ClayMoltzPowerPt

Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security: 

Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security Dr. Clay Moltz Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies February 9, 2007

Popular Views of Space Security : 

Popular Views of Space Security Dominant view of space today: U.S. defeat of Soviets (Klingons) in Cold War But Chinese (Romulans) are rising challenge United States in role as USS Enterprise must bring peace (through photon torpedoes)

Slide4: 

21st Century Space Security Debate

Overview of Remarks: 

Overview of Remarks Review history of space security Examine “lessons” of U.S.-Soviet experience for today space’s main value as an information network Discuss what U.S. reaction should be to China’s anti-satellite test How to preserve safe U.S. access to space in the future?

Military-Led Space Security: 1957-1962: 

Military-Led Space Security: 1957-1962 U.S.-Soviet assumption of “technological determinism” in military space Rapid growth of U.S./Soviet space weapons programs ABM, ASATs, orbital stations, Moon bases Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962): “There is an increasing danger that outer space will become man’s newest battle-field.”

Slide7: 

U.S./Soviet Nuclear Tests in Space, 1958-62

Trade-Offs Facing U.S. and Soviet Leaders : 

Trade-Offs Facing U.S. and Soviet Leaders Implications of military-led course in space: No manned space programs No commercial applications Possible war in space and claiming of the Moon U.S. Defense Secretary Neil McElroy regarding space weapons: “We should not spend hundreds of millions of dollars …pending general confirmatory indications that we know what we are doing.” (1958)

Slide9: 

Putting Military Satellites (and Their Information) at Risk

U.S.-Soviet Space Restraint and Management: 

U.S.-Soviet Space Restraint and Management Partial Test Ban Treaty (October 1963) U.N. Space Resolution (December 1963) Outer Space Treaty (1967) ABM Treaty and SALT I (1972) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972)

Slide11: 

Apollo Lunar Mission

Slide12: 

Communications Revolution

Slide13: 

U.S. DSP Early-Warning Satellite

U.S. and Soviet Military “Hedging” Strategies : 

U.S. and Soviet Military “Hedging” Strategies U.S. Nike-Zeus and Thor nuclear ASAT programs deployed but phased out Residual ASAT capabilities in nuclear ABM systems Soviet conventional (co-orbital) ASAT system tested from 1968-82 But hedging contributed to action-reaction dynamics

Slide15: 

U.S. Kinetic-Kill ASAT Test (1985) Results: Direct hit and <250 pieces of large debris (for 20 years)

Slide16: 

U.S. GPS System

Slide17: 

LACROSSE Radar-Imaging Satellite

Maintenance of Space Norms/Rules:1991-2001 : 

Maintenance of Space Norms/Rules: 1991-2001 Debris as growing concern (Air Force vs. Sen. Bob Smith on KEASAT) Clinton policy: no unilateral advantages (ABM demarcation) But—no movement on preventing testing of space weapons/defenses (U.S. ABM tests)

Return to U.S. Military-led Space Policies (2001-present): 

Return to U.S. Military-led Space Policies (2001-present) Air Force’s “Vision 2020” and Rumsfeld I and II reports (1998, 2001) U.S. withdraws from ABM Treaty and begins to deploy missile defense system Rise of new “space dominance” school: “The United States is the morally superior choice to seize and control space” (Everett Dolman, Air War College)

International Perspectives: 

International Perspectives Foreign preference for treaties; closing loopholes U.N. resolutions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Chinese/Russian proposals and draft arms control treaty at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva— rejected by U.S. as unnecessary U.S. freedom of action preserved, but at what cost?

China’s Space Program: 

China’s Space Program Ambitious plans for manned spaceflight (but banned from ISS) Rising military capabilities (and arms control goals) Strong cadre of young space scientists January 2007 ASAT test

Alternatives to Space Defenses?: 

Alternatives to Space Defenses? Air Force Undersecretary Gary Payton (2006): “We’d be fools to actually get into the kinetic-energy anti-satellite business.” Non-space weapons for space defense Sophisticated “non-offensive” defenses Decoys, maneuverability, ready-to-launch spares, use of non-space resources

Other Emerging Factors in Space Security: 

Other Emerging Factors in Space Security Increasing “globalization” of space industry Rise of new non-state, commercial actors Growing global economic dependency on space Desirability of limits on weapons testing in low-Earth orbit

Policy Options in Current Debate: 

Policy Options in Current Debate Active U.S. space defenses (foreign reactions, impact on usable orbits?) Informal agreements “Rules of the road” (Krepon) Create a Space Security Initiative (SSI)? Treaties and formal agreements (time-consuming, but best long-term mechanism) Lack of U.S. diplomatic strategy since 1991

Conclusions: 

Conclusions Lessons of Cold War: Main value is as transmitter of information Mutual restraint (re: EMP, debris) is critical to continued use “Management” of space reduces vulnerabilities New security risks raise complexities: China, India, Russia, others? Guidelines for the road ahead: Resist temptation to “fight fire with fire” (expensive, destabilizing, and hard to stop) U.S. should enforce Outer Space Treaty (Article IX) Talking with other space powers can only help (new “rules of the road” are a good start)