Senate Radicalization

Radicalization of European Jihadi Networks: 

1 Radicalization of European Jihadi Networks Marc Sageman sageman@post.harvard.edu

Methodology of Research: 

2 Methodology of Research Emphasis is on application of scientific method to terrorism studies: Evidence based terrorism research Open source data, open to peer review & criticism Analysis of data, using rules of the scientific method What is happening on the ground, and not exclusively based on an interpretation of what leaders say or write

Interim Results: 

3 Interim Results Specific threat to the U.S. Started with 9/11 Perpetrators as index sample Identified terrorists & networks operationally linked to above 400 biographies of terrorists: Open Source information Trial transcripts Press accounts (Open Source Center) Academic publications Internet (corroborated)

Global Salafi Jihad: 

4 Global Salafi Jihad Violent Islamist born-again social movement Idealistic young people seeking glory by trying to build a better world View themselves as heroes fighting for justice & fairness Crisis of value: Salafi virtue v. Western decadence & greed Utopia modeled on community of the Prophet & his companions (Salaf) Four phases: Peaceful capture of the state Against the near enemy Global expansion of defensive jihad Global offense against the far enemy Expel the West from the Middle East Use of violence against non-Muslim governments or population to establish an Islamist state

Evolution of al Qaeda: 

5 Evolution of al Qaeda Three processes of self-selection of the most militants: 1988-9: the most militants, who had come to fight the anti-Soviet jihad & could not go home, stayed behind and formed al Qaeda 1991-2: the most militants expelled from Pakistan went to Sudan Switch of strategy from “near enemy” to “far enemy” 1996: 150 militants expelled from Sudan returned to Afghanistan 1996-2001: Golden age of al Qaeda: Control of “Golden Chain:” exclusive funding for terrorism Control of training camps & provision of shelter Staff for planning & coordination Afghanistan, as failed state, has little ability to control al Qaeda Al Qaeda controlled social movement & focused it on “far enemy”

Poverty?: Family of origin (SES): 

6 Poverty?: Family of origin (SES)

Islam?: Devotion as youth: 

7 Islam?: Devotion as youth

Madrassa?: Educational background: 

8 Madrassa?: Educational background

Naïve teenagers?: Age at joining: 

9 Naïve teenagers?: Age at joining Average Age: 25.69

Ignorance?: Levels of education: 

10 Ignorance?: Levels of education

Religious?: Type of education: 

11 Religious?: Type of education

Lack of opportunity?: Occupation: 

12 Lack of opportunity?: Occupation

No sex?: Marital status: 

13 No sex?: Marital status

No responsibility?: Family status: 

14 No responsibility?: Family status

Just bad?: Criminal background: 

15 Just bad?: Criminal background

Criminal Background: 

16 Criminal Background Vast Majority: no crime Some major crime Robbery (Roubaix gang, Kelkal gang, JI) Drugs (Madrid, Strasbourg) Petty crime: Maghreb logistic cells Credit card fraud, false documents, insurance fraud Drug traffic (more common now) ASPD eliminated Those least likely to do harm individually are most able to do so collectively.

Simply mad?: Mental health: 

17 Simply mad?: Mental health Very little evidence of mental illness Very little evidence of personality disorder No narcissism (willingness to sacrifice for the comrade & cause) No pathological hatred Very little trauma in family studied: usually overprotected youths Overall, “good kids,” except second generation Maghreb Arabs, who lived life of petty crime

Place where they joined jihad: 

18 Place where they joined jihad

Diaspora: 

19 Diaspora Global Salafi Jihad is a Diaspora phenomenon Expatriate + Second/Third Generation 84% of Global Salafi Mujahedin have joined the jihad, while living in a Diaspora (87% in Western Europe) Link between terrorism & Diaspora predated “globalization” & not specific to religion or Islam Anarchists, IRA, LTTE, ETA

Joining the Jihad: 

20 Joining the Jihad Friendship (pre-existing): 68% “Bunch of guys” collectively deciding to join Joining childhood friends Kinship: 20% Fathers, brothers, first cousins Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement friendship bonds

Trajectory of Muslim expatriates: 

21 Trajectory of Muslim expatriates Upwardly & geographically mobile (“best & brightest”) Religious, caring & middle class families Global citizens: 3 or 4 languages, skilled in IT Sent to university in the West Separated from traditional bonds & culture Homesick, lonely, marginalized & excluded from society Adopt Western lifestyle, without relief Seek friends Drift to mosques for companionship, not religion Move in together (halal food), formed cliques

Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants: 

22 Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants Two main paths Second generation in the West Young economic immigrants to the West Upwardly mobile, & completely secular background Discriminated by & excluded from society Drop out of school Turn to petty crime & drugs Form gangs Resentful & reactive activation of collective identity Collectively drift to religion to escape situation Radicalized collectively Personal experience resonate with Salafi ideology

Mobilization: 

23 Mobilization Spontaneously self-organized “bunches of guys” of trusted friends, from the bottom up No top down Al Qaeda recruitment program Self-selection: 15% of volunteers accepted No brainwashing: acquire beliefs of their friends No recruiter: total proselytizing environment, constant mutual recruitment Social bonds came before ideological commitment

Progressive Motivation : 

24 Progressive Motivation Innocuous participation with ever closer set of friends Increased commitment in born-again movement Importance of specific script 12 mosques generated 50% of sample Faith & commitment grounded in intense group dynamics Gradual development of collective identity (vanguard) Attraction of heroic jihadi pathway Gradual slide into violence In-group love: self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause Out-group hate: experience of discrimination & exclusion Endorse takfir doctrine  sanctions crime v. society

Group Dynamics: 

25 Group Dynamics Explanation in normal group dynamics, rather than individual mental pathology Group acts as interactive “echo chamber,” leading to escalation, & overcoming inertia & fatalism Once in the movement, difficult to abandon it without betraying close friends & family This natural & intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists

Radicalization: 

26 Radicalization Idealistic young people chasing dreams of glory (cause & comrades) Bottom up process of radical group formation Four major factors: Sense of moral outrage, activating Muslim identity Interpreted through specific ideology Resonates with personal experience Mobilized through networks

Moral Outrage: 

27 Moral Outrage Political in nature Major moral violation (killings, injury, arrests…) Usually anger, not personal humiliation Images of global horrors (TV or Internet) Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq Local personal experience Above horrors are part of larger issue that affects people personally EUR > U.S.

Ideological Relevance: 

28 Ideological Relevance Perceptions (“frames”) are crucial intervening variables Crisis of values (Western decadence v. Salafi virtue) Most relevant in Muslim countries trying to emulate the West EUR> U.S. Greater cultural rejection of outsiders National essence v. Melting Pot Myths of national essence excludes outsiders Countries built on immigration more accepting of outsiders Lack of European Dream v. American Dream Discrimination v. “land of opportunity” European collectivism v. American Individualism Individuals less prone to collective hostility to host population Grass-root voluntarism v. lack of governmental action Exclusion & discrimination in EUR interpreted as “War on Islam”

Resonance with Personal Experience: 

29 Resonance with Personal Experience Local structural grievances: EUR >> U.S.  War on Islam Historical Socio-economic Different immigrant population (unskilled v. skilled) Labor markets Welfare policies Leisure time (boredom) v. necessity of working Social rigidity v. grass root voluntarism Political Failure of top down integration policy Lack of alternative expression of social protest Reaction to Xenophobic Right Religious US tolerance of religious fundamentalism (defuses escalation) Salafi supply of religious alternatives: jihadi models of heroism

Mobilization through Networks: 

30 Mobilization through Networks Face to Face groups: Gangs of young Muslims Segmented patterns of immigration France: Oran (Kelkal Gang…) Montreal: Algiers (Fateh Kamel Group) Madrid: Tetuan (3/11 Group) Britain: Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir (7/7, Plane Plot) Amsterdam: Al-Hoceima (Hofstad Group) Radical Muslim Student Associations Germany, U.S., Britain (active student social life) Study groups around radical mosques Al Quds, Finsbury Park, M-30, Lukmanul Hakiem… Virtual groups: Interactive chat-rooms (Osage)

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Why no CONUS attacks since 9/11?: 

32 Why no CONUS attacks since 9/11? Mobilization is bottom up: EUR > U.S. EUR: 340 M people & 12-20 M Muslims U.S.: 300 M people & 3-6 M Muslims Expected # arrests (terrorism): EUR = 3-4 x U.S. Actual # arrests (terrorism): thousand v. dozens, > 10 to 1 ratio Canada & Australia are intermediary Culture ~ to U.S., but social system ~ EUR No sleeper cells in U.S. Threat comes from outside, so far, mostly from Europe Good deterrence at borders (very few attempts at penetration) Good law enforcement Elimination of any inside threat

Continued Evolution: 

33 Continued Evolution Success of Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism campaign Elimination of sanctuary, funding, communication & key leaders Increased worldwide vigilance Neutralization of al Qaeda proper (except for British Fx links) Physical break up of formal global Salafi jihad networks Same dynamics (self organized groups) but no more linkage Homegrown phenomenon (decentralized, loosely linked networks) Lack of strategic leadership & restraints (more aggressive & reckless) Local autonomy, self-financing & self-training Informal communications, difficult to monitor Fuzzy boundaries: no formal initiation or fixed numbers

Toward a Leaderless Jihad: 

34 Toward a Leaderless Jihad Gradual evolution from face to face to online interactions Especially in Europe, with 90% Internet penetration Militant young people in Middle East & Asia are online Growing importance of the Internet Social transformation of jihad (younger members & women) Interactivity of chat-rooms is critical factor People change their mind thru discussions with friends & family, not by reading impersonal stories (interactivity) Jihadi chat-rooms are Enemy Center of Gravity Virtual “invisible hand” organizing terrorists operations: C2 Links networks into global social movement Provides ideological guidance & uniting vision True leader of jihad: collective discourse on jihadi chat-rooms Ideological battleground