Lesson16 Italy

Lesson 16: 

Lesson 16 Italy: Sicily, Salerno, Anzio

Agenda: 

Agenda Strategic Picture Sicily Branches and Sequels http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/Brochures/72-16/72-16.htm Salerno Invading the mainland http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/naples/72-17.htm Anzio Missed Opportunity http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/anzio/72-19.htm

Italy: 

Italy On 10th June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France and four months later invaded Greece.

Allies: 

Allies US advocates for a cross channel invasion to directly attack Germany Churchill prefers an indirect approach, attacking through the “soft underbelly of Europe” Describe the American and British strategies in terms of annihilation, exhaustion, and attrition.

Casablanca ConferenceJan 1943: 

Casablanca Conference Jan 1943 Britain “the control of the Mediterranean meant… control of the Western world.” Had imperial fortunes in Egypt, the Middle East, and India Felt it was the Axis’ vulnerable point Americans “periphery pecking” would delay the cross-channel invasion that would strike the German jugular

Trident Conference May 1943: 

Trident Conference May 1943 Americans accept the strategic goal of eliminating Italy from the war but demand that the forces involved consist only of those already in the Mediterranean Americans and British also agree that planning begin for a cross channel invasion in May 1943 Doughty, 497

Sicily, 1943: 

Sicily, 1943 Branches and Sequels

Operation Husky: 

Operation Husky “It is inexcusable that high planning on an overall scale is not taking definite form. Planners should project themselves forward and set up a grand-scale strategic plan for the Allied forces. We can’t win a war by capturing islands.” General Mark Clark, Fifth Army Cdr

Eisenhower’s Mission: 

Eisenhower’s Mission “to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces” Numerous possible plans beyond Sicily were offered and discussed, but all were “reserved for future determination” Hanson Baldwin

Next Step?: 

Next Step? Sicily “was a strategic compromise conceived in dissension and born of uneasy alliance-- a child of conflicting concepts and unclear in purpose.” Hanson Baldwin “An attempt to decide upon the next objective would have revived divergences of view-- but in such matters tactful deferment is apt to result in strategic unreadiness.” B. H. Liddell Hart With the invasion less than two months away, “The Americans were still asking…, “Where do we go from here?’ and the British were still irritated by the query.” Hanson Baldwin

The failure to plan ahead: 

The failure to plan ahead “The decision to land in Sicily… [was] unaccompanied by any consideration as to further aims.” B. H. Liddell Hart Sicily “was entered upon as an end unto itself; not as a springboard for Italy or anywhere else.” Samuel Morrison “There were no decisions reached about how to exploit a victory in Sicily… It was an egregious error to leave the future unresolved. It led to misguided planning for and a cloudy conclusion to the Sicily operation and to costly mistakes beyond Sicily.” Omar Bradley

The Result: 

The Result Landing occurred with minimal resistance on 10 July “Astonishing as it seems in retrospect, there was no master plan for the conquest of Sicily. Nothing had been worked out beyond the limited beachhead objectives.” Omar Bradley On 12 July Axis forces begin withdrawing On 23 July Patton captures western tip of Sicily Alexander orders him to turn eastward toward Messina, key transit point between Sicily and the Italian mainland

The Result: 

The Result 26 July the Italian king puts Mussolini under arrest, but... It’s not until 31 July that Roosevelt and Churchill agree to a set of short armistice terms to present to the Italians 17 Aug American elements reach Messina, but… German evacuation is over by the time they get there

Branches and Sequels: 

Branches and Sequels Branches Options built into the basic plan Sequels Subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation-- victory, defeat, or stalemate How do these relate to your tactical planning?

Salerno, 1943: 

Salerno, 1943 Invading the Italian Mainland

Operation Avalanche: 

Operation Avalanche Operation Husky had exceeded Allied expectations and the Italian Army was on the verge of disintegrating Operation Avalanche was designed to seize the port of Naples and the airfields of Foggia, followed by a drive to Rome

Possibilities: 

Possibilities Shift German strength away from the Western Front. Forcing the Italian surrender would cause the Axis powers to replace them with German units. Vital airfields in Italy could be seized to further control the Mediterranean. The push in Italy would create a second front to relieve pressure on Stalin in the east.

The Plan: 

The Plan Fifth Army would land at Salerno on 9 Sept McCreery’s British X Corps in the north Dawley’s American VI Corps in the south Montgomery’s Eigth Army would cross the Straits of Messina on 3 Sept as a diversionary attack Germans had expected Allies to choose Salerno as main thrust and were not fooled by the diversion

The Invasion of Italy: 

The Invasion of Italy

Clark, Montgomery, Dawley: 

Clark, Montgomery, Dawley

Kesselring: 

Kesselring Supreme Commander "South" or O.B.S. (Oberbefehlshaber Süd)

Operational: 

Operational General Clark and both of his corps commanders had no amphibious experience prior to Salerno Both corps commanders decided to skip the pre-invasion bombardment in order to obtain tactical surprise After landing, both sides raced to obtain numerical superiority over the other

Tactical: 

Tactical Landing Phase: No surprise One Panzer Division had to defend 30-miles of beach Reinforcement race (10-13 September) 45th Division (Reserve) thrown in 82nd Airborne Division 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions 15th Panzer Grenadier Division

Tactical: 

Tactical Counterattack (13-16 September) Three Panzer and three Panzer Grenadier Divisions Main drive against VI Corps along Sele River Push Allies back to D+1 positions General Kesselring stopped by Massive naval gunfire Strategic bombers Determined Allied ground forces.

German defense centered on Monte Cassino astride the Liri, Sangro, Rapido, and Garigliano Rivers -- Major position from which to defend Rome : 

German defense centered on Monte Cassino astride the Liri, Sangro, Rapido, and Garigliano Rivers -- Major position from which to defend Rome Gustav Line

Anzio, 1944: 

Anzio, 1944 Missed Opportunity

Strategic Situation in late 1943: 

Strategic Situation in late 1943 Allies searching for a way to alleviate stalemate Campaign had stalled about 80 miles short of Rome and was beginning to resemble the trench warfare of WWI A landing at Anzio would bypass German defenses around Cassino and put the Allies just 35 miles south of Rome

Overall Guidance to Fifth Army: 

Overall Guidance to Fifth Army “Carry out an assault landing on the beaches in the vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German 14 Corps” “Cut the enemy’s main communications in the Colli Laziali (Alban Hills) area southeast of Rome, and threaten the rear of the 14 German corps” “Advantage must be taken of this… to break through his main defenses, and to ensure that the two forces join hands at the earliest possible moment” Harold Alexander, 15th Army Group commander

Planning Considerations: 

Planning Considerations Despite the relatively few German units immediately available to defend at Anzio, Fifth Army assumed that VI Corps would meet strong initial resistance on the beaches Expected the corps to receive heavy counterattacks as soon as the Germans became aware of the extent and the purpose of the operation.

Defensive Mindset: 

Defensive Mindset Lesson of having underestimated German strength at the time of the Salerno invasion had been too well learned. Fifth Army and VI Corps expected the same pattern of opposition to develop at Anzio that had come close to defeating the Allies at Salerno. The emphasis consequently turned toward defense. VI Corps was to maintain a strong reserve. Troops were to dig in on initial objectives at once to hold the beachhead against armored counterattack.

Contingencies: 

Contingencies Fifth Army expected VI Corps to be ready to do one of two things upon landing. If the enemy reacted in strength, the corps was to take the defensive and assemble reserves to meet German counterattacks. If the corps could take the offensive, it was to advance "on" the Alban Hills by one of two routes: directly up the Albano road to cut Highway 7; or by way of Cisterna and Velletri to cut not only Highway 7 but also Highway 6 near Valmontone. Whether the VI Corps assumed a defensive or offensive attitude after landing would depend on how General Lucas saw the situation and on how he decided to act.

Rome, Alban Hills, Anzio: 

Rome, Alban Hills, Anzio

Lucas’ Pessimism: 

Lucas’ Pessimism Replaced Dawley after Salerno Tired from mountain warfare in Italy; appeared dispirited and discouraged. In mid-January 1944, eight days before the Anzio landing, he turned fifty-four years old. Wrote in his diary, “I am afraid I feel every year of it.” “I must keep from thinking of the fact,” he wrote on the following day, “that my order will send these men into a desperate attack.…”

Lucas’ Pessimism: 

Lucas’ Pessimism “Unless we can get what we want [in the way of vessels], the operation becomes such a desperate undertaking that it should not, in my opinion, be attempted.” Otherwise, “a crack on the chin is certain.” Lucas would do what he was ordered to do, “but these ‘Battles of the Little Big Horn’ aren't much fun and a failure now would ruin Clark, probably kill me, and certainly prolong the war.”

Anzio: 

Anzio Allies achieved complete surprise by landing on 22 Jan 1944 Quickly established a beachhead and advanced three miles inland by midmorning against light resistance Majority of German forces were south around Cassino and could not possibly reinforce Anzio until 23 or 24 January

Initial Landing: 

Initial Landing

Immediate Success: 

Immediate Success If Allies pursed their advantage they could seize a virtually undefended Rome Instead Lucas took counsel of his fears and waited until 29 January to continue offensive operations By then the opportunity was lost Germans reinforcements has arrived in force and seized the dominating high ground in the break head area Allied drive stalled and Germans now had the initiative

Immediate Success: 

Immediate Success

Opportunity Lost: 

Opportunity Lost

Missed Opportunity: 

Missed Opportunity “On January 22 and even the following day, an audacious and enterprising formation of enemy troops… could have penetrated into the city of Rome itself without having overcome any serious opposition” Siegried Westphal, German Chief of Staff Lucas’ orders were to advance “on” the Alban Hills Did that mean “toward” or “to”? What was Alexander’s intent?

Anzio Review: 

Anzio Review Describe in terms of Command climate Commander’s intent Audacity and tempo (characteristics of the offense) Surprise and offensive (principles of war)

Homework: 

Homework Read Doughty, p. 517-526