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Premium member Presentation Transcript Slide1: Lesson 15 The Impact of Logistics on War: Napoleon Invades RussiaSlide2: Lesson Objectives • Define "logistics" and begin to understand its importance in modern war. • Begin to understand the magnitude of the support required to keep an army in the field during the early 19th century. • Be able to discuss Napoleon's campaign objectives for the Russian campaign of 1812. • Understand the factors that contributed to the French defeat in Russia. • Attempt to comprehend the magnitude of the disaster that befell the French army in Russia. Slide3: Logistics Case Study The Russian Campaign of 1812 Slide4: Situation to 1812Slide5: Continental System 1806 Berlin Decree (November 21,1806) Initiated economic war against Britain Driven by French frustration at not being able to engage British forces on land or defeat them at sea Milan Decree (1807) strengthened enforcement • Prohibited countries under his control from trading with Britain • All European countries prohibited from trading with BritainSlide6: Fifth Coalition 1809 Britain, Austria Slide7: Napoleonic WarsSlide8: Russian Campaign Why did Napoleon attack Russia? Strategic Objectives 1812Slide9: Russian Campaign Napoleon frustration with Russian rejection of Continental System Strategic Objectives 1812Slide10: Strategic Objectives "I have come to finish off, once and for all, the Colossus of Northern Barbarism. The sword is drawn. They must be thrust back into their snow and ice, so that for a quarter of a century at least they will not be able to interfere with civilied [sic] Europe." With Napoleon in Russia: The Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza (From the original memoirs as edited by Jean Hanoteau. Abridged, edited, and with an introduction by George Libaire) (1935 William Morrow & Co. New York). Quoted in: Richard Orsinger “France During the French Revolution and Under Napoleon Bonaparte” http://www.txdirect.net/users/rrichard/napoleo1.htm Napoleon I June 1812Slide11: Operational Objective Engage and destroy the Russian army just inside the border • No intention to go on to Moscow (reported)Slide12: Chronology 1812 Crosses Nieman River into Russia Battle of Borodino • Indecisive; enormous losses, both sides Enters Moscow Begins retreat from Moscow Remnants of Grand Armée leave Russia June 23 September 7 September 14 October December 14Slide13: Russian Campaign Napoleon entered Russia with force of ~400,000 men June 1812 Napoleon left Russia with 20,000 to 45,000 men December 1812 Slide14: Napoleon Enters Russia The Grande Armée crosses the Neman River June 24, 1812 March to Moscow Britten AustinSlide15: Minard’s Graphic Charles Joseph Minard (1861) "It may well be the best statistical graphic ever drawn.“ Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 1983Slide16: The Russian CampaignSlide17: The Russian CampaignSlide18: Konigsberg to Moscow ~ 600 milesSlide19: Battle of Borodino Russian army had retreated before the French without offering significant resistance Finally established a defensive stand 125 km west of Moscow French: 125,000 - 130,000 men, 580 guns Russians: ~ 155,000 men, 640 guns Russians had built strong field fortifications to take advantage of the terrainSlide20: Battle of Borodino Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights September 7, 1812 Napoleon initiated a frontal assault into an entrenched superior forceSlide21: Battle of BorodinoSlide22: Battle of BorodinoSlide23: Battle of Borodino Storming the Great Redoubt - Borodino Slide24: Battle of Borodino “Bloodiest single day in human history.” Casualties: French 28-50,000, Russians 39-58,000 Slide25: "Among all my battles, the worst one was on Borodino field. My army showed that they deserved the Victory; and the Russian Army got the right to be called invincible." Napoleon Bonaparte Slide26: Moscow Napoleon arrived September 15, 1812 with ~100,000 menSlide27: The Retreat From MoscowSlide28: The Retreat From Moscow Napoleon Burning the EaglesSlide29: Retreat From Moscow Napoleon’s Retreat From Moscow Adolph Northern •Slide30: Retreat From Moscow In 1812 Illarion Pryanishnikov • "I have no army any more! For many days I have been marching in the midst of a mob of disbanded, disorganized men, who wander all over the countryside in search of food." Napoleon Bonaparte, 1812 Slide31: The Russian CampaignSlide32: Russian Campaign Napoleon entered Russia with force of ~400,000 men June 1812 Napoleon left Russia with 20,000 to 45,000 men December 1812 " ... the most conspicuous logistical failure in the history of warfare." Stanley L. Falk Introduction to Pure LogisticsSlide33: What Went Wrong? The Magnitude of the ProblemSlide34: Napoleon’s Challenge Entered Russia with 400,000 men 150,000 “primary” horses 120,000 supply train horses Feed ration per horse: 8 lbs. oats + 12 lbs. hay = 20 lbs/horse/day Feed for 270,000 horses = 5,400,000 lbs. = 2,700 tons/day! For one week of travel (~100 miles), fodder requirement is 19,800 tons!Slide35: Napoleon’s Challenge Put another way: Using this technologySlide36: Napoleon’s Challenge Accomplish this: Twice each week … for 100 milesSlide37: Napoleon’s Challenge Assuming only half the 120,000 provision horses were used to draw wagons, At six horses per wagon, … that would be 10,000 wagons at ~2 tons each MoreSlide38: Napoleon’s Challenge Allowing 100 ft. per wagon, that’s about 50 wagons/mile 10,000 wagons single file would stretch 200 miles! so …Slide39: What Went Wrong? Plenty of food in the storehouses Food and fodder available in the countryside … if properly requisitioned Transportation resources poorly managed • Could not provide enough wagons • Wagons available not effectively used First echelons plundered as they went • Left nothing for those who followed Returned over much the same route as ingressSlide40: This, of course, was partly due to logistics shortages.” What Went Wrong? “ …the Grande Armee’s problems were at all times, including the retreat from Moscow, largely due to bad discipline. “It would, however, be unwise to attribute this solely to the problems of supply. The need to protect enormously long lines of communication and to leave garrisons behind and the effects of distance per se were also factors of major importance.” Martin van Creveld Supplying WarSlide41: The Russian CampaignSlide42: Russian Campaign Consequences Reinforced the importance of logistics in war … one more time! Europe realized that Napoleon was not invincibleSlide43: What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? “Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of military operations, logistics the means therefore.” George Thorpe Pure LogisticsSlide44: What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? “Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point. Baron de JominiSlide45: What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? “Logistics is all or almost all of the field of military activities except combat. It is the province of not merely staffs, but also of Generals-in-Chief.” Baron de JominiSlide46: What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…” Sun TzuSlide47: So what is Logistics?Slide48: So what is Logistics? “Logistics is the ‘practical art of moving armies.’” Baron de Jomini … and more!Slide49: Logistics The art and science of managing and controlling the flow of goods, energy and information Slide50: Logistics The art and science of managing and controlling the flow of goods, energy and information • production and procurement (strategic) • transportation (operational) • distribution (tactical) • maintenance (all) Slide51: Logistics “Logistics [is] a ’distinctive branch of warfare,’ embracing a large number of activities that should be coordinated, but not confused , with tactical or strategic activities.” Stanley L. Falk, introduction to Pure Logistics by George ThorpeSlide52: Logistics “Logistics thus included the ‘preparation of all material necessary for setting the army in motion’; the drawing up of initial and subsequent orders; provision for security and reconnaissance; movement and sustenance of the troops; establishment of camps, depots, and supply lines; organization of medical services and communications; and a host of other tasks.” Stanley L. Falk, quoting Jomini in introduction to Pure Logistics by George Thorpe “Logistics, declared Jomini, ‘comprise the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics.’”Slide53: What Have People Said About Logistics Over the Ages? Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics Author UnknownSlide54: Logistics logistics - The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated TermsSlide55: The Logistician Logisticians are a sad and embittered race of men who are very much in demand in war, and who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only in facts, but must work for men who merchant in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much a fact. They disappear in peace because peace is mostly theory. The people who merchant in theories, and who employ logisticians in war and ignore them in peace, are generals. Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war and in peace, generals try to forget logisticians. Romping along beside generals are strategists and tacticians. Logisticians despise strategists and tacticians. Strategists and tacticians do not know about logisticians until they grow to become generals--which they usually do. Sometimes a logistician becomes a general. If he does, he must associate with generals whom he hates; he has a retinue of strategists and tacticians whom he despises; and, on his back, is a logistician whom he fears. This is why logisticians who become generals always have ulcers and cannot eat their ambrosia. Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war and in peace, generals try to forget logisticians. Author Unknown http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm Slide56: Russian Campaign Consequences Reinforced the importance of logistics in war … one more time! Europe realized that Napoleon was not invincible European powers saw opportunity to defeat NapoleonSlide57: Sixth Coalition 1813-1814 Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal, SwedenSlide58: Sixth Coalition 1813-1814 Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Sweden • Major French defeat at Leipzig (October 1813) • “The Battle of Nations”Slide59: Sixth Coalition 1813-1814 Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Sweden • Major French defeat at Leipzig (October 1813) • “The Battle of Nations” • 1814: France invaded • Paris surrendered March 1814Slide60: Sixth Coalition 1813-1814 Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Sweden • Major French defeat at Leipzig (October 1813) • “The Battle of Nations” • 1814: France invaded • Paris surrenders March 1814 • Napoleon abdicated, is exiled to ElbaSlide61: Lesson 16 Waterloo: End of an Empire and an EraSlide62: EndSlide63: Transportation in War "The fierce glory that plays on red, triumphant bayonets dazzles the observer; nor does he care to look behind to where, along a thousand miles of rail, road, and river, the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession. Victory is the beautiful, bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed." Winston S. Churchill The River War, 1899 … the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession.Slide64: Transportation in War “ … the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession.” Napoleonic Wars U. S. Civil WarSlide65: “ … the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession.” Spanish-American WarSlide66: “ … the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession.”Slide67: “ … the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession.”Slide68: Transportation in WarSlide69: Transportation in WarSlide70: Transportation in WarSlide71: Transportation in WarSlide72: Transportation in War You do not have the permission to view this presentation. In order to view it, please contact the author of the presentation.