Induction and Confirmation

Scientific Thought: 

Scientific Thought Science has been able to achieve its goals due to a specific way of thinking. Science has changed the world in the past 200 years more than the world changed in the previous 2000 years Assumes regularity in nature. Requires honesty in reporting of results. Science would have gotten nowhere if cheating were as prevalent in business as reported in the Wall Street Journal. Has increased knowledge as its only objective. It is non-materialist in nature. Is non-dogmatic and is always open to change. Relies on human curiosity to ask questions to which answers can be obtained by experiment or observation. Utilizes mathematics whenever possible.

Science is a Second Language: 

Science is a Second Language It uses many terms in a different way than the usual common sense definition as contained in the dictionary. "Observation" is a good example. People tend to believe what they observe and will defend their observations with pride. Scientists, with their constant questioning, will not take personal ownership of an egocentric concept. Common sense definitions tend to be qualitative in nature, where the scientific counterpart is quantitative. Observations to a scientist are quantifiable data collected and documented during experiments. These observations must always be able to be reproduced independently to be accepted by the scientific community. The word "truth" is rarely if ever used in scientific journals.

The Mother of All Problems: 

The Mother of All Problems What is evidence? What is the relationship between evidence and hypothesis? How does one verify a hypothesis? Does inductive verification work? How does one know anything?

Assumption: 

Assumption The goal of science is to make general statements about the universe. Science aims to reduces all empirically obtained knowledge to several all-encompassing theories

Alert: 

Alert The following discussion seems to indicate that scientific generalization are not either verifiable nor falsifiable. In other words science appears as isolated realms of empirical data.

Problems with Induction: 

Problems with Induction Inductive arguments are not valid, logical arguments

Problems with Induction: 

Problems with Induction The principle of induction cannot not be logically deduced from experience

Problems with Induction: 

Problems with Induction There is ambiguity with respect to the constituent requirements for valid inductive inference ignorance-of-the-theory dependent basis of observation

Problems with Induction: 

Problems with Induction The impossibility of constructing an account of induction ( how to do induction) that avoids the consequence that the probability of an universal statement making claims about nature is zero, regardless of the observational evidence

Problems with Induction: 

Problems with Induction Ascribing non-zero probabilities to individual rather than universal predictions is epistemologically counter-intuitive Universal statements are inevitably involved in the estimation of the likelihood of a given prediction being successful

Problems with Induction: 

Problems with Induction Once universal statements are involved in any significant way, the probabilities of the correctness of individual predictions again threatens to be zero. Scientific progress is viewed as an a-historical a-cultural process with ignorance of the role of theory and metaphysical speculation in scientific progress.

Hypothesis Selection: 

Hypothesis Selection Through any number of points it is possible to fit an infinite number of curves with the same correlation coefficient squared. This means it is neither possible to verify nor falsify any hypothesis. Only interpolation is permissible within the range of the data points; extrapolation is not. It appears as if science works in isolated domains. How then does one choose among hypotheses? No one knows. The guess is that the most relevant hypothesis is chosen. But how is relevant defined?

Inductive arguments are not erosion proof: 

Inductive arguments are not erosion proof Bertrand Russell's Inductivist Turkey `` The turkey found that, on his first morning at the turkey farm, that he was fed at 9 a.m. Being a good inductivist turkey he did not jump to conclusions. He waited until he collected a large number of observations that he was fed at 9 a.m. and made these observations under a wide range of circumstances, on Wednesdays, on Thursdays, on cold days, on warm days. Each day he added another observation statement to his list. Finally he was satisfied that he had collected a number of observation statements to inductively infer that ``I am always fed at 9 a.m.''. However on the morning of Christmas eve he was not fed but instead had his throat cut.''

The Problem of Induction: 

The Problem of Induction Simple induction: a large proportion of our beliefs are obtained by a process of projecting from observed (past or present) events to cases that are either unknown, unobserved, or in the future, e.g.: Every swan I have ever seen has been has been white. (likely) the next swan I see will be white. The old problem of induction (David Hume): what reason do we have to believe that simple induction is rational? The new problem of induction (Nelson Goodman): which inductive conclusion is the right one to make from a particular set of observations?

David Hume (1711-1776 ): 

David Hume (1711-1776 ) According to Hume , our belief that events are causally related is a custom or habit acquired by experience: having observed the regularity with which events of particular sorts occur together, we form the association of ideas that produces the habit of expecting the effect whenever we experience the cause. But something is missing from this account: we also believe that the cause somehow produces the effect. Even if this belief is unjustifiable, Hume must offer some explanation for the fact that we do hold it. His technique was to search for the original impression from which our idea of the necessary connection between cause and effect is copied.

Hume's refutation of induction: 

Hume's refutation of induction The principle of induction cannot be justified by an appeal to logic. How, therefore, might the principle of induction be derived from experience ? ``Induction has been observed to work on a large number of occasions. For instance the laws of optics and planetary motion have been derived from disinterested laboratory experiment and astronomical observation, and have been used successfully to design optical instruments and predict planetary motion. This list could be greatly extended with illustrations of successful predictions and explanations made possible by inductively derived laws and theories. In this way, the principle of induction, and hence logical empiricism, is justified.'' This argument is flawed as it employs the very kind of inductive argument the validity of which is supposed to be in need of justification.

Ambiguity of the Constituent components of the Inductive framework: 

Ambiguity of the Constituent components of the Inductive framework How many observations make up a ``large number'' ? Is there an invariable necessity for a large number of observations ? Consider blunt trauma to the head dropping an atomic bomb Can ``a wide variety of circumstances'' be logically articulated without recourse to metaphysical or theoretical speculation ? The variations in circumstances that are significant are distinguished from those that are superfluous by appealing to our theoretical knowledge of the situation and of the kinds of mechanisms operative.

The theory dependence of observation: 

The theory dependence of observation There are assumptions involved in the simplistic inductionist's position: science starts with observation observation yields a secure basis from which knowledge can be derived.

The theory dependence of observation: 

The theory dependence of observation What an observer sees, that is, the visual experience that an observer has when viewing an object depends in part on past experience, knowledge and expectations. Individual experiences cannot be logically deduced to be identical or even the same.

Hume and the problem of justifying induction: 

Hume and the problem of justifying induction Hume divides human reasoning into two categories (1) reasoning based on matters of fact: particular empirical (e.g., from memory or the senses) claims about the world (propositions whose denial are not contradictory) and (2) reasoning based on relations of ideas: propositions which can be known a priori--without dependence on matters of fact (e.g., mathematics and logic)--and can be proven by demonstrative reasoning (propositions whose denial involves a contradiction)

Hume's argument: 

Hume's argument The justification of induction must occur in one of these two ways. 1. Reasoning based on relations of ideas is deductive reasoning. We can't use deductive reasoning to justify inductive reasoning, because the conclusions of inductive inferences go beyond the premises given. 2. Reasoning based on matters of fact is inductive reasoning. We can't justify induction with an inductive argument, because that would be circular reasoning. If induction cannot be justified by either matters of fact or relations of ideas, it cannot be justified.

Reasoning beyond the premises given. : 

Reasoning beyond the premises given. The sun has risen every other day of my life. Things continue in the future as they did in the past. The sun will rise again tomorrow.  

Hume’s Psychologism: 

Hume’s Psychologism Hume argues that we feel compelled by the vividness of repeated experience as we do any other feeling or emotion--our expectation is "custom" or "habit". Hume's point is not that our inductive inferences are wrong, just that we don't have the slightest rational basis for thinking they are true. Induction explains our inferences, it doesn't justify them.

Nelson Goodman: 

Nelson Goodman Born on August 7, 1906, in Somerville, MA, Professor Goodman received the B.S. magna cum laude (1928) and the Ph.D. (1941) degrees from Harvard. From 1929 to 1940 he operated an art gallery in Boston, and was always a collector of ancient and modern art. From 1942 to 1945 he was in the U.S. Army. Professor Goodman died in December 1998, at the age of 92, after a long illness.

The New Problem of Induction: 

The New Problem of Induction Simple induction projects certain predicates, that is, we say for some object x that it will have predicate (property) y in the future: All observed x's have been y The next x will be y The sun has risen every other day of my life. Things continue in the future as they did in the past. The sun will rise again tomorrow.   However, we don't want to project every predicate: The sun has risen every other day of my life. The Earth has got to be winding down by now._____________________ So every morning the chance increases that there won't be a sun rise at all.

Goodman's problem: 

Goodman's problem When there is more than one inductive conclusion that is consistent with our observations, which one should we chose? Goodman wants to find a general rule which will tell us what the appropriate conclusions are to draw from any given set of experiences--a general difference between projectable predicates and un-projectable predicates.

Grue : 

Grue Consider the following predicate, "Grue": An object X is grue if X is examined before the year 2000 and found to be green, or X is not examined until after the year 2000 and found to be blue.   Now consider our past experience: Every emerald I have ever seen is green. Every emerald I have ever seen is grue.   All we know up to now equally confirms green and grue hypothesis. Which conclusion shall we draw: The next emerald I see will be green, or The next emerald I see will be grue? Why chose green?

Why chose green?: 

Why chose green? Bleen: X is examined before the year 2000 and found to be blue, or X is not examined until after the year 2000 and found to be green. Green: X is green if examined before the year 2000 and found to be grue, or X is not examined until after the year 2000 and found to be bleen.

Underdetermination: 

Underdetermination Experience can't uniquely determine which inductive conclusion one should choose. A finite sequence of events or observations or items of evidence can always be taken as conforming to a great many--in fact, infinitely many--different incompatible general patterns. This is related to the problem of theory-ladenness of observation: how do we know when a particular observation is evidence for one hypothesis, and not another? If observations are made in light of certain beliefs about the world, we have already decided what is true in advance of looking.

Epistemic Values: 

Epistemic Values The absence of strict empirical constraints may be interpreted to mean that the conclusions we choose is a matter of social and personal beliefs. But this extreme conclusion is based on fallacious reasoning. Just because induction doesn't completely dictate the choice of a conclusion doesn't mean there are not more or less rational choices. But what makes one choice "more rational" than another choice which is equally compatible with the evidence cannot be in virtue of that evidence. Philosophers of science have suggested other non-empirical "rules" or "values" by which we can choose one inductive conclusion over the other: 1. Generality: choose the conclusion which allows you to make sense of a wider variety of observations than just those used in the induction itself. 2. Fecundity or fruitfulness: choose the conclusion that seems promising--that is, that seems as if it might help you make sense of future observations, even if it doesn't make sense of very many you have already had.   3. Coherence: choose the conclusion that is most compatible with (and least contradictory to) your other inductive conclusions. 4. Simplicity: choose the conclusion that uses less terms or relies on less assumptions.  

POPPER, Sir Karl Raimund, 1902-1994, kt, Philosopher: 

POPPER, Sir Karl Raimund, 1902-1994, kt, Philosopher Sir Karl Raimund Popper was born in Vienna on 28 July 1902. His rise from a modest background as an assistant cabinet maker and school teacher to one of the most influential theorists and leading philosophers was characteristically Austrian. Popper commanded international audiences and conversation with him was an intellectual adventure - even if a little rough -, animated by a myriad of philosophical problems. His intense desire to tear away at the veneer of falsity in pursuit of the truth lead him to contribute to a field of thought encompassing (among others) political theory, quantum mechanics, logic, scientific method and evolutionary theory.

Popper's Principle: 

Popper's Principle Austrian-born philosopher of science who defines science as a discipline founded on the creation of hypotheses that predict phenomena, preferably new ones, that can be tested. Popper's Principle holds that testability rather than truth should be the criterion for judging scientific truths. This principle views scientific progress in a different light than does Planck's Principle. Max Planck was also a philosopher of science. In his Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, he stated Planck's Principle, which holds that "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it." This view contradicts that forwarded by Karl Popper known as Popper's Principle.

The Falsification Thesis: 

The Falsification Thesis ``Theories are construed as speculative and tentative statements intended to account for features of the natural world, and are created to overcome the problems of previous theories. These speculative theories are then to be rigorously tested by experiment and observation. Theories failing to gain observational or experimental support are rejected and replaced by appropriately modified or new speculative theories. Science progresses by trial and error, with only the ``fittest'' surviving''