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Premium member Presentation Transcript Slide1: The European Union and its Neighbourhood: Interests, Values and Public Opinion Steve Wood Osteuropa Institut München October 2006 email@example.com © Steve Wood 2006Slide2: The contemporary circumstances of world politics, economics and security impel the EU towards becoming a comprehensive global actor. For it to adequately cope on a global scale the EU must acquire and exercise a capacity to deal with internal issues and an array of challenges presented by its wider neighbourhood. A range of perspectives can be employed to examine the EU’s interaction with its neighbourhood including those from, but not limited to, International Relations, International Political Economy, Security Studies, International Economics and Comparative Politics. This overview interprets the EU’s declared policy and its undeclared (attributed) neighbourhood strategy as a reflecting an interdisciplinary confluence of factors and influences. Plausible cases can be made for each of some basic, and usually perceived as competing, conceptions of international affairs. For political practitioners, policy planners, and scholars, the EU’s developing relations with and strategies for its wider neighbourhood divulges, or means it must contend with, diverse themes and tangents including: geopolitics; strategic assets; leverage and incentives; democracy and democratisation; public opinion; issue linkage; non-state actors; military power; state-business relations;domestic-foreign policy connections © Steve Wood 2006Slide3: Each of three basic International Relations approaches or schools has some claims to explaining EU interaction with and political possibilities vis-à-vis its neighbourhood or individual actors within it These approaches have differing analytical perspectives and privilege particular factors or non-material considerations Realism/neo-realism States and power (political, military, economic, natural resources) Liberal institutionalism Interdependent interests (commercial, economic, security) Normative/constructivism Values, norms and ‘social learning’ (‘logic of appropriateness’ ) © Steve Wood 2006Slide4: global context EU ‘neighbourhood’ EU EU as global actor: ambition, responsibility, uncertainty © Steve Wood 2006 Figure 1: Three Interrelated Policy Zones EU as a Global Partner: Financial Perspective 2007-2013*: EU as a Global Partner: Financial Perspective 2007-2013* Source: European Commission. *€ million at current prices (2006) adjusted for inflationSlide6: European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) an attempt to exert some influence over (some of) the neighbourhood driven principally by security concerns (conventional, anti-terror, societal, energy) - economic interests 2nd - democracy export 3rd linked to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) optimal size of EU exceeded - ENP an alternative to accession interim stabilisation (playing for time - no clear conception for future) © Steve Wood 2006Slide7: At present there are 13 ENP participants: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Ukraine And three others nominally invited but without a current, ratified contractual agreement with the EU. No Country Report has yet been prepared for these: Belarus, Libya, Syria Slide8: However, the EU ‘neighbourhood’ is larger and with more actors than suggested by ENP In 2003 Michael Emerson noted that ‘Wider Europe’ had 360 million people (80% of the EU25 population) and only 10% of EU25 GDP ‘despite containing the great natural resources of Russia’ Concurrently the ‘Greater Middle East’ had 392 million people (85% EU25 population) and only 10% of EU25 GDP ‘despite the fabulous oil wealth of the Middle East’. Emerson argued that ‘these disproportions speak trouble’ and ‘EU initiatives are not credibly articulated so far’ (Emerson The Wider Europe Matrix 2003)Slide9: Russia Kosovo Kurds Chechens Kaliningrad © Steve Wood 2006 TransnistriaSlide10: Eastern flank (c. 5000km) Southern flank (c. 5000km))Slide11: Nexus around Black Sea, Turkey, Caucasus, Caspian basin EU will be drawn more into this region Slide12: Preliminary conditions (interest in ENP, EU interest in it, some formal relations - e.g. Associate Agreement) Country Report Action Plan (3 to 5 years) ‘European Neighbourhood Agreement’ (under discussion) thereafter ? How does an actor join ENP - and what follows? © Steve Wood 2006ENP Content: ENP Content Political dialogue Technical and financial assistance Economic integration (partial/phased) - ‘stake in the EU market’ - investment possibilities Reform of judiciary, administration, governance Promotion of functioning market economies Security cooperation (terrorism, crime, illegal migration, environmental) ‘Sectoral issues’: transport, energy, research and development, maritime policy, etc. People-to-people contacts Selective and often informal diplomatic support © Steve Wood 2006Slide14: ENP combines incentives and conditionality. Both are signalled in the following statement: “Financial allocations for country and multi-country programmes will reflect not only the characteristics and management capacity of the countries involved but also the level of ambition of the partnership of a given country within the European Union” Regulation of the EP and of the Council on general provisions establishing ENPI (September 2004)Slide15: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (replaces TACIS and MEDA) Commission budget proposal 2004 (€ Million) Council budget agreement 2006 (€ Million at 2004 prices) Additional EIB and EBRD credits are also availableSlide16: Some of the EU’s most problematic neighbours are not in ENP: Russia, Iraq, Iran or are are far from meeting political conditionality and only nominally associated: Belarus, Libya, Syria © Steve Wood 2006Priorities for selected EU states (Interessenpolitik): Priorities for selected EU states (Interessenpolitik) Germany: eastern orientation ‘Russia first’ (Kohl, Schröder, Merkel, Stoiber) raw materials dependence Baltic Sea pipeline France: southern orientation - special friend of Muslim world contain terrorism Moscow friendly, balance v USA UK: enlargement but not Russia; interests in Middle East; USA Poland: ‘Eastern Dimension’, pro-Ukraine EU membership antagonistic relations with Russia ‘energy NATO’ Italy/Spain: control/regulate immigration from Africa Greece: relations with Turkey critical © Steve Wood 2006Slide18: Issues of importance for the USA geo-strategic interests in Middle East and Central Asia securing of access to and transport of energy materials military-intelligence bases (Romania, Georgia, Central Asia) encouraged Turkey’s EU aspirations; Ukraine, Georgia NATO goals worsening relations with Russia and Turkey conflict potential with EU/within EU © Steve Wood 2006Slide19: Energy-related issues confronting the EU EU has to diversify its energy suppliers Many possible suppliers in extended neighbourhood; some are in ENP, some are not Supply lines will cross the territory and/or territorial waters of various neighbours 33% oil and 75% gas from Russia and ENP states. These shares are rising EU imports 17% of its oil and 27% of its gas from Maghreb Some neighbours content to export energy products without joining ENP (Russia, Libya; a Country Report is still being compiled on Algeria) © Steve Wood 2006Proven Oil and Gas Reserves (at end 2005): Proven Oil and Gas Reserves (at end 2005) Oil (Bill. Barrels) Gas (Tril. Cubic M.) Russia 74.5 26.5 Azerbaijan 7 1.4 Kazakhstan 40 3 Turkmenistan 0.5 2.9 Uzbekistan 0.6 1.9 Total FSU 130 55 Iran 137 26.7 Iraq 115 3.1 Saudi Arabia 264 6.9 Total Mid-East 742 72 Libya 39 1.5 Algeria 12 4.6 Total Africa 114 14.5 Norway 10 2.4 Total West Europe 16 6 USA 29 5.5 Canada 16.5 1.6 Total North America 59.5 7.5 Source: BP © Steve Wood 2006Oil Requirements (Million Barrels per day): Oil Requirements (Million Barrels per day) Western Europe 15 Germany 2.6 USA 20.5 China 6.7 Japan 5.3 India 2.6 Source: Der SpiegelSlide23: EU – Russia relations Today’s value community oriented EU partnership with Russia will concede to a pragmatic partnership of interests. The EU will not succeed in democratising Russia or transferring its western liberal model there. Despite this, in issues of energy security and supply the EU will be chiefly dependent on its partnership with Russia (Alexander Rahr ‘Schröders Russlandpolitik’ Welttrends 50 (Spring) 2006) 25% EU oil and 50% EU gas from Russia If the EU fails to democratise Russia its efforts in other Soviet successor states are likely to be confronted with some form of resistance Russia has (temporarily) stopped the flow of and/or significantly raised the price of gas for Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia © Steve Wood 2006Slide24: EU-Russia Partnership Agreement expires 2007 Russia in much stronger position than earlier The EU wants Russia to ratify the ‘European Energy Charter’ and include in a new agreement (i.e. ensure oil and gas supplies and open the market for EU firms) Putin: ‘we cannot include everything in the new agreement’ Barroso: all should refrain from an ‘over-politicising of energy policy’ © Steve Wood 2006Slide25: EU Membership? some have applied, some will apply some may use weakness or unpredictability as leverage what benefits might they bring to the EU? potential security threats ostensibly reduced through membership macro-incentive of full membership has enabled the EU to exert considerable control over transformation processes and would-be entrants generally shaping and steering capacity is less robust when based on formulations that depict a ‘ring of friends’ who will ‘share everything but institutions’ © Steve Wood 2006Slide26: Public opinion has emerged as a major influence on EU policy towards its neighbourhood This ‘domestic politics’ factor challenges the 3 basic IR orientations outlined at the outset Electorates in several member states are unenthusiastic about further accessions Turkey membership debate and constitutional treaty referendums in 2005 support this © Steve Wood 2006Slide29: © Steve Wood 2006Slide30: March/May 2006 surveys - Special EB on Attitudes to Enlargement Accession of Turkey to the EU For Ag EU25 39 48 EU15 38 49 NMS (2004) 44 40 Germany 27 69 France 39 54 UK 42 39 Austria 13 81 In whose interest would Turkey’s EU accession be? (%) Primarily Turkey 52 Both Turkey and EU 20 Primarily EU 7 Primarily my own country 3 © Steve Wood 2006Slide31: Commission (Prodi): ‘everything but institutions’ / ‘ring of friends’ Commission (Barroso): ‘a reality that the EU cannot expand ad infinitum’ European Parliament: wary of unlimited enlargements; HR questions ‘EU should keep its promises to candidate countries and possible candidate countries but also take the EU’s absorption capacity fully into account…’ report by the end 2006 setting out principles defining the EU’s absorption capacity - “the nature of the EU, including its geographical borders”, should be defined communication strategy “so as to meet the legitimate concerns of the European public regarding European enlargement and integration” © Steve Wood 2006Slide32: ‘Our neighbours are not just citizens of “third countries”, they are our close partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals, and aspirations, and we face common challenges to our security…we offered this “ring of friends” a new, special relationship… In return for concrete steps being taken towards economic reform, and our shared values - good governance, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, it offers our partners deeper political and economic integration with the EU…’ Speech by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Brussels Economic Forum, Brussels, 22 April 2005. Emphasis in original. If the values are already ‘shared’, why are ‘concrete steps’ towards them needed? © Steve Wood 2006Slide33: Democratisation presented as principal generator of security By applying ‘soft power’, of which ENPI or pre-accession funding are elements, the EU endeavours to acquire influence over states poorly credentialed in democratic governance, independent judiciaries and civil rights At present most of the neighbours ‘share’ European values to a moderate extent at best © Steve Wood 2006Slide34: © Steve Wood 2006Slide36: The EU has never activated the human rights clause of its Association Agreements with states that are now ENP partners, despite many, or in some cases, permanent grounds for it to do soSlide37: success in encouraging democracy (even if the EU is not primarily responsible) will increase accession pressures, perhaps from several aspirants simultaneously Democratisation and Europeanisation are not the same thing. Although democratic practices are part of Europeanisation not all neighbours are regarded as European © Steve Wood 2006Slide38: Evaluation of ENP bilateral partnerships replace regionalism encouragement for neighbours to interact (peacefully); not always manifested in practice full extension of the Single Market’s ‘four freedoms’ or the Schengen agreement to ENP members is at present unlikely democracy export or instability import? before the EU can support reliable partners it has to transform unreliable regimes (EU developing a reserve military component / NATO is present) © Steve Wood 2006Slide39: EU restricted in what it can or will do - ENP appears positive but dependent on many other factors Sit out negative periods, hope for upswing or useful action by others Rhetoric - ‘no dividing lines’ Practical outcome - dividing lines Supporting statements often appear targeted to EU/western audience rather than neighbours Pressure to include more neighbours as members likely to increase Opposition in member state electorates to more accessions will also increase © Steve Wood 2006 You do not have the permission to view this presentation. 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