Newig Symbolic Legislation Bath 2005

International Sociological Association - RC 24 Environment and Society“Double Standards and Simulation:Symbolism, Rhetoric and Irony in Eco-Politics”University of Bath, UK, 1st - 4th September 2005Symbolic Environmental Legislationand Societal Self-Deception:The Societal, Technical and Environmental ContextJens NewigInstitute of Environmental Systems ResearchUniversity of Osnabrück, Germanyjens.newig@usf.uni-osnabrueck.de: 

International Sociological Association - RC 24 Environment and Society “Double Standards and Simulation: Symbolism, Rhetoric and Irony in Eco-Politics” University of Bath, UK, 1st - 4th September 2005 Symbolic Environmental Legislation and Societal Self-Deception: The Societal, Technical and Environmental Context Jens Newig Institute of Environmental Systems Research University of Osnabrück, Germany jens.newig@usf.uni-osnabrueck.de

Symbolic politics and environmental legislation: 

Last decades: great success of environmental policy and legislation in enhancing environmental quality in industrialised countries Various environmental problems still largely unresolved Reasons for insufficient legislation are manifold; one particular type is symbolic legislation Classic political theory assumes collectively “rational” policy-making (e.g. stagist approach) and thus neglects symbolic actions Some authors assume general tendency of symbolic politics (e.g. Edelman 1962) However, empirical evidence suggests that both symbolic and non-symbolic forms of politics and legislation exist, depending on their respective context ► So what, exactly, are these context factors that favour symbolic, or non-symbolic, legislation? ► How to explain incidences of symbolic against those of non-symbolic environmental legislation? Symbolic politics and environmental legislation

Outline: 

Definition and some negative implications of symbolic legislation Theoretical approach state-centered approach, methodological individualism (no systems approach) but: societal and technical context important -- draw conclusions regarding societal “self-deception” Results of two empirical cases: German Summer Smog Act (Ozongesetz) German Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants (Großfeuerungsanlagen-Verordnung) comparison with theoretical conjectures Conclusions: Strategic deception of citizens by government, or societal self-deception? Outline

Symbolic legislation: definition: 

Symbolic legislation: definition

The trouble of symbolic environmental legislation: 

Substantively ineffective, but huge costs of legislation Costs and troubles of (fruitless) enforcement efforts (see Dwyer 1990) Legal validity (principle of proportionality)? Poisoning the population’s sense of justice impeding effect through seemingly “solved” environmental issues The trouble of symbolic environmental legislation

Theoretical explanationof symbolic legislation: approach: 

Theoretical scope explain a social/political phenomenon, search for mechanisms no general social theory! situational factors regarding particular instances of legislation Public choice approach (e.g. Downs 1957, Hansjürgens 2000) rational, self-interested actors bounded rationality: no complete information, rather: asymmetrical information politicians maximize electors’ votes citizens often “rationally ignorant” as regards complex environmental problems Theoretical explanation of symbolic legislation: approach

Problem costs and problem-solving resources: 

Problem costs and problem-solving resources Maximization of electors’ votes demands: effective legislative measures will only be enacted when their overall short-term benefits are assumed to exceed their overall costs. ► Hypothesis 1: Necessary precondition for symbolic legislation: considerable degree of political pressure on the part of the public. [Variables: PUBLIC ATTENTION and INTERESTS of the actors involved] Dilemma: What if state action is demanded that cannot possibly meet the above demands? ► Hypothesis 2: A socially relevant problem, for which at a given point of time there is no solution or only one in which the costs would exceed the benefits, is likely to be “resolved” through symbolic legislation. [Variables: PROBLEM SEVERITY and PROBLEM-SOLVING RESOURCES]

The organized “few” versus the unorganized “many”: 

Further assumptions (e.g. Tollison 1997, Olson 1961): Societal actors are unequal in terms of “importance” for politicians Asymmetrical information between “rationally ignorant” citizens and well-organised interest groups who can mobilise more votes than can other actors ► Hypothesis 3: Chances that symbolic legislation is enacted depend positively on the degree of societal conflict. [Variable: INTERESTS of the involved actors]. ► Hypothesis 4: In the case of conflicting interests, the legislature tends to satisfy the more powerful interest groups in a substantive manner, whereas the less powerful groups are satisfied merely symbolically. [Variable: POWER POSITIONS of the involved actors]. The organized “few” versus the unorganized “many”

Issue complexity, information and transaction costs: 

The more complex, uncertain and opaque a regulatory issue, the more effort (time, money) is needed to understand its implications and the less likely it becomes that actors with given resources will invest these rersources. ► The relevance of asymmetrical information rises with the complexity of the issue at stake. ► Hypothesis 5: The more complex and opaque a regulatory problem issue, the more likely symbolic legislation will arise, and vice versa. [Variable: ISSUE COMPLEXITY]. Issue complexity, information and transaction costs

Case studies:introduction and methodology: 

originally three case studies, two of which - the most contrasting ones - are presented here Both German cases, both laws passed under the Kohl government analysis of legal texts, parliamentary material, newspaper articles and secondary literature 18 semi-structured, guided interviews with responsible politicians and government officials obtain context data obtain information on the legislative intent, in particular regarding possible gaps between “real” and officialy announced intentions Case studies: introduction and methodology

The German “Ozongesetz”:The futile struggle for traffic restrictions: 

In Germany, discussion of high values of summer smog (mostly: tropospherical ozone) since late 1980s Debate driven by Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens (Die Grünen) as well as by some environmental groups: demand for traffic restrictions Conservative government (Kohl/Merkel) lacked interest in such measures and instead counted on long-term effects of earlier legislation 1993: Some SPD-governed German Länder (federal states) enact their own summer smog ordinances (temporary traffic restrictions in summer smog situations) Summer 1995: “Ozongesetz” passed by German parliament: traffic ban (no speed limits!) in areas with exceptionally high ozone concentrations ► probability of application extremely low numerous exceptions (commuters, even vacationists) ► ban practically not controllable existing state ordinances invalidated The German “Ozongesetz”: The futile struggle for traffic restrictions

Summer smog - troposhperical ozone load,precursor emissions and public attention: 

Summer smog - troposhperical ozone load, precursor emissions and public attention

The symbolic nature of the “Ozongesetz”: 

Extremely poor prospective legal-substantive effectiveness: Ambituous objectives (“prevention of a further increase of peak levels of ozone by means of a ban on non-low-emission vehicles; basis of a further, enduring reduction in the basic ozone load”) clearly not met responsible politicians were clearly aware of this - Ozongesetz as “typical example of hysteria in Germany”; parliament “just did anything”; “absurd law”; “law one should be ashamed of” (all quotes: interviews with deputies of the governing coalition) High prospective symbolic-political effectiveness new minister of the environment, Merkel had at the time neither any recognizable political profile nor scored any significant political success - she scented a political success, highly interested in presenting herself as ecological pioneer and time getting the vexatious issue off the agenda high position in the legal hierarchy “law that was made to placate the public will” (interview coalition member) ► Prototypical example of symbolic legislation The symbolic nature of the “Ozongesetz”

Explaining the genesis of the “Ozongesetz”: 

Hypothesis 1 (political pressure):  high public attention, high political pressure from SPD-governed Länder Hypothesis 2 (problem costs - problem severity):  prospective benefit of legislation: at most moderate given the expected long-term effects of earlier legislation prospective costs of effective legislation: very high (week-long traffic bans in large areas of Germany) Hypothesis 3 (conflict of interests):  conflict of interest and of values between the liberty of motorists and the health of children could hardly have been more severe But: interest of “the public” was divided! Whereas polls regularly reported more than 2/3 of people welcoming traffic bans to combat summer smog, compliance of actual traffic restrictions proved extremely low Hypothesis 4 (power position):  German auto industry extremely powerful actor Hypothesis 5 (issue complexity):  issue complexity extremely high due to complex immission situation, several unknown causal relationships and a multitude of limit values under discussion Explaining the genesis of the “Ozongesetz”

The symbolic nature of the Ozongesetz: 

The symbolic nature of the Ozongesetz “Ozongesetz”

The German Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants:effectively reducing industrial emissions: 

Two main motives: legal uncertainties regarding the validity of limit values high public pressure to reduce acidic emissions (mainly sulphur dioxide, SO2) because of the “Waldsterben” debate in the early 1980s Work on the ordinance started under the social-liberal-democratic government of chancellor Schmidt Ordinance passed in 1983 under the conservative government of Kohl/Zimmermann against heavy resistance by electricity industry strict limit values of SO2 and other pollutants emitted by large combustion plants (mainly coal-fired power plants) strict time frame for retrofitting of old plants The German Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants: effectively reducing industrial emissions

“Waldsterben” and SO2 emissions: 

“Waldsterben” and SO2 emissions

The non-symbolic nature of the ordinance: 

Extremely high prospective legal-substantive effectiveness: Ordinance clearly suitable to meet ambituous objectives (“drastically reduce these high total emissions of sulphur oxides, nitrous oxides, [...] by measures at the source”) through strict limit values and easy enforceability responsible politicians clearly intended to “achieve an immense breakthrough in the total air quality situation” (interview Ministry of the Interior) Moderate prospective symbolic-political effectiveness new government sought to capture votes from the newly emerged Green party (interview Environmental Agency/Umweltbundesamt) “No other instrument of air quality control has heated people’s tempers, and received such a degree of attention in the media but also on the part of the people, like this measure. This accounts for the high political importance of this ordinance as a means to combat air pollution and forest damage” (Kuhnt 1983) ► Prototypical example of effective legislation The non-symbolic nature of the ordinance

Explaining the genesis of the ordinance: 

Hypothesis 1 (political pressure): () extremely high public attention and political pressure from environmental groups Hypothesis 2 (problem costs - problem severity):  prospective benefit of legislation: drastic reduction of acid emissions from exhaust gases (estimated at 1’500’000’000 to 4’000’000’000 € per year) prospective costs of effective legislation: estimated at approx. 1’500’000’000 € per year; rise of electricity bills by 10 per cent) Hypothesis 3 (conflict of interests): () open conflict between government and environmental groups on the one hand and electricity industry on the other. Position of industry changed after ordinance entered into force Hypothesis 4 (power position):  Electricity industry generally powerful, but no threat of relocation possible Hypothesis 5 (issue complexity):  issue complexity moderate because of clear causal link between SO2 emissions of coal-fired power plants and forest damages Explaining the genesis of the ordinance

The non-symbolic nature of the ordinance: 

The non-symbolic nature of the ordinance Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants

Conclusions: 

Approach suitable to capture important elements of legislation in a late-modern society Notion of symbolic legislation (and: symbolic politics) not outdated: Many ecological problems exist that could be tackled in a substantively effective, non-symbolic way. Whether they are, depends on the context. Public choice approach, with special focus on issue complexity, can explain the geneis of symbolic versus non-symbolic legislation Summer smog case shows that deliberate and conscious deceit of the public does in fact occur At the same time: majority of citizens psychologically divided between sustaining strict traffic restrictions when asked about summer smog, and not obeying them when these were actually applied: “double standard” “productive” role of symbolic legislation if it expresses a divided opinion of the people Conclusions

Thank you for listening!: 

Thank you for listening!

Summer smog - troposhperical ozone load and public attention (monthly numbers): 

Summer smog - troposhperical ozone load and public attention (monthly numbers) Source: Newig 2003, 2004