Workshop 2004 11 26 Blanke

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I. 1. Trade Union Density <10 ~25 ~25 ~80 <30 Trade union members among private and public employees (%)

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I. 2. Collective Bargaining Coverage Trade union members among private and public employees (%) Employees bound by collective bargaining 2001 <10 90-95 ~25 ~20 ~25 88 ~80 >90 <30 36

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I. 3. Collective Bargaining Coverage Trade union members among private and public employees (%) Employees bound by collective bargaining 2001 <10 90-95 ~25 ~80 ~25 88 ~80 >90 <30 36

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II. 1. Normative Basis of Collective Bargaining General right to bargain collectively

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II. 2. Normative Basis of Collective Bargaining The autonomy of collective bargaining

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II. 3. Scope and Extensions of the Binding Effect Scope

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II. 4. Duration of the Binding-Effect Duration of the full binding-effect of collective agreements

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II. 5. Duration of the Binding-Effect Post-effectiveness as part of the individual contract

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II.6. Binding Effect and Deviations Deviations to the disadvantage of employees through individual contract

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II. 7. Binding Effect and Deviations Deviations to the disadvantage of employees through agreements with work councils

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III. Five Different Types France: State-organised bargaining system guided by law in many details Germany: Dual structure with two powerful channels created by law Netherlands:Cooperative bargaining system institutionalised in bi- and triparty pacts Sweden: Effective single channel bargaining system highly accepted and perfectly flexible UK: Voluntarism suffering from weak collectivity stabilised by legal minimum standards.

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IV. Thesis Despite similar economic and societal challenges, national systems of collective wage formation in Europe show almost no tendency to converge. Instead, each nation is trying to develop the specific strengths of its own collective bargaining system .