AFNORTH Briefing

Briefing on Afghanistan: 

Briefing on Afghanistan Barnett R. Rubin AFNORTH 3 December 2003

I. Mission of ISAF:Security for State Building: 

I. Mission of ISAF: Security for State Building Help Afghans provide security as they build institutions to do so themselves. Effective provision of security requires: Military (ministry of defense) Police (ministry of interior) Legitimate government accountable to people Economy supplying legal livelihoods and adequate tax base

ISAF Mandate in the Bonn Agreement (Annex 1): 

ISAF Mandate in the Bonn Agreement (Annex 1) Security the responsibility of Afghans. Request international aid in “establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.” Till then, UN-mandated force for Kabul and environs, expanded elsewhere as appropriate. Parties to Bonn agree to “withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed.” Not implemented.

Security from what for what?: 

Security from what for what? Security from: Factional pressure to assure that capital is national center. External attack (Taliban, al-Qaida, Hizb-Hikmatyar) Security for: Peace implementation, e.g. for DDR Training of new security institutions

II. Land, people, nation: 

II. Land, people, nation Territory: arid, mountainous, sparsely populated People: dispersed, rural, urbanizing, with multiple sources of identity Economy: poor, agricultural-pastoral, trade, criminalized Nation: Long history, strong identity, weak institutions

Territory: Satellite View of Afghanistan: 

Territory: Satellite View of Afghanistan

Drought and Vegetation: 

Drought and Vegetation

People: Sources of Identity: 

People: Sources of Identity Family – Patrilineal, Patriarchal Qawm – solidarity group Clan/Tribe Ethnic Group Location (region, province, valley, city) Religion – Islam, Sunni/Shi’a, Sufism Party/Faction

Family and honor: 

Family and honor Patrilineal, patriarchal family is basic social unit. Creates close solidarity groups by lineage. Marriage is political and economic alliance of two lineages. Men must defend honor of family and home. Implications for searches.

Qawm: solidarity group: 

Qawm: solidarity group Many potential units, mobilized by leadership and patronage. Kinship as idiom of solidarity: inherited, created, fictive. Leaders: khan, malik. Ethnicity situational and fluid, multilayered. Institutions: shura, jirga

Approximate location of ethnic groups (National Geographic). 10 named groups.: 

Approximate location of ethnic groups (National Geographic). 10 named groups.

CNN Ethnic map (4 named groups): Beware of ethnic percentages:No census; no definition of ethnic membership; no definition of population.Hot political issue: whose Afghanistan is it?: 

CNN Ethnic map (4 named groups): Beware of ethnic percentages: No census; no definition of ethnic membership; no definition of population. Hot political issue: whose Afghanistan is it?

CIA ethnic map (11 named groups): 

CIA ethnic map (11 named groups)

BBC Ethnic map (9 named groups): 

BBC Ethnic map (9 named groups)

Islam: 

Islam Central identity Sects: Sunni/Hanafi, Shi’a, Ismaili Worship, law, Sufism Islamic politics: local alliances, national parties, ulama, shura. Islam and state: Key issue not whether state is Islamic, but who determines what is Islamic.

Major parties/factions: 

Major parties/factions No legal parties as yet. Current factions: remnants of jihad, regime militias (Jamiat, Junbesh, Shura-yi Nazar). New parties forming (Nehzat, royalists, others) Regionally based factions. Anti-regime groups: Taliban, Hizb-i Islami of Hikmatyar, al-Qa’ida (Arab and other non-Afghan)

III. State and power: 

III. State and power Descended from Pashtun tribal empire established in 1747. Pre-1978: Rule by Pashtun dynasty through ethnically mixed centralized, weak state. Last 25 years: Collapse of state Empowerment of non-Pashtun militias Formation of transnational networks Pashtun reassertion by Taliban

Centralized administration, weak state: 

Centralized administration, weak state Power centralized in executive No provincial or local governments Weak state: pre-1978 domestic revenue 6%, state expenditure 10% of GDP Balance covered by foreign aid Informal self-government at local level. Local shuras built by UN, NGOs.

Legal administrative map: 

Legal administrative map Territory divided into 32 provinces, 300+ districts. Governors, district heads appointed by center. All revenue, foreign aid belongs to center.

Rough de facto power map(omits Eastern Afghanistan): 

Rough de facto power map (omits Eastern Afghanistan) “Warlords” head ethno-regional militarized patronage networks Official positions: military/civilian Control of resources: Foreign aid Legal duties and taxes kept illegally Parallel economy

IV. International intervention and the Bonn Agreement: 

IV. International intervention and the Bonn Agreement Afghanistan on 10 Sept. 01 – Taliban vs. NA International response to 9/11/01: counter-terrorism, regime change Bonn Agreement: timetable, benchmarks Defining success in Afghanistan: building a sustainable state Back to ISAF mandate

Afghanistan on 10 Sept. 2001: 

Afghanistan on 10 Sept. 2001 Taliban Islamic Emirate controls most of country Who are Taliban? Response to warlordism after 1992 Start as Qandahari group (Deobandi mullahs) Link to Pakistan: more than an ally Pashtun reassertion Growing links to al-Qaida

Resistance to Taliban (UF/NA): 

Resistance to Taliban (UF/NA) Mostly non-Pashtun Supplied by Iran, Russia, through C. Asia US non-lethal aid, intelligence cooperation, after embassy bombings of August 1998 No effective unified command Holds UN seat, tenuous international legitimacy Dialogue with Zahir Shah in Rome

Other groups/processes: 

Other groups/processes Zahir Shah/Rome group Cyprus, Peshawar groups NGOs, civil society

US response to 9/11: 

US response to 9/11 Overthrow Taliban regime if do not give up al-Qaida leaders Arm and fund UF/NA commanders plus others (Pashtuns, e.g. Hamid Karzai) to fight with US aid through Special Forces and CIA Result on ground: revival of warlordism

Bonn Agreement (Dec. 5, 2001): 

Bonn Agreement (Dec. 5, 2001) Not a peace agreement UN mediated agreement on forming government after overthrow of Taliban Occurred after NA/Shura-yi Nazar occupation of Kabul, revival of warlords. Established legal framework for power, incorporating facts on ground.

Legal/political framework of Bonn: 

Legal/political framework of Bonn Restore 1964 constitution without king, parliament Interim administration under Karzai (6 months) Emergency Loya Jirga chooses transitional administration Constitution, elections by June 2004

Political deal of Bonn: 

Political deal of Bonn Shura-yi Nazar controls power ministries, cedes head of state to Qandahari Pashtun from Rome group Regions controlled by commanders allied with US to fight Taliban, al-Qaida, mostly NA Zahir Shah returns, opens LJ

Rough de facto power map(omits Eastern Afghanistan): 

Rough de facto power map (omits Eastern Afghanistan) “Warlords” head ethno-regional militarized patronage networks Official positions: military/civilian Control of resources: Foreign aid Legal duties and taxes kept illegally Parallel economy

Situation by theater: 

Situation by theater Kabul and national government Northeast (Shura-yi Nazar, Jamiat) East (Jalalabad – Hazrat Ali, Hajji Din Muhammad, the Kunar/Nuristan problem) Southeast: Tribal fragmentation, Taliban South: Changes in Qandahar? Taliban West: Herat – Ismail Khan vs. center North: Mazar – Dostum vs. Atta Center: Bamiyan – Khalili, excluded no more

Basic contradiction (1) of post-Bonn: counter-terror vs. peace building: 

Basic contradiction (1) of post-Bonn: counter-terror vs. peace building Counter-terror: military campaign allied with warlord militias in Pashtun areas State building: make Afghanistan permanently immune to terror by building legitimate state, removing or transforming warlords, bring Pashtun leaders into power coalition Need for Pashtun inclusion vs. empowering non-Pashtun anti-Taliban allies Control of Kabul by Fahim/Shura-yi Nazar vs. political need to demilitarize.

Basic contradiction (2) of post-Bonn: politics without state building: 

Basic contradiction (2) of post-Bonn: politics without state building ELJ: Insecurity and failure to make government more representative Effect on constitutional drafting: fear of intimidation The revival of the Taliban The impossibility of elections

Elements of state building: 

Elements of state building New security forces subject to rule of law Reform of MoD, MoI Afghan National Army (ANA) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) of existing forces Means disempowering UF/NA Establishing national control of provincial administration, revenues

Obstacles to state building: 

Obstacles to state building Weak resource base of government Ineffective administration With US military aid, warlords captured parallel economy: Drugs: leading producer of opium; half GDP Gems (emeralds, lapis lazuli) Customs, smuggling, transit trade Timber, arms, more

Poor road network: 

Poor road network

Reconstruction: delayed, nearly invisible: 

Reconstruction: delayed, nearly invisible A. Government of Afghanistan estimate of needs over five years ($15 billion). Source: "Afghanistan High Level Strategic Forum, Brussels, 17 March 2004, Chairman's Summary," http://www.af/resources/mof/adf-ahsf-artf/ahsf/AHSF%20Chairmans%20summary.pdf. B. Baseline World Bank/Asian Development Bank/UN Development Program preliminary estimate of needs over five years from ($10.2 billion). Source: World Bank, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/ ex/$File/n-ex.pdf. C. Total pledged at the International Conference for Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo, January 2002, for first five years of reconstruction ($5.2 billion), plus additional pledges by the US and others (preliminary total - $7 billion). A more accurate tally of new pledges should be available in late February, after the second pledging conference. Sources: US Government, Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA). D. Total committed as of 15 November 2003 ($5.4 billion). Source: AACA E. Total disbursed as of 15 November 2003 ($2.9 billion). Source: AACA. F. Total disbursed for reconstruction projects as of 15 November 2003 ($2.04 billion), excluding humanitarian assistance, defined as refugee/IDP aid, food, and relief commodity distribution, and coordination costs of international agencies. Source: AACA. G. Total disbursed for reconstruction projects that have begun as of 15 November 2003 ($1.8 billion). Source: AACA. H. Total expenditure on reconstruction projects that have been completed as of 15 November 2003 ($.11 billion). Source: AACA.

Current political issues: 

Current political issues Who has power? Weakening Panjsheris: MoD reform, ANA, MoI reform, DDR State building and Pashtun technocrats: UF vs. Ministries of Finance and Interior Constitution and future government Form of government and ethnic balance Rights and judiciary Islam and the state Degree of centralization

Regional environment pre-9/11: 

Regional environment pre-9/11 States Pakistan: sponsor of Taliban Iran, Russia, Tajikistan: sponsors of NA; Uzbekistan and Dostum Non-state actors, networks Pakistani parties Al-Qaida Traders, smugglers, refugees

Regional environment post-9/11: 

Regional environment post-9/11 US-coalition presence a deterrent to open regional interference Skepticism over US commitment: keeping options open Pakistan’s choice: partner or target Ally against al-Qaida Sanctuary and support for Taliban Iran: multiple tracks Russia: support for NA

US policy: reluctant nation builder: 

US policy: reluctant nation builder Two policies in conflict: DoD, State The Congressional critique Belated policy shift: accelerate success Shift from war to stabilization: coordinate military with political Double reconstruction funding Change rules of engagement on green on green Support ISAF expansion Focus on the south

ISAF: indispensable leverage for state building: 

ISAF: indispensable leverage for state building In Kabul Oversee withdrawal, DDR of Fahim’s forces Support MoI to establish security in city Establish external security, prevent infiltration In Provinces Leverage for administration change Security for DDR Security for reconstruction of administration

PRTs, ISAF expansion, reconstruction: 

PRTs, ISAF expansion, reconstruction Provincial Reconstruction Teams Origin in coalition experience Relation of security to reconstruction Inadequacy of PRTs ISAF expansion PRT/PST as unit of expansion Need for uniform mandate

ISAF PRTs, PSTs and reconstruction: 

ISAF PRTs, PSTs and reconstruction Principal mandate: stabilization under national control Provide environment for SSR and administrative reform Security for reconstruction actors Focus on civil affairs activities others can or will not do, such as building government offices, courts

Strengthen national, not necessarily central, government: 

Strengthen national, not necessarily central, government Liaison through MoI general Meet regularly with local shuras, elders, together with administration Focus on stabilization, patrolling, strengthening government response to security threats

NATO: Condemned to success: 

NATO: Condemned to success The only exit strategy: success Local support for the goals of the operation is strong Providing, deepening, and expanding security necessary to deepening and expanding peace process, state building, to provide sustainable resistance to re-establishment of terror bases