Bodenez berkeley presentation

Slide1: 

The disposal of High level Radioactive Waste in France : The main Safety issues Philippe BODENEZ – Deputy Director for Research Facilities and Waste

Slide2: 

The role of ASN The French program for a geological disposal The dossier ANDRA “Clay 2005” Opinion of ASN on the safety case of ANDRA The safety of the geological disposal

Slide3: 

The role of ASN The French program for a geological disposal The dossier ANDRA “Clay 2005” Opinion of ASN on the safety case of ANDRA The safety of the geological disposal

Slide4: 

ASN : Establishes the regulation Authorized the different phases of the construction of the laboratory Surveys, from a safety point of view, the research conducted by ANDRA Gives an opinion to the Government at the steps set by the law, on the basis of IRSN reports and opinions of a standing group of experts Studies conducted on the geological disposal – contribution of ASN

Slide5: 

Published by ASN in June 1991 Defines safety objectives in the design and construction phase of a geological disposal Up-date of RFS III.2.f since 2003 to take into account: Reversibility Feedback experience in France and abroad New recommandations of ICRP, IAEA, NEA RFS III.2.f - Version of 1991 was the regulation applicable for the assessment of dossier 2005 of ANDRA The RFS III.2.f Rule

Slide6: 

IN REFERENCE SITUATION, THE LIMIT Of INDIVIDUAL DOSE IS 0.25 mSv/a FOR A TIMEFRAME OF 10 000 YEARS AFTER 10 000 YEARS, EVALUATION OF DOSE WILL BE MADE, AND THE LIMIT OF 0.25 mSv/a WILL BE KEPT AS A REFERENCE FOR NON-REFERENCE SITUATIONS, THE DOSE SHALL BE SUFFICIENTLY LIMITED COMPARED TO LEVELS OF DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS Radiation Protection Criteria

Slide7: 

The Rule RFS III.2.f sets objectives on: the concept the packages the engineered barriers the geological barrier Essential criteria: Stability of the site Hydrogeology Important criteria: Mechanical, thermal, geochemical Minimum depth, no exceptional natural resources Safety objectives

Slide8: 

The safety evaluation shall consider: the justification of any advantageous feature on the performance of each barrier the evaluation of effects of the disposal on the host rock and the verification of the acceptability of these effects the evaluation of the future behavior of the disposal and the verification that individual doses are acceptable Safety demonstration

Slide9: 

ASN conducts inspections in the Bure underground laboratory Inspection of ASN in the Bure laboratory

Slide10: 

The role of ASN The French program for a geological disposal The dossier ANDRA “Clay 2005” Opinion of ASN on the safety case of ANDRA The safety of the geological disposal

Slide11: 

Operational classification of radioactive waste in France Pathway under investigation within the framework of article L. 542 of the Environment Code Sub-surface disposal (currently under investigation) Long-lived High level Intermediate level Surface disposal (Aube repository) Low level VLL surface disposal (or recycling) Very low level Short-lived ( <31 years) Very short-lived (<100 days) Activity Period 580,000 m3 Anticipated volumes in 2020 (ANDRA inventory – March 2006) 105,000 m3 1,193,000 m3 3,600 m3 of HLW And 55,000 m3 Of LL ILW Radioactive decay

Slide12: 

Radioactive waste management in France

Slide13: 

History 1976 - Under European union steering, studies in granite in France and GB, in Clay in Belgium & Italy, in salt in Germany and Netherlands 1981 - Castaing commission, recommended to study other rock than Granite and to establish safety criteria to issue a future technical rule 1985 – 1987 – Gogel working group -> RFS III.2.f of 1991 December 1991 – “Bataille” Act 1993 – Bataille mission 1997 - Selection of Meuse Haute Marne site in Clay 1999 - License of the underground laboratory of Bure 2001 - Granite “mission” in 2001 2006 – “Birraux” Act

Slide14: 

High level Waste Vitrified canister :CSD-V Fission products : Cs137, Sr90, I129, … Minor actinides : Cu144, Am241, Np 237… Activation products : Cl36… Heat emitters : 2000 W for hundreds of years 1019 alpha disintegration on 10 000 years Activity : 1015 Bq Nearly 99% of total activity

Slide15: 

Intermediate long-lived Waste All radioactive waste not acceptable in surface or subsurface disposal B1 :Technological waste produced by NPP B2 :Bituminized waste produced by the Treatment of effluents in reprocessing facilities B3 :Cemented technological waste B4 : Cemented hulls and clad B5 :Compacted hulls and clad : CSD-C B6 : varied waste (including radium needles) B2 and B3 produce H2 by radiolysis (1 to 10 liters per year)

Slide16: 

Spent fuel The possibility to dispose directly the spent fuel has been studied The spent fuel : emits heat on longer time frame; produces H2

Slide17: 

Location of the Underground Laboratory Underground laboratory in clay in Eastern part of France (border of Meuse and Haute Marne Department) The transposition zone : 200 km² at the North of Bure (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide18: 

Geological parameters Host rock : Callovo oxfordian Located between two calcareous rocks Oxfordian Dogger Low permeability ~ 5.10-14 m/s Depth between 420 m and 600 m Thickness : between 130 m and 160 m (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide19: 

PEP: permeability and Interstitial pressure REP: Response to the shaft excavation SUG: Examination of the excavation of tunnels PAC: Sampling and chemical analyses DIR: Diffusion and Radionuclides retention of water KEY: Swelling clay plug experimental device for EDZ TER: Effects on host rock properties involved by heat emission GIS: Mechanical deformation on long time frame The experimental program

Slide20: 

The underground laboratory (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide21: 

The experimental “niche” (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide22: 

The deviated boreholes (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide23: 

The role of ASN The French program for a geological disposal The dossier ANDRA “Clay 2005” Opinion of ASN on the safety case of ANDRA The safety of the geological disposal

Slide24: 

The design of the disposal (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide25: 

The design of the disposal for IL-LLW (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide26: 

The design of the disposal for IL-LLW (2) (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide27: 

The design of the disposal for HLW (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide28: 

1 million years is a sound objective for the design and the safety analyses of a geological disposal The only disturbance able to extend on 100 m is thermal The thermal disturbance does not act after 10 000 years The mechanical, hydraulic and chemical disturbance depends on concept, it is not possible to determine a cut-off value, but must be studied It is possible to forecast times when barriers stay available The timeframes and orders of magnitude

Slide29: 

Protection of waste from surface phenomena and human intrusion Prevent water circulation Limitation of the release of radionuclides and immobilisation inside the disposal Delay and reduce the migration of any radionuclides released by waste The safety functions

Slide30: 

According to ANDRA: Favourable properties of host rock (no fractures, low permeability) Weak potential of water migration inside the rock Low potential of migration of radionuclides in neighbouring rocks Limitation of perturbation effects able to increase the flow of radionuclides Lessons learned from dossier Clay 2005 (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide31: 

According to ANDRA: For the reference situation: Maximum dose of 0,022 mSv/year (spent fuel) (<0,25 mSv/year) Contributors to the dose: I129, Cl36 and Se79 I139 has a major contribution to the dose Actinides do not contribute to the dose ! Outlet : a well for drinking water (100 l/min) Lessons learned from dossier Clay 2005

Slide32: 

Lessons learned from dossier Clay 2005 Flow path using actual hydrogeological model (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide33: 

Lessons learned from dossier Clay 2005 Flow path using hydrogeological model simulated in one million years (ANDRA document – dossier 205)

Slide34: 

Lessons learned from dossier Clay 2005 Outlets and times of migration evaluated using the hydrogeological model for the dose assessment

Slide35: 

Man induced Phenomena : Drills ; Mines; Near surface buildings; Failure of package containment; Failure of engineered barriers; Climatic changes (global warming effect) Hypothetical situations to address

Slide36: 

ANDRA defined 3 main scenarios, on the basis of safety function issue: Seals failures; Package/overpack failures; Drills; Very degraded scenarios which combine : Lower permeability of clay defects on seals, containers and packages Dossier ANDRA CLAY 2005

Slide37: 

Main lessons learned: Important role of the clay barrier : Low permeability => limits water flow rate; Geochemical properties => limit migration of radionuclides (except for Cl36 and I139); Sensitive role of the seals : limit migration of soluble radionuclides Engineered barriers : role on treatment of uncertainty on thermomecanical behaviour - Very degraded scenario : 0,12 mSv/a Dossier ANDRA CLAY 2005 (2)

Slide38: 

The role of ASN The French program for a geological disposal The dossier ANDRA “Clay 2005” Opinion of ASN on the safety case of ANDRA The safety of the geological disposal

Slide39: 

The ASN published in February 2006 its opinion on the dossier 2005 submitted by ANDRA, with the conclusions of the standing group of experts and the report of IRSN ASN concluded that it was reasonable to search a site in the area of 200 km² at the north of the Bure laboratory for a geological disposal. It is likely to demonstrate the safety of such disposal in this area ASN pointed out that some additional studies should be undertaken : Develop a strategy to investigate the 200 km² area Make progress in some particular fields (ventilation…) The opinion of ASN - 1st February 2006 on geological disposal

Slide40: 

At the laboratory scale: The observations realised by seismic studies, boreholes, and in laboratory confirmed the continuity and favourable properties of the host rock (low permeability, no signs of fractures) Appropriate chemical and hydrogeological properties able to confine radionuclides inside the rock In the transposition area: It is possible to find large volumes of rocks with favourable properties No natural resources (oil, coal, mineral) Position on geology of Meuse/Haute Marne Site

Slide41: 

The options of ANDRA: Limit the perturbation on chemical, mechanical, hydrological and thermal properties of the host rock The design of seals seems appropriate in order to intercept potential flow of radionuclides in EDZ Safety issues of operations have been addressed appropriately Position on the concept of disposal

Slide42: 

Although ANDRA claimed that is is possible to maintain reversibility of the disposal for 200 – 300 years, ASN believe additional work is needed to validate such opinion ASN recalled that reversibility shall have a limited timeframe. The law of 2006 establishes an objective of 100 years of reversibility at least Position on the reversibility

Slide43: 

In the transposition area : Until 2009, 2D seismic studies and boreholes in an area of 200 km² In 2009, finalization of design options, inventory of waste, identification of a smaller area (~30 km²) where more precise experiments will be conducted (3D seismic studies) More experiments on mechanical behaviour of host rock is needed (especially for B-waste tunnels) More information is needed on gas induced effects on engineered barriers (seals) More work is needed on operational phase (ventilation – H2 waste producers) Possibility to remove waste packages from tunnels must be confirmed by practical experiments inside the lab Further information is needed before licence application

Slide44: 

The ASN prepared the decree to authorise ANDRA to pursue the research in Bure laboratory until 31 December 2011 (Decree of 23 December 2006) The reversible geological disposal will be authorized as a nuclear installation by the Government, after an opinion of CNE and ASN The Parliament will establish the reversibility conditions of the disposal The Parliament will authorise the closure of the disposal The authorisation of a reversible geological disposal

Slide45: 

The law of 28 June 2006 is an important step in the development of a reversible geological disposal for HLW in France, since it is considered now as a reference solution. ASN is up-dating its regulation on the safety of a geological disposal, which should be available in 2007 ASN will carry on the task in order to give its opinion on the safety of a project of geological disposal in the Bure region More information ? http://www.andra.fr (all documents of dossier 2005 are available in English on website) http://www.asn.fr CONCLUSION