Space Countermeasures Hands On Program (CHOP) : Space Countermeasures Hands On Program (CHOP) Capt Mark W. Marasch
Chief, Space CHOP
Space Vehicles Directorate
Air Force Research Laboratory
Where We Have Been: Space CHOP AFSPC Contacts: Where We Have Been: Space CHOP AFSPC Contacts 26 Jan 01 Col Tom Fitzgerald, SMC/AX & Lt Col Clay, SMC/MT
9 Jan 01 Maj Gaines, DRCC & LtCol Moss, DOYD
13 Nov 00 Col Roberts, DRC
22 Sept 00 Lt Gen Dekok, CV & BGen Hamel, DR
10 Aug 00 BGen Hamel, DR
3 May 00 SWC/DOG / Air, Space & Aggressor Symposium
23 Feb 00 Col Ryals, SWC/CV
What is Space CHOP? Definition of Countermeasure: What is Space CHOP? Definition of Countermeasure From Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (www.m-w.com): coun·ter·mea·sure Pronunciation: -"me-zh&r, -"mA- Function: noun Date: 1923 : an action or device designed to negate or offset another; especially : a military system or device intended to thwart a sensing mechanism (as radar) <electronic countermeasures>
Space CHOP uses the broadest definition
Space CHOP is named and modeled after BMDO CHOP (now called HARDFAC)
The term CHOP implies the “bad guy” element
What is Space CHOP? Why We Exist: What is Space CHOP? Why We Exist Our purpose is nicely stated in the Rumsfeld Space Commission Report (Jan 2001): “If the US is to avoid a ‘space Pearl Harbor,’ it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on US space systems.” “Those hostile to the US can acquire on the global market the means to deny, disrupt or destroy US space systems by attacking satellites in space, communication links to and from the ground or ground stations that command the satellites and process their data.”
What is Space CHOP? Mission: What is Space CHOP? Mission To assist our customers in identifying and reducing space systems vulnerability by:
Performing open source-based analysis and hardware development,
Using simulated threat teams composed of junior officers with limited system knowledge
What is Space CHOP? Why We are Unique: What is Space CHOP? Why We are Unique To assist our customers in identifying and reducing space systems vulnerability by:
Performing open source-based analysis and hardware development,
Using simulated threat teams composed of junior officers with limited system knowledge
Identification--we focus on the unknown threat
Space Systems--we do not duplicate BMDO CHOP
Open Source--have no access to classified system information, and use COTS hardware
Hardware Development--not typically involved in excercises
Limited System Knowledge--teams are calibrated
Slide7: What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 1 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Blind Private Unknown *Proportions are not necessarily equal.
Slide8: What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 2 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Blind Private Unknown Secrets
Slide9: What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 3 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Private Unknown First-World Assessments Blind =
DANGER
Slide10: What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 4 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Private Unknown First-World Assessments Blind =
DANGER Space CHOP Vulnerability Assessments & Hardware
Slide11: What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari RESULT Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Blind Private Un-
known
How Space CHOP Does Business: Space CHOP Operation: How Space CHOP Does Business: Space CHOP Operation Built on BMDO CHOP’s successful history & methods
Rapid prototyping of less-than-peer Rest Of World (ROW) hardware
Fast response
Strict ROW simulation
Referee team monitors the team’s activities
Small, custom-built teams (CGOs and junior DoD civilians)
Perform studies, design, and build hardware
How vulnerable is this ground station?
How Space CHOP Does Business: Space CHOP Operation: Streamlined acquisition process
All missions are funded by the customer
Space CHOP does not receive AFRL/VS funds
Wide potential customer base--all space-dependent organizations and systems are potentially vulnerable
AFSPC, USSPACECOM, NRO, AFRL, SMC, NASA...
Commercial and allied governments’ assets How Space CHOP Does Business: Space CHOP Operation
How Space CHOP Does Business: Mission Architecture: How Space CHOP Does Business: Mission Architecture S CHOP Manager S CHOP Advisor CHOP Team CHOP Core MISSION TEAM
(ROW SIMULATION) Space CHOP
MANAGEMENT Referee Team CUSTOMER = Customer/ US Asset = Briefed Mission Control Team = Non-briefed Mission Execution Team Defines the mission
Provides funding
Populates Referee Team
Custodian of final results Recognized experts that focus the team
Customer representatives
Technical Experts
Others as required Guides each Red Team
“Stewards” customer’s funds
Provides infrastructure
Red team ROW simulation
Researches the mission
Develops solutions
Builds Hardware
How Space CHOP Does Business: Potential Targets: How Space CHOP Does Business: Potential Targets Abstract Direct Bomb Attack Cyber Attack Directed Energy RF Jamming Threat Spectrum
How Space CHOP Does Business: Mission Flow: How Space CHOP Does Business: Mission Flow Start Freewheeling Mission Open Source Research General Vulnerability Analysis Concentration on Specific Vulnerabilities Threat Plan, Design, Cost Estimate Fabrication Team Testing 1st World Testing Start Directed Mission End End End End
Benefits to Space CHOP Team Members: Benefits to Space CHOP Team Members Develop Understanding of System and Mission
Understand Enemy Thought Processes
See Vulnerabilities of Our Own Systems
Understand What Information to Protect
Hands-On Experience
Fun and Satisfying
Who we can use:
Junior Military and Civilian With Technical Degrees
Properly Calibrated--Must NOT Know Too Much!
Permanent Party and Borrowed
Hardware-Oriented People With Initiative
Mission History Since July 99: Mission History Since July 99 SCM-1 Threat-Representative RF Noise Source
AFSPC/SWC
Completed Fall 99
SCM-3 GPS Data Collection Mission
AFSPC/CN
Completed Jan 00
SCM-4 Theater Events System Vulnerability Study
USSPACE J33
Completed Dec 00
SCM-5 Satellite Emulator
AFRL, SMC
Completed Dec 00
SCM-6 Sensitive Mission
AFRL/VS
In Progress
Summary: Summary Facilities are in place
The Core Team is in place
Security procedures are in place
to protect the results
Ready for business
Points of Contact: Points of Contact Captain Mark W. Marasch, USAF DSN 246-7547, Comm (505) 846-7547 mark.marasch@kirtland.af.mil
Mr. John Holbrook, USAF DSN 246-2875, Comm (505) 846-2875 john.holbrook@kirtland.af.mil
Example Mission: Donutsat: Example Mission: Donutsat Freewheeling Mission: Attack the morale and effectiveness of US law enforcement agencies by disabling the Donutsat System.
Team is simulating a terrorist threat.
Example Mission: Donutsat: Example Mission: Donutsat Team analyzes entire Donutsat system using open-source materials.
Example Mission: Donutsat: Example Mission: Donutsat The team identifies vulnerabilities of the system, and proposes threats. SUGAR VIRUS
Example Mission: Donutsat: Example Mission: Donutsat The customer asks the team to do a detailed design of a donut decoy.
The team designs, builds, and tests this device.
The customer takes delivery of this device, and does their own testing to determine its effectiveness.
The customer chooses whether or not to share this data with other organizations using this system.
Local Police
County Sheriff
State Patrol
FBI