WM College July 17 2005

Slide1: 

Teaching Counterterrorism in the 21st Century James JF Forest, Ph.D. Director of Terrorism Studies

Agenda: 

Agenda Advice from Sun Tzu MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Conclusion & Recommendations for Teaching Notes: - This presentation is entirely at the unclassified level. - The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

1. Understanding the Terrorist Threat: 

1. Understanding the Terrorist Threat NATO definition of terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives Sun Tzu Know yourself Know your allies Know your enemy

Sun Tzu: Know Your Enemy: 

Sun Tzu: Know Your Enemy Understanding the Terrorist Threat What motivates terrorists? How do they get to a willingness to be a suicide bomber? What do they want? What are they capable of? How do they view this struggle? “You have to be lucky everyday – We only have to be lucky once” - IRA Bomber

The Terrorists’ Perspective: 

The Terrorists’ Perspective For one thing, al Qaeda’s leaders believes that they have been tested by two superpowers (Soviets and Americans); they defeated the first, and survived the second despite overwhelming military force – thus, both are considered victories Globally, members of this global religious-inspired insurgency believe this is an epic struggle that will likely take place beyond the current generation of fighters In Iraq, terrorists are developing a new “cult of the insurgent” by demonstrating how they, not the once-feared Saddam Hussein’s military, can inflict pain and suffering on the mighty U.S. (and coalition) forces Rationale for terrorism: perceived as only available means by which to achieve strategic goal

Terrorism as Strategy: 

Terrorism as Strategy Terrorism is not new Terrorism is not merely religious: 1980 Bologna, Munich attacks; LTTE (Sri Lanka) Terrorism as weapon in a strategy Terrorist attacks as a form of strategic communication

Terrorism as Strategic Communication: 

Terrorism as Strategic Communication What audiences are they attempting to communicate with? What message for each audience? How are they communicating (beyond acts of violence)? What are your actions, foreign policies, etc. communicating, and to whom? How can you determine the effectiveness of your own communications?

Some Strategic Acts of Terrorism: 

Some Strategic Acts of Terrorism The terrorist act is generally a symbolic gesture against a group or national government. Tactics include: armed attacks arson assassination bombing hijacking hostage-taking kidnapping, etc. Suicide bombings

Terrorism as Strategy: 

Terrorism as Strategy Terrorism as means to achieve goals and objectives Strategic goals include: Political change (e.g., overthrow govt.) Social change (e.g., France headscarf ban) Economic change (e.g., stop resource export) Religious change (e.g., fundamentalism) Overall goal: create a “better” world

Some Strategic Objectives of Terrorism: 

Some Strategic Objectives of Terrorism Recognition: Gaining national or international recognition for their cause; recruiting new personnel; raising funds; demonstrating their strength Coercion: Force a desired behavior of an individual or government Intimidation: Prevent individuals, groups, or governments from acting Provocation: Provoking overreaction by a government to the attack on symbolic targets or personnel, thereby gaining sympathy for their cause. Insurgency support: Forcing the government to overextend itself in dealing with the threat, thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support and commit further attacks against the government.

Marine Barracks Beirut, Lebanon23 October 1983: 

Marine Barracks Beirut, Lebanon 23 October 1983 241 Dead 105 Injured

Khobar Towers - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 25 June 1996: 

Khobar Towers - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 25 June 1996 19 Dead 240 Injured

New York, World Trade Center12 October 1993: 

New York, World Trade Center 12 October 1993 6 Dead 1,042 Injured

Murrah Federal BuildingOklahoma City 19 April 1995: 

Murrah Federal Building Oklahoma City 19 April 1995 168 Dead 490 Injured Some religious motivation, but different religion Same tactics (ammonium nitrate truck bomb) as 1993 WTC attack

Slide15: 

American Embassy Bombings, Kenya and Tanzania August 1998 224 Americans, Kenyans, and Tanzanians dead Over 4,025 injured

1999 LAX Attack Plan: 

1999 LAX Attack Plan

USS Cole, Aden, YemenOctober 12, 2000: 

USS Cole, Aden, Yemen October 12, 2000 17 Dead 39 Injured

Terrorism as Strategy: 

Terrorism as Strategy Increasing interest in “soft targets” (economically strategic impact, and less protected) such as: pubs in Northern Ireland & London UK open markets & cafes in Israel international airport, Sri Lanka bus in Manila, the Philippines shopping mall in southern Philippines nightclub in Bali, Indonesia banks in Istanbul, Turkey hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia nightclub in Berlin, Germany and, of course . . .

New York City & Washington, DCSeptember 11, 2001: 

New York City & Washington, DC September 11, 2001 2,973 Dead 10,000+ Injured

Karachi, PakistanMay 8, 2002 June 14, 2002: 

Karachi, Pakistan May 8, 2002 June 14, 2002 12 Dead 50 Injured 14 Dead, including 11 French engineers Bus attack Attack on U.S. Consulate

Bali, IndonesiaOctober 12, 2002: 

Bali, Indonesia October 12, 2002 202 Dead 350 Injured Citizens from 21 countries, mostly Western tourists, were killed in the blasts

Casablanca, MoroccoMay 17, 2003: 

Casablanca, Morocco May 17, 2003 44 Dead 107 Injured

Jakarta, IndonesiaAugust 5, 2003: 

Jakarta, Indonesia August 5, 2003 12 Dead 60 Injured J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta

Riyadh, Saudi ArabiaNovember 8, 2003 April 21, 2004: 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia November 8, 2003 April 21, 2004 4 Dead 148 Injured 3 simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on Al-Muhaya apartment complex Attack on Security Services Headquarters 17 Dead 122 Injured

Istanbul, TurkeyNovember 20, 2003: 

Istanbul, Turkey November 20, 2003 27 Dead 400 Injured Primary Targets: British consulate and the HSBC bank headquarters

Madrid, SpainMarch 11, 2004: 

Madrid, Spain March 11, 2004 191 Dead 1,035 Injured

Jakarta, IndonesiaSeptember 9, 2004: 

Jakarta, Indonesia September 9, 2004 9 Dead 173 Injured Australian Embassy was primary target

London, UKJuly 7, 2005: 

London, UK July 7, 2005 54 Dead 716 Injured

Strategy and Recruitment: 

Strategy and Recruitment Terrorism is an individual’s strategic choice most often driven by a combination of: Intense grievances Sense of crisis Address a power imbalance - empower the disenfranchised The ties that bind: training camps, extended family, social networks; trusted networks = key Combination of ideology and psychology No constraints re: geography, organizational affiliation, etc.

Strategy and Recruitment: 

Strategy and Recruitment Recruit individuals with differing talents or attributes to offer Locals with knowledge of customs, culture Foreigners with passports, language skills Sleepers or operationalists who can “fit in” Individuals who can serve as critical functionaries Sleeper cells were key for the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks

Terrorists as Strategic Actors: 

Terrorists as Strategic Actors Even though it’s a decentralized network, there are still critical functions that enable the network to operate Critical functionary roles – can become a hub of multiple networks weapons procurement financier (funder or banker) (particularly in Halawa system) document forgerer human traffickers Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and sometimes do support multiple networks; can provide supplies/facilitate trafficking of weapons & funds to multiple networks Example: 60% of day spent moving legitimate charity money around; 20% of day on Hamas transactions, other activity on side Some may get profit for doing these support/function roles

Slide32: 

Different members of the network play support and action roles

Strategy and Training: 

Strategy and Training

Strategy and Training: 

Strategy and Training Afghanistan Algeria Bosnia Chechnya Colombia Egypt Indonesia Japan Kashmir Lebanon Libya Establish training camps – developing the will to kill and the skill to kill Operational space: Geographic isolation Teachers: Experts in relevant knowledge, e.g., military combat experience Committed learners Time, money, and basic necessities Northern Ireland Peru The Philippines Somalia Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Syria Turkey United States Uzbekistan

Strategy and Training: 

Strategy and Training Psychological dimensions Moral disengagement Displacement of responsibility Disregard for/distortion of consequences Dehumanization Moral justification Group power over behavior, personal decisions Preparation for martyrdom

Strategy and Training: 

Strategy and Training education in explosives and detonators: how to assemble bombs (e.g., TNT, C4), mines and grenades, pressure and trip wire booby traps, and the basic knowledge of electrical engineering how to mount rocket launchers in the beds of pickup trucks how and where to launder money how to successfully conduct a kidnapping how to conduct target identification, surveillance and reconnaissance how and where to build camouflage-covered trenches how to covertly communicate with other members of a group or network how to fire handguns, machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers Lessons for new recruits include:

Strategy and Training: 

Strategy and Training the rudiments of chemical and biological warfare field command and escape tactics marksmanship and camouflage the use and employment of Soviet rocket-propelled grenades and shoulder borne STRELA missiles sniper rifle skills; how to fine-tune a rifle sight at short range to ensure accuracy at longer distances how to direct weapon fire at targets on the ground and in the air training in four-man unit deployments and formations—including wedges, columns, echelons and lines—techniques similar to those used by U.S. Marines and Army Rangers Lessons for new recruits include:

Strategy and Training: 

Strategy and Training Increasing use of the Internet Provide free tactical advice (print or online dissemination of information on bomb making, computer hacking, etc.) Advise sleepers on how to adapt to local surroundings (e.g., dress, friendly relationships with locals, etc.) Examples of online resources include: The Terrorists’ Handbook How to Make Bombs, Book Two 13 volume Encyclopedia of Jihad Manual of Jihad The Green Book (IRA) The Turner Diaries (US extremists) Mu’askar al-Battar (The Al Battar Training Camp, an Al Qaeda magazine) The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook The Anarchist Cookbook Field Manual for Free Militia Sabotage Handbook Special Force – first-person shooter game, developed by Hizballah Cyber-attack tools and instructions

Example of Tactics: Ammonium Nitrate: 

Example of Tactics: Ammonium Nitrate Millions of tons produced each year for use as fertilizer Mining companies mix small amounts of explosive grade ammonium nitrate with fuel oil to create explosives Used in several IRA bombings Used in World Trade Center bombing, 1993 (1,200 lbs in truck bomb) Used in the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995 Used in the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 1998 Used in the Bali bombing, 2002 March 30, 2004: More than half a ton of ammonium nitrate fertilizer is found in a lock-up in West London. Eight British citizens, one American and one Canadian were arrested on suspicion of being involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.

Strategy and Training: 

Strategy and Training These are Learning Organizations = committed to capturing knowledge, analyzing it, forming new doctrine and tactics which are informed by lessons from the past Learn from each other Learn from trial and error (IRA example) Media showcasing ‘best practices’ to others Managing public image (PR) (becoming more sophisticated) Terrorists are learning many things in Iraq, like: Manufacturing and concealing IEDs Urban warfare Sniper and ambush techniques Hostage taking Media manipulation OVERALL: How to recruit, fund, and execute assymetric warfare

Suicide Terrorism as Logical Strategy: 

Suicide Terrorism as Logical Strategy

Suicide Terrorism: Who?: 

Suicide Terrorism: Who? Perception: Generalized profile of suicide terrorists, including: Young Single Male Uneducated Religious fanatics Reality The “profile” is wrong Terrorists are: Preteen - mid-sixties Both single and married with families Both male and female Both educated and uneducated Not motivated by religious fanaticism World’s leader in suicide terror are Hindu; Tamil Tigers who are conducting insurgency against Sri Lanka

Suicide Terrorism: Why?: 

Suicide Terrorism: Why? Perception: Seemingly irrational act Reality Part of a strategy that is: Well planned Logical Designed to achieve specific political objectives Does two things: Inflicts immediate punishment against target society Threatens more punishment in the future

Suicide Terror Attacks are . . . : 

Suicide Terror Attacks are . . . inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost benefits for the terrorists less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and success means no assailant to capture and interrogate perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute changes in timing, access, and target a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually assured media coverage effective because the weaker opponent acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage

Suicide Terrorism: Where?: 

Suicide Terrorism: Where? Three types of attacks are most likely to occur: High value, symbolic targets involving mass casualties Important government buildings, installations, or landmarks Major means of personal or commercial transportation High value, symbolic targets against specific persons Political assassinations (e.g., head of state, regional governor, etc.) Deliberately lethal attacks targeting the public Bus, train, subway bombings; attacks on shopping malls, cinemas, sports stadiums, public gathering spaces

Slide48: 

Understanding Counterterrorism

2. MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach: 

2. MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach Question: Once we understand the threat, how do we address it? Answer: We employ all the instruments of national power available to us. Military Intelligence Diplomacy Legal Information Financial Economic

Slide50: 

Example of the Financial/Economic Dimensions: How does the LTTE Sustain its Operation Financially? In Areas heavily dominated by Tamils

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Propaganda/ Fund raising projects INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

US Counterterrorism Strategy: 

US Counterterrorism Strategy Helped Sri Lankan military develop 4 key capabilities Operate behind enemy lines Engage in night fighting SEAL, special boat operations Psyops capabilities Helped Sri Lankan banking and commerce tracking systems locate & disrupt money laundering networks

The “L” in MIDLIFE: 

The “L” in MIDLIFE Legal/Law Enforcement Rule of law is vital, both domestically and internationally The primary intelligence gatherers and first responders are local law enforcement officers Help countries develop their law enforcement capabilities and legal institutions Must conduct CT within ethical and legal frameworks, to avoid exacerbating existing grievances

Intelligence: Learn from our own mistakes: 

Intelligence: Learn from our own mistakes We assumed simultaneous 9/11 attacks in U.S. were beyond the capabilities of terrorists Overestimated the significance of past successes & the terrorists’ own incompetence Attention was focused exclusively on opposite ends of the terrorist technological spectrum Believed terrorists were still interested in publicity and not killing

3. U.S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 

3. U.S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (released in February 2003) Four main objectives: defeating terrorist organizations with global reach denying sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit defending U.S. citizens and interests

Elements of the National CT Strategy: 

Elements of the National CT Strategy 4 D’s: Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support, and sanctuary they need to survive Diminish the underlying conditions that promote the despair and destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace terrorism Defend against terrorist attacks on the U.S., our citizens and our interests around the world

Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach: 

Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach Objectives: Identify the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information) Locate the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information) Destroy the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Military, Financial, Legal) Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation Particular importance given to organizations with combination of high motivation and significant capabilities

Deny terrorists sponsorship, support, & sanctuary: 

Deny terrorists sponsorship, support, & sanctuary Objectives: End state sponsorship (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal, and in the most extreme cases, Military) Establish & maintain international accountability (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) Strengthen international will to combat terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Military, Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Legal) Interdict & disrupt material support for terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial, Legal) Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Military, Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial, Legal) Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation In particular, we must work with willing and able states, enable weak states, persuade reluctant states, and compel unwilling states

Diminish the underlying conditions: 

Diminish the underlying conditions Objectives: Strengthen international capacity to combat terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal) Win the war of ideas (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Legal) Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation Special attention is already being given to developing SOF capabilities in places like the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel Region (e.g., TSCTI) We need to focus on strengthening law enforcement/rule of law; intelligence gathering & sharing; public diplomacy Local communities must de-legitimize terrorism

Defend against terrorist attacks: 

Defend against terrorist attacks Objectives: Implement National Strategy for Homeland Security (DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal) Attain domain awareness (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) Enhance measures to protect critical infrastructure (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) Integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) Ensure an integrated response capability (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) Based on the mindset that “the best defense is a good offense”

Slide63: 

U.S. National Security Strategy, September 2002 (Replaces 2000 Clinton Edition)

National Strategic Framework for the GWOT : 

National Strategic Framework for the GWOT Overall Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to that way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists. Ends Means National, partner and international instruments of power Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism Protect the Homeland Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks Ways Enemy Foot soldiers Leadership Ideological support Safe havens Weapons Funds Comms & Movement Access to Targets Help create and lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks the resources they need to operate and survive.

Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT: 

Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT Strategic Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to our way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists. Termination Objectives from the Contingency Planning Guidance Ends Means Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies Military Strategic Objectives Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism Protect the Homeland Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks Enable partner nations to counter terrorism. Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt. Ways Establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. Defeat terrorists and their organizations. Persuade, coerce, and when necessary, compel states and non-states to cease support for terrorists. Enemy Foot soldiers Leadership Ideological support Safe havens Weapons Funds Comms & Movement Access to Targets END-STATE UNCLASSIFIED

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Our strategy must involve denying terrorists sanctuary; separating terrorists from the population Must isolate them, take away their support, force them to continually be on the run Organizing for force protection based on battle line mentality won’t work UAV’s aren’t as useful as you might think; over-reliance on technical wizardry has been a problem in the field Attrition – we must keep after them, never give up, while making sure they don’t recruit new members Counterterrorism Strategy

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Human intelligence networks are critical (although non-efficient use of manpower) Must have continual presence – cannot go into a village “looking for the terrorists” Focus on the enemy’s ideology, in addition to their tactics This is a War of Ideas: We need to convince them (potential supporters and recruits) that we (liberal democracies) offer a better way than separatist Islamic Jihad (but without attempting to convert them to our way of life) We must work to bolster the image of American morals and values being compatible with those of the Arab and Islamic world, where we are too often portrayed as greedy, selfish hedonists Counterterrorism Strategy

Counterterrorism Strategy: 

Counterterrorism Strategy Evaluate trends and potentials, capabilities and intentions, and provide an operational net assessment The contemporary terrorist threat involves a series of adversaries linked in networks. Combating networks requires an understanding of networked threats Must not over-react; terrorist strategy may be to provoke over-reaction, leading to further alienation and possible supporters among populace Tactical level: thwart an attack, pursue and bring to justice attack perpetrators Strategic level: build resilient communities

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Information warfare - We must develop an effective counter-ideological message - Manage perceptions/be more proactive in the information battlespace - Undermine the perceived legitimacy among supporters How well do we invest in and support the “extremists whom we like” (a.k.a., “moderates”) and support ways to amplify their voices? We must invest in educational & social institutions; media organizations Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism can only be achieved through Multinational partnerships Interagency coordination Counterterrorism Strategy

Coordination Levels: 

Coordination Levels Coalition Interagency Joint Army Combined Arms

Interagency Coordination Process: 

Interagency Coordination Process Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) Deputies Committee Principals Committee President Core Group: NSC, DOS, DOJ/FBI, DOD, CIA, Treasury (Secret Service), and Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Level Secretary Level

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POTUS SECDEF SECSTATE Sec of Home. Sec. Nat’l Security Advisor CJCS DCI WH COS VP NSC DOS DOD DOHS NSC Staff JCS INTEL Community The National Security Council

Interagency Coordination: Lead Federal Agency Concept: 

Interagency Coordination: Lead Federal Agency Concept Terrorist Incident Overseas: Department of State Terrorist Incident in United States: FBI Consequence Management in United States: Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) Terrorist Financing: Department of the Treasury Military Action*: Department of Defense *and support lead agency Intelligence Community Support: Identifying, locating and tracking terrorists and organizations CIA, FBI, DIA and DoD Intel Orgs, State INR (plus Allies and Partners)

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National Counterterrorism Center Addressing the first “I” in MIDLIFE NCTC currently has assignees (USG staff) from: Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Defense Central Intelligence Agency Department of Homeland Security Department of State Others – DOE, NRC, HHS, USDA, USCHP Assignees to NCTC retain authorities of parent entities In NCTC, key organizations involved in the fight against terrorism are collectively fulfilling shared responsibilities

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Many U.S. Government networks are available in NCTC Integrated architecture will enable a simultaneous, federated search capability against the terabytes of data available to the U.S. government Advanced analytic tools are facilitating the automated sourcing and tailoring multi-use products; enhancing data exploitation and integration “Terrorism information” covers an exceptionally broad array of data Active information acquisition effort underway Seeking awareness and integration of non-obvious terrorism information Terrorism Information Access and Integration

Slide76: 

What do we know? What do we need to know? Providing daily terrorism analysis for the President, senior policymakers, and the U.S. Government NCTC produces integrated and coordinated analysis – if there are analytic differences on the nature or seriousness of a particular threat or issue, they are incorporated into the analysis Producing special analysis and other in-depth, strategic, and alternative analyses Counterterrorism Requirements - Identifying gaps in knowledge; prioritizing transnational terrorism information needs Terrorism Analysis and CT Requirements

Slide77: 

Beyond implementing Center responsibilities, the greater goal is facilitating a counterterrorism “system” as part of a greater U.S. Government (USG) system-of-systems All USG elements need not be centralized; however, a distributed but integrated framework must be consciously agreed upon and orchestrated Roles and responsibilities of USG CT elements must be as unambiguous and straightforward as possible; intentional rather than haphazard redundancy Toward a Counterterrorism “System”

Conclusion: 

Conclusion You must thoroughly know your enemy before you can successfully defeat him You cannot address terrorism in isolation Root causes (socioeconomic, religious extremism, etc.) Facilitators (criminal networks, arms trafficking) Finances are key Ideology, other motivators Information/public diplomacy is vital All must be done in the context of moral, ethical & legal principles Bottom line: CT goes way beyond strategy and tactics; we must focus on environmental factors that facilitate terrorism

Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism: 

Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism Use case studies to frame the key issues/challenges (particularly the moral, legal, tactical dimensions) Assign National Security Strategy and other White House documents as required reading Have students analyze National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from MIDLIFE perspective, noting that effective CT requires integration of all dimensions Assessment (papers, presentations, quizzes) – students should demonstrate - understanding of threat - the strategy behind the threat - dimensions of DIMEFIL model, and - the integration of DIMEFIL dimensions into holistic CT strategy

Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism: 

Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism Integrative Exercise/Capstone Experience: Complex terrorism scenario Assign different readings to different groups of students; integrative exercise should focus on the complex requirements for information and force collective strategic thinking and action Questions for groups to answer can include: What will you recommend? What are the moral, legal implications of your actions? Who (what national assets) will you involve? Overall goal is to integrate lessons learned throughout the course, and to learn while engaged in the exercise Outcome should give you a sense of what they’ve learned, whether or not they “get it”

Slide81: 

Questions?