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Sobering after a „grim wedding” – a realistic evaluation of Hungary’s accession to the EU : 

Sobering after a „grim wedding” – a realistic evaluation of Hungary’s accession to the EU Krisztina Arató Ph.D ELTE, Budapest „Euroscepticism and European Integration” Zagreb, 12 April 2007

Introduction: 

Introduction Why grim wedding? Timothy Garton Ash in The Guardian (June 27, 2002) Something went wrong – neither the old, nor the new member states are happy with the realisation of the EU’s Eastern enlargement Problem not important in itself – interesting for the future, the innovation capacity of the new EU

Basis: 

Basis There was no other possible way for modernising Central-Eastern Europe The overall result of EU accession in positive for both old and new member states However, after accession euphoria there is a need for a realistic evaluation of EU eastern enlargement process

Major parts of the presentation: 

Major parts of the presentation Analysis of the European Union – approach, motivation, institutional background, conditionality in Eastern enlargement Analysis of new member states (esp. Hungary) – accession strategies, roles of regional institutions in accession process Conclusions

EU and eastern enlargement I.: 

EU and eastern enlargement I. Why enlargement? Several analyses (e.g. H.Grabbe) argued that the EU had no clearcut strategy for Eastern enlargement It seemed just a natural consequence of the collapse of the bipolar world EU: special responsibility for the region (Hallstein, Mitterand, Dooge Committee, etc.) 1990s: symbolic and concrete promises after the Copenhagen criteria

EU and eastern enlargement II.: 

EU and eastern enlargement II. Just how important is Eastern enlargement for the EU? Not a priority throughout the process (Ágh) – see Constitution and Lisbon strategy Internal engagements and debates (EMU, clashes of interest in EU15) No external pressure

EU and eastern enlargement III.: 

EU and eastern enlargement III. Role of the Commission No formal responsibility in enlargement in general Huge role in Eastern enlargement – no political decision on Council level Uncertain, even contradictory information from different DGs in different periods of the negotiation process

EU and eastern enlargement IV.: 

EU and eastern enlargement IV. Moving target The EU did not present a clear schedule for enlargement Not accession date, only indirect schedule (2000-2006 financial perspective) Principle of differentiation changed late 2001 to Big Bang – too late to change accession strategies for most applicants

EU and eastern enlargement V.: 

EU and eastern enlargement V. Conditionality Formal and informal conditionality Exceptional in scale Expectations to apply parts of the acquis prior to accession Informal expectations in excess – e.g. concerning regional policy and subnational government structures

EU and eastern enlargement VI.: 

EU and eastern enlargement VI. Money EU transfers have been one of the biggest attractions of membership How much money is available? – set in 2000-2006 financial perspecive for 4-6 new member states Good deal for the EU - cheap enlargement

EU and eastern enlargement VII.: 

EU and eastern enlargement VII. Poland 67€ Hungary 49 € Slovenia 41 € Czech Republic 29 € Per capita available EU funding for 2005 Data from Michaela Schreyer in Int. Herald Tribune Greece 437 € Ireland 418 € Spain 216 € Portugal 211 € Per capita available EU funding for 2000

CEECs and EU accession I.: 

CEECs and EU accession I. Why accession? Symbolic reasons – „returning to Europe” Economic reasons – economic stability, stabilisation of strong trade links, FDI, etc. Modernisation – EU membership might be a key element in modernising key sectors like pension reforms, budgetary stability, etc. Political reasons – stabilising democratic political systems UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT FOR MEMBERSHIP

CEECs and EU accession II.: 

CEECs and EU accession II. Accession strategies 2 main models – Hungarian and Polish Hungarian: to become a member state at the first possible date with the best possible conditions Few derogations Strong adaptive attitude – „best pupil in class” Belief in the principle of differentiation Polish: there is no Eastern enlargement without Poland Hard negotiations, better concessions

CEECs and EU accession III.: 

CEECs and EU accession III. Regional co-operation Failure of Visegrad and other regional organisations Rational expectations: co-operation might strengthen negotiating positions of CEECs Reality: Historic conflicts and neuralgic points Principle of differentiation – Divide et impera from the Commission?

Conclusions: 

Conclusions I have listed the major mistakes made by both negotiating sides Why they happened? NO STRATEGY ON ANY SIDES EU15 did not have a vision about how an enlaged Union would target and operate New members did not have an idea how to change attitude after accession (from applicant to club member) Now EU 27 are in a visionless status – in order to make the EU work, we all have to contribute to create the future