approach for Developing Exploitation Methods & Applications Establish “Effects-Based” Acceptance Criteria


Required Changes Engage and Unleash Human Potential: Required Changes Engage and Unleash Human Potential Restore an Advisory Body Like the Old JAWG, But… With General Officer Accountability With Safeguards to Ensure Promotion of “Best of Breed” Capabilities With Specified Problems to Solve (May Be Identified By the Group) With Broader Review of Capabilities (e.g., via DCS Exercises)


Conclusion: Conclusion “Transformation” in Space Surveillance Must Be Revolutionary, Not Evolutionary The Role That Space Surveillance Must Play in SSA Has Changed Broader Collaboration is Needed to Ensure Greatest Space Surveillance Contribution to SSA and to Space Superiority