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PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS & THREATS OF TERRORISM HOW GRAVE IS THE DANGER?: 

PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS & THREATS OF TERRORISM HOW GRAVE IS THE DANGER?

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM INTRODUCTION THE ISSUE NUCLEAR TERRORISM DEFINING THE THREAT THREAT SCENARIOS CONCERNS OVER NUCLEAR SECURITY HOW DOES PAKISTAN LOOK AT THE ISSUE GROUND REALITIES CONCLUSION

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Dangers emerge from: terrorists’ acquisition of nuclear weapons or sabotage thereof, dirty bombs, RDDs, and radiation hazards caused by sabotage/attack on a nuclear facility or a transport vehicle. Potential for nuclear/radiological terrorism rises from inter-related factors: global terrorism which does not recognize any boundaries, regional tensions and non-resolution of core disputes, hegemonic policies and threatening sovereignty of smaller countries, growth of nuclear arsenal and induction of new weapons.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Two prong strategy needed; fighting terrorism/extremism and securing nuclear weapons, material and other radiation sources. Revitalizing existing multilateral mechanism, regimes and treaties for their contribution to prevent terrorist activities. Creating comprehensive legal framework and national and international measures to control, and account for all sensitive materials, particularly the loosely controlled fissile material in certain countries. Enhancing capacity of states to implement their treaty obligations. Some steps are:-

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM “A large information gap and general lack of official communication about the Pakistan nuclear program had led to a snowballing effect of worry about the issues of safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, technology, and materials” Director General Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM 438 NPPs, 250 nuclear fuel cycle plants, more than 10,000 teletherapy sources, several tons of thousands industrial radiography sources – 1855 metric tons of plutonium (1700 tons in civil stocks 155 tons in military), 1900 tons of HEU (175 tons in civil and 1725 tons military) – enough for 100,000 nuclear weapons. Pakistan possesses 0.884 out the total world stock of 3870 tones. Defining the Threat More than 130 research reactors still use HEU. Most of these facilities have a very modest security – in many cases, no more than a night watchman and a chain link fence.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Potential Threats Emerge From Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom reports – Nuclear attack would be among the most difficult types of attacks for terrorists to accomplish. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by theft Creation of nuclear explosive device using stolen nuc material Use of radiological sources in RDD Attack/sabotage against nuclear facility or transport vehicle Steve Coll suggests, “The available evidence, then, suggests that while jihadi leaders might like to acquire a proper fission weapon, their pragmatic plans seem to run to dirty bombs – a more plausible ambition”

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Significant security lapses have occurred in many nuclear weapons programs. In 1996, the Russian General Alexander Lebed claimed that 40 of these so called suitcase weapons were unaccounted for. Defining the Threat There are unconfirmed reports of small, fully built Russian nuclear weapons going missing.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Defining the Threat Reports of theft and unauthorized removal of radioactive materials in other countries as well. In some cases the material involved highly radio active isotopes. Although Pakistan has put in place effective remedies to prevent recurrence of past malpractice, no nation can be satisfied as improvement is a continuous phenomenon. Reports of safety and security failures in many developed countries emphasize the need for constant improvement.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Improvement in technology and globalization have widened security parameters, threats and corresponding approach to deal with today’s realities. Potential nuclear terrorism threat can be shaped into any possible scenario including its use within or out side Pakistan. DG IAEA stated, “In the 20th Century, the advent of airplanes, submarines, ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction began to undermine this approach to security – by making borders increasingly porous and by enabling the remote delivery of destruction on a scale previously not envisioned”. Threat Scenarios

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Threat Scenarios Manifestation of threat scenario would involve:- Outsider threat Insider threat Insider/outsider threat

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Concerns Over Nuclear Security of Pakistan Theft of nuclear weapon or weapon-grade material Vulnerability during war time, movement, and deployment Control by extremist elements Worries that experts from the nuclear complex could steal sensitive information or assist programs of other countries or terrorist groups. Sabotage on nuclear facility or NPPs Accidental or unauthorized launch

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM How does Pakistan Look at the Issue Reasons leading to suspicions are:- Legacy of A.Q Khan’s proliferation network Proximity to region where Al Qaeda and Taliban remnant are located Conservatism in some segments of society Instances of illicit trafficking of nuclear material and loss of control over nuclear assets in other countries should not be made the basis to raise suspicions over Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM How does Pakistan Look at the Issue Disregard to Pakistan’s security concerns Technology denial regimes “The United States failed to prevent Pakistan from building nuclear weapons because US officials never fully grasped Pakistan’s perception of its security situation relative to India, especially after the 1971 Bangladesh War” Feroz Hassan Khan, Naval Post Graduate School

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM How does Pakistan Look at the Issue Pretext of non-state actors for preemption or prevention undermines state sovereignty and violates Article 51 of the UN Charter. “This reversion to realpolitik combined with the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapon terrorism, continued regional instability and the existence of revisionist powers in various security complexes increases the potential for instability the world over” “Although such responses appear possible in theory, their implementation could be extremely difficult and dangerous” David Albright Strategizing preemptive or preventive use of force against nuclear facilities/weapons has potentially dangerous consequences for security, stability, and peace.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Renewed strategic partnership with US and frontline role in the global war against terrorism elevate dangers to sensitive materials The geo-political environment and maintenance of strategic stability present other challenges No reported case of security failure subsequent of the AQ Khan’s case.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Theft of Nuclear Weapon or Fissile Material States closely guard their nuclear assets. Road blocks for fabricating a nuclear device:- Relevant knowledge and expertise Requisite equipment and material A huge engineering and industrial structure States’ security apparatus Manufacturing a suitable delivery mechanism Diagnostic and test facilities Pakistan’s strategic organizations are in the public sector. Smaller size of nuclear assets decreases the chances of theft vis-à-vis a larger stockpile.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Theft of Nuclear Weapon or Fissile Material To prevent theft nuclear facilities employ a range of protection measures. “Fissile material components (pits) are thought to be kept separately from the rest of the warhead. Such a physical separation helps deter unauthorized use and complicates theft” CRS Report on Nuclear Threat Reduction for India and Pakistan – February 2005 Separate storage of nuclear and non-nuclear components would greatly complicate seizure of intact device All safeguarded facilities regularly inspected by IAEA experts Pakistan is a state party to CPPNM, CNS, has elaborate legal framework to ensure implementation of UNSCR-1540

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Vulnerability during Movement and Deployment Security during peace time at its best. During crisis force deployment becomes necessary – not for offensive intent but for just-in-case probabilities. Geographical contiguity place the two countries into an awkward state. Both India and Pakistan lack real time warning and surveillance capabilities. This raises the chances for faulty or imperfect decisions. Level of security procedurally rises during crisis and war like situations – implied dangers also get pronounced.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Vulnerability during Movement and War Time Deployment Adequate measures are taken by the strategic forces for defense against ground and aerial threats. For regional stability India and Pakistan should establish a regime of restraint, crisis management, and risk reduction. Pakistan has initiated a Composite Dialogue Process with India. This process needs expansion to bring in more transparency and confidence. Pakistan has incorporated technical safety features into weapon designs to ensure safety and security during peace, movement/deployment and crisis conditions.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Accidental/Unauthorized Launch Given the absence of a comprehensive crisis management system between India and Pakistan, accidental or unauthorized launch can result in imperfect decision. Pakistan nuclear weapons are in de-mated status – technical design features supplement safety against accidental/unauthorized launch. This is a matter of nuclear safety, as well as physical security to ensure positive control.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Accidental/Unauthorized Launch Both India and Pakistan face nuclear command and control challenges somewhat similar to US and FSU during early decades of Cold War. “Pakistani nuclear controls include some functional equivalent to the two-men rule and Permissive Action Links that the US and some other nuclear weapon states rely on to protect against loss of control, inadvertent weapon use, accidents, and other mishaps” Director General Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division Security set up arranged since the beginning has been reinforced since 1998 nuclear tests.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Theft of Nuclear Material and Radiological Sources The level of security at nuclear facilities containing sensitive material is believed to be high, security of industrial radiation sources, medical, agriculture, engineering etc is comparatively weak in many countries. Security ensured through periodic physical verification and regulatory inspections. All the radioactive sources are under strict regulatory control right from import until their disposal. PNRA controls, regulates, and supervises all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection in Pakistan.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Theft of Nuclear Material and Radiological Sources PNRA has initiated a five year Nuclear Security Action Plan The plan aims at establishing a more robust nuclear security regime. Seeks capacity building to plan for, respond to, and recover from terrorists’ incidents. Main features are:- Management of radioactive sources in category 1, 2 and 3, and evaluation of vulnerable facilities and supporting their efforts Establish Nuclear Safety/Security Center Establish National Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Center Locating and securing orphan radioactive sources Provision of detection equipment at strategic points

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup The fear of Islamist threat has influenced most Western countries foreign policies towards Pakistan. Overwhelming majority of Pakistani society consists of moderates. Religious parties are politically oriented and there is no rhetoric for Islamic bomb. Analogy based on conservatism in some segment of the society and presence of Taliban sympathizers in remote areas of NWFP/North & South Waziristan.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup “No one else’s bomb is called Hindu, Jewish, Christian, capitalist, or communist, yet somehow our bomb becomes “Islamic”, as if that makes it illegitimate. The idea is illogical and essentially racist. This is an example of how Muslims continually feel unjustly singled out and alienated” President Pervez Musharraf’’s Memoir, “In the Line of Fire”

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup Religious parties’ electoral support historically varied between 5-8%, trailing far behind other parties. Security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations or its nuclear command and control mechanism has never been in jeopardy from internal political instability or Islamists or terrorists forces inside Pakistan. Thus far no report of theft involving nuclear material – neither any attempt by extremist/terrorist group to gain access to sensitive materials in Pakistan

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup Scott Parrish & William C. Potter of the WMD Commission say, “As a result, while many states may view Islamic fundamentalism as a significant threat, there appears to be much less agreement on the nature of that threat and its relationship to nuclear terrorism or proliferation” Frightening thinking that extremists in military will stage a coup and seize control, is an overstretch. An institutional mechanism exists to control all strategic assets irrespective of whosoever is in power.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Sabotage and Concern Over Proliferation by Nuclear Establishment Sabotage and proliferation relate to reliability and trustworthiness of scientists, technicians, and others who work in nuclear establishment. Creation of NCA, PNRA, Security Division, Strategic Force Command, promulgation of laws, setting up a system of monitoring, supervision and auditing are some of the steps to meet potential challenges. Not a single case of leakage of nuclear material, components or technology has come up since the creation of NCA. Most recently the government has approved creation of Strategic Export Control Division.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Ground Realities Sabotage and Concern Over Proliferation by Nuclear Establishment PRP cover periodic security clearance, screening, recruitment, training of security personnel etc. All Civil NPPs under facility specific IAEA safeguards.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Priority Areas for Pakistan-US Cooperation Assistance in expanding PRP. Strengthen institutional capacity for crisis management and consequence management. For regional stability India and Pakistan should evolve a strategic restraint regime covering both nuclear and conventional forces.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Priority Areas for Pakistan-US Cooperation Carry forward the ongoing Composite Dialogue Process Establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Extend existing agreement on pre-notification of ballistic missile testing to cruise missiles. An agreement not to produce and deploy tactical nuclear weapons. Lay out comprehensive procedures for authorized use. Establish a procedure to deal with false warnings. Launcher and warhead separation to mutually agreed geographical locations. Move towards conflict resolution. Keep the communication channels open during peace as well as crisis situations.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM Priority Areas for Pakistan-US Cooperation At international level negotiating a non-discriminatory and universal treaty on preventing non-state actors’ access to WMD and components thereof. Alternatively existing treaty regime could be strengthened specifically against threats of nuclear terrorism. There is a need to de-link the issues of nuclear safety from nuclear proliferation and redefine the non-proliferation regime in a more realistic manner. Promote twinning between various agencies of the two countries.

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM: 

SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS OF TERRORISM CONCLUSION

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