Network Centric Operations (NCO) Case Study: Stryker Brigade Stability and Support Operations in Iraq: Network Centric Operations (NCO) Case Study: Stryker Brigade Stability and Support Operations in Iraq 23 March 2006


Bottom Line: “Networked Forces Outfight Non-Networked Forces” “…it allowed us to make decisions and execute those decisions faster than any opponent.” Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, OIF 23 April 03 Bottom Line


Study Objectives: Study Objectives The Stryker Bde - a new force design that utilizes An information-centric concept of operations First generation NCO capabilities Interim mobile networks and satellite communications evolving battle command systems RSTA Vehicle speed and stealth NCO capabilities are hypothesized to provide significant information and decision superiority and increase force effectiveness The objective of this study is to understand whether Stryker Bde NCO capabilities provide the above and are a source of combat power


Outline: Outline Phase I study Study Context Mission Capability Package (MCP) Network Unit comparison, Scenario and Quality of Information Speed of Command, Self Synchronization and Observations Phase II study Summary


Phase I Study Context: Phase I Study Context Operational Environment Small Scale Contingency (SSC) Early Entry Operations in a rapid response/deployment scenario Analysis focus: Certification Exercise (CERTEX) for U.S. Army Stryker Bde Combat Team (SBCT) Joint Readiness Training Center, May 2003 Scenario: SBCT Attack on Shughart-Gordon Baseline for comparison Non-digitized light infantry brigade Measurable results and differences: Measures of Mission Effectiveness (MOEs): Force Effectiveness, Survivability Measures of C2 effectiveness: Quality of Situation Awareness, Speed of Command, Quality of Decisions, Force Synchronization


Outline: Outline Phase I study Study Context Mission Capability Package (MCP) Network Unit comparison, Scenario and Quality of Information Speed of Command, Self Synchronization and Observations Phase II study Summary


Stryker Brigade NCW MCP Overview: Stryker Brigade NCW MCP Overview 4th ID: Added network and ABCS to existing DTLOM concepts SBCT: Changed DTLOM concepts to exploit “digital” systems


Outline: Outline Phase I study Study Context Mission Capability Package (MCP) Network Unit comparison, Scenario and Quality of Information Speed of Command, Self Synchronization and Observations Phase II study Summary


The SBCT Network is Heterogeneous: The SBCT Network is Heterogeneous Digital Network Ready Nodes: 75% or more of Stryker Bde Combat Vehicles Were Network Ready


Outline: Outline Phase I study Study Context Mission Capability Package (MCP) Network Unit comparison, Scenario and Quality of Information Speed of Command, Self Synchronization and Observations Phase II study Summary


Stryker Brigade Overview: Stryker Brigade Overview


Organizational Structure Comparison : Organizational Structure Comparison Lt Inf Bde Stryker Bde OPCON or DS to Lt Inf Bde at JRTC. Organic Units Organic Units OPCON or DS to Lt Inf Bde at JRTC. Stryker units all organic except for Aviation Stryker Bde - approximately 700 More “Boots and Eyes on the Ground” Stryker Bde - significantly more reconnaissance capability Stryker Bde MI Company - significant analysis and HUMINT capability.


Scenario - Enemy Situation: Scenario - Enemy Situation Realistic, Contemporary, Challenging Enemy Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) Conventional Threats: Unconventional Threats: Irregular Threats: Criminal Organizations harass civilians. Civilians on the Battlefield International Media Presence


Scenario - Friendly SituationSmall Scale Contingency: Scenario - Friendly Situation Small Scale Contingency SBCT On-Going Tasks Secure FOB to deploy follow-on forces Attack in zone to defeat enemy insurgents. Provide Force Protection to local civil authorities Conduct Stability and Support Operations (SASO) to maintain popular support Attack to seize OBJ Blaze (Shughart-Gordon). Transition control of SHUGHART-GORDON to civil authorities. Defend to defeat enemy mechanized attack. NCO capabilities enable conduct of simultaneous, independent operations in non-contiguous areas.


Improved Shared Awareness & Understanding: Improved Shared Awareness & Understanding Lt Inf Bde Each leader must estimate own & enemy locations. Verbal spot reports are sent via FM radio. Each leader monitors own & higher command radio nets – no post/retrieve capability. TOC or Commander occasionally issues an integrated situation report. Each leader holds a poorly maintained map. There is no COP. Result: Very low level of shared awareness & understanding. Stryker Bde Common Operational Picture easily facilitates Shared Awareness Shared Understanding is much improved but still requires analysis and trained, experienced judgment


Outline: Outline Phase I study Study Context Mission Capability Package (MCP) Network Unit comparison, Scenario and Quality of Information Speed of Command, Self Synchronization and Observations Phase II study Summary


Improved Speed of Command: Improved Speed of Command DAY 1 1200 1800 2400 0600 1200 1800 2400 DAY 2 DAY 3 0600 1200 1800 2400 0600 1200 1800 DAY 4 IN BN Attacks (Planned) Stryker Bde Lt Inf Bde Receive the Mission Receive the Mission IN BN Attacks Begin Recon (Bn Scouts) 42 hours of reconnaissance by 1/4 less ISR capability 1 Brigade OPORD (Selects COA) Lt Inf Bde Cdr decides based on poor information & situational awareness. (“Command Push”) 3


Improved Self-Synchronization & Tempo INF BN CDR Decides to Attack early to maintain Fast Tempo: Improved Self-Synchronization & Tempo INF BN CDR Decides to Attack early to maintain Fast Tempo RSTA identified enemy forces in the disruption zone and OBJ Blaze Infantry Battalion Commander on Self-Synchronization: “I could see [on the COP] the lead Bn had accomplished its mission early. I moved up our attack time to maintain momentum.” Rapidly bypassed enemy forces in the disruption zone and isolated OBJ Blaze to prevent enemy surprise and engagement main effort Planned: Attack 250400 MAY 03 Executed: Attacked 241500 MAY 03 13 Hours Early Tempo: Attack covered 25 km and seized 20 buildings in 6 hours.


Better Decision Options: Better Decision Options Lt Inf Bde Selected COA before gaining some situational awareness, made contact, developed the situation Rarely gained shared understanding of enemy defense Enemy forces retained the initiative; friendly forces continued to fight the plan Enemy forces massed effects of combat power to defeat the Brigade in detail. (Mission Failure) Stryker Bde See First: High quality situational awareness Understand First: Collaborative sense-making and planning – Shared Understanding - determination of enemy weak weakness Act First: Self-Synchronization, Agile forces seized the initiative, achieved surprise, and maintained tempo Finish Decisively: Destroyed enemy forces and cleared every building. (Mission Success) Enemy has Information & Decision Advantage Stryker Brigade has Information & Decision Advantage INF BN CDR: “We had a great read by RSTA confirmed by UAV. We selected the best avenues to attack the least defended areas.”


Observations (Phase I): Observations (Phase I) The Stryker Bde is significantly more agile and capable than its closest predecessor – a non-digitized light infantry brigade Several NCW factors contribute to order of magnitude increase in SBCT force effectiveness 75% of SBCT has networked battle command systems High bandwidth beyond line of sight (B-LOS) SATCOM links Increase in individual/shared information quality from about 10% to ~ 80% Acceleration of speed of command from 24 to 3 hrs in key engagement Ability to control speed of command Key results from recent SBCT CERTEX at JRTC: Accomplished Mission, Defeated OPFOR, Cleared Every Building Friendly:Enemy casualty ratio decreased from 10:1 to 1:1 Current results may underestimate future potential Current Stryker network based on legacy LOS comms at the lowest tactical level JTRS and future SATCOM programs will increase networking capabilities significantly


Outline: Outline Phase I study Study Context Mission Capability Package (MCP) Network Unit comparision, Scenario and Quality of Information Speed of Command and self synchronization Observations Phase II study Summary


Slide22: “…we are a 4,500-person combat unit uniquely tailored to apply enhanced situational awareness that allows leaders to decide when, where and how to engage and destroy the enemy.” Capt Paul Carron, Stryker Brigade, Mosul, Iraq Washington Times, Feb 12, 2005 Stryker Brigade Combat Team: … insights from Current Operations in Iraq


Outline: Outline Phase I Study Phase II Study Phase II Study Context Preliminary Findings Post Major Combat Operations Operational Environment Comparison of Stryker and the 101st ABD Initial Research Results Mission Effectiveness – Real World Example Summary


Study Context: Study Context Operational Environment SASO for a large AOR in Iraq (3-2 SBCT) Active insurgent and terrorist forces Asymmetric threat Analysis focus: Lessons Learned for U.S. Army Stryker Bde Combat Team (SBCT), Operations in Iraq Baseline for comparison 101st Airborne division – responsible for same AOR prior to 3-2 SBCT Had BFT, ABCS, but not FBCB2


Outline: Outline Phase I Study Phase II Study Phase II Study Context Preliminary Findings Post Major Combat Operations Operational Environment Comparison of Stryker and the 101st ABD Initial Research Results Mission Effectiveness – Real World Example Summary


SBCT Performed Well, But There Are Opportunities for Improvement (1): SBCT Performed Well, But There Are Opportunities for Improvement (1) Combined materiel and non-materiel NCO improvements to achieve significantly better Blue force situation awareness and understanding Performed SASO over an area 15 times larger than defined in doctrine 3/2 SBCT used as a theater rapid response force Used advanced tactics drawing on improved Blue force situation awareness Accelerated planning on the move, dynamic force re-tasking, swarming, expanded convoys, rapid force movements


SBCT Performed Well, But There Are Opportunities for Improvement (2): SBCT Performed Well, But There Are Opportunities for Improvement (2) Although difficult to assess mission effectiveness in stability operations, the 3/2 SBCT casualty rate was significantly lower than the 101st ABD, even while insurgent attacks increased Factor of 6 reduction in average monthly casualty rate Almost a factor of 2 reduction in the “per soldier” casualty rate between units


Outline: Outline Phase I Study Phase II Study Phase II Study Context Preliminary Findings Post Major Combat Operations Operational Environment Comparison of Stryker and the 101st ABD Initial Research Results Mission Effectiveness – Real World Example Summary


Iraqi Insurgency Lies Predominantly in the Sunni “Triangle”*: Iraqi Insurgency Lies Predominantly in the Sunni “Triangle”*


Characteristics of the Insurgency: Characteristics of the Insurgency Multi-dimensional with multiple factions and leadership Dedicated core of hardcore elements Baathist party regulars… Recruited members from society at large Many in it for the money High Iraqi unemployment rate Foreign fighters, members of transnational terrorist networks All elements can hide in large civilian population, cross porous borders Insurgents Typically have the element of surprise during attacks Are networked – cell phones, satellite phones, internet… Have established effective means to exploit western and Middle Eastern media


Outline: Outline Phase I Study Phase II Study Phase II Study Context Preliminary Findings Post Major Combat Operations Operational Environment Comparison of Stryker and the 101st ABD Initial Research Results Mission Effectiveness – Real World Example Summary


Organizational Structure Comparison : Organizational Structure Comparison 101st Airborne Division 3-2 SBCT Significant reductions in Aviation and MP support from 101st ABD to 3/2 SBCT 101st ABD had over 100 UH-60 helos available 3/2 SBCT initially had only 4 UH-60s, and eventually only 10 UH-60s Conversely, 3-2 SBCT had over 600 Stryker vehicles available


Unit AOs, Resources, Troop Levels and Tactical Networking Capabilities: Unit AOs, Resources, Troop Levels and Tactical Networking Capabilities *AO size according to SBCT O&O: 2500 km2 Factor with a relative advantage Factor with a relative disadvantage


Outline: Outline Phase I Study Phase II Study Phase II Study Context Preliminary Findings Post Major Combat Operations Operational Environment Comparison of Stryker and the 101st ABD Initial Research Results Mission Effectiveness – Real World Example Summary


Quality of Information Differences for SASO Between the 3/2 SBCT and the 101st ABD: Quality of Information Differences for SASO Between the 3/2 SBCT and the 101st ABD Stryker demonstrated the ability to swarm due to increased information For cordon and search, convoy, and humanitarian assistance operations, SBCT consistently had significantly higher quality Blue force information For same, SBCT had marginally but consistently higher quality information on the enemy SBCT had lower quality information on Iraq police and religious leaders and sites, we believe because of smaller number of MPs and chaplains and non-digital connectivity to MPs.


3-2 SBCT Demonstrated Increased Speed of Command and Improved Agility: 3-2 SBCT Demonstrated Increased Speed of Command and Improved Agility Ability to receive digital orders and graphics significantly reduced planning and briefing cycles, improving operational tempo Reliable friendly force SA and communications allowed units to be effectively re-tasked during operations, allowing for more effective responses SBCT units conducted “swarming” - at right time, dispersed SBCT units would “swarm”, executing missions described on previously distributed graphics – allowed for element of surprise Conventional SBCT Planning / Briefing Planning / Briefing Conduct Preplanned Operation Unable to respond to significant event Opposing force can detect operation “Patrol” Respond to event Can respond to significant event Swarm SBCT achieves surprise Time


Outline: Outline Phase I Study Phase II Study Phase II Study Context Preliminary Findings Post Major Combat Operations Operational Environment Comparison of Stryker and the 101st ABD Initial Research Results Mission Effectiveness – Real World Example Summary


A Case for Comparison: The Battle of Mogadishu: A Case for Comparison: The Battle of Mogadishu Operation Gothic Serpent: On October 3, 1993 US intelligence indicated that Habr Gidr clan leaders were holding a meeting near the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu. The primary targets were Omar Salad & Mohammed Hassan Awale, both senior figures in Aidid’s regime US Force: 19 aircraft (MH-60 Black Hawk; AH-6 & MH-6 “little bird”) 12 vehicles (Humvees & trucks) 160 soldiers (mix of Delta Force & Rangers) Ad hoc Response Force (AHRF) Mixture of US, Malaysian, Pakistani Forces 60 vehicles ( mixture of Tanks, APVs) Air support (AH-1 & UH-60 copters) Communications and navigational systems Voice communications Paper maps


Timeline for the Battle of Mogadishu: Timeline for the Battle of Mogadishu


Observations on the Battle of Mogadishu: Observations on the Battle of Mogadishu Total Mission Casualties: Using voice comms and paper maps US and AHRF Forces: Unable to consistently locate and follow designated routes, and locate crash sites and surrounding units Unable to communicate effectively Units not on same communications channels; had to funnel all communications back through JSOTF HQ Did not have contingency plans for multinational rescue missions Initial US force inadequate armor and firepower Lightly armed helicopters, Humvees, and trucks


A Similar Case for the 3-2 SBCT:“They Weren’t Going to Get This Bird”: A Similar Case for the 3-2 SBCT: “They Weren’t Going to Get This Bird” 4 Sep 2004, 0850: Iraqi insurgents shoot down a Kiowa Warrior helicopter near 5-20’s Scout Platoon and B Company Scout Platoon leader: “The thing that goes through your mind is them jumping on the Kiowa dancing around and executing the pilot…” In the next three hours, SBCT soldiers would face “the most complex and potentially deadly firefight I have ever witnessed” (5-20 SBCT commander) In the end, despite the AIF having the advantage of surprise— Kiowa helicopter and pilots recovered No friendly force soldiers killed, 5 wounded 110 enemy force killed, 17 wounded


Timeline of Tall Afar Engagement: Timeline of Tall Afar Engagement 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200 Kiowa Warrior shot down Scout Platoon arrives, secures crash site 5-20 CDR meets with Scout platoon CDR; orders Bravo company to crash site Bravo company consolidated near crash site B Company CDR orders troops to take surrounding buildings after JDAM blast JDAM drops; B Company takes buildings Local police department directs locals to “protect the mosque from coalition forces” C Company arrives to recover Kiowa Warrior F-16 strafes area, ending 60mm mortar fire 1130: SBCT soldiers move out with Kiowa Warrior Source: Army Times 5-20 CDR sees downed helicopters position on FBCB2, makes radio contact with pilots 5-20 CDR hears that two F-16s are available for CAS UAV shows ~60 insurgents moving towards crash site US Movements Insurgent Disinformation Helicopter Crashes Key:


Observations on Tall Afar Engagement: Observations on Tall Afar Engagement SBCT in Tal Afar able to effectively direct CAS to targets In contrast with the Battle of Mogadishu: SBCT soldiers capitalized on significantly better situational awareness In first minutes, able to identify location of crash, direct forces to correct location first units arrive a few minutes Did have advantage that some SBCT units saw OH-58 crash Maintained knowledge of units’ positions throughout– able to adjust as needed SBCT maintained seamless communications and navigation throughout, even to airborne ISR assets – not possible in Mogadishu FBCB2/EPLRS, FBCB2/BFT, electronic maps, etc. SBCT soldiers performed as if they had rehearsed for rescue mission Scout Platoon able to secure crash site quickly B Company able to gain ground, conduct operations effectively in the midst of very heavy fire (small arms, RPGS, mortars) C Company – “I can’t believe how prepared they were to recover this aircraft. It looked like they had rehearsed” (5-20 CDR) Increase in Blue force survivability not all due to NCO capabilities SBCT had more armor than initial Ranger/SOF teams in Mogadishu Larger insurgent force in Mogadishu (>1000), although size of force (~ 200?) a surprise in Tal Afar


Outline: Outline Phase I Study Phase II Study Phase II Study Context Preliminary Findings Post Major Combat Operations Operational Environment Comparison of Stryker and the 101st ABD Initial Research Results Mission Effectiveness – Real World Example Summary


Observations (Phase II): Performed SASO over a division sized AO 15 times larger than doctrinally defined area Combined materiel and non-materiel NCO capabilities to achieve significantly better Blue force awareness and understanding SBCT used advanced tactics enabled by high quality Blue force situation awareness 3/2 SBCT used as a theater rapid response force Although difficult to assess mission effectiveness in SASO, 3/2 SBCT had a significantly lower casualty rate than the 101st ABD, even while the insurgency was increasing Factor of 6 reduction in monthly casualty rate Observations (Phase II)


Overall Summary: Overall Summary We found the Stryker brigade with its NCO capabilities demonstrated an order of magnitude increase in its combat power in a training environment (JRTC CERTEX 2003). In addition, we found the Stryker brigade performed well in the more complex, asymmetric threat environment in Iraq (3/2 SBCT and 1/25 SBCT rotations in OIF 2003-2005) For the full realization of the potential of network-centric capabilities, it is essential that the organizational structure and changes to command and control processes are redesigned to enable more flexible and rapid response to the opportunities afforded in an increased level of situation awareness that NCO provides


Slide47: Question


Slide48: Office of Force Transformation Office of the Secretary of Defense www.oft.osd.mil COL Bob Ballew Transformation Strategist Office of Force Transformation Office of the Secretary of Defense (703) 696-5716 robert.ballew@osd.mil


Slide49: Back-up


Comparison of Traditional and New Operational Concepts: Comparison of Traditional and New Operational Concepts Lt Inf Bde Stryker Bde* Stryker Bde commanders endeavor to exploit NCW capabilities to make more effective use of mission orders, reconnaissance-pull operations, and self-synchronization guided by the Commander’s Intent. Mission Orders Detailed Orders Recon Pull Command Push Self-Synchronization IAW CDR Intent Pre-Planned Synchronization * Central goals articulated in Stryker Bde doctrine


Stryker Brigade Concept of Operations: Stryker Brigade Concept of Operations Decision Point: Select AO Grizzly North or South as the axis of advance for main attack? Concept of Operations is predicated on NCO capabilities (high quality information and shared awareness) MCS Screen Shot Day before the Attack


When the OPFOR Wins the Fight for Information: When the OPFOR Wins the Fight for Information Enemy Information Superiority Enemy wins recon battle Enemy makes better decisions faster Enemy has the maneuver advantage Enemy synchronizes greater effects Limited Accurate Information about the Enemy Limited Decision Options: Poor Situational Awareness forces the Brigade to attack blind, make contact, and develop the situation.


When Friendly Forces Win the Fight for Information: When Friendly Forces Win the Fight for Information Friendly Information Superiority SBCT wins recon battle SBCT makes better decisions faster SBCT has the maneuver advantage SBCT synchronizes greater effects Isolated Areas that lack Accurate Information about the Enemy This level of Situational Awareness was achieved by human eyes in the Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) and confirmed by UAV.


Stryker Brigade NCW Hypothesis: Stryker Brigade NCW Hypothesis The Stryker Brigade’s new organizational structure, battle command and networking capabilities, and evolving operational concepts: Improve information quality Which improves interactions and collaboration Which improves shared awareness and understanding Which Provides the commander with better decision options Enables better control of speed of command Together, these make the force more agile and better able to exploit other force capabilities to increase combat effectiveness. Army Concept: See First, Understand First, Act First, Finish Decisively


Quality of Individual & Shared Information: Quality of Individual & Shared Information (1) Sources: BN CDR during the Shughart-Gordon Attack and LTC in the OE Control Group with 24 rotations as a JRTC OC. Quality of Information achieved after 60 hours of reconnaissance before a deliberate attack at Shughart-Gordon. Quality of Information varies over time and depends on the mission.


Improved Mission Accomplishment and Operational Concept Validation: Improved Mission Accomplishment and Operational Concept Validation Survey Responses from SBCT Operational Evaluation at JRTC *Source: JRTC OC Comments from SBCT JRTC Operational Evaluation Mission Success “Rate your unit’s ability to successfully accomplish the missions encountered during this rotation.”


Information Quality – Cordon and Search: Information Quality – Cordon and Search Survey Question 2.1. We want to know about the quality of information that was available to you during the preparation stage of cordon & search/knock and raid missions. How would you rate the information you had about the following things in the left-hand column of the table? 3-2 SBCT had significantly higher Quality of Information on Blue and Red forces than 101st ABD. N=15 N=14 N = Number of Respondents


Information Quality – Convoy Missions: Information Quality – Convoy Missions Survey Question 2.4. We want to know about the quality of information that was available to you during the preparation stage of convoy missions. How would you rate the information you had about the following things in the left-hand column of the table? 3-2 SBCT had significantly higher Quality of Information on Blue and Red forces, IED types, positions, and TTPs than 101st ABD. N=15 N=14 N = Number of Respondents


Quality of Interactions, Shared Awareness and Shared Understanding: Quality of Interactions, Shared Awareness and Shared Understanding Survey Question 3.1. We want to know about the quality of the interactions between soldiers, as well as with non-military leaders. We also want to know about the ability of these groups to collaborate and develop a shared understanding. How would you rate the effectiveness of coordination and collaboration between the groups listed in the left-hand column of the table to create a good, shared situational understanding? Key (x-axis): 1= Coordination and collaboration with higher echelons 2= Coordination and collaboration within your echelon 3= Coordination and collaboration with lower echelons 4= Coordination and collaboration with non-military leaders Scale (y-axis): 1 = Very poor (0-15% of required) 2 = Poor (16-39% of required) 3 = Fair (40-59% of required) 4 = Good (60-84% of required) 5 = Very good (85-100% of required) N/A = Did not coordinate with this group N = Number of Respondents N=15 N=14


Slide60: “…and why is this important to us? Because we've seen the power in Iraq and in Afghanistan of network centricity. We've seen the power of what happens when you have a Stryker brigade. You know, we took a battalion task force out of Mosul back in April. It did a 420-mile move, fought a battle in Baqouba, entered battle in Najaf, maintained total situational awareness, planned on the move, and did it all in 48 hours. That is huge operational agility. And it's because of the situational awareness and because of the network centricity and because of the speed of those platforms that allowed that to take place.” General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Speech to Heritage Foundation, 7 December 2004 Stryker Brigade Combat Team: …insights from Current Operations in Iraq


Caveats: Caveats N=1 Many factors contributed to increased force effectiveness: It is not possible to isolate or quantify the contribution of each factor based on existing data. There is synergy between physical mobility & command agility. The NCW factors were necessary conditions to achieve the increase in force effectiveness. NCW Factors Quality of Battle Command Network Quality of Information (BDE RSTA) Quality of Interactions & Collaboration Quality of Shared Awareness & Understanding Non-NCW Factors Vehicle mobility, protection, and firepower Personnel stabilization and training


US Military Fatalities Since March 19 2003- Theater-Wide: US Military Fatalities Since March 19 2003- Theater-Wide 101st ABD SASO 3/2 SBCT SASO 1/25 SBCT SASO 3/2 SBCT SASO in Sumarra Najaf Uprising Buildup to Fallujah Fallujah Iraqi Elections


Time Line of Significant Events for Mosul AO: SAMARRA Ops (Nov.-Dec. 2003) COORDINATED ATTACKS (April 9, 2004) Out of Area Ops (April 2004) Stryker Ops (Sept. 2004) SUICIDE BOMBER Mosul FOB Mess Hall (Dec. 2004) 2nd BATTLE OF FALLUJA (Nov. 2004) Insurgents Flee to Mosul area, … May ‘03 Nov ‘03 Nov ‘04 101st ABD 3/2 SBCT 1/25 SBCT Time Line of Significant Events for Mosul AO Capture of Uday and Qusay Hussien (July 2003) Numerous HVT Capture Ops Counter VBIED Ops Mosul (March 2005) May ‘05 Tactical Operations analyzed in following slides TAL AFAR OH 58 Shoot down/Recovery