logging in or signing up St Louis 081505cpjpc Jeremiah Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 11 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: October 22, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Tradable Priority Permits: Tradable Priority Permits Prof. Charles R. Plott Dr. Joseph P. Cook Overview: Overview Problem Possible solutions Proposal General Proposed policy features Experimental Testbed Expected effects What will be the relationship of prices? What happens to profits? What types of traffic benefit and what are hurt? Logic of the Expected ResultsThe Problem to be Solved: The Problem to be Solved Lock outages, both scheduled and unscheduled, are one source of congestion leading to delay. Greenup lock on the Ohio River: planned 18 day outage stretched to 52 days. Lock 27 on the Mississippi River: auxiliary lock delayed by an average of 25 hours in the peak month. Delays caused by lock outages have significant costs: congestion on one lock costs $209 million annually (MARC 2000). Cargo choices are impacted by uncertainty as is competition with other modes of transportation. Location of potential demanders impacted by delay and uncertainty.Possible Solutions: Possible Solutions Lockage Fees Panama Canal Washington DC Metro System Scheduling and Priority Air Traffic Control Panama Canal Command and Control Regulations Tradable Permits OTC NOx Budget Program Los Angeles RECLAIM projectExpected Effects – Traffic Types: Expected Effects – Traffic Types The risk of lock delay impacts the nature of the cargo and contracts transported through the river system. The ‘first-come-first-served’ policy discourages high value contracts with fast delivery requirements. The introduction of a system of tradable priority permits changes the distribution of the types of contracts found in use. Contracting shifts to the more valuable types of contracts and fills the available capacity for such contracts. The priority permit system operates to maximize total profits of operators. TRADABLE PRIORITY PERMITSGeneral Proposal: General Proposal System will be flexible to deal with unforeseen delays (e.g. weather, unplanned outages, etc.) System will reduce the costs of congestion System will reduce uncertaintyProposed Policy Features: Proposed Policy Features Tradable Priority Permits: “A permit will give to the holder the right to move ahead of all barges waiting for access to the lock and traveling in the same direction, up to the holder of a permit in the queue being exercised with equal rights.” Features Master Instrument and Two-week Permits Marketable and Transferable Priority in levels Initial allocation could be based on historical usage Permits will be numbered and recorded by the Corps Lock masters and the Corps will be responsible for enforcement Experimental Test Bed: Experimental Test Bed In order to demonstrate the effects of the proposal, an experimental test bed was set up with the following parameters: One lock Nine lockages per day Nine barge operators Each barge operator owns five tug or tug/barge combinations Each period represents 5 days Twenty-two periods First ten periods are under “first-come-first-served” rule, the rest are under the “priority permit” rule Each operator’s boats arrive randomly at the lockTheoretical Prices: Theoretical PricesExpected Effects: Expected Effects Relationship of Prices Graphs will show the markets for Priority 1, 2, and 3 permits. Markets for Priority 4 and Priority 5 permits: Only three trades in the two markets in periods 11 through 22. What happens to profits? What types of traffic benefit and what types are hurt?Expected Effects - Prices: Expected Effects - PricesExpected Effects - Prices: Expected Effects - PricesExpected Effects - Prices: Expected Effects - PricesExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects – Traffic Types: Expected Effects – Traffic Types The risk of lock delay impacts the nature of the cargo and contracts transported through the river system. The ‘first-come-first-served’ policy discourages high value contracts with fast delivery requirements. The introduction of a system of tradable priority permits changes the distribution of the types of contracts found in use. Contracting shifts to the more valuable types of contracts and fills the available capacity for such contracts. The priority permit system operates to maximize total profits of operators. You do not have the permission to view this presentation. In order to view it, please contact the author of the presentation.
St Louis 081505cpjpc Jeremiah Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 11 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: October 22, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Tradable Priority Permits: Tradable Priority Permits Prof. Charles R. Plott Dr. Joseph P. Cook Overview: Overview Problem Possible solutions Proposal General Proposed policy features Experimental Testbed Expected effects What will be the relationship of prices? What happens to profits? What types of traffic benefit and what are hurt? Logic of the Expected ResultsThe Problem to be Solved: The Problem to be Solved Lock outages, both scheduled and unscheduled, are one source of congestion leading to delay. Greenup lock on the Ohio River: planned 18 day outage stretched to 52 days. Lock 27 on the Mississippi River: auxiliary lock delayed by an average of 25 hours in the peak month. Delays caused by lock outages have significant costs: congestion on one lock costs $209 million annually (MARC 2000). Cargo choices are impacted by uncertainty as is competition with other modes of transportation. Location of potential demanders impacted by delay and uncertainty.Possible Solutions: Possible Solutions Lockage Fees Panama Canal Washington DC Metro System Scheduling and Priority Air Traffic Control Panama Canal Command and Control Regulations Tradable Permits OTC NOx Budget Program Los Angeles RECLAIM projectExpected Effects – Traffic Types: Expected Effects – Traffic Types The risk of lock delay impacts the nature of the cargo and contracts transported through the river system. The ‘first-come-first-served’ policy discourages high value contracts with fast delivery requirements. The introduction of a system of tradable priority permits changes the distribution of the types of contracts found in use. Contracting shifts to the more valuable types of contracts and fills the available capacity for such contracts. The priority permit system operates to maximize total profits of operators. TRADABLE PRIORITY PERMITSGeneral Proposal: General Proposal System will be flexible to deal with unforeseen delays (e.g. weather, unplanned outages, etc.) System will reduce the costs of congestion System will reduce uncertaintyProposed Policy Features: Proposed Policy Features Tradable Priority Permits: “A permit will give to the holder the right to move ahead of all barges waiting for access to the lock and traveling in the same direction, up to the holder of a permit in the queue being exercised with equal rights.” Features Master Instrument and Two-week Permits Marketable and Transferable Priority in levels Initial allocation could be based on historical usage Permits will be numbered and recorded by the Corps Lock masters and the Corps will be responsible for enforcement Experimental Test Bed: Experimental Test Bed In order to demonstrate the effects of the proposal, an experimental test bed was set up with the following parameters: One lock Nine lockages per day Nine barge operators Each barge operator owns five tug or tug/barge combinations Each period represents 5 days Twenty-two periods First ten periods are under “first-come-first-served” rule, the rest are under the “priority permit” rule Each operator’s boats arrive randomly at the lockTheoretical Prices: Theoretical PricesExpected Effects: Expected Effects Relationship of Prices Graphs will show the markets for Priority 1, 2, and 3 permits. Markets for Priority 4 and Priority 5 permits: Only three trades in the two markets in periods 11 through 22. What happens to profits? What types of traffic benefit and what types are hurt?Expected Effects - Prices: Expected Effects - PricesExpected Effects - Prices: Expected Effects - PricesExpected Effects - Prices: Expected Effects - PricesExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects - Profits: Expected Effects - ProfitsExpected Effects – Traffic Types: Expected Effects – Traffic Types The risk of lock delay impacts the nature of the cargo and contracts transported through the river system. The ‘first-come-first-served’ policy discourages high value contracts with fast delivery requirements. The introduction of a system of tradable priority permits changes the distribution of the types of contracts found in use. Contracting shifts to the more valuable types of contracts and fills the available capacity for such contracts. The priority permit system operates to maximize total profits of operators.