logging in or signing up 05 Pro Waltz Freedom Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 779 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: December 23, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Waltz’s Neorealism: Waltz’s Neorealism The argument in favorFacts and Assumptions: PSC272 Facts and Assumptions Assumptions need not be true; what is important is whether they are useful Useful assumptions lead to powerful theories: Parsimonious Testable The test of structural realism is whether it generates hypotheses that can be supported by evidenceWaltz in Review: PSC272 Waltz in Review Social systems impose constraints; all actors are compelled to behave similarly Analogy to a competitive market The international system is anarchic Self-help Defensive balancing The number of important states and the distribution of power among them determines the constraintsBalance of Power: PSC272 Balance of Power Balances form recurrently Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: States prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions If one coalition weakens, the opposing one loosens Anticipated balancing leads to restraintSlide5: PSC272 BoP as a Reaction to a Threat: Napoleon, 1802-1815 Major Powers: FRA, UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS After French Revolution (1789), Napoleon Bonaparte rises to power. -- Consul (1802) -- Emperor of France (1804) Continues military campaigns to build empire and feed war machine. -- Poses major threat to Europe UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS form “coalitions” against FRA -- Napoleon defeated (1814) -- Congress of Vienna (1814) -- Napoleon returns (1815) -- Waterloo (1815)Slide6: PSC272 BoP as a Peaceful Equilibrium: Concert of Europe, 1815-1848 After Napoleonic Wars, Congress of Vienna continues (1815) Defeated France let back into “club” Quadruple Alliance: Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia Congresses held to attempt to resolve issues. Buffer states/territory traded. Assessing Balance of Power Hypotheses: PSC272 Assessing Balance of Power Hypotheses Balances form recurrently Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: States prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions If one coalition weakens, the opposing one loosens Anticipated balancing leads to restraintSubsidiary Hypotheses: PSC272 Subsidiary Hypotheses Socialization States emulate successful competitors Military advances: Agincourt French Revolution and mass mobilization German general staff model Organization: Market economy Nonconformist states gradually adapt Bolshevik RussiaSubsidiary Hypotheses: PSC272 Subsidiary Hypotheses Interdependence Relative gains impede cooperation Interdependence increases probability of war Economic vulnerability leads to imperialismBipolarity vs Multipolarity: PSC272 Bipolarity vs Multipolarity 1792 1815 1854 1866 1870 Napoleonic Wars Concert of Europe Crimean War Austro-Prussian War Franco-Prussian War WW I WW II 1914 1939 Multipolar loose, shifting alliances, Britain as balancer four or five Great Powers 1945 1990 Cold War—or “Long Peace” Bipolar (two Great Powers, tight blocs) ? (“peaceful”)Bipolarity vs Multipolarity: PSC272 Bipolarity vs Multipolarity Bipolarity is more “stable.” Why? Multipolar balancing breaks down because of uncertainty Bipolar internal balancing Multipolar external balancing States can maximize/accrue power in two ways: Cold War 19th Century EuropeBipolarity vs Multipolarity: PSC272 Bipolarity vs Multipolarity Internal balancing is more reliable External balancing can give rise to miscalculations that lead to general war Large influence of small allies Deterrence fails because there is an incentive to defect from commitments As numbers grow, strategic complexity grows geometrically Uncertainty is the leading cause of warStructural Theories: WWI: Structural Theories: WWI Multipolar System Abandoning an ally invites one’s own destruction In a moment of crisis, the weaker or more adventurous party (Austria) is likely to determine its side’s policy Its partners (Germany) can afford neither to let the weaker member be defeated nor to advertise their disunity by failing to back a venture even while deploring its risksStructural Theories: WWI: Structural Theories: WWI Balance of Power The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance were approximately balanced The defeat of any great power would give the opposing coalition a decisive advantage in the overall European balance of power Britain entered the war to prevent Germany from upsetting the balance of power on the continentStructural Theories: WWI: Structural Theories: WWI Alliance System The establishment of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance divided the European powers into two camps While seen as a form of self-protection, the alliances also had the potential to escalate small crises into major wars When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, this brought Serbia’s ally Russia into the war, which brought Germany, France, and Britain into the warAssessing hypotheses about multipolarity in WWI: PSC272 Assessing hypotheses about multipolarity in WWI External balancing can give rise to miscalculations that lead to general war Large influence of small allies Deterrence fails because there is an incentive to defect from commitments Admittedly, an unfair testStrengths of Structural Realism: Strengths of Structural Realism Parsimony Focus on systemic effects Power is defined as capabilities (non-tautological) Explanatory power is in the constraints, not in the preferences Collective action Probabilistic predictions You do not have the permission to view this presentation. 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05 Pro Waltz Freedom Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 779 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: December 23, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript Waltz’s Neorealism: Waltz’s Neorealism The argument in favorFacts and Assumptions: PSC272 Facts and Assumptions Assumptions need not be true; what is important is whether they are useful Useful assumptions lead to powerful theories: Parsimonious Testable The test of structural realism is whether it generates hypotheses that can be supported by evidenceWaltz in Review: PSC272 Waltz in Review Social systems impose constraints; all actors are compelled to behave similarly Analogy to a competitive market The international system is anarchic Self-help Defensive balancing The number of important states and the distribution of power among them determines the constraintsBalance of Power: PSC272 Balance of Power Balances form recurrently Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: States prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions If one coalition weakens, the opposing one loosens Anticipated balancing leads to restraintSlide5: PSC272 BoP as a Reaction to a Threat: Napoleon, 1802-1815 Major Powers: FRA, UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS After French Revolution (1789), Napoleon Bonaparte rises to power. -- Consul (1802) -- Emperor of France (1804) Continues military campaigns to build empire and feed war machine. -- Poses major threat to Europe UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS form “coalitions” against FRA -- Napoleon defeated (1814) -- Congress of Vienna (1814) -- Napoleon returns (1815) -- Waterloo (1815)Slide6: PSC272 BoP as a Peaceful Equilibrium: Concert of Europe, 1815-1848 After Napoleonic Wars, Congress of Vienna continues (1815) Defeated France let back into “club” Quadruple Alliance: Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia Congresses held to attempt to resolve issues. Buffer states/territory traded. Assessing Balance of Power Hypotheses: PSC272 Assessing Balance of Power Hypotheses Balances form recurrently Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: States prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions If one coalition weakens, the opposing one loosens Anticipated balancing leads to restraintSubsidiary Hypotheses: PSC272 Subsidiary Hypotheses Socialization States emulate successful competitors Military advances: Agincourt French Revolution and mass mobilization German general staff model Organization: Market economy Nonconformist states gradually adapt Bolshevik RussiaSubsidiary Hypotheses: PSC272 Subsidiary Hypotheses Interdependence Relative gains impede cooperation Interdependence increases probability of war Economic vulnerability leads to imperialismBipolarity vs Multipolarity: PSC272 Bipolarity vs Multipolarity 1792 1815 1854 1866 1870 Napoleonic Wars Concert of Europe Crimean War Austro-Prussian War Franco-Prussian War WW I WW II 1914 1939 Multipolar loose, shifting alliances, Britain as balancer four or five Great Powers 1945 1990 Cold War—or “Long Peace” Bipolar (two Great Powers, tight blocs) ? (“peaceful”)Bipolarity vs Multipolarity: PSC272 Bipolarity vs Multipolarity Bipolarity is more “stable.” Why? Multipolar balancing breaks down because of uncertainty Bipolar internal balancing Multipolar external balancing States can maximize/accrue power in two ways: Cold War 19th Century EuropeBipolarity vs Multipolarity: PSC272 Bipolarity vs Multipolarity Internal balancing is more reliable External balancing can give rise to miscalculations that lead to general war Large influence of small allies Deterrence fails because there is an incentive to defect from commitments As numbers grow, strategic complexity grows geometrically Uncertainty is the leading cause of warStructural Theories: WWI: Structural Theories: WWI Multipolar System Abandoning an ally invites one’s own destruction In a moment of crisis, the weaker or more adventurous party (Austria) is likely to determine its side’s policy Its partners (Germany) can afford neither to let the weaker member be defeated nor to advertise their disunity by failing to back a venture even while deploring its risksStructural Theories: WWI: Structural Theories: WWI Balance of Power The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance were approximately balanced The defeat of any great power would give the opposing coalition a decisive advantage in the overall European balance of power Britain entered the war to prevent Germany from upsetting the balance of power on the continentStructural Theories: WWI: Structural Theories: WWI Alliance System The establishment of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance divided the European powers into two camps While seen as a form of self-protection, the alliances also had the potential to escalate small crises into major wars When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, this brought Serbia’s ally Russia into the war, which brought Germany, France, and Britain into the warAssessing hypotheses about multipolarity in WWI: PSC272 Assessing hypotheses about multipolarity in WWI External balancing can give rise to miscalculations that lead to general war Large influence of small allies Deterrence fails because there is an incentive to defect from commitments Admittedly, an unfair testStrengths of Structural Realism: Strengths of Structural Realism Parsimony Focus on systemic effects Power is defined as capabilities (non-tautological) Explanatory power is in the constraints, not in the preferences Collective action Probabilistic predictions