Slide 1: Prepared by : MKDah
Supervised by : Dr. Abed Al-Raouf EL-Manaama Slide 2: “Sadly the world has changed.
The threat of bioterrorism is
real and growing.”
Margaret Hamburg MD – Oct 12, 1999
The nation is “woefully unprepared to deal with bioterrorism”
Jerome M. Hauer BW – CDC Category A : BW – CDC Category A High priority agent
Pose national security risk
Easily transmitted & disseminated
Major public health impact BW – CDC Category A : BW – CDC Category A Anthrax
Marburg hemorrhagic fever
Argentinehemorrhagic fever BW – CDC Category B : BW – CDC Category B Easy to disseminate
Low mortality rates BW – CDC Category B : BW – CDC Category B Q fever
Eastern equine encephalomyelitis
Western equine encephalomyelitis
Staph enterotoxin B
Cryptosporidium parvum BW – CDC Category C : BW – CDC Category C Emerging Pathogens
Possibly engineerable BW – CDC Category C : BW – CDC Category C Nipah virus
Tickborne hemorrhagic fever
Tickborne encephalitis virus
Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis BW – Early History : BW – Early History Assyrians poisoned wells
with Rye Ergot BW – Early History : BW – Early History Romans
Used dead animals to foul enemy’s water
Catapulted dead bubonic plague victims
Caused medieval European plague epidemic BW – Early History : BW – Early History British – French-Indian War
“Gifts” of smallpox infected blankets
Devastated # of Indians BW – Modern British : BW – Modern British Feared a German-Japanese advantage in WW II
Studied anthrax dispersion
Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland
Too close to mainland
infected coastal sheep
Gruinard Island still contaminated with spores BW – Modern US : BW – Modern US US Program – 1942
Acquired Japanese data
1956 – USSR accused US of using BW in Korea
USSR threatened retaliatory
Chemical & BW
US shifted to “defensive” research
Sprayed Serratia over populated areas
San Francisco – 10 infected, 1 died
1966 B. subtilis dispersed in NY subways BW – Modern Russian : BW – Modern Russian 1979 – Sverdlosk factory exploded followed by Anthrax outbreak – >66 dead
All accusations of BW research were denied
1992 –Yeltsin confirmed Anthrax research vowed to stop all BW research
Allegations of “super virus” research BW – advantages : BW – advantages Great killing efficiency
Biological toxins are among the most toxic agents known
Botulinum 3 million x more potent than Sarin
Large quantities can be produced in a short period.
Conventional weapons explode once, BW like the energizer bunny – keeps on going.
Easy and inexpensive to grow BW cost to affect 1 km2 : BW cost to affect 1 km2 BW – disadvantages : BW – disadvantages Unpredictable
Lifespan of material
Poor storage survival
Difficult to control once released
Difficulty of protecting the workers at all stages of production, transportation, loading of delivery systems and final delivery Biological Weapon Production : Biological Weapon Production A biological agent must first be chosen and acquired.
Various selection and modification procedures alter characteristics of the microorganism.
The agent is then prepared for delivery CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BW : CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BW Highly infectious
Readily grown and produced in large quantities.
Stable in storage
Resistant enough to environmental conditions
Resistant to treatment Slide 20: A pathogen can be obtained from two major sources:
Its natural environment
A microbiology laboratory or bank (ATCC)
Creating them Modification : Modification Increasing pathogenicity
Shorting incubation peroid <<< fast-acting disease.
Acquisition of pathogenicity.
Other changes could make treatments, vaccines, or the body's immune system useless. Delivery preparation : Delivery preparation Exposure to environmental stresses reduce the agent's activity.
Don’t need (Anthrax)
Lyophilization Delivery : Delivery Biological warfare agents can be disseminated in various ways:
Through the air by aerosol sprays
Used in explosives
Put into food or water
Absorbed through or injected into the skin. Detection : Detection Disease (or strain) not endemic
Unusual antibiotic resistance patterns
Atypical clinical presentation
Case distribution geographically and/or temporally inconsistent
Other inconstant elements
Large # of fatal cases
Lower attack rate in people who were indoors.
Deviations from disease occurrence baseline Protective measures : Protective measures Generally not transmitted from person to person (except pneumonic plague & smallpox)
Health care providers should use latex gloves and wear gowns and masks
Victims would be isolated in private rooms while receiving treatment. Protective measures : Protective measures Antibiotics
Immune protection against ricin and staphylococcal toxins may also be possible in the near future. Slide 27: Thanks