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Physics/Global Studies 280 Module 4: Delivery Systems*: 

Physics/Global Studies 280 Module 4: Delivery Systems* Part 1: Historic roots and overview Part 2: Aircraft Part 4: Cruise missiles Part 4: Ballistic missiles Part 5: Technical and operational aspects. Part 6: Nuclear command and control * Selected slides are marked by ´ * ´

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems: 

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems Overview of weapon delivery methods Aircraft Cruise missiles Ballistic missiles Technical and operational aspects Nuclear command and control Unconventional delivery methods

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems: 

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems Part 1: Overview

German V-1 Flying Bomb: 

German V-1 Flying Bomb “Reprisal weapon" (Vergeltungswaffe), Buzz bomb  First cruise missile Powered by pulse jet engine (660 lb thrust) Speed 630 km/h (390 mph) range 250 – 400 km (150 – 250 mile) Flight altitude 100 - 1000 m 850 kg warhead Autopilot regulates height and speed 30,000 manufactured, 10,000 fired at England, 7,000 "hits"

The V-2 Ballistic Missile: 

The V-2 Ballistic Missile From Hermann Oberth’s Rocket to the Planets to Wernher von Braun’s Wonder Weapon V-2/A4 Hermann Oberth Walter Dornberger Wernher von Braun

The V-2/A-4 Missile: 

The V-2/A-4 Missile Range: 300 km Warhead: 1000 kg Accuracy (CEP): 17 km Propellents: ethanol, water, liquid oxygen Production: KZ Dora No: >5000 Casualties: >5000 Cost: 2 bio. Mark Source: encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/V-2_rocket

V-2 Missile Proliferation: 

V-2 Missile Proliferation Operation Paperclip: V-2 missiles and 126 designers to the U.S. Operation Ossavakim: V-2 blueprints and designers to the USSR Operation Backfire: V2 missiles and designers to the UK

Basic Propulsion Mechanisms: 

Basic Propulsion Mechanisms None (examples: mines, depth charges, shipping container) Explosives (example: artillery shell) Propellers (example: torpedo, speeds ~ 50 mph) Jet engines (example: bomber, speeds ~ 600 mph) Rocket motor (example: missile, speeds ~ 18,000 mph) Unconventional (examples: barge, boat, Ryder truck, backpack)

Examples of Weapon Delivery Methods: 

Examples of Weapon Delivery Methods Air-breathing vehicles — Aircrafts (manned) Cruise missiles (unmanned aircraft) Rocket-propelled vehicles — Land-based ballistic missiles Submarine-based ballistic missiles Surface ship-based ballistic missiles* Space-based ballistic missiles* Short range rockets (no guidance) Other — Artillery/howitzers Land mines Torpedoes * Never deployed by US or USSR/Russia for nuclear weapons

Important Attributes of Delivery Systems: 

Important Attributes of Delivery Systems Range Speed Accuracy Recallability Reliability Payload/throw-weight Ability to penetrate defenses Survivability (at deployment base) Capital and operational costs Safety

Air-Breathing Vehicles : 

Air-Breathing Vehicles Aircraft (manned) — Long-range (“heavy”) bombers (examples: Bear, Blackjack, B52, B-1, B-2) Intermediate-range bombers (examples: B-29, FB-111, …) Tactical aircraft (examples: F-16, F-18, F-22, …) Cruise missiles (unmanned) — Air-launched cruise missiles(ALCMs) Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) Ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)

Rocket-Powered Vehicles : 

Rocket-Powered Vehicles Land-based ballistic missiles — Intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Shorter-range ballistic missiles Sea-based ballistic Missiles — Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) Surface-ship-launched ballistic missiles

Historical Examples of Other Nuclear Weapon Delivery Methods: 

Nuclear artillery shells: 16” naval guns 280 mm cannons (howitzer) "Atomic Annie" 1953: 15-kiloton atomic projectile to range of 17 miles, weighing 85 tons Nuclear-armed torpedoes Historical Examples of Other Nuclear Weapon Delivery Methods Operation Upshot/Knothole (1953)

Davy Crocket Nuclear Bazooka: 

Davy Crocket Nuclear Bazooka 76 lb. weight, 10-250 tons yield 25.5 “ x 11 size 1.2 - 2.5 mile range 1961 - 1971 deployed 2,100 produced for $10.2 billion Impact of 20 ton nuclear explosion Source: www.guntruck.com/DavyCrockett.html

Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs): 

Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs) Carried by back pack 0.01 kt yield? Source: www.osti.gov/historicalfilms/opentext/data/0800031.html

Other Methods of Delivering Nuclear Explosives: 

Other Methods of Delivering Nuclear Explosives “U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked with [chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear] materials from non-missile delivery means—most likely from terrorists—than by missiles, primarily because non-missile delivery means are — less costly easier to acquire more reliable and accurate They also can be used without attribution.” Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, December 2001

The U.S. Cold-War Strategic “Triad” – 1: 

The U.S. Cold-War Strategic “Triad” – 1 Initially US nuclear weapons delivery systems were developed without any coherent plan, in the — Truman administration Eisenhower administration McNamara (Kennedy’s SecDef) changed this — Survivable basing Secure command and control Determine how much is enough by calculation! Concluded 400 ‘effective’ megatons (EMT) would be “enough” The need to give roles to the USAF and the USN defined the “Triad” paradigm, which lasted until the 1990s Established the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) for targeting

The U.S. Cold-War Strategic “Triad” – 2: 

The U.S. Cold-War Strategic “Triad” – 2 Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) — The definition of “strategic” nuclear weapons was important for arms control but was controversial during the Cold War: the Soviet Union wanted to count weapons on its periphery whereas the U.S. did not want to count these: Systems with intercontinental range (U.S. def.) Systems able to strike directly the homeland of the adversary (Soviet def.) Systems in the Triad — Intercontinental-range bombers Intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)

The Post-Cold-War U.S. Nuclear Force Structure: 

The Post-Cold-War U.S. Nuclear Force Structure Do we need to retain the Cold War Triad (HBs, ICBMs and SLBMs) in today’s world? What are the strengths of each leg? What are disadvantages of each leg? What is best tradeoff between the different legs The best answer also depends on the opportunity cost Broader questions — Are there more important places to spend the money on military programs? Are there more important places to spend the money on civilian programs?

The U.S. “New Triad”: 

The U.S. “New Triad” The U.S. has proposed as the cornerstone of its 21st-Century defense strategy a "New Triad” — Nuclear forces and non-nuclear strike means, such as information warfare Passive and active defenses, notably missile defense A defense-industrial infrastructure to build and sustain these elements “Included in the New Triad, and critical to its ability to function, are command, control and intelligence systems.” Congressional testimony by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, February 14, 2002

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems: 

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems Part 2: Aircraft

Examples of Intercontinental Bombers – 1: 

Examples of Intercontinental Bombers – 1 Current US bombers — B-52 Hs, each carrying 20 ALCMs B1-Bs, each carrying 16 bombs B-2, carrying 16 bombs Russian bombers* — Bear-H16s, each carrying 16 ALCMs Bear-H6s, each carrying 6 ALCMs Blackjacks, each carrying 12 ALCMs *Very few are currently operational

Examples of Intercontinental Bombers – 2: 

Examples of Intercontinental Bombers – 2

Examples of Intercontinental Bombers – 3: 

Examples of Intercontinental Bombers – 3

The B-2 Stealth Bomber: 

The B-2 Stealth Bomber Speed: Mach 0.85 Height: 15 km Range: 12,230 km Armament: 16 B83 gravity bombs 20 B61 bombs 80 500 lb bombs

B-61 Bomb: 

B-61 Bomb

Intercontinental Bomber Issues – 1: 

Intercontinental Bomber Issues – 1 Evolution of bomber missions — High-altitude bombing Low-altitude penetration and bombing As a stand-off launch platform for Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)

Intercontinental Bomber Issues – 2: 

Intercontinental Bomber Issues – 2 Operational considerations — Launch, release to targets, and arming of weapons requires permission from the National Command Authority (NCA) (in the US, the President or his designated successor) Can be recalled until weapons (e.g., bombs, cruise missiles, or air-to-surface ballistic missiles) are dropped or fired from the bomber US has substantial in-flight refueling capability; other countries have none

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems: 

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems Part 3: Cruise Missiles

Introduction to Cruise Missiles – 1: 

Introduction to Cruise Missiles – 1 Cruise missiles (CMs) are pilotless vehicles powered by jet engines — Fly within the atmosphere Speeds are subsonic Cruise missiles were conceived 50 years ago However, militarily useful CMs could not be built until the late 1970s, when technological advances made them possible

Introduction to Cruise Missiles – 2: 

Introduction to Cruise Missiles – 2 Key technological advances — Smaller and lighter nuclear warheads Efficient turbofan engines Highly capable miniaturized computers GPS, Tercom, and terminal guidance “Stealth” airframe technology

Introduction to Cruise Missiles – 3: 

Introduction to Cruise Missiles – 3 Key properties — Small Easily stored and launched Highly penetrating Versatile Highly accurate Very cheap (about ~ $1 million per copy)

Long-Range Cruise Missiles – 1: 

Long-Range Cruise Missiles – 1

Long-Range Cruise Missiles – 2: 

Long-Range Cruise Missiles – 2 Conventionally-Armed Tomahawk Cruise Missile

Chinese Silkworm Anti-Ship Cruise Missile: 

Chinese Silkworm Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Chinese CSS-C-2 SILKWORM / HY-1 / SY-1 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

Launching Cruise Missiles – 1: 

Launching Cruise Missiles – 1

Launching Cruise Missiles – 2: 

Launching Cruise Missiles – 2

Cruise-Missile Guidance – 1: 

Cruise-Missile Guidance – 1

Cruise-Missile Guidance – 2: 

Cruise-Missile Guidance – 2

Cruise-Missile Guidance – 3: 

Cruise-Missile Guidance – 3

Accuracy of Cruise Missiles: 

Accuracy of Cruise Missiles

Implications of Cruise Missiles – 1: 

Implications of Cruise Missiles – 1 Like MIRVs, the US developed and deployed CMs without any coherent plan that considered the offensive, defensive, and long-range impact of their deployment. Military history — Was the US countermeasure to the heavy Soviet investment in air defense It capitalized on the temporary US lead in this technology However, the US was more vulnerable to CMs than Russia and this came back to haunt the US

Implications of Cruise Missiles – 2: 

Implications of Cruise Missiles – 2 Implications for U.S. security— Very small (hard to find and count with NTM) Can be based almost anywhere (hard to count) Dual capable (almost impossible to distinguish nuclear from high-explosive warhead) Cheap (can be produced in very large numbers)

Implications of Cruise Missiles – 3: 

Implications of Cruise Missiles – 3 “Several countries could develop a mechanism to launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms; a few are likely to do so—more likely for cruise missiles— before 2015.” Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, December 2001

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems: 

Module 4: Nuclear Delivery Systems Part 3: Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic Missile Trajectories: 

J. Altmann, SDI for Europe?, Frankfurt 1988 Ballistic Missile Trajectories

Flight of Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): 

Flight of Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Basic phases of ballistic missile flight — Boost phase: rocket motors burning (Post-boost phase: release of payload from bus) Midcourse phase: ballistic motion in space Terminal phase: passage through atmosphere

Categories of Ballistic Missiles Based on Their Range: 

Categories of Ballistic Missiles Based on Their Range Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) — Ranges under 1,000 km Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) — Ranges between 1,000 km and 3,000 km Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) — Ranges between 3,000 km and 5,500 km Intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) — Limited-range ICBMs (LRICBMs): 5,500 to 8,000 km Full-range ICBMs (FRICBMs): > 8,000 km Ranges of US and Russian ICBMs are ~ 12,000 km These categories are not fluid, because they are based on the performance characteristics of the missile.

Categories of Ballistic Missiles Based on Their Purpose: 

Categories of Ballistic Missiles Based on Their Purpose Tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) — For use on the battlefield (e.g., on a particular front) Usually have shorter ranges (SRBMs) Theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) — For use in an entire theater of war (e.g., the Middle East) Usually have longer ranges than tactical missiles Strategic ballistic missiles (an example of SNDVs) — For attacking the homeland of the adversary May have longer, perhaps intercontinental ranges These categories are fluid, because they are based on the intent of the user at the time the missile is fired.

Elements of a Ballistic Missile: 

Elements of a Ballistic Missile

Attributes of Ballistic Missiles: 

Attributes of Ballistic Missiles Basing modes — Fixed (e.g., blast-hardened silos in the ground) Mobile (e.g., on railroad cars) Propellants — Liquid (fuel and oxidizer are separate) Solid (fuel and oxidizer are mixed) Payloads — Single warhead + penetration aids (“penaids”) Multiple warheads + penetration aids

Missile Guidance Technologies: 

Missile Guidance Technologies Inertial — Uses gyroscopes and accelerometers No contact with outside world Stellar — Star trackers update inertial guidance system Satellite — Uses accurate (atomic) clocks on satellites Uses coded radio transmissions Uses sophisticated receivers Can determine both position and velocity very accurately using signals from 3 to 4 satellites

The Tree of Missile Proliferation: 

The Tree of Missile Proliferation

Titan Family of Missiles and Launch Vehicles: 

Titan Family of Missiles and Launch Vehicles

Soviet Scud Missiles and Derivatives - 1: 

Soviet Scud Missiles and Derivatives - 1 Soviet Scud-B Missile (based on the German V2) Range: 300 km Iraqi Al-Hussein SRBM Range: 600–650 km

Scud Missiles and Derivatives – 2: 

Scud Missiles and Derivatives – 2 Pakistan’s Ghauri MRBM and transporter (range 1,300 km). It is almost identical to North Korea’s No Dong MRBM, which is based on Scud technology that North Korea got from Egypt in the 1970s.

Short-range ballistic missiles: 

Short-range ballistic missiles Source: www.missilethreat.com/picture/srbm_comparison.html

Flight of MIRV’d ICBMs: 

Flight of MIRV’d ICBMs Four phases of MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles)— Boost phase (lasts about 1–5 min) Rocket motors are burning Missile rises through the atmosphere and enters near-Earth space Stages drop away as they burn out Post-boost phase (lasts about 5 min) Bus separates from the final stage Bus maneuvers and releases RVs Midcourse phase (lasts about 20 min) RVs fall ballistically around the Earth, in space Terminal phase (lasts about 20–60 sec) RVs re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere and encounter aerodynamic forces RVs fall toward targets, until detonation or impact

Flight of a MIRV’d ICBM (Schematic): 

Flight of a MIRV’d ICBM (Schematic)

Re-Entry Vehicles (RVs) : 

Re-Entry Vehicles (RVs) Basic types — MRV = multiple RV Final stage carries more than 1 RV Final stage has no propulsion RVs are not independently targetable MIRV = multiple, independently targetable RV Final stage carries more than 1 RV Final stage has guidance package and propulsion RVs are independently targetable MARV = maneuverable RV RV has a guidance package RV maneuvers during the terminal phase, using, e.g., thrusters or aerodynamic forces

MIRV Technology: 

MIRV Technology MX Peacekeeper missile tested at Kwajalein Atoll Source:www.smdc.army.mil/kwaj/Media/Photo/missions.htm

Examples of US and Russian ICBMs: 

Examples of US and Russian ICBMs US ICBMs — MMIII Solid-propellant, range ~ 12,000 km, 3 warheads MX Solid-propellant, range ~ 12,000 km, 10 warheads Russian ICBMs — SS-18 Liquid-propellant (storable), range ~ 12,000 km, 12 to 18 warheads SS-24 Solid-propellant, range > 9,000 km SS-25 Solid-propellant, range > 9,000 km

US ICBMs – 1: 

US ICBMs – 1

US ICBMs – 2: 

US ICBMs – 2 Launch of a Minuteman Launch of an MX

Russian ICBMs – 1: 

Russian ICBMs – 1

Russian ICBMs – 2: 

Russian ICBMs – 2 SS-18 “Satan” SS-18 in its launch canister SS-18 leaving its launcher

US and Russian SSBNs: 

US and Russian SSBNs

US Trident SSBN: 

US Trident SSBN Trident Missile Tubes With Covers Open Trident Submarine Underway

Submarine-Based Missiles: 

Submarine-Based Missiles US SLBMs — Trident C4 missiles carried 8 MIRVs each (solid propellant, range 7400 km) Trident D5 missiles carry 8 MIRVs each (solid propellant, range 7400 km) Russian SLBMs — SS-N-8 missiles carried 1 warhead each (range 9100 km, 64 warheads total) SS-N-18 missiles carried 3 warheads each (liquid propellant, range 6500 km) SS-N-20 missiles carried 10 warheads each (solid propellant, range 8300 km) SS-N-23 missiles carried 4 warheads each (liquid propellant, range 8300 km)

US and Russian SLBMs: 

US and Russian SLBMs

US and Russian SSBNs: 

US and Russian SSBNs

US Trident SSBN: 

US Trident SSBN Trident Missile Tubes With Covers Open Trident Submarine Underway

Submarine-Based Missiles: 

Submarine-Based Missiles US SLBMs — Trident C4 missiles carried 8 MIRVs each (solid propellant, range 7400 km) Trident D5 missiles carry 8 MIRVs each (solid propellant, range 7400 km) Russian SLBMs — SS-N-8 missiles carried 1 warhead each (range 9100 km, 64 warheads total) SS-N-18 missiles carried 3 warheads each (liquid propellant, range 6500 km) SS-N-20 missiles carried 10 warheads each (solid propellant, range 8300 km) SS-N-23 missiles carried 4 warheads each (liquid propellant, range 8300 km)

US and Russian SLBMs: 

US and Russian SLBMs

Range-Payload Tradeoff: 

MTCR is the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime to restrain missile exports A. Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, sipri, 1996, p. 157 Range-Payload Tradeoff

Increasing Demands with Missile Range: 

Increasing Demands with Missile Range

ICBM Accuracy & Vulnerability: 

ICBM Accuracy & Vulnerability Missile accuracy steadily improved during the Cold War as the result of technological innovation. As ICBMs become more accurate, they become more vulnerable to attack by the adversary, increasing crisis instability. Each ICBM and each SLBM was armed with more and more warheads during the Cold War. As each missile was armed with more warheads, it became a greater threat to the nuclear forces of the adversary and a more attractive target for a pre-emptive or first strike, increasing crisis instability.

Silo-Based Missiles: 

Silo-Based Missiles Vulnerable to attack Silo locations are known very accurately MIRVed missiles make it possible to launch many warheads against each silo Effect of silo hardness Hardening is expensive US assumes its silos can withstand 2,000 psi (5 psi will completely destroy a brick house) US assumes Russian silos can withstand 5,000 psi (example of ‘worst-case’ analysis) To destroy a silo this hard, a 300 kt warhead would have to land within 100 m

Silo-Based Missiles: 

Silo-Based Missiles Effect of missile accuracy Theoretically, missile survival is very sensitive to the miss distance D of incoming warheads An an example, assume 1,000 Minuteman silos are hardened to 2,000 psi Two 1.5 MT warheads are targeted to explode at ground level on each silo Computations predict If D = 300 ft, then 20 missiles survive (60 if 5,000 psi) If D = 500 ft, then 200 missiles survive (600 if 5,000 psi)

Ballistic Missile Accuracy: 

Ballistic Missile Accuracy The accuracy of a ballistic missile—like the value of any physical quantity—can only be specified statistically. Important concepts: D = total miss distance CEP = “circular error probable” (random error) B = Bias (systematic error) Algebraic relation — D = (B2 + CEP2)1/2 CEP is not a measure of the miss distance. The miss distance is at least as large as the CEP, but can be much larger if there is significant bias.

Ballistic Missile Accuracy: 

Ballistic Missile Accuracy Distribution of RV impact points —

Missile Range – Accuracy Tradeoff: 

A. Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, sipri, 1996, p. 112 Lance missile Missile Range – Accuracy Tradeoff

Ballistic Missile Accuracy: 

Ballistic Missile Accuracy Published CEPs for some ICBMs and SLBMs Missile CEP US MMIII 220 m Trident I 450 m Trident II 100 m Russia SS-18 450 m SS-N-18 600 m

Sources of Systematic Error: 

Sources of Systematic Error Gravitational field variations Atmospheric drag variations

Gravitational Field Variations: 

Gravitational Field Variations Some possible causes — Bumps on the Earth (mountains) Mass concentrations (masscons) Gravitational pull of the Moon (Motion of the Moon changes g by 3 ppm. An error in g of 3 ppm introduces a bias of 300 ft.) The Earth’s gravitational field is carefully measured over US and R (E-W) test ranges — US: Vandenberg to Kwajalein R: Plesetsk to Kamchatka and Tyuratam to Pacific But wartime trajectories would be N-S over pole.

Atmospheric Drag Variations: 

Atmospheric Drag Variations Some possible sources — Jet streams Pressure fronts Surface winds (30 mph surface wind introduces a bias of 300 ft.) Density of the atmosphere — Is a factor of 2 greater in the day than at night Varies significantly with the season Is affected by warm and cold fronts Data from military weather satellites and from models of weather over SU targets were reportedly used to update US warheads twice per day

Uncertainties on Silo-Based Missiles: 

Uncertainties on Silo-Based Missiles Fundamental uncertainties Missile accuracy Warhead yield Silo hardness Operational uncertainties Timing of attack System reliability Wind and weather Effects of other warheads (fratricide) Extent of ‘collateral damage’ (‘digging out’ missiles creates enormous fallout)

Sources of Missile Inaccuracy in Inertial Guidance: 

Sources of Missile Inaccuracy in Inertial Guidance Source: K. Tsipis, The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles, Scientific American, July 1975.

Missile Lethality (Kill Factor): 

Missile Lethality (Kill Factor) Warhead yield Y Missile inaccuracy CEP Silo hardness H Lethality (kill factor) Probability of kill

Impact of Accuracy and Yield on Lethality: 

Impact of Accuracy and Yield on Lethality

Silo Destruction and Kill Factor: 

Silo Destruction and Kill Factor Source: D. Schroeer, Science, Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race, John Wiley 1984.

Submarine-Based Missiles : 

Submarine-Based Missiles Operational considerations Relative vulnerability (size of operational areas, ASW threat, counter-ASW capability) Access to high seas, time to reach stations (Russian subs used to take longer; not any more) Fraction of forces on-station (duration of patrols, time required for repairs) System reliability Effectiveness of command and control

Slide93: 

Submarine-Based Missiles Effective number of warheads (example) United States 2688 [SLBM warheads} x 0.75 [fraction typically on-station] x 0.90 [estimated reliability] = 1,814 [effective number of warheads] Russia 2384 [SLBM warheads} x 0.25 [fraction typically on-station] x 0.70 [estimated reliability] = 447 [effective number of warheads]

Submarine-Based Missiles: 

Submarine-Based Missiles Ability to survive US SSBNs are quieter than Russian SSBNs (but Russia is improving rapidly) US leads in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability These examples show that many factors other than just the number of warheads are important in comparing the effectiveness of nuclear forces.

Population and Industry Affected: 

Population and Industry Affected

Counterforce Capabilities 1975: 

Counterforce Capabilities 1975

MIRV, Accuracy and Overkill: 

MIRV, Accuracy and Overkill

Counterforce Capabilities 1985: 

Counterforce Capabilities 1985 U.S. ICBMs: K = 107,000 U.S. SLBMs: K = 48,000 U.S. Trident II D5: K = (475,000) Russia ICBMs: K = 131,000 Russia SLBMs: K = 9,500

The MX Weapon System: 

The MX Weapon System Some questions — Why did the Air Force want the MX? Why was the “window of vulnerability” important? Why wasn’t the Air Force interested in the survivability of the MX? Does ”prompt, hard-target kill capability” make nuclear war more or less likely? Does capability to fight a “limited” nuclear war make nuclear war more or less likely? Why was the MX eventually built? Why was the MX placed in Minuteman silos?

Nuclear Weapon Systems: 

Nuclear Weapon Systems Roles of nuclear weapon systems — Military Psychological Political

Physics/Global Studies 280 : 

Physics/Global Studies 280 March 10, 2005 Session 17 -News, announcements -Missile testing -Nuclear command and control

News and Announcements: 

News and Announcements Bush Nominates John Bolton as U.N. Ambassador (March 7, 2005) Condoleezza Rice: "He is a tough-minded diplomat, he has a strong record of success, and he has a proven track record of effective multilateralism.” Russia confronts U.S. on Nuclear Arms Pact (March 8, 2005) “Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defence minister, asked Donald Rumsfeld, his US counterpart, how the Bush administration would respond if Russia quit the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF)” 60th anniversary of the firebombing of Tokyo (March 10, 2005) “About 500,000 phosphorous firebombs were dropped, creating an enormous fire that killed more than 100,000 people within about four hours.” Pakistan Admits Rogue Scientist Aided Iran (March 10, 2005) “Pakistan's information minister acknowledged Thursday that a rogue scientist at the heart of an international nuclear black market investigation gave centrifuges to Iran, but he insisted the government had nothing to do with the transfer.” Missile Defense and Europe: WMD and Terrorism Julian Palmore (Professor, Mathematics, UIUC) March 14, 2005: 2:30-4:00PM, 384 Armory, 505 E. Armory Ave.

Missile Launches: Titan 2: 

Missile Launches: Titan 2

Missile Launches: Minuteman: 

Missile Launches: Minuteman

Radio Communication in a Trident Missile Test: 

Radio Communication in a Trident Missile Test

Missile Test Sites and Monitoring Systems: 

Missile Test Sites and Monitoring Systems Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1980, Chapter 7 “Verification of the SALT II Treaty”

Coverage of US Radars to Detect Soviet Missile Launches: 

Coverage of US Radars to Detect Soviet Missile Launches

Nuclear Command and Control – 1: 

Nuclear Command and Control – 1 C3I: Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence Specific goals— Provide strategic and tactical warning Provide damage assessments Execute war orders from National Command Authority before, during, and after initial attack Evaluate effectiveness of retaliation Monitor development of hostilities, provide command and control for days, weeks, months

Nuclear Command and Control – 2: 

Some important aspects and implications — Organizational structure of command and control Available strategic communications, command, control and intelligence (C3I) assets Vulnerability of strategic C3I assets to attack Nuclear Command and Control – 2

Nuclear Command and Control – 3: 

Satellite systems Early warning Reconnaissance Electronic signals Weather Communication Navigation Nuclear Command and Control – 3

Strategic Automated Command Control System (SACCS): 

Strategic Automated Command Control System (SACCS) Primary network for the transmission of Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) to commanders Prime communications link between the CINC USSTRATCOM and nuclear missile forces Critical secure command control information Provides SIOP messages DEFCON 5 Normal peacetime readiness DEFCON 4 Normal, increased intelligence and strengthened security measures DEFCON 3 Increase in force readiness above normal readiness DEFCON 2 Further Increase in force readiness DEFCON 1 Maximum force readiness. www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/saccs.htm

Two-strike Scenario: 

Two-strike Scenario Infra- structure Missile Defense Bombers Silos Subs Infra- structure Missile Defense Bombers Silos Subs First strike Second strike

Complexity of Strategic Warfare: 

Complexity of Strategic Warfare

Response Times for Attack or Breakout: 

Response Times for Attack or Breakout years seconds minutes hours days weeks months Automatic launch Disarmament Launch on warning Launch under attack Launch after attack Time for decisionmaking Risk of accidental nuclear war Dealerting Arms control

Accidental Nuclear War: 20 Cases of Risk: 

Accidental Nuclear War: 20 Cases of Risk 1) November 5, 1956: Suez Crisis Coincidence 2) November 24, 1961: BMEWS Communication Failure 3) August 23, 1962: B-52 Navigation Error 4) August-October, 1962: U2 Flights into Soviet Airspace 5) October 24, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: A Soviet Satellite Explodes 6) October 25, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Intruder in Duluth 7) October 26, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: ICBM Test Launch 8) October 26, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Unannounced Titan Missile Launch 9) October 26, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Malstrom Air Force Base 10) October, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: NATO Readiness 11) October, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: British Alerts 12) October 28, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Moorestown False Alarm 13) October 28, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: False Warning Due to Satellite 14) November 2, 1962: The Penkovsky False Warning 15) November, 1965: Power Failure and Faulty Bomb Alarms 16) January 21, 1968: B-52 Crash near Thule 17) October 24-25, 1973: False Alarm During Middle East Crisis 18) November 9, 1979: Computer Exercise Tape 19) June , 1980: Faulty Computer Chip 20) January, 1995: Russian False Alarm Source: www.nuclearfiles.org/kinuclearweapons/anwindex.html

Steps Towards Nuclear War 1: 

Steps Towards Nuclear War 1

Steps Towards Nuclear War 2: 

Steps Towards Nuclear War 2

Risk Reduction Measures: 

Risk Reduction Measures Put ballistic-missiles on low level alert Reduce number of warheads on missiles Remove warheads to storage Disable missiles by having safety switches pinned open and immobilisation Allow inspections and cooperative verification

End of Module 4: 

End of Module 4

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