StratTac06 Trachtenberg

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THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: Past, Present, and Prospective Presentation to AIAA Strategic and Tactical Missiles Conference David J. Trachtenberg Vice President CACI-NSR, Inc. 31 January 2006 Note: The views represented here are those of the briefer and not those of CACI International or CACI-NSR, Inc.

What Is the Nuclear Posture Review?: 

What Is the Nuclear Posture Review? Mandated by Congress in FY 2001 NDAA A broad-based strategic review An effort to explain the nature of the dynamic security environment An attempt to match military means with strategic ends A rationale for tailoring our deterrent to contemporary threats U.S. Nuclear Policy Cannot Be Based on Bluff – To Be Effective, It Must Be Credible

The “ABCs” of the NPR: 

The “ABCs” of the NPR The global security environment has changed Russia no longer an enemy; not an immediate threat Future relationship with China uncertain Regional nuclear tensions (e.g., Iran/Israel; India/Pakistan) Rogue states seek WMD capabilities U.S. strategic capabilities must be transformed Deterrence increasingly uncertain against rogue states that may not act “rationally” (as we define it); Cold War approach no longer appropriate Nuclear weapons still necessary to deterrence, but not sufficient Broader range of strategic capabilities necessary Advanced non-nuclear strike Missile defenses Robust infrastructure Improved C2, intelligence, and adaptive planning Nuclear weapons remain vital to U.S. security strategy Smaller arsenal reflects change in security environment Nuclear weapons support assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, defense Nuclear and non-nuclear capability gaps reduce credibility of deterrence

NPR Future Contingencies: 

NPR Future Contingencies Immediate Contingencies Well-recognized, current dangers Examples include Soviet threat in Cold War, WMD attack on U.S. forces or allies Potential Contingencies Plausible, but not immediate dangers Timely warning can be expected Examples include emergence of hostile coalition, re-emergence of hostile peer competitor Unexpected Contingencies Sudden, unpredicted challenge Examples include unanticipated regime change, surprise WMD acquisition by hostile group Dealing with uncertainty is the greatest challenge

Policy Guidance: 

Policy Guidance Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for capabilities-based approach: Replace Cold War Strategic Triad with “New Triad,” including greater emphasis on advanced conventional systems and deployment of missile defenses Reduce strategic nuclear forces consistent with security requirements and changes in security environment Maintain maximum flexibility (i.e., “Responsive Capability”) to respond to changes or technological surprise

The New Triad: 

The New Triad

Implementation Path: 

Implementation Path

New Triad Capabilities: 

New Triad Capabilities Nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities ICBMs Bombers SLBMs Advanced strike capabilities (e.g., new delivery vehicles and conventional precision munitions) Defenses Active and passive (incl. missile defense) Responsive Infrastructure e.g., test readiness, pit facility C2, Intelligence, Adaptive Planning

Defense Policy Goals: 

Defense Policy Goals Assure allies and friends U.S. security guarantees must be credible U.S. nuclear capability must be second-to-none Active defenses protect allies and friends and forward deployed forces Dissuade competitors Broad spectrum of capabilities reduces incentive to compete Advanced non-nuclear capabilities maintain U.S. advantages U.S. strategic edge maintained by robust infrastructure

Defense Policy Goals (2): 

Defense Policy Goals (2) Deter aggressors Tailored deterrent based on portfolio of capabilities Defenses discourage attack by complicating adversary plans Robust infrastructure helps U.S. maintain technological edge Defeat enemies Broad capabilities provide flexible options Defenses protect should deterrence fail Rapid response assured by enhanced C2, intelligence, and adaptive planning

Critical Problems: 

Critical Problems Little public knowledge of the NPR and New Triad Document remains classified Little public domain information; most articles negative Requires turning Cold War theories on their head e.g., stability, MAD, etc. Limited public understanding of national security policies and relevance to contemporary security threats Nuclear strategy considered a Cold War academic discipline Congressional understanding and interest minimal Lack of comprehension regarding relevance of nuclear weapons in global war on terror Budget austerity, other priorities lead to atrophy of nuclear capabilities Belief that these are weapons that will never be used Bureaucratic impediments e.g., Service priorities Lack of understanding, experience, and support among senior decision-makers and military officials Organizational issues Process for generating sustained support for NPR initiatives within DOD requires adaptation

Some NPR “Myths”: 

Some NPR “Myths” According to critics, the NPR: Rejects deterrence Blurs the distinction between conventional and nuclear forces Places greater emphasis on nuclear weapons Makes nuclear weapons more useable Calls for new nuclear weapons and nuclear testing Lowers the nuclear threshold Spurs nuclear proliferation Supports nuclear preemption NPR critics use Cold War logic to challenge its findings

Some NPR Facts: 

Some NPR Facts The NPR validates deterrence, it does not repudiate it It rejects the Cold War “balance of terror” philosophy Because deterrence is increasingly uncertain, we need new tools to strengthen it The NPR’s “New Triad” is intended to provide those tools The New Triad would provide a wide spectrum of capabilities to better tailor deterrent strategies to more diverse threats This includes nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive and defensive capabilities The NPR keeps the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons intact It does not revise procedures for nuclear release authority It preserves the firewall between nuclear and conventional systems The NPR downgrades the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy It supports reductions in nuclear forces to the levels of the Moscow Treaty It advocates improvements in conventional and defensive capabilities

Some NPR Facts (con’t.): 

Some NPR Facts (con’t.) The NPR sees nuclear weapons as important for deterrence, not warfighting Deterrence rests on having credible capabilities Current nuclear capabilities were designed for a different adversary in a different era Existing nuclear capabilities are inappropriate to today’s threats Hence, their deterrent effect is questionable Modern nuclear capabilities, tailored to today’s threats, would be a more credible deterrent Lower yield nuclear weapons may be critical to deterrence because of their ability to hold targets at risk that cannot be defeated with current capabilities The NPR does not lower the nuclear threshold or make nuclear weapons more useable The decision to use nuclear weapons – of any yield – remains fraught with significant consequences The nuclear threshold remains as high as always The NPR seeks to deter nuclear proliferation, not accelerate it Nations act in their own self interest U.S. nuclear disarmament may provoke proliferation as enemies seek an equal footing with the United States and friends seek to compensate for loss of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” Rogue states see benefits in acquiring nuclear weapons, regardless of U.S. actions

Status of NPR Implementation: 

Status of NPR Implementation Policy and Guidance NSPDs, SecDef guidance, etc. Implementation actions Budgets and Programs FY05 and FY06 results, POM process Nuclear drawdown New Triad capabilities Congressional Action Statutory direction Opposition concerns Issues and Impediments Implementation Challenges

Conclusion: 

Conclusion The NPR is not well understood Public commentary, Congressional interest lacking NPR Implementation is in jeopardy Lack of senior-level attention; competition for scarce resources; belief that nuclear weapons less relevant to today’s challenges Opposition to modernizing our nuclear capabilities will leave us with a deterrent that is: Structured for Cold War threats Insufficient for deterring today’s challenges Increasingly seen as not credible Based on “bluff”

Solutions: 

Solutions Public Education Speaking, writing, and setting the record straight on the NPR Organized Activities, e.g.: AIAA Conferences U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum Commission on the Implementation of the New Strategic Posture of the United States Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities Top-Level Leadership Need to overcome bureaucratic and organizational impediments to understanding need for U.S. nuclear deterrent