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A Linear Analysis of Blowfish and Khufu : A Linear Analysis of Blowfish and Khufu
Jorge Nakahara Jr
Unisantos, Brazil
jorge_nakahara@yahoo.com.br
Outline : Outline The Khufu and Blowfish Block Ciphers
Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear Attacks on Blowfish
Linear Attacks on Khufu
Conclusions
The Khufu Block Cipher : The Khufu Block Cipher Block cipher with Feistel Network structure
Designed by R.C.Merkle in 1989
64-bit blocks (plaintext/ciphertext)
Variable-length key: up to 512 bits
8r rounds (1≤ r ≤ 8), where r is called octet (originally r = 2 was suggested)
One key-dependent 8x32-bit S-box per octet
The Khufu Block Cipher : The Khufu Block Cipher
The Blowfish Block Cipher : The Blowfish Block Cipher Cipher with Feistel Network structure
Designed by B. Schneier in 1993
64-bit blocks (plaintext/ciphertext)
Variable-length key: 32 bits up to 448 bits
16 rounds
Key-dependent 8x32-bit S-boxes and a P-table
The Blowfish Block Cipher : The Blowfish Block Cipher
Linear Cryptanalysis : Linear Cryptanalysis Developed by Mitsuru Matsui (Mitsubishi Corp.)
Initially applied against DES (1990), FEAL-4 and FEAL-8 (1989)
Known-plaintext (KP) attack setting
Distinguisher tool: linear relation involving plaintext, key and ciphertext bits with non-uniform parity (away from ½)
(nonzero) bias of linear relations
Linear Cryptanalysis : Linear Cryptanalysis number of known-plaintexts for high success rate attack is proportional to bias-2
general attack technique (applied to block and stream ciphers)
variant techniques: differential-linear, multiple linear relations, linear hulls
Linear Attacks on Blowfish : Linear Attacks on Blowfish - unlike previous DC, our LC attacks do not require the S-boxes to be non-injective mappings
- 8x32-bit S-boxes are key-dependent, but always non-surjective mappings
we exploit linear relations of the form 0 across the S-boxes, where is a non-zero bit mask.
we choose = 1 due to mixing of modular addition and exclusive-or in the round function,
Linear Attacks on Blowfish : Linear Attacks on Blowfish exploit the least significant bit positions (to avoid decreasing the bias due to carry and borrow bits)
extend linear relations to full rounds, and to multiple rounds: iterative linear relations
we have found 2-round iterative linear relations
construction of the linear distinguishers was heavily influenced by the design of Blowfish
Linear Attacks on Blowfish : Linear Attacks on Blowfish we derive one-bit of information on the key-dependent P-table:
(L0 + L2t).1 = (P1 + P2 + ...+ P2t+1).1
(R0 + R2t).1 = (P2 + P4 + ...+ P2t).1
where (Li, Ri) are the left and right halves of the
i-th round block, and + is xor.
Linear Attacks on Blowfish : Linear Attacks on Blowfish the bias of linear relations depends on the key since the four S-boxes are key-dependent: weak (user) keys
Linear Attacks on Khufu : Linear Attacks on Khufu 8x32-bit key-dependent S-boxes
again, S-boxes are non-surjective: the bit mask has the form 0, with non-zero
bit-rotation in each round is by a multiple of 8 bits
this fact inspired rotation-invariant bit masks: <<< 8t =
Linear Attacks on Khufu : Linear Attacks on Khufu thus, the masks do not change if they are rotated by 8-bit amounts (in either direction)
more precisely, = mmmm, m *256
we have looked for iterative linear relations
we have found 2-round and 8-round iterative linear relations for rotation-symmetric masks
Linear Attacks on Khufu : Linear Attacks on Khufu
Linear Attacks on Khufu : Linear Attacks on Khufu ciphertext-only (CO) attacks: exploit linear relations of the form 80000000x, 00800000x, .... 80808080x and assuming the plaintext is ASCII text.
CO attack is possible because of exclusive-or (diffusion is poor!)
Conclusions : Conclusions linear attacks on Blowfish and Khufu
weak-key assumption (distinct from DC attack assumption)
old, known attack technique on old ciphers,
but new and better (known-plaintext and ciphertext-only) results, compared to previous attacks (DC, ID) that worked in a chosen-plaintext setting.
Conclusions : Conclusions
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