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After Columbia: How We Got into this Fix and How We Can Get out of It : 

After Columbia: How We Got into this Fix and How We Can Get out of It Roger D. Launius Division of Space History National Air and Space Museum Smithsonian Institution Washington, D.C.

Overview: 

Overview Origins of Space Shuttle. The shuttle as a creature of compromise. 20+ years of shuttle operations. The Columbia accident. The investigation—echoes of Challenger. The policy debate—what is the future of humans in space?

Origins of the Space Shuttle: 

Origins of the Space Shuttle Winged reusable spaceplanes considered the penultimate in space access. “Holy grail” of spaceflight—“single-stage-to-orbit” (SSTO). Take offs like an airplane, flies into orbit, perform its mission, and returns to Earth like an airplane. Exceptionally difficult flight regime with a myriad of challenges. Concept dates from 1920s, to well into 1950s. Strikingly different approach from ballistic capsule programs—Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo.

Eugen Sänger’s Antipodal Bomber: 

Eugen Sänger’s Antipodal Bomber Proposed “RaBo” suborbital rocket bomber to attack targets at intercontinental ranges dates from 1920s. Incorporated advanced swept, wedge-shaped supersonic airfoils, a heat-dissipating fuselage, and rocket engines of extraordinary thrust. Sänger’s studies reached the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) in 1946, enforcing the vision of orbital spaceplanes.

The von Braun Paradigm: 

The von Braun Paradigm Robotic Earth orbital satellites Human Earth orbital flights Winged reusable spacecraft Permanently inhabited space station Human lunar exploration Human expeditions to Mars

Wernher von Braun’s Space Transportation System: 

Wernher von Braun’s Space Transportation System

Space Shuttle and NASA Ideology: 

Space Shuttle and NASA Ideology NASA proposed Space Shuttle as formal program in 1966, feasibility studies began in 1967, and public unveiling took place in 1968. NASA determined 100% reusability a primary objective in 1969. Next step in realizing the vision of a multi-planetary human presence. Intended as means for achieving flexible, “just-in-time,” reliable, and economical access to space. Viewed as “one-size-fits-all” space access vehicle. Would position NASA as central organization for space access indefinitely into the future.

Early Space Shuttle Concepts: 

Early Space Shuttle Concepts

A Creature of Compromise: 

A Creature of Compromise NASA’s efforts in favor of a shuttle decision proved fruitless between 1968 and 1971. NASA originally estimated cost of shuttle at $10 billion; but that proved too high for president’s approval. Succession of BoB/OMB reviews and studies, without resolution. Mathematica, Inc., study in 1971 indicated that two-stage, fully-reusable Space Shuttle was not economically justified, but one-and-a-half-stage vehicle was “cost effective.” DoD requirements: Transport 45,000 pounds of cargo into near­Earth orbit, 115 to 250 statute miles above the Earth. Accommodate a flight crew of up to ten persons for up to seven days. Cross­range maneuvering capability of 1,265 statute miles to meet requirements for lift­off and landing at the same location after only one orbit. Fly up to 50 missions per year.

The Space Shuttle Decision: 

The Space Shuttle Decision Richard Nixon announced the decision for shuttle on January 5, 1972, after long debate. Decision came after two major discussions: August 12, 1971, memorandum to president, in which Caspar Weinberger said that not approving shuttle would confirm a belief “that our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward,...and voluntarily starting to give up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superiority.” Nixon replied “I agree with Cap.” NASA November 22, 1971, memorandum to president, saying that “an accelerated start of the Shuttle would lead to direct employment of 8,800 by the end of 1972, and 24,000 by the end of 1973,” jobs that the president would be able to take credit for in 1972 election campaign. Budget set at $5.5 billion over eight year period.

Building the Shuttle: 

Building the Shuttle Space Shuttle to provide routine, flexible, reliable, inexpensive access to space. Intended to fly by 1978. ELVs to be retired. All U.S. government scientific and military satellites to be launched on shuttle. Two principal technological challenges: Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Thermal Protection System (TPS)

20+ Years of Shuttle Operations: 

20+ Years of Shuttle Operations 1981—First flight of Columbia, TPS feared a serious safety hazard. 1982—Reagan declares Space Shuttle operational. 1983—First American woman and first African American flies in space. 1983-1986—Numerous comsat deployments, on-orbit recovery. 1986—Challenger accident at launch of 25th flight of shuttle. 1986—Commercial payloads removed from shuttle. 1988—Return to flight of shuttle. 1989—Military payloads removed from shuttle. 1995—First docking at Russian Mir space station. 1998—STS-95, John Glenn flight, loss of materials from tail. 1998—First orbital assembly of International Space Station. 1999—STS-93 (Columbia), premature main engine cutoff because of hydrogen leak. 2000—Wiring problems in every orbiter. 2003—Columbia accident on reentry. Total of 113 missions, 111 successful.

Shuttle/Soyuz Reliability: 

Shuttle/Soyuz Reliability Space Shuttle (1981-2003) 112 successful launches in 113 attempts 111 successful missions in 113 attempts (launch and recovery) 1 failed launch, 1 failed reentry (both fatal to crew) 98% realized reliability (launch and recovery) Soyuz (various models) (1967-2003) 89 successful launches in 91 attempts 87 successful missions in 91 attempts (launch and recovery) 2 failed launches (both crews saved by abort systems) 2 failed reentries (both fatal to crew) 96% realized reliability (launch and recovery)

Space Shuttle Compared to NASA Budget: 

Space Shuttle Compared to NASA Budget

Is the Space Shuttle a Good Investment?: 

Is the Space Shuttle a Good Investment?

Public Willingness to Fly on the Space Shuttle: 

Public Willingness to Fly on the Space Shuttle

The Columbia Accident: 

The Columbia Accident ET foam insulation from bipod ramp, where struts attach the tank to the bottom of the orbiter's nose, hit the orbiter approximately 82 seconds after launch. Struck leading edge of left wing between RCC panels 8 and 9 at a relative velocity of 530 mph. Two smaller foam chunks that broke off at the same time missed the wing. Seemingly insubstantial, the foam Frisbee, traveling at that velocity and spinning at least 18 times a second, struck with about a ton of force. Impact blew a hole 6 to 10 inches across.

Missed Opportunities to Check for Damage to Columbia (1): 

Missed Opportunities to Check for Damage to Columbia (1) Flight Day 4: Rodney Rocha inquires if crew has been asked to inspect for damage. No response. Flight Day 6: Mission Control fails to ask crew member David Brown to downlink video he took of External Tank separation, which may have revealed missing bipod foam. Flight Day 6: NASA and National Imagery and Mapping Agency personnel discuss possible request for imagery. No action taken. Flight Day 7: Wayne Hale phones Department of Defense representative, who begins identifying imaging assets, only to be stopped per Linda Ham's orders.

Missed Opportunities to Check for Damage to Columbia (2): 

Missed Opportunities to Check for Damage to Columbia (2) Flight Day 7: Michael Card, NASA Headquarters Safety and Mission Assurance Office, discusses imagery request with Mark Erminger, JSC Safety Office. No action taken. Flight Day 7: Card then discusses imagery request with Bryan O'Connor, Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance. No action taken. Flight Day 8: Barbara Conte, discussed imagery request with Rodney Rocha, then calls LeRoy Cain, STS-107 ascent/entry Flight Director. Cain checks with Phil Engelauf; receives a “no” answer. Flight Day 14: Michael Card discusses imaging request with William Readdy, Associate Administrator for Space Flight. Directed that imagery to be gathered on a “not-to-interfere” basis. None was forthcoming.

Sensor(y) Deprivation: 

Sensor(y) Deprivation During reentry hot gasses breached the wheel well of the left wing. In less than five minutes—demonstrated by sensor losses in the wing—the structure failed and began to break up.

The Investigation—Echoes of Challenger: 

The Investigation—Echoes of Challenger Technical causes of accident strikingly different between Challenger and Columbia, but institutional factors allowing technical causes to go unresolved are identical. “Board recognized early on that the accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASA's history and the human space flight program's culture.” “Management decisions made during Columbia’s final flight reflect missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels, flawed analysis, and ineffective leadership.” “Perhaps the ultimate example of engineering concerns not making their way upstream, Challenger astronauts were told that the cold temperature was not a problem, and Columbia astronauts were told that the foam strike was not a problem.”

The NASA Culture: 

The NASA Culture Organizational practices emphasizing cost and schedule but detrimental to reliability and safety. Reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices. Failure to determine why systems did not perform in accordance with specifications. “Normalization of risk.” Organizational culture barriers to effective communication. Lack of integrated management across program elements. Allowance of informal decision-making processes that operate outside established procedures. Perfect place syndrome.

The “Perfect Place” Syndrome: 

The “Perfect Place” Syndrome NASA “came close to being the best organization human beings could create to accomplish selected goals…[but] success reinforces lessons that eventually become obsolete or even harmful.” Consequences of an organization viewing itself as a perfect place include “righteousness, flawed decision making, self deception, introversion, and a diminished curiosity about the world outside the perfect place.” “NASA is no longer a perfect place. It is deeply troubled and needs new ways of thinking, new people, and new means to come to terms with social, economic, and political environments as challenging and harsh as deep space itself.” From Gary Brewer, “Perfect Places: NASA as an Idealized Institution.” In Radford Byerly Jr., ed., Space Policy Reconsidered (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1989).

CAIB Recommendations: 

CAIB Recommendations 29 recommendations organized into five broad categories. Technical requirements for “return to flight.” Thermal protection system. Imaging. Orbiter sensor data. Bolt catchers. Closeout procedures. Micrometeoroid and orbital debris. Foreign object debris. Technical requirements for “continuing to fly.” Additional actions in the same areas as shown above. Technical excellence as an organization. Technical Engineering Authority responsible for requirements and waivers. Training. Systemic cultural and organizational issues. Scheduling. Decision-making. Risk management. Communication. Future space operations. Recertification for shuttle operations beyond 2010. Upgrade the shuttle engineering drawing system.

Some Specific NASA Remedial Actions: 

Some Specific NASA Remedial Actions Change in the Mission Management Team that oversees shuttle flights. Overhaul of NASA's safety organization. Redesign of the orbiter's thermal protection system to make it more impact-resistant. Extensive redesign of several areas on the shuttle's external fuel tank. Use the international space station as a “safe haven” where shuttle astronauts with a damaged ship could live for up to six months while waiting for a rescue flight. Change in the NASA organizational culture to emphasize safety, reliability, and communication.

Sensemaking Process for Catastrophic Failures : 

Sensemaking Process for Catastrophic Failures

The Policy Debate—What is the Future of Humans in Space?: 

The Policy Debate—What is the Future of Humans in Space? Rationales for spaceflight. The tortured path toward shuttle replacement. Culture shock. Reasonable steps for the immediate future. Interim steps for the future. Whither human spaceflight.

Rationales for Spaceflight: 

Rationales for Spaceflight Scientific Discovery and Understanding National Security Economic Competitiveness Human Destiny/Survival of the Species National Prestige

The Tortured Path toward Shuttle Replacement: 

The Tortured Path toward Shuttle Replacement With first flight of Shuttle, planning began for its replacement. Resulted from belief than an ambitious flight rate would quickly exhaust the 100 missions per vehicle design life of shuttle fleet. By 1985 NASA still projected 24 flights per year. National Commission on Space (1986) recommended shuttle replacement, as it would “become obsolescent by the turn of the century.” After Challenger accident in 1986, studies usually emphasized 2000 as year when replacement vehicle should come on-line. Report of Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (1990) recommended replacement shuttle “should reach operational capability in time to support all but the initial phase of space station deployment.”

National Aero-Space Plane (X-30): 

National Aero-Space Plane (X-30) NASA/DoD joint project, begun 1982. Called for two vehicles, capable of single stage to orbit at Mach 25. Used multicycle engine shifting from jet to ramjet to scramjet; liquid hydrogen fuel with oxygen scooped and frozen from the atmosphere. President Ronald Reagan: “We are going forward with research on a new Orient Express that could, by the end of the decade, take off from Dulles Airport, accelerate up to 25 times the speed of sound attaining low-Earth orbit, or fly to Tokyo within two hours.” (State of the Union Address, Feb. 4, 1986) Canceled in 1992; did not fly.

X-33/VentureStar™: 

X-33/VentureStar™ X-33/VentureStar™ Program operated 1995-2001. NASA partnership with Lockheed Martin. Approximately $1.5 B joint venture, $1 B from NASA. Program suffered from significant technological overreach—built from “unobtainum.” Intended to fly by 1999. Shuttle replacement by 2005/2008. Cancelled in 2001 without a test flight

Where are We Regarding a Shuttle Replacement?: 

Where are We Regarding a Shuttle Replacement? National space policy and NASA have reversed courses several times with respect to whether to pursue Space Shuttle upgrades extending service life versus aggressive efforts to replace vehicle. NASA has tended not to stay with a shuttle replacement program. Project engineers whipsawed by changing decisions/priorities. Considerable resources expended on projects that never reach completion. For more than a decade through late 2002, NASA leadership hoped to replace shuttle as soon as possible, but treated program as necessary rather than desirable. Resources have always been a challenge in Space Shuttle replacement. No national commitment to multi-billion dollar investment required. The lack of a firm decision to develop a shuttle replacement represents the single most egregious failure of space policy in history.

Culture Shock: 

Culture Shock Organizational culture reflects the assumptions groups make about appropriate behavior absent other institutional procedures. It is a self-reinforcing standard of action almost invisible to those a part of the institution. Possesses positive, negative, and neutral attributes. It affects almost every aspect of our working lives, and everyone at some level must take into consideration the norms, practices, and biases of the culture in which they work. Once established, organizational culture is enormously resilient and difficult to change. Most technological challenges are solved through organizational structures; therefore organizational culture is critical to addressing technical issues.

Is It Possible to Change an Organizational Culture?: 

Is It Possible to Change an Organizational Culture? Virtually no historical evidence to suggest one can rapidly change a large institution’s culture. Attempts to change one company’s culture to another’s during corporate mergers has huge costs and frequently fails, leading the merged company to sell off those parts of itself that have not adjusted. Corporate mergers routinely fail due to incompatible and irreconcilable “cultural” differences. Recent AOL/Time Warner is a well-known cultural disaster. So, too, is the Pan Am/National merger in airline history. Similar problems arose in the round of aerospace mergers in 1990s. The merger of Army, Navy, NACA, and other elements into NASA in 1958 proved exceptionally difficult and still creates difficulties. Department of Homeland Security currently wrestling with myriad cultures from its many components. Bottom line: It is possible to change an organizational culture, but doing so requires enormous resources—financial and personnel—to bring about true change.

What About NASA’s Culture?: 

What About NASA’s Culture? There are profound challenges to cultural change at NASA. Multiple competing communities within agency. Resource and leadership constrained capabilities. Lack of sustained attention aimed at culture shift. Uncertain map of current culture and roadmap for change. Where are the resources necessary to pay the “culture shock” costs? Who will provide sustained leadership and management attention necessary to bring about true change? Genuine concerns exist that operational tasks may well overwhelm NASA as it seeks this transformation.

Will NASA Cultural Change be Sufficient?: 

Will NASA Cultural Change be Sufficient? Probably not! Whether or not “high reliability organizations” can be created and sustained over long periods of time is highly problematic. Organizations cannot sustain an emphasis on “safety at all costs” for very long, simply because people get complacent with risk—they come to accept it as routine and no longer put in the effort necessary to avoid it. No question but that NASA had become complacent with shuttle. Indicates that it is an organization like any other—full of humans who are not expert at maintaining vigilance/managing risk over the long-term. “Normal accidents” thesis is a more compelling approach. Postulates that technologies are only reliable and safe over the long run when they are not tightly coupled systems. Safety is built in through gross engineering margins, multiple redundancies, etc. Such systems are inherently inefficient. An appropriate path for human spaceflight is to develop an entirely new vehicle—one that had broad engineering margins and achieves multiple redundancies using modern off-the-shelf technologies—with all possible speed.

Reasonable Steps for the Immediate Future: 

Reasonable Steps for the Immediate Future Launch existing ISS elements on shuttle after CAIB “return to flight” recommendations implemented. Make prudent upgrades to shuttle fleet to extend service life for ten years. Reconfigure shuttle for remotely-piloted operations, and use as cargo—but not astronaut—hauler as soon as practical. Develop a new vehicle for transporting humans to and from low-Earth-orbit as soon as possible, not waiting for any cutting-edge technology to be invented. Not a step backward if this vehicle looked like an upgraded Apollo capsule. Use as crew return vehicle for long stays at ISS.

Interim Steps for the Future: 

Interim Steps for the Future Fly all human spaceflight missions on a new vehicle as soon as it is available. Launch all shuttle missions without crew; and only fly missions delivering ISS hardware that had been designed for launch on the shuttle. Give the Space Shuttle an honorable retirement, and fly all future cargo on ELVs such as the Delta 4 and Atlas 5. Develop a reusable Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) based at ISS. Used for short transit operations for unloading cargo to ISS. Perhaps include geosynchronous orbit capability to refuel, retrieve, or repair communications and other applications satellites. Design space access and orbital infrastructure to support eventual human missions to deep space—back to the Moon and perhaps someday to Mars.

Whither Human Spaceflight?: 

Whither Human Spaceflight? What is the current state of U.S. access to space and what should be its capabilities through 2025? What short- and long-term effect will the Columbia accident have upon commercial, military, scientific, international space (such as International Space Station) activities? What is the future for humans in space? Does the U.S. have the political will to sustain expansive human spaceflight for the future? What major space policy decisions must be taken in 2003-2005 period?

Backup Slides: 

Backup Slides

NASA’s Technical Efforts to Return to Flight: 

NASA’s Technical Efforts to Return to Flight Developing ways to repair damage to shuttle's TPS while on-orbit—whether or not docked to the International Space Station. Redesigning insulation on the External Tank, especially the area from which the insulating foam broke off on STS-107. Developing new techniques for inspecting the leading edge heat shielding—the reinforced carbon carbon (RCC) composite. Arranging with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to take images of the shuttle on every flight to inspect for damage. Setting up a new safety organization based at Langley Research Center in Hampton, Va. Installing better cameras on the shuttle to monitor debris strikes during the eight-minute climb to orbit. Enhancing preflight inspections of the vulnerable thermal armor on the leading edges of the shuttle wings. Altering procedures for safety issues to be raised to the mission leaders.

Engineering by Viewgraph: 

Engineering by Viewgraph

Major CAIB Recommendations (1): 

Major CAIB Recommendations (1) NASA management failures are to blame for the accident as much as the piece of foam insulation that tore a hole in Columbia's left wing. Better preflight inspections are needed of the thermal protection system on shuttle wings. NASA must minimize the amount of foam insulation that is shed from the external fuel tank during liftoff, and do a better job of applying and analyzing the lightweight insulation. Astronauts must be able to inspect and repair any potential damage to the outer thermal layer of the shuttle, particularly the wings. Space Shuttles must be equipped with more and better cameras during liftoff, and the pictures need to be relayed immediately to flight controllers so they can check for potential damage. NASA needs to augment its staff of shuttle safety inspectors, reduced during the 1990s to save money. NASA should study the best practices of how other organizations handle high-risk endeavors, like nuclear submarines and nuclear power plants.

Major CAIB Recommendations (2): 

Major CAIB Recommendations (2) Communication needs to be more open and freer between low-level engineers and high-level mission managers, to prevent the confusion that prompted NASA to not seek spy satellite photos of Columbia's damaged wing. During every shuttle flight, NASA needs to obtain reconnaissance pictures of the orbiting ship to check for damage. Columbia's mission management team met only five times during the 16-day flight, rather than daily. Mission managers need to meet more frequently during shuttle flights and need more and better training to handle emergencies. Because of budget cuts, the space shuttle had to be redesigned early on, adding deficiencies that were never later corrected. Shuttle improvements also were delayed over the years because of NASA's belief that a successor was on the horizon. A replacement for the shuttle is still far off, however. After 22 years and 113 flights, space shuttles are still experimental craft and should be treated as such.

Access to Space Study: 

Access to Space Study NASA study commissioned by administrator, issued January 1994. Reviewed space access requirements for period 2005-2030. Examined three launch alternatives: Upgrade the Space Shuttle and keep it flying until 2030. Develop a new expendable launcher. Replace the Space Shuttle with a “next-generation, advanced technology system…a ‘leapfrog’ approach, designed to capitalize on advances made in NASP and SDI programs to achieve order-of-magnitude improvements in the cost effectiveness of space transportation.” Strongly advocated development of single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicle for flight by 2005. Space Shuttle to continue for the short term: “The most beneficial and cost-effective upgrades should be considered for incorporation into these vehicles until the new single-stage-to-orbit vehicles becomes available.”

Decision and Reversal: 

Decision and Reversal “Freeze the design” policy for Space Shuttle implemented by NASA in 1994. No major upgrades to vehicle after those already planned. Allowed only minor safety upgrades. Viewed as responsive to National Space Policy. NASA officials believed that cost/safety benefit of additional Space Shuttle upgrades out of balance. Decided only responsible answer for human space access was to retire shuttle fleet in early part of 21st century. Tried to accomplish this with minimal investment. Administrator told Congress in 1998, “I don’t think that NASA’s going to go back to the American Congress and say, ‘We need billions of dollars so we can go make a big program to try and get a replacement for the shuttle’.” The “freeze the design” decision reversed in March 1996. Approximately $100 M per year allocated for upgrades to improve mission supportability.

NASA Administrator Declares a “Space Launch Crisis” – July 1999: 

NASA Administrator Declares a “Space Launch Crisis” – July 1999 Tells OMB “that amounts budgeted for Shuttle upgrades in FY2000 are inadequate to accommodate upgrades necessary to yield significant safety improvements . . . Related civil service staffing levels are also in need of augmentation.” Concerns reinforced by two serious in-flight anomalies on STS-93 mission later in July 1999. Result was Administrator’s Safety Upgrade Initiative, with Electric APU as top priority upgrade. Goal was to fly shuttle until 2012 Also led to Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) effort.

Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS): 

Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) Begun in 1999, STAS pushed decision on developing second generation RLV architectures to 2005. Found that after 5 years of studying space access, in 1999 NASA was still 5 years away from meeting the goal set for the end of 1999. NASA “desired” to issue a competitive announcement in 2005, with the shuttle replacement flying in the 2008-2012 timeframe. Meantime, NASA would upgrade the Space Shuttle and continue flying it through at least 2012: “Until a proven replacement is able to be rolled to the launch pad, this is the vehicle that will guarantee human access to low-Earth orbit and play a critical role in the assembly of the International Space Station.” (NASA Administrator, October 1, 1998).

Recent Shuttle Replacement Developments: 

Recent Shuttle Replacement Developments Based on STAS results, in 2001 NASA/OMB initiated a Space Launch Initiative (SLI) aimed at taking a decision by 2006 on what next generation vehicle to build. By 2002, SLI results did not look promising as a basis for a 2006 decision. In response, NASA developed Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), which recognized that shuttle would fly to 2020 and possibly 2030, and reallocated SLI funding to shuttle upgrades. Shuttle Life Extension Program (SLEP) created.