20051214 Sutton DSTO

Maritime Force Protection Operations Analysis Methodology Development  Analysis Techniques for Defeating Threats to Naval Assets : 

Maritime Force Protection Operations Analysis Methodology Development Analysis Techniques for Defeating Threats to Naval Assets International Maritime Protection Symposium 12-14 December 2005 Presented by Dr Darren J. Sutton Navy Scientific Adviser Defence Science and Technology Organisation – Australia

Presentation Outline: 

Presentation Outline Maritime Force Protection Scope the Problem Multiple views Risk Analysis Attribute Analysis Threat Analysis Functional Decomposition Quantify The Problem Modelling Solution Options Evaluation Requirements Determination Examples Solution Options - Weapons Performance Requirement for defence against suicide light aircraft Conclusion

TTCP MAR AG-5 : 

TTCP MAR AG-5 Small Boat Swarm Attack Suicide Attack on Berthed or Anchored Ship Surface Craft Truck Bomb Swimmer or SDV Attack on Berthed or Anchored Ship Attack by Asymmetric Air Threats on Berthed or Anchored Ship

IntroductionMaritime Force Protection {closely related to security of commercial ships, ports and harbour installations}: 

Introduction Maritime Force Protection {closely related to security of commercial ships, ports and harbour installations} Maritime Force Protection To conserve the fighting potential of the force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversary, natural and human hazards, and fratricide. Harbour Protection To protect critical waterfront and floating assets by providing area security (defence) of the harbour or port. In-Harbour Force Protection To secure ships and naval assets while anchored or alongside in a port or harbour by offboard or onboard means. Ship-Based Force Protection To protect naval vessels berthed, anchored or underway, close-to-shore, at home or away with onboard means.

RISK ANALYSISComparative Risk : 

RISK ANALYSIS Comparative Risk [after Bhattracharya et al]

Attribute Analysis View: 

Effects based approach Seek publicity as effects-multiplier (political damage) Flexibility and Improvising ability Opportunistic (initiative seizing / offensive) Cellular Local or Tactical Organisation (Network or Hierarchy Command Structure) Dispersed operations Low cost relative to Military Force Civilian - Non-compliant with UN, Laws of Armed Conflict, national or local legislation Hardening (deterrence/survivability) Intelligence /surveillance/reconnaissance Preparedness (alertness/response capability) Flexibility (defences need to be as flexible and adaptable as the threat!) Flatter Command and Control (more autonomous smaller forces) Affordability (Realistic cost) Freer legal operational environment (maintain minimal collateral damage and avoid fratricide) Anti-terrorist Requirements Terrorist Attributes Attribute Analysis View

Threat Analysis View Maritime Terrorist Threats: 

Threat Analysis View Maritime Terrorist Threats Threats may be characterised by mission or intent harassment or attention-seeking non-lethal attacks lethal weapon attacks suicidal explosive attacks effector delivery method Surface, sub-surface, air; Manned, unmanned physical features of the threat platform form, material, dimensions speed, agility stability signatures. cross platform features manning strategy (recruitment, training, practicing, command and control) interoperability and tactical skill strategy radical unpredictability opportunistic employ quantity versus quality of forces

Force Protection Functional Chain: 

Force Protection Functional Chain Detect Defeat Deter Classify Mitigate Next Map Functions to Capability Components and then Enablers

Detect: 

Detect Intelligence Sensors

Classify: 

Classify Classification (provoke intent)

Deter: 

Deter Show of force Perimeter Security

Deny Defeat: 

Deny Defeat Non-Lethal Lethal

Mitigate : 

Mitigate Reduce damage and casualties during threat strike Recover rapidly to full operations / capability

Quantify the Problem: 

Quantify the Problem Variables Constraints Inclusions Exclusions Measures of Performance Derive mathematical relationship between Variables Temporal Spacial Spectral Develop Model Exploratory (parametric) Deterministic

Heirarchy of Mathematical Models: 

Heirarchy of Mathematical Models Tactical Operational Platform Sub-system/ technical System Scenarios

Slide16: 

Probability of success Ranges (detect, open fire, intercept) Weapon Probability of Hit & Kill Time Delays Threat Number Speed, Separation Engagement Scheduling Firing rate, Burst, Magazine Size Platform-Level Modelling

Weapon Performance Study: 

Weapon Performance Study Aim – to compare general classes of gun based weapons against surface threats Options 30mm stabilised 25 mm stabilised 20mm Close in Weapon System 50 cal (stabilised or unstabilised) 7.26 mm gun 5.56mm Deconstruction Single Gun vs single target Platform vs multiple targets Swarm Annihilation Tools Gun Operational Analysis Model (GOAT), Ship weapons scheduling model, Target kill rate model.

Weapon Study: 

Weapon Study

Terrorist Aircraft Attack Keep-Out-Range Requirement Study: 

Terrorist Aircraft Attack Keep-Out-Range Requirement Study Scenario: Vessel attacked by low slow aircraft Problem: Survive the Attack Engage the target Avoid debris damage Questions: What is Close-in Weapons System effectiveness ? What distance must the aircraft be defeated so heavy debris does not hit the ship ? What are the effects of wind on collateral damage ?

Debris Pattern: 

Example: Given Aircraft speed of 300 m/s at altitude of 200 ft. Results: Debris spread is between 300-1000 m High R-value falls between 300 and 600 m, depending on the initial angle of the aircraft A keep-out-range of 600 m would be chosen to avoid being hit by the most damaging material A keep-out-range of up to 1000 m would be chosen to avoid being hit by all material down to an R-value of 2. Debris Pattern

Suicide Aircraft AttackIn Port or at Anchor : 

Suicide Aircraft Attack In Port or at Anchor Weapon Solution Options Guns, Missiles Variables Effective Range Lethality Magazine capacity Measure of Performance Probability of hit Conditional Probability of kill / hit Salvo probability of kill

Conclusion Summarising Methodology : 

Conclusion Summarising Methodology Define Top level Requirements Propose S&T development Functions required Propose non-tech change Strategic/Legal/Operational/Tactical Maritime Operational Analysis Studies Contribution Determine Capability Gaps Assess S&T Component of Solution Set Identify Potential Solutions – compare options Map function required to capability

Finally: 

Finally Continuing Research Operations Analysis Methodology Development Analysis Techniques for Maritime Force Protection Applications to the Royal Australian Navy capability analysis for development and acquisition of ship and harbour force protection improvements. Eileen Moran eileen.moran@dsto.defence.gov.au Defence Science and Technology Organisation Maritime Operations Division Wharf 17, Pirrama Road Pyrmont NSW 2009 Australia.

SPARES: 

SPARES

Functions - Deter, Deny, DefeatGraded Responses : 

Functions - Deter, Deny, Defeat Graded Responses Avoidance/deterrence Persistent Situational Awareness Interrogations (IFF) Warnings (illuminators, acoustic, pyrotechnics) Non-lethal effectors (floodlights, water hose, flash-bang, acoustic blast) Lethal Weapons (guns, missiles, torpedos ) Mitigation - Survivability, Recovery

Non - lethal Options: 

Non - lethal Options Acoustic (LRAD) Electrical (Stun Gun) Mechanical/Kinetic (Water cannon, nets) Electromagnetic (Active Denial system) Optical (Laser dazzle, spotlights) Bio/Chemical (Foam, Smoke)

Measures of Performance for the Defender: 

Measures of Performance for the Defender Prob uncovering plans to attack Prob detection outside restricted zone Prob determining hostile intent outside restricted zone Prob warning-off/dissuading outside a keep-out-zone Prob destroying/disabling by keep-out-zone Or Prob halting attack at outer layer boundary Prob halting attack at inner layer boundary