pranesimasb2

Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy: 

Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier

Who is this person?: 

Who is this person? Richard Sherman Assistant Professor of Political Science Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1996-2004 Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996 What I do International Relations Political Economy Empirical Political Science Comparative Politics Where I publish The World Economy Comparative Political Studies Journal of Conflict Resolution International Interactions Economics Letters Social Science Quarterly International Politics Current Politics and Economics of Europe

My research: 

My research Intersection of domestic politics and international relations International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues Connections: The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter? The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik) International regimes & organizations Political markets vs. political contests

Privatizing commercial diplomacy: 

Privatizing commercial diplomacy Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors: petition for the initiation of trade disputes consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues attend WTO talks with government officials negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on regulatory reform EU Trade Barriers Regulation US Section 301 US: Private Sector Advisory Committees EU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations

Institutional innovation: 

Institutional innovation Nihil nove sub sole? Industry influence on government Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.) Government organizing industry (corporatism) But... Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure International industry groups are being organized by states Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access

Why is this interesting?: 

Why is this interesting? The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally? Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions Normative issues

Research questions: 

Research questions Positive: What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy? Which industries & groups are most active, influential? What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups? What are the differences across institutions and polities? Normative: Is “the cart leading the horse”? Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ? Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade regime? Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they lend ammunition to its critics?

Research strategy: 

Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis Research strategy

Research strategy: 

Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis • Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US • Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301 --compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) • Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes • Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU

Slide10: 

Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis • Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US • Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301 --compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) • Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes • Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU • Interviews and analysis of documents • Information / opinion from industry, government, and civil-society groups • Emphases: --implementation and politics / process --extent of business-government cooperation --connection to global trade regime --normative questions

Conclusions: 

Conclusions The petition processes are relatively successful still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry “International corporatism” has proved difficult Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful Explaining origins: institutional causes political/electoral causes hegemony/state-power causes Normative issues: “nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized retaliatory measures Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction