dsbbrief

Slide1: 

DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism Friday August 16, 2002 Final Outbrief For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering TerrorismDr. Ted GoldMr. Don Latham: 

Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism Dr. Ted Gold Mr. Don Latham Prior CT Insights MG Bob Scales Dr. Wick Murray Advanced CT Technologies & Systems Dr. Mim John Dr. Ron Kerber Future Force Capabilities GEN Bill Hartzog VADM Dave Frost Intel Panel Dr. Joe Markowitz ADM Bill Studeman Unconventional Use of Nuclear Weapons Against U.S. Dr. Rich Wagner Dr. Bill Graham Biological Warfare Dr. Anna Skalka Mr. Larry Lynn Discriminant Use of Force Dr. Ted Gold Dr. Josh Lederberg Psyops Managed Information Dissemination Precision Targeting Defensive Information Operations Others We drew on past DSB studies We leveraged current DSB Studies Enduring Freedom 2 USD(AT&L)/Commander JFCOM Sponsors

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War, A New Type of Adversary: 

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War, A New Type of Adversary Requires new strategies, postures, and organization This study only scratches the surface of what will eventually be needed Committed, resourceful, globally dispersed adversary with strategic reach A long, at times violent, and borderless war

Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign: 

Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick-response capabilities Be proactive in securing partners and help from allies, friends, and others Hold states/sub-state actors accountable Foster information sharing Fight forward Focus particular attention on WMD Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy All the above in parallel with consequence management and protecting the homeland and DoD’s missions and forces

Guidance From Our Terms of Reference: 

Guidance From Our Terms of Reference Focus is overseas military operations Military instrument is only part of the necessary capabilities Examined the role of intelligence in some detail Did not address homeland defense explicitly But difficult to segment theaters in this war We did consider threats to US military force projection from the US

The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks: 

The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks Very small “signals” hidden in massive clutter and noise Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts Extensive differences as well

Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists: 

Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward desired force capabilities From Air, land, sea, space These emerging capabilities will be critical for an effective military role in GWOT To Robust connectivity Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed Effective remote fires Adaptive joint command and control Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset)

Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist: 

Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist A more central role for SOF and specialized capabilities Joint integration at very low levels Discriminant use of force Interagency partners play major roles Creative operational arrangements with coalition partners

Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT: 

Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) initiatives Interagency – Link analysis Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at Combatant Commands JFCOM – CENTCOM – NORTHCOM New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg Multi-agency – Joint – Global perspective – New analysis tools – Multi-option analysis Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures: Mission Assurance Analysis Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office – Technical Support Working Group Physical Security Equipment Action Group Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center J8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section DoD Support to DEA Special Intelligence JFCOM Initiatives Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Joint Interagency Coordination Group Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term Enhanced C4ISR Homeland Operations Center – Joint National Training Capability USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group) USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of Concept USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives

Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT: 

Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT DARPA projects, e.g.: Genoa Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery Translingual Information Detection, Extraction, and Summarization Babylon Human Identification at a Distance Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I) Standoff Precision Identification from 3D Data Digital Radio Frequency Tags Advanced ISR Management ACTDs: High-Altitude Airship Pathfinder Active Denial System Thermobaric Adaptive Joint C4ISR Mode Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness Language and Speech Exploitation Resources Cave and Urban Assault Urban Reconnaissance Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (HyCAS)

Major Concerns: 

Major Concerns DoD should take the terrorist threat as seriously as it takes the likelihood and consequences of major theater war DoD still struggling to get joint C4 right Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures remain input- rather than product-oriented

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors: 

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors: 

Not the focus of our study Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors: 

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations A much more responsive, flexible, and effective military capability “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities 2 Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making 4 3

Discussion Outline: 

Discussion Outline Organization, context, and themes Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities Recap

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability: 

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence: Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the Terrorists and Their Networks: 

Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence: Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the Terrorists and Their Networks - Key Initiatives – Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical) operations Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations Intelligence surge/unsurge capability Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput against asymmetrical adversaries Understand adversaries as complex adaptive systems

Transformation of HUMINT Operations: 

Transformation of HUMINT Operations SecDef (working with DCI) expand overall Directorate of HUMINT Services (DHS)/Service roles and explore SOF opportunities Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence Work with DCI to deploy new DoD clandestine technical capabilities NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more attention to support of DoD HUMINT in the field SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations (AFO) Define HUMINT role in “Proactive” Ops; ensure Covert Action (CA) and IW/IO connections Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT capabilities (beyond current compartmented programs) A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made joint Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes – described on next chart

Classified HUMINT Chart: 

Classified HUMINT Chart Transformation of HUMINT Operations

Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG): 

Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) CLASSIFIED

Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations: 

Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating Group (P2OG) of creative subject matter operational experts such as: IW/IO – Covert Action – Diplomacy – Cover & Deception Intelligence Operations – PSYOPS – HUMINT – SIGINT – SOF Improves information collection by stimulating reactions Enhance operational preparation of the battlespace to support preemptive options and actions Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk Vest responsibility and accountability for the P2OG to a “Special Operations Executive” in the NSC* who shall: Define the national strategy Coordinate action Enunciate policy Execute to a plan coordinated with the SecDef and DCI and others as appropriate * The position exists in the NSC and is called: “National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism”, NSPD-8, Oct. 24, 2001

Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability: 

Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees, reservists, and others who are trained and qualified to serve on short notice, including expatriates Make investments now Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least annually Maintain a database of individuals and skills Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may be necessary Contracted roles for industry, universities, and think tanks Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities, CA/SOF issues, scientists and engineers, linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery skills Work with DoD and Congress on “unsurge” issues, particularly related to callups Develop innovative “data surge” capabilities

Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput: 

Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput Create a new and larger analytic workforce with skills and innovative tools focused on counterterrorism (CT) Focus on “actionable intelligence,” improved situational awareness, targeting and reachback support and “connecting the dots” using JWAC-like analysis approaches Full-time collaborative connections between all the critical centers working CT intelligence and support Analysis components of national intelligence organizations physically or virtually collocated to improve all-source multi-INT “analysis” collaboration and production Support for intelligence collection-related “target development” Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid analysts in protecting new sources and methods Identify roles for analysts in operational net assessment process/joint experimentation, vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and CT-related gaming and simulation

Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence Counterterrorism Information: 

Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence Counterterrorism Information SecDef/DCI establish a group to define a future path to achieve a truly joint interoperable CT Common Operating Picture (COP) Improve chat windows and secure collaborative means/directories for direct access to relevant analysts and related data environments Converge large e-gov programs currently underway in SIGINT and IMINT for improved customer access to intelligence data/collaboration Pursue an integrated family of “small terminal programs” for field/small unit access to intelligence data (data, imagery, etc.)—smart push and pull DCI/SecDef provide portals, tools and pointers for access to unclassified open sources data bases, commercial sources etc. Develop advanced visualization concepts for conveying intelligence and situational information

Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems: 

Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems These capabilities are also needed to: Focus information collection efforts Provide context to better understand collected data The capabilities must be coupled closer to campaign planning and execution (effects-based operations): To influence as well as respond Support information/influence ops in peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional maneuver/fires Further expand and enhance Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)-like capabilities Expand the number of countries/actors as well as the factors considered Address non-physical as well as physical dimensions Address money flow, cronies, family, intra-military, other

Recommendation: Proactive Operations: 

Recommendation: Proactive Operations Recommendation Develop an entirely new capability to proactively, preemptively evoke responses from adversary/terrorist groups Form a new elite Counter-terrorism Proactive Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) at the NSC level Highly specialized people with unique technical and intelligence skills such as information operations, PSYOP, network attack, covert activities, SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence warfare/deception operations Reports to NSC principal level Lead Responsibility NSC lead with DCI, SecDef, State, Justice participation “Cost” 100 “new” people $100M/yr for operations and support

Recommendation: Improve Intelligence : 

Recommendation: Improve Intelligence Recommendation Develop new capabilities, sources, and methods to enable deep penetration of adversaries DO/DHS develop new modes and methods for covert operations – See classified chart on HUMINT Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain close target access Develop new clandestine technical capabilities Create a surge capability in intelligence to preempt and deal with rapidly emerging crises in the GWOT Maintain a robust cadre of retirees reservists and specialists, qualified to serve on short notice Contract roles for industry universities and think tanks Lead Responsibility DCI Lead SecDef/CJCS ASD(C3I) and DCI Community Management Staff (CMS) DCI/DoD co-shared lead “Cost” $1.7 Billion/FY beginning in FY-04 and continuing $100M/yr for exercises, engagement in the form of gaming, and real operations Supports CIA DO/DDS&T initiatives

Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont.): 

Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont.) Recommendation Expand counter terrorism and asymmetric adversary analytical capabilities and throughput Increase Service and intelligence agency analytic specialties, unique to CT challenges, by 500 people over the next 18 months to add depth of expertise Focus on understanding effects of globalization, radicalism, cultures, religions, economics, etc., to better characterize potential adversaries More virtual collaboration architecture for analyst support and customers interaction Lead Responsibility CMS shared lead with ASD(C3I) “Cost” $800M/yr for technical capabilities development and 500 new staff

Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems: 

Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems Recommendation Establish additional “centers” of excellence to handle the greatly increased work load and to augment JWAC to support “targeting” (in the broadest sense) of terrorist organizations and their supporting infrastructure—these activities will draw upon intelligence feeds, Red Teaming, and a great variety of subject matter experts (regional, cultural, psychological, soft and hard sensors) Pursue and expand JFCOM’s operational net assessment activity employed in millennium challenge Lead Responsibility JFCOM “Cost” Add to existing initiatives up to $100M per FY as appropriate $100M initiative at JFCOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and DARPA

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability: 

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

Slide31: 

“Tools” to Handle Tough Environments and Difficult Targets and to Understand Our Vulnerabilities - Key Initiatives - Tough Environments: Urban Warfare Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction Theater and CONUS protection The consequence management challenge In-theater CONUS Finding terrorists and WMD—persistent ISR The Red Team Asymmetric Adversaries and Force Projection

Slide32: 

Inadequate Attention and Resources Devoted to Improving Capabilities to Operate in Urban Environments URBAN OUR FOCUS: Most likely terrorism environment and the one for which we are the least prepared Shortfalls in doctrine, training, and technology for urban operations Doctrine: JFCOM Executive Agent in FY03 Put priority and resources behind the effort to create joint urban operations doctrine and address DOTMLPF challenges Training: Current urban ops training facilities inadequate Include an urban facility in the Joint National Training Capability Initiative Technology: Develop urban-specific technologies including: Knowledge systems Movement capabilities Precision fires Special sensor systems Communications unique to urban environment Integrated system solutions

Challenges for Military Operations in Urban Terrain: 

Challenges for Military Operations in Urban Terrain Urban terrain presents unique challenges in: Precision strike to avoid collateral damage Command and control communications limitations Need for diverse, manpower intensive operations Standoff weapons’ advantages diminish The need to call for and control supporting arms at platoon and squad levels To meet the unique urban challenge, we need better capabilities in: Ground and aerial surveillance (GPS-guided UAV helos) Situation awareness (persistent layered ISR) Urban training and development (dedicated center) Command, control and communications (DARPA SUO/SAS system) Low level combined arms maneuver Precision supporting fires Detecting and preempting WMD threats

Progress – USMC “Project Metropolis”: 

Progress – USMC “Project Metropolis” USMC battalion-sized MAGTF experiment Concept Penetration, thrust Combined arms to squad level (infantry, tank, helo, etc.) 4-5 weeks intense training Packaged combat support teams Bounding overwatch Spherical security Schedule Victorville, California – Summer 02 Urban ground reconnaissance Rotary-wing tactics Command and control Small unit logistics

The Way Ahead: 

The Way Ahead Develop an urban strategy on the strategic and operational levels We don’t do cities We do cities into rubble We have some good ideas for new urban warfare operations Develop a dedicated joint urban training and development center Part of joint West Coast training centers Subordinate to JFCOM Develop specialized tools for urban environments Many good ideas Develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) emphasizing: Urban intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) techniques Small unit action Leadership initiative and flexibility Low level call for and control of supporting fires Develop a precise urban environment representation

Urban Point Position Database(CityMap): 

Urban Point Position Database (CityMap) Creation Theater-based sensors (LADAR, IFSAR) update a priori maps Semi automated feature extraction to model structures Update/revisit rate much higher than traditional maps Urban context added to basic geometry using other sources (e.g., building plans, Integrated Survey Program, …) Utility Gridlock sensor and report data for fusion and handoff Precisely locate targets for remote fires Perform accessibility analysis to find routes in and around city Coordinate movement and position of forces Construct urban IPB Precision 3D representation of Structures (windows and doors) LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground) Obstacles (power lines) Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm) Database of supporting information Addresses, occupants, functions, more

Urban OPS Are Enabled by Precise Environment Representation: 

Urban OPS Are Enabled by Precise Environment Representation Precision 3D representation of: Structures LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground) Obstacles (power lines) Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm) Database of supporting information Addresses Occupants Functions More Gridlock of sensor data Enable HD multi-sensor processes Locate and track targets for long epochs Gridlock of report data Fuse disparate INT types precisely Locate targets for remote precision fires Urban C2 Coordinate movement Select / prioritize targets for remote precision fires Mission planning and rehearsal Critical node analysis Accessibility analysis (ground and air)

Finding the Enemy and WMD in Complex Environments: 

Finding the Enemy and WMD in Complex Environments

Slide39: 

The Integrated Battlespace • ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Earth’s Surface • Navigation / Position Fixing • Precision Time • Ballistic Missile Launch Warning • Weather Space: • ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Ground and Sea • Airborne Object Detection / Tracking / ID • Atmospheric Sampling • Localized Weather Air: • ISR: SIGINT, EO / IR, Acoustic, Seismic, Magnetic • Terrain & Man-made Feature Data • Weather • Oceanographic Data • Internet & World Wide Web • Weapons of Mass Destruction Data & Warning • ISR • Oceanographic Data • Other Undersea: Terrestrial / Ocean Surface:

Improved and Persistent Battlefield ISR Capabilities: 

Improved and Persistent Battlefield ISR Capabilities Capable of search, synoptic coverage, and space, air, ground sensor dwell (persistent ISR) Balanced space, air and ground capabilities to create a layered capability and an integrated ISR battlespace Optimize resource allocation to achieve localized, persistent, high density coverage Address the unique urban ISR problems Include ground-based improved tagging, tracking, locating (TTL), close and clandestine technologies More centralized planning and coordination of architectures, technology, and capabilities – Joint SIGINT Avionics Architecture (JSAA) program Acquisition of system-of-system (strategic-operational-tactical) ISR architectures and systems – Multimission Command and Control Constellation (MC2C) New approaches to acquisition, architecture development and systems engineering – capabilities-based approach being used in the MDA

An Integrated Joint C2/BM Capability Supported Through A Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII): 

An Integrated Joint C2/BM Capability Supported Through A Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII) Synchronous Orbit Relay Satellite Intel Data / CONUS Commands Covert Uplink Multiple RF Circuits Ground/Maritime Sensors Low-Altitude UAVs Optical Links Optical Link Communications Node with Multi-Beam Antenna and Data Switching Capability Airborne Command Center Broad-Area Surveillance Radar UAV All entities: people, platforms, sensors, weapons are interconnected All entities can pull data in real time All entities have access (as appropriate) to relevant data at all times Forces Attributes: Forward deployed data to everyone

New Sensor Capabilities Are Needed for Locating People and WMD: 

New Sensor Capabilities Are Needed for Locating People and WMD

Tracking Individuals: 

Tracking Individuals Many ideas are in the laboratory phase Passive/active Line of sight/non-line of sight Cooperative/non-cooperative Emphasis is on tags vs. systems/emplacement/environment Spectrum of ideas/options Short term (6 mos.)/long term (years) Physical tags Remote biometrics Need coordinated program to provide a toolkit of capabilities and operationalize concepts, especially in placement and exfiltration schemes

Priority Challenge for Counter-WMD Warfare: Detecting, Identifying, and Localizing WMD : 

Priority Challenge for Counter-WMD Warfare: Detecting, Identifying, and Localizing WMD Needed Standoff detection and tracking at kilometer ranges Active interrogation; high-resolution, high-efficiency devices Passive spectral systems with km’s stand-off range for detection Low false alarm Remotely emplaced sample collection and retrieval Handheld units for ID characterization in seconds to minutes with low false alarms Emplacement, networking, data processing, exfiltration – all clandestine

Slide45: 

Remote sensing has not proved out—seems to require in place sensors Sensor systems should be considered end-to-end, but initial work should focus on phenomenology and sensing techniques Network monitoring and analysis of inferential signatures (e.g., deliveries, manifests, people movement) should be undertaken Stimulated emissions may hold promise for nuclear choke point monitoring Energize followup on the Zebra Chip recommendation No matter the sensing, “agent defeat” is critical and requires additional resources WMD—The Way Ahead

WMD—The Way Ahead: 

WMD—The Way Ahead Chem Bio Nuclear Sensor Physics/Chemistry Precision Sensor (Stealth) Deployment (LPD) Data Exfiltration Choke Point Monitoring Attack Sensing Agent Destruction Consider Provocative Deployment CONOPS Network and Inferential Signature Analysis Relative Investment Proposed Among N, C, B

An Expanded In-Theater and CONUS Counter-WMD Consequence Management Capability: 

An Expanded In-Theater and CONUS Counter-WMD Consequence Management Capability The Counter-WMD Force Element: expanding on today’s capabilities A joint, deployable counter-WMD force element, trained and equipped for CONUS or overseas: force/base protection, quarantine ops, WMD ISR, helping to plan counter-WMD offensive ops, search and render-safe Must address consequence management capabilities and serious shortfalls CONUS National Guard has civil support teams in 32 locations today Greatly expand role of National Guard and Reserves and improve training and equipage The 50 states need to define their roles and budgeting for this mission and other disaster relief missions Overseas Any use of WMD in-theater directly impacts host nation as well as US forces A coalition developed plan for consequence management is needed – country by country – with US assistance No plans, and little capability, in place today

Counter-WMD Mission and Relation to CONUS Protection: 

Counter-WMD Mission and Relation to CONUS Protection Create a special WMD “Red Team” dedicated to planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the US homeland and forces overseas Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief making and terrorist cultural beliefs Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who derive “observables” from scenarios and focus collection on these Major reach out to creative people outside government for their ideas, scenarios, and postulated adversary capabilities Major intelligence analytic support on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and WMD

Assessing DoD Force Projection Vulnerabilities in a GWOT Environment: 

Assessing DoD Force Projection Vulnerabilities in a GWOT Environment DoD GWOT force projection capabilities are highly dependent on both commercial and Defense Department infrastructure Approximately 450 DoD bases involved in some aspect of force projection (Unknown numbers) of commercial sites are involved as well The responsibilities for DoD force projection risk assessment effort must be clarified DoD asset vulnerabilities must be ranked in importance and reported to the appropriate levels within DoD The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NORTHCOM must add the DoD critical commercial infrastructure required for force projection to their critical national infrastructure protection priorities No systematic mapping of this infrastructure and associated vulnerabilities to mission requirements exists Currently multiple DoD entities have some responsibility for assessing site-by-site vulnerabilities: Local installation/base commanders Joint Program Office-Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) at Dahlgren with NIMA and DTRA in support Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) with DTRA in support Others responsible based upon the attack vector

Responsibilities for Force Projection Risk Mitigation: 

Responsibilities for Force Projection Risk Mitigation Responsibilities for mitigation of identified force projection risks must be clarified The Combatant Commander does not have the resources to fix the problem Resources must flow from who “owns” the site day to day, not the “gaining command” At the base level, risk assessment and mitigation funding competes with other installation sustainment demands SecDef should consider establishing a new line item in each Service and Agency budget for force projection risk mitigation Segregates the funding Enables assessments to be matched against mitigation efforts Provides senior DoD leadership better visibility into this issue

Slide51: 

The following list of missiles are manufactured in Tucson, Arizona: AIM-9X AMRAAM EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle for the BMD system) ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow) Javelin Maverick Phalanx Phoenix RAM Sparrow Standard Missile Stinger TOW (anti-tank missile) Tomahawk All of Raytheon’s missiles except Hawk and Patriot (Massachusetts) Missiles Made in Tucson

Classified: 

Classified Sustainability Enables Force Projection

Recommendation: Take Urban Environment Seriously by Building on Emerging Activities: 

Recommendation: Take Urban Environment Seriously by Building on Emerging Activities Recommendation Create infrastructure to enable new capabilities in urban operations New urban-like facility able to support battalion-size forces to train, exercise, and experiment realistically Replicates different types of urban environments Large numbers of structures – some high rise Networked to other ranges/facilities Mission rehearsal capability Equipment evaluation Develop urban-unique modeling and simulation tools Develop the Urban Point Positioning Database DARPA develop a major R&D thrust Provide guidance and resources to JFCOM in their new role as Executive Agent for Joint Urban Operations Develop new concept at operational level Integrate Service efforts Conduct and sponsor experiments, exercises, and ACTDs Work with allies and draw lessons learned fostering urban-relevant M&S Lead Responsibility JFCOM with Army, USMC DARPA NIMA “Cost” $300M/yr for POM period

Recommendation: Improve ISR: 

Recommendation: Improve ISR Recommendation Significant improvement in battlespace ISR and supporting analysis Develop the capability to employ a 24/7 Persistent ISR in a designated area for days or weeks A layered architecture from space, air, and a rich set of new ground sensor capabilities for now, next and after-next ISR systems Overlay with Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII) for support of network centric and gridlock capabilities Lead Responsibility ASD(C3I) and CMS “Cost” $1.6 Billion/FY over FY-04 POM period IOC in FY-06 FOC in FY-09

Recommendation: Scenarios, Plans, and Templates: An Important Initiative For a “Red Team”: 

Recommendation: Scenarios, Plans, and Templates: An Important Initiative For a “Red Team” Recommendation For the WMD issues, there should be a dedicated team of smart, creative individuals dedicated to planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the US homeland and forces overseas Collect and collate terrorist MOs from previous incidents Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief making Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who derive “observables” from the scenarios and focus collection on these Includes comprehensive tagging, tracking and locating critical componentry Includes monitoring of support structures Monitoring individuals and institutions with critical know-how Provide the systems support so that the notional components can be stored and recombined, and can index into intelligence reports Avoid premature focus on one or several end-to-end scenarios Reports to Director CIA Lead Responsibility DCI with support from SecDef and CJCS “Cost” Hiring/finding the two dozen skilled people Resources to reach out to non-government skills Operations support cost of $20M/yr

Recommendation: Develop and Implement a Comprehensive Counter-WMD Plan: 

Recommendation: Develop and Implement a Comprehensive Counter-WMD Plan Recommendation Execute consolidated oversight and funding of an aggressive and coordinated RDT&E program Create and exercise WMD operational decision support systems Push R&D on WMD sensors, sampling, and retrieval concepts Develop networked C4ISR systems specific to WMD targets Get serious about acquiring a WMD agent, device, and/or delivery defeat Provide resources for near-term staffing and equipage for an expanded Counter-WMD Force Element Joint, deployable; CONUS or overseas Force protection, offensive action, consequence management Lead Responsibility USD(AT&L), ATSD(NCB) Services, SOCOM SOCOM Services “Cost” $1B/yr $500M/yr

Recommendation: Identify and Redress Force Projection Vulnerabilities: 

Recommendation: Identify and Redress Force Projection Vulnerabilities Recommendation Increase tenfold (over three years) the people and resources devoted to assessing vulnerabilities of our DoD force projection capabilities and critical infrastructure Support with extensive Red Teaming and R&D on new analysis techniques Assign Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security [ASD(HLS)] as Executive Agent for DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection and assure the vulnerabilities are addressed Task NORTHCOM and ASD(HLS) to coordinate the vulnerability assessments and develop a plan to redress the vulnerabilities Move funding for the JPO-STC to a new NORTHCOM funding line Lead Responsibility JPO-STC “Cost” > $100M Personnel costs. Need to coordinate multiple groups conducting vulnerability assessments $150M/year

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability: 

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

Slide59: 

Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations Traditional SOF Combat Support & Combat Service Support Allied Conv. Forces US Conventional Forces

Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations : 

Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations - Key Initiatives - Provide operational command flexibility Increase SOF capabilities Couple SOF and conventional forces more tightly Enhance the contributions of conventional forces Make SOF more central in our military planning with our Allies

Provide Operational Command Flexibility: 

Provide Operational Command Flexibility Prepare SOF to be the supported command in at least some phases of future campaigns Enhance the robustness of the theater special operations commands and joint special operations task force (JSOTF) headquarters (level/resources, skills, C4) Expand exercises and training with conventional forces Provide for seamless transition of supported/supporting commands during a campaign; task JFCOM and SOCOM to: Develop transition phasing experiments and exercises Ensure interoperable situational awareness capabilities among SOF and conventional forces

Increase SOF capabilities: 

Increase SOF capabilities A greater role in “preparing the battlefield” Focus SOF worldwide day-to-day presence to exploit human and geographic access in potential crisis locations Exploit SOF’s inherent intelligence collection capabilities “Modest” increase in personnel ~2% per year (+ some additional growth from transfers possible) CENTCOM crisis response element Substantial increase in equipage: Blue force tracking Sensor “emplacement” Common Operating Picture Communications and other equipment Upgrade special mission aircraft, maritime and ground mobility

Slide63: 

Couple SOF and Conventional Forces More Tightly More training and rehearsal for both SOF-led and conventional-led operations Standardize TTPs between SOF and conventional forces for SOF-initiated operations Command relationships Enhanced institutional and unit education Tailor force packaging to enhance pre-conflict/post-conflict capabilities Identify “packages” of engineers, civil affairs, military police, and medical personnel that can be coupled to in-theater SOF These resources reside mostly in Reserve Component (RC)

Slide64: 

Enhance Conventional Force’s Contributions in the GWOT Improve selected conventional capabilities to support SOF-centric operations Night vision/night flying/tactical resupply Sea-basing Fire support Foreign internal defense (training) Accelerate development and fielding of specialized capabilities in selected conventional forces Includes changes to training, professional military education, equipage, personnel practices Operate dispersed and distributed Leverage remote fires and aerial ISR Use language and cultural awareness as force multipliers Leverage indigenous ground forces Have conventional forces with requisite capabilities assume missions currently being performed by SOF E.g., USMC MEU(SOC) Explosive ordnance disposal Consequence management Force protection Combat service support

Slide65: 

Make SOF More Central in Military Engagement Planning With Our Allies/others One of few areas where allies can be near peer partners JSOTF-South in OEF provides a model: forces of eight nations Focus efforts at early stages of emerging crisis Center Allied and coalition planning operations at Combatant Command level Prioritize engagement opportunities Aggressively fund combined exercises and training events

Recommendation: Preparing For More, Larger and More Complex Operations in Which SOF (and SOF-like) Capabilities Play a Central Role: 

Recommendation: Preparing For More, Larger and More Complex Operations in Which SOF (and SOF-like) Capabilities Play a Central Role Recommendation Provide operational command flexibility Increase SOF capabilities Couple more tightly SOF and conventional forces Enhance the contributions of conventional forces in Warfighting Shaping Make SOF more central in our military planning with our Allies and coalition partners Lead/Supporting Responsibility SecDef/JFCOM SecDef/SOCOM CJCS/JFCOM & SOCOM/Services SecDef/JFCOM/Services SecDef/ASD(SO/LIC) “Cost” $10s of M Billions $10s of M $100s of M $10s of M

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability: 

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

Operationalizing New Approaches and Capabilities: 

Operationalizing New Approaches and Capabilities Extensive joint experimentation, training, and doctrine development Adaptive joint C4 systems Interoperability at low levels Hard-headed assessment of real world operations and experiments - Key Initiatives - Business as usual puts us at risk of not having capabilities when needed. Achieving capabilities will require

Creating an Organizational Center for Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT : 

Creating an Organizational Center for Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT SecDef/CJCS should formally and visibly recognize JFCOM’s new focus As their “executive agent” for joint doctrine, training, experimentation, and joint integration to meet GWOT requirements Linchpin for integration of joint and special ops efforts by services, USSOCOM, and other Combatant Commands Relieved of geographic and homeland defense responsibilities Transition to NATO functional Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation or divest SACLANT

Accelerate Maturation of JFCOM to Fulfill Joint Doctrine, Training, Experimentation Roles : 

Accelerate Maturation of JFCOM to Fulfill Joint Doctrine, Training, Experimentation Roles Create and sustain continuous experimentation/spiral development capability flexible to connect to real world operations New responsibility for joint doctrine Establish closer links to other Combatant Commands and Services Enlarge interagency and multinational initiatives Serve as Executive Agent for improving Joint Urban Operations Joint training capability

Accelerate Development and Fielding of More Adaptive and Capable Joint Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Systems: 

Accelerate Development and Fielding of More Adaptive and Capable Joint Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Systems Provide, through spiral development, continuous improvement of joint C4 systems (including Joint Headquarters) at the Regional Combatant Commanders Work closely with: Regional Combatant Commands to tailor to theater SOCOM to empower SOF-centric operations The new STRATCOM in their potential role as provider of global sensors and comms

Empower JFCOM to Ensure Jointness and Interoperability at Appropriate Levels: 

Empower JFCOM to Ensure Jointness and Interoperability at Appropriate Levels Establish Service acquisition program standards for processing/formatting (not just interface) Make JFCOM effective “gatekeeper” for interoperability for all Service requirements Accelerate integration of common operational pictures

Turning Lessons into Lessons Learned and Acted Upon: 

Turning Lessons into Lessons Learned and Acted Upon Needed: a standing process for development and top-down direction of lessons learned Make Joint Center for Lessons Learned subordinate to JFCOM Collect from operations, experiments, and training events (US and others) Create synthesis capability Develop an integrated electronic library Facilitate horizontal dispersion Create action plan Routinely report high priority lessons to SecDef/CJCS Result: Greater likelihood of discovering weaknesses before our adversaries do

Resourcing Jointness to Support the GWOT: 

Resourcing Jointness to Support the GWOT Create a program (set of program elements) to provide JFCOM the resources (through control of the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we have laid out for: Joint training, doctrine development, and experimentation Providing of joint C4 at the Combatant Commands Ensuring interoperability at all joint levels Joint urban operations Joint Center for Lessons Learned Should include funds and contracting authority for limited “acquisition” of products and other opportunities in support of this mission Should make maximum use of existing acquisition and procurement organizations in carrying out these responsibilities Provide JFCOM additional intellectual resources JFSC and NDU A formal relationship with counterpart activities in the Services (TRADOC, NWDC, AFDC, MCCDC/MCWL) Establish a premier system-of-systems engineering and integration capability to support JFCOM

Recommendation: Creating an Organizational Center for Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT : 

Recommendation: Creating an Organizational Center for Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT Recommendation Create a program to provide JFCOM the resources (through control of the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we have laid out Provide them premier system engineering and integration support Assign NDU/JFSC to JFCOM to ensure more influence of Service institutional counterparts Lead Responsibility SecDef/CJCS “Cost”

What Will You Get If You Implement Our Recommendations: 

What Will You Get If You Implement Our Recommendations Understanding of the adversary Proactive operations for Intelligence Deeper understanding and broader coverage A new and new kind of expansion of HUMINT Intelligence surge capability Understanding the enemy as a complex adaptive system (beyond physical dimensions) Deeper, broader, and more expert analysis Customer and query-driven analysis More capabilities for “tough” operations Facilities for urban operations, experiment, training, and mission rehearsal/planning 3D maps of urban environments Responsive ISR, persistent focus Tagging, tracking, and locating – even of people Sensors for WMD A “red team” to anticipate the terrorists A “SWAT-like” team to contain WMD weapons Powerful SOF-centric military options tailored to the GWOT Greater contributions from the conventional forces Robust, adaptive, and flexible operational-level C4 Finally, interoperability of C4 – and at the lower levels needed

What It Will Mean: 

What It Will Mean Much better able to anticipate terrorist behavior and react to “bolts-out-of-the-gray” Much richer set of proactive/preemptive options More responsive, flexible, and effective military instrument to prosecute the GWOT better prepared for simultaneous campaigns more capable in tough environments and against difficult targets Allies much more capable (and perhaps willing) to contribute militarily DoD’s missions much less vulnerable to terrorist disruption A catalyst for a broad and deep transformation of DoD’s capabilities and practices

Slide78: 

“ Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen…What is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance, and freedom.” President George W. Bush September 20, 2001