Distributed Operations and Command: A Brief Historical Perspective : Distributed Operations and Command: A Brief Historical Perspective
Eric M. Walters, MA, MSSI
ericmwalters@yahoo.com
Purpose : Purpose What did previous efforts in executing “distributed operations” intend?
What were the results of previous DO efforts?
What are the implications for command & control?
?
Agenda : Agenda Historical Evolution of DO:
What “Drove” DO
DO Historical Antecedents
Historical DO Theory and Practice
Historical Trends
Historical DO Countermeasures
Historical DO Command and Control Patterns
Historical DO Intelligence Patterns
Implications
What Drove DO in History? : What Drove DO in History? Progressively larger units grew beyond ability of a single commander to command them effectively
Need for speed/tempo at operational and tactical levels—coupled with growing size of force—demanded decentralization of decisionmaking
Social and economic factors allowed effective decentralization to occur
DO Entails Decentralization & Infiltration : DO Entails Decentralization & Infiltration Senior Commander can no longer see and command reaction to fleeting opportunities everywhere contact is made/will be made
Lower level leaders allowed to “break contact” with flanks to get through “gaps” in opponent
Past DO Historical Trends : Past DO Historical Trends Consistently “higher” casualties—particularly among junior leaders—but gained results that were disproportionately larger
The smaller the DO element, the greater the risk of isolation and loss; mitigated by “supporting range” of other elements (forces and arms)
Cohesion factors paramount during employment
Works best asymmetrically against opponents with centralized C2 structures that cannot react fast enough to OODA challenges
Reconnaissance pull is central pillar to tactical success
Reconnaissance Pull: What It is…What It Isn’t : Reconnaissance Pull: What It is…What It Isn’t “Your forward element is a reconnaissance screen. Its job is to look for surfaces and gaps. When it finds a gap, it goes through, and calls for other forces to follow.”
Forward element DOES recon; doesn’t have to BE recon—pulls neighboring units behind it when gaps are found
Example: SSgt Rubarth on the Meuse vic Sedan, 1940 (see Doughty, Breaking Point)
Recon Pull is NOT WAITING for HHQ to send/ redirect units through recon-discovered gaps. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of
France, 1940 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990)
DO Historical Antecedents (I) : DO Historical Antecedents (I) 1916-1918 German stormtroop tactics
Decentralize to squad level; infiltrate trench line, reaggregate in rear to attack defending artillery and “collapse” the defense Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1989); Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine (Fort Leavenworth,
KS, 1981).
DO Historical Antecedents (II) : DO Historical Antecedents (II) 1939-1940 Finnish “motti” tactics
Decentralized action against strung out Soviet motorized columns on roads Allen F Chew, The White Death: The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish War
(Quantico, VA: FMFRP 12-78, 1989.
DO Historical Antecedents (III) : DO Historical Antecedents (III) 1944 CHINDIT operations in CBI
Long-range direct action operations under independent command Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaigns
In Burma, 1944 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Ltd., 1979)
DO Historical Antecedents (IV) : DO Historical Antecedents (IV) “Stingray” teams in Viet Nam
Small camouflaged teams with dedicated “on-call” supporting arms Maj Bruce H Norton, Stingray (New York: Ballantine Books, 2000)
DO Historical Antecedents (V) : DO Historical Antecedents (V) Combined Action Platoons (CAP), VietNam
Provide decentralized persistent presence to cut off insurgent from the people Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers, 1989)
Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994)
DO Historical Antecedents (VI) : DO Historical Antecedents (VI) Soviet Operational Maneuver Group (OMG)
Independently infiltrate small tactical groups, then bring under a single command to execute operations cohesively Christopher Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1987)
Historical DO Theory (I): Complementary Force Dilemma : Historical DO Theory (I): Complementary Force Dilemma “Fix and flank” – decentralization of capability:
Do it with a single army; apogee was Frederick the Great
Do it with several armies; apogee was the anti-Napoleonic Coalition in 1813-1815
Do it within a tactical organization: apogee within 20th Century to the squad level (for a 3GW force) – birth of DO
All required decentralization—trend has been to decentralize command to lowest level. John A. English & Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry (Rev Ed) (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994); Stephen Biddle, Military Power, (Princeton, NJ: 2004)
Historical DO Practice (I): Complementary Force Dilemma : Historical DO Practice (I): Complementary Force Dilemma Situational Awareness obtained locally by employed forces in contact proved most useful in execution
Collaborative/cooperative C2 worked better than hierarchical C2
Assumes adversary not as nimble as you—if he is, this won’t achieve disproportionate success Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in
Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)
Historical DO Theory (II): Operational Leverage Relationship : Historical DO Theory (II): Operational Leverage Relationship The deeper the penetration/turning movement, the smaller the force can be, but the longer the effects take to be felt at the front.
Conversely, the shallower the penetration/envelopment, the larger the force must be, and the faster effects will be felt at the front. Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century
Warfare (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishing Co., Ltd., 1985) Maneuver force The “Lever Arm” Maneuver force
Historical DO Practice (II): Operational Leverage Relationship : Historical DO Practice (II): Operational Leverage Relationship When the relationship worked:
Stormtroop tactics, 1916-1918
Norway and France, 1940
Russia, 1941 through early 1942
South Pacific, 1943-44
Inchon, 1950
Ia Drang Valley campaign, 1965
U.S. Recon Ops in Vietnam
Afghanistan, 2002
When it didn’t:
Anzio, 1944
Arnhem and Nijmegen, 1944
Ardennes Forest, 1944
Dien Bien Phu, 1954
U.S. Recon Ops in Vietnam
Lam Son 719, Cambodia, 1971
Battle of Mogadishu, 1993
Operation ANACONDA, 2002
Historical DO Theory (III): Troop to Task to Space Ratios : Historical DO Theory (III): Troop to Task to Space Ratios The denser the opposing troop concentration in a given space, the smaller the DO force must be to infiltrate/insert through the front.
Conversely, the more spread out the opponent is, the larger the DO force can be to infiltrate/insert through the front. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern
Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)
Historical DO Practice (III): Troop to Task to Space Ratios : Historical DO Practice (III): Troop to Task to Space Ratios In cases where this failed, it was not during the insertion/infiltration, but afterward
Enemy could not be accurately determined and/or targeted…and therefore could not be avoided and/or neutralized
Enemy found the force and isolated it from other nearby forces
Loss of DO element relative mobility evident in nearly all cases due to opposing force proximity/troop & weapon densities
Historical DO Theory (IV): Dispersion = Protection : Historical DO Theory (IV): Dispersion = Protection The antidote to increased lethality of fires is ever-greater dispersion of forces being targeted
Principle of war changing from massing forces to massing effects—greater demands on C2 and intelligence Trevor N. Dupuy, Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in
Modern War (Falls Church, VA: NOVA Publications, 1995); Stephen Biddle, Military
Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Robert Leonhard,
Principles of War of the Information Age (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000)
Historical DO Practice (IV): Dispersion = Protection : Historical DO Practice (IV): Dispersion = Protection Adopting a “protect” posture means sacrificing abilities to “move” and/or “strike” which exposes the force.
DO units suffer higher casualties because of this imperative:
Physical dispersal causes additional effort to coordinate “move” and “strike”
Social/training factors impel action Robert Leonhard, Fighting By Minutes:Time and the Art of War (Novato, CA: 1991)
Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift (London: Brassey’s Defence
Publishing, 1985) MOVE PROTECT STRIKE
Recent Trends Enhancing DO: : Recent Trends Enhancing DO: Technological:
Explosion of electronically accessible information and networks
Electronic sensor revolution
Miniaturization of ADP and communications
Increase in weapon range and lethality forces greater target dispersion to negate effects
Social:
Technological competency of American youth
Greater military cultural tolerance regarding C2 decentralization and NCO responsibility (e.g., “The Strategic Corporal”)
Recent Trends Inhibiting DO: : Recent Trends Inhibiting DO: Technological:
Enhanced technical capabilities require enhanced technical specialization
Fragility of networks at the “last tactical mile”
Social:
“Fourth Generation Warfare” adversaries and methods require solutions beyond purely military ones
Unfamiliar cultural environments
Cohesion stability when taking casualties
Historical DO Countermeasures (I) : Historical DO Countermeasures (I) CM #1: Mass Human Wave Assaults
More bad guys get through than you have fires/ammo/time to stop them
Best when adversary force is intermingled (CM #2); DO force is away from logistical support (CM #3), engagement in an urban environment (CM #4), and with civilians (CM #5)
CM #2: Intermingle personnel
Prevent supporting arms usage, complicate organic weapon employment
DO force is in turn made vulnerable to opposing DO (e.g., infiltration) Brian Steed, Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare (New
York: Ballantine Books, 2002
Historical DO Countermeasures (II) : Historical DO Countermeasures (II) CM #3: Draw force away from source of logistics
DO force cannot defend itself and log source simultaneously if geographically separated
Adversary presents its own complementary force dilemma—DO force is “flanked” where it is not fixed
CM #4: Pull DO force into urban environment
Leonhard’s “Alcyoneus Principle” applied
From “3-Block War” to “A Marine On Every Block”
Degrade C2, precision weapons, ISR effectiveness Brian Steed, Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002; Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1991)
Historical DO Countermeasures (II) : Historical DO Countermeasures (II) CM #5: Involve civilians to prosecute attrition warfare
Not easily targeted without repercussions
They know the ground intimately
CM #6: Protract the conflict
Use defeat in battle to achieve operational goals
The “winner” cannot afford more “victories”
DO force cannot sustain itself over the long haul
Brian Steed, Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002
Conceptual Conflicts and Dangers : Conceptual Conflicts and Dangers DO Intelligence requirements for “on the deck” footprint to support DO may increase, not decrease…subverts EMW conceptual requirements for small footprint and greater reliance on reachback.
DO requires greater “local” intelligence developed while in contact to succeed in execution…may subvert STOM conceptual requirement for ship-to-objective employment with no pausing
Will greater shared situational awareness lead to a return of battlefield shock?
Is the “sea-base” going to stay secure? Robert Bateman, Digital War: A View From the Front Lines (Novato, CA: Presidio
Press, 1999).
DO Command and Control: Historical Patterns : DO Command and Control: Historical Patterns In execution, lateral communications/ collaboration and ad hoc temporary task organization is critical to facilitate reconnaissance pull
Communications failures are catastrophic when in contact
Rigid hierarchical structures inhibit effective (i.e., timely) action
Historical DO Intelligence Patterns (I) : Historical DO Intelligence Patterns (I) Emphasis on adequate pre-operation IPB supporting planning
We go where the enemy isn’t…and he better not be there when we arrive.
Ia Drang (1965) and Arnhem (1944) provide good examples of what can happen when intelligence is wrong.
Emphasis on accurate target identification, acquisition, tracking, and assessment
Adversaries focus on blending into environment, engaging when in very close range to inhibit supporting arms employment
Finding bad guys may depend more on cultural skills/savvy (“knowing the neighborhood”) than on technical means to achieve target acquisition
Historical DO Intelligence Patterns (II) : Historical DO Intelligence Patterns (II) Extreme emphasis on sharing locally-gathered intelligence during execution
Primary driver for successful reconnaissance pull
In some cases the commander with the best local SA—not the most senior--became the overall battlegroup/site commander (intelligence = power)
Dilemma between persistent presence to develop detailed local SA and need to keep moving or “going to ground” to survive
Implications : Implications Doctrine
May require collaborative development and archival from the field vice “proponency” from the school house (see Doughty’s Seeds of Disaster)
Organization
Task organization may be performed “on the fly” during execution
Requirements to perform continuous information management and leverage external/outside resources for DS use will require new TTP Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French
Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985)
Implications : Implications Training
Technical mastery requirement long recognized
Cultural mastery possibly most germane for intelligence R&S operations within the DO element
Materiel
Pushing down “the last tactical mile” for external database/sensor access
SCI implications/requirements?
Intra-unit collections/processing/archival/ dissemination equipment
Leadership and Education
Adopting the “special operations mindset” in execution – the mission expert/man on the scene is in charge (see Doughty’s Breaking Point)
Expertise in analytical and dissemination problem-solving Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of
France, 1940 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990)
Implications : Implications Personnel
Sustaining DO force trained manpower in protracted conflict will be challenging
Individual skills
Collective skills and unit cohesion
Facilities
Information brokerage services probably required on site and via reachback during planning and execution
NTC/JRTC for DO may be required for units to train within…versatile “Ender’s Game” scenarios/situations
QUESTIONS?? : QUESTIONS??